Introduction

In this precedential opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit clarified two important points of federal civil procedure that will reverberate across district courts within the Circuit: (1) a defendant may challenge the sufficiency of a complaint after answering by filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion that courts should treat as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings; and (2) the denial of a preliminary injunction—based on an evidentiary record and the heightened standard for extraordinary relief—does not itself provide notice of pleading defects or render amendment futile.

Substantively, the court affirmed dismissal of Oxford House, Inc.’s Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) claims for failure to plausibly plead intentional discrimination (disparate treatment); it deemed disparate impact arguments forfeited because they were not briefed in the district court. But the panel vacated the district court’s denial of leave to amend and remanded for further proceedings, including consideration of Rule 16(b)(4) “good cause” and whether leave to amend should be granted sua sponte.

The dispute arose after North Bergen, New Jersey denied a Certificate of Continuing Occupancy (CCO) to a residence Oxford House leased for individuals recovering from addiction. The Township said the use violated zoning because the residence was a “Community Residence” that could not operate in a two-family dwelling. Oxford House alleged disability discrimination under the FHA and ADA. After the district court denied a preliminary injunction (and the Third Circuit affirmed that denial), Oxford House filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC). The Township—having earlier answered—moved to dismiss; the district court granted the motion with prejudice and denied further amendment. Oxford House appealed.

Summary of the Opinion

• Post-answer motions: The Third Circuit expressly held that a post-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion may be considered and should be construed as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings because the failure-to-state-a-claim defense is preserved under Rule 12(h)(2). The standard under Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) is materially the same, so no party is prejudiced.
• Pleading FHA/ADA discrimination: The court affirmed that the FAC failed to plausibly allege disparate treatment (intentional discrimination). Allegations of mere misapplication of law, the absence of similar housing in the Township, minor procedural deviations, and inconsistent explanations—without more—did not support a reasonable inference of discriminatory purpose.
• Disparate impact claim: Because Oxford House did not respond to the Township’s disparate impact arguments below, the issue was forfeited. The court did not reach the merits but recited governing pleading principles for disparate impact.
• Leave to amend: The court vacated the denial of leave to amend. It emphasized that preliminary-injunction rulings, which turn on evidence and a heightened standard, do not necessarily reveal or cure pleading deficiencies. The district court also misapprehended a filing it took to be a proposed second amended complaint. On remand, the district court must consider Rule 16(b)(4) “good cause” and whether to grant leave to amend (including sua sponte) consistent with the liberal amendment policy in civil rights cases.
• Disposition: Affirmed in part (dismissal of the FAC), vacated in part (denial of leave to amend), and remanded.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 and Leyse v. Bank of America, N.A., 804 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2015): Rule 12(h)(2) preserves a failure-to-state-a-claim defense for assertion in a Rule 12(c) motion or at trial. The panel extended the reasoning of Leyse—which permitted successive Rule 12 motions without waiving certain defenses—to the specific posture of post-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motions. District courts may entertain such motions by construing them as Rule 12(c) motions, with no change in the legal standard and no prejudice to the parties.
• Pleading standard cases: Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009); Connelly v. Lane Construction, 809 F.3d 780 (3d Cir. 2016); James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 2012); and In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997). These authorities frame the plausibility inquiry: factual content must permit a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of unlawful conduct; legal conclusions and “threadbare recitals” are insufficient.
• FHA/ADA frameworks: Community Services, Inc. v. Wind Gap Municipal Authority, 421 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2005) confirms FHA/ADA coverage of public entities and identifies three discrimination theories: disparate treatment, disparate impact, and failure to accommodate.
• Proof of discriminatory intent: Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (circumstantial multi-factor intent analysis); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden shifting for circumstantial proof); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (direct evidence paradigm); Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Furnco Construction v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978); and circuit applications such as Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2009) and Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2008). The opinion emphasizes that a plaintiff is not required at the pleading stage to elect a proof method, plead a prima facie case, or marshal Arlington Heights-type historical and procedural evidence.
• Disparate impact: Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, 849 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 2017); Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008); Texas Dep’t of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 576 U.S. 519 (2015); Stouffer v. Union R.R. Co., 85 F.4th 139 (3d Cir. 2023); Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 975 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2020); Wards Cove, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); and N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). The court catalogs the elements necessary to plead disparate impact—identification of a specific neutral policy and plausible data suggesting a statistical disparity—though it declines to apply them due to forfeiture.
• Preliminary injunction vs pleading standards: AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (extraordinary nature of preliminary injunction); Fowler, 578 F.3d at 214 (pleading standards differ from evidentiary standards). These underscore why PI denials do not automatically control Rule 12(b)(6) outcomes or amendment futility.
• Leave to amend and case management: United States ex rel. Ascolese v. Shoemaker Construction, 55 F.4th 188 (3d Cir. 2022) (abuse-of-discretion review); Premier Computer Solutions, LLC v. UPMC, 970 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2020) (Rule 16(b)(4) good cause after scheduling deadline); LabMD Inc. v. Boback, 47 F.4th 164 (3d Cir. 2022) (sua sponte leave); and Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete, 482 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2007) (liberal amendment in civil rights cases). The panel leans on these to vacate the denial of leave to amend.
• Waiver vs forfeiture: Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) and United States v. Dowdell, 70 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2023). The court corrects terminology, treating the failure to brief disparate impact below as forfeiture, not waiver.
• Other illustrative authorities: Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004) (same standard under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c)); Internet Products LLC v. LLJ Enterprises, 2020 WL 6883430 (D.N.J. 2020) (post-answer 12(b)(6) practice); Power Probe Group v. Innova Electronics, 670 F. Supp. 3d 1143 (D. Nev. 2023) (contrary district court trend elsewhere); Rollerson v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist., 6 F.4th 633 (5th Cir. 2021); Fowler v. Sitt, 104 F.4th 770 (10th Cir. 2024), cert. granted and vacated, 2025 WL 1787695 (remand in light of United States v. Skrmetti, 145 S. Ct. 1816 (2025)).

Legal Reasoning

1) Post-Answer Rule 12(b)(6) Motions Are Properly Construed as Rule 12(c)

The court dispelled confusion over whether a defendant who has already answered may subsequently challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings. Rule 12(b) states certain defenses “must” be made before a responsive pleading, but Rule 12(h)(2) preserves the failure-to-state-a-claim defense and permits it to be raised in a pleading, by Rule 12(c) motion, or at trial. Some courts have treated a post-answer Rule 12(b)(6) filing as procedurally improper. The Third Circuit expressly rejected that view and instructed district courts to treat such filings as Rule 12(c) motions. Because the legal standards under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c) are materially the same, this approach is straightforward and non-prejudicial. The court extended its prior reasoning in Leyse (allowing successive Rule 12 motions) to this context.

2) Disparate Treatment Pleading Was Insufficient

While recognizing that plaintiffs need not select a proof method at the pleading stage or plead a prima facie case, the court held the FAC did not plausibly allege discriminatory purpose under either direct evidence or circumstantial Arlington Heights-type theories.

Four pleaded themes failed to bridge the gap from possibility to plausibility:

• Misapplication of law: The Township’s classification of the proposed Oxford House as a “Community Residence” barred in a two-family dwelling might have been wrong, but a mistaken legal interpretation does not, without more, support an inference of intentional disability bias. The complaint lacked factual material suggesting the alleged misinterpretation was a pretext for animus rather than an innocent error.
• Absence of similar housing in the Township: Alleging there are no other Oxford Houses, sober living facilities, or rooming/boarding houses in North Bergen does not show discriminatory intent absent facts about comparable applications that were denied or affirmative steps taken to block such housing. An absence of such facilities, standing alone, does not make the claim plausible.
• Procedural deviation: The zoning officer’s failure to provide written reasons himself (instead conveying the reason by phone and then referring counsel’s written explanation) was a minor departure from the ordinance’s written-notice protocol. Arlington Heights recognizes procedural departures may sometimes evidence discriminatory purpose, but there must be facts linking the departure to animus or to concealing/facilitating discrimination. Those links were missing.
• Inconsistent explanations: The allegation that the zoning officer “admitted” he did not deny the CCO because the property was a “community residence,” contrasted with the attorney’s rationale, was insufficient to show pretext or animus. The FAC did not plead what the officer’s actual reason was or any facts inferring a discriminatory motive behind the inconsistency.

In short, even under the forgiving Rule 8 standard, the FAC lacked factual content that would allow a reasonable inference that disability bias motivated the CCO denial.

3) Disparate Impact: Standards Recited, Issue Forfeited

The court restated core disparate impact pleading requirements: a plaintiff must identify a specific facially neutral policy (not a one-off decision), and must allege plausible data suggesting a statistically significant disparity affecting a protected class, sufficient to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will yield methodologically sound evidence. Because Oxford House did not respond to the Township’s disparate impact arguments below, the court treated the issue as forfeited and declined to reach the merits on appeal.

4) Leave to Amend: PI Denial ≠ Pleading Notice; Futility Not Shown

The district court denied leave to amend with prejudice, reasoning that its earlier denial of a preliminary injunction—and the Third Circuit’s affirmance—provided guidance about pleading deficiencies that Oxford House failed to cure. The Third Circuit rejected that rationale as an abuse of discretion:

• Different standards: Preliminary injunction rulings rest on evidence and a heightened likelihood-of-success standard; they do not equate to or necessarily illuminate Rule 12(b)(6) pleading sufficiency. “Standards of pleading are not the same as standards of proof.”
• No prior notice of pleading defects: The earlier PI rulings did not put Oxford House on notice of specific pleading deficiencies; the first clear notice was the dismissal of the FAC itself.
• Misapprehended filing: The district court believed Oxford House had submitted a proposed second amended complaint; in fact, it was merely a redline comparing the FAC to the original complaint. Thus, the court could not have properly concluded that amendment would be futile based on that document.

Accordingly, the panel vacated the denial of leave to amend and remanded for the district court to consider Rule 16(b)(4) good cause (given the scheduling order), as well as whether to grant leave sua sponte, consistent with the Circuit’s practice of liberally allowing amendment in civil rights cases unless inequitable or futile.

Impact

On Civil Procedure in the Third Circuit

• Clear permission for post-answer challenges: Defendants who discover pleading defects after answering are not locked out from seeking dismissal. They may file a post-answer Rule 12(b)(6) motion, which the court will treat as a Rule 12(c) motion, applying the same standard. This promotes efficient resolution of legal defects without needless discovery.
• Guardrails on using PI denials to restrict amendment: District courts may not short-circuit the liberal amendment policy by labeling amendment “futile” simply because a plaintiff failed to secure a preliminary injunction. Pleading sufficiency and evidentiary sufficiency at the PI stage are distinct inquiries; a complaint that cannot justify an injunction may still state a claim.
• Case management under Rule 16(b)(4): When amendment deadlines have passed, courts must undertake a good-cause analysis before deciding whether to allow further amendments. This opinion prompts more rigorous attention to that step on remand.

On FHA/ADA Litigation Strategy

• Disparate treatment pleading: Plaintiffs should include specific facts supporting an inference of discriminatory purpose—e.g., comparator treatment, contemporaneous statements by decisionmakers, patterns of enforcement, substantive/procedural irregularities tied to animus, and sequences of events that point to disability as a motivating factor. Mere assertions of misinterpretation, administrative slippage, or lack of similar facilities will rarely suffice.
• Disparate impact pleading: Plaintiffs should identify a concrete policy (e.g., a spacing requirement, occupancy limit, categorical exclusion) and include plausible data suggesting statistical disparities affecting persons with disabilities. “One-time” permitting decisions are generally not policies for disparate-impact purposes. Failure to respond to a defendant’s arguments can forfeit the issue.
• Consider all three FHA/ADA theories: Where appropriate, plaintiffs should also assess pleading a reasonable accommodation claim. The panel noted that FHA/ADA discrimination can be shown by disparate treatment, disparate impact, or failure to accommodate; only the first two were at issue here.
• Municipal practice pointers: Municipalities should document reasons consistently and adhere to established procedures. While minor deviations may not alone imply animus, contemporaneous written rationales and consistent application of zoning/occupancy rules will reduce litigation risk and strengthen defenses.

Likely Future Use

• Defense bar: Expect more post-answer “12(b)(6)” motions styled as Rule 12(c) or treated as such, particularly after early discovery reveals pleading gaps.
• Plaintiffs’ bar: Anticipate courts granting dismissal without prejudice and affording at least one opportunity to amend, especially in civil rights cases. Plaintiffs should seize that opportunity to add Arlington Heights-type facts and any available comparator evidence.
• Judicial administration: The opinion promotes clarity and uniformity in handling post-answer motions and in keeping the PI analysis separate from Rule 12(b)(6). It should reduce procedural skirmishes about sequencing and waiver in the district courts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 12(b)(6) vs. Rule 12(c): Both ask whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. If a defendant files a “12(b)(6)” motion after answering, courts simply treat it as a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. The standard is the same; the label does not matter.
• Pleading vs. proof vs. preliminary injunction:
  • Pleading (Rule 8/12): Are there enough facts to make the claim plausible?
  • Preliminary injunction: Is there clear evidence showing a likelihood of success on the merits plus other equitable factors?
  • Proof at trial/summary judgment: Has the plaintiff produced admissible evidence sufficient to meet burdens under frameworks like Arlington Heights or McDonnell Douglas?
  A failure at the PI stage does not mean the complaint is deficient.
• Disparate treatment vs. disparate impact vs. reasonable accommodation:
  • Disparate treatment: Intentional discrimination because of disability (motive matters).
  • Disparate impact: A facially neutral policy disproportionately harms people with disabilities (statistics matter).
  • Reasonable accommodation: A refusal to make reasonable changes to rules/policies when necessary for equal use and enjoyment of housing.
• Arlington Heights factors: Courts infer intent by looking at the historical background, sequence of events, departures from normal procedures, and contemporaneous statements. Plaintiffs should plead facts aligning with these factors where available.
• Waiver vs. forfeiture: Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right; forfeiture is failing to raise an argument in time. The latter applied here to the disparate-impact claim because Oxford House did not address it in district court briefing.
• Rule 16(b)(4) “good cause”: Once a scheduling order sets an amendment deadline, a party seeking to amend after that date must show good cause—usually diligence in pursuing amendment—before the court evaluates Rule 15’s liberal amendment standard and any futility arguments.

Conclusion

Oxford House, Inc. v. Township of North Bergen cements two procedural guideposts in the Third Circuit. First, defendants may challenge pleadings after answering; district courts should entertain such motions under Rule 12(c) without elevating form over substance. Second, preliminary-injunction denials—rooted in evidentiary assessments and a heightened standard—are not a surrogate for pleading sufficiency and do not by themselves render amendment futile.

On the merits, the opinion underscores that alleging intentional disability discrimination under the FHA/ADA requires factual content supporting an inference of discriminatory purpose. Misapplication of law, the bare absence of similar facilities, modest procedural deviations, and inconsistent explanations—without connective tissue to animus—will not suffice. And plaintiffs pressing disparate impact should identify a specific policy and include plausible data suggesting a statistical disparity, while ensuring the argument is preserved.

The decision’s practical significance is substantial. It promotes efficient case-resolution by clarifying post-answer motion practice, preserves the liberal amendment ethos—especially in civil rights litigation—and refines pleading expectations for FHA/ADA claims. On remand, the district court will determine whether “good cause” exists to permit Oxford House to file a second amended complaint and, if so, whether any proposed amendments would cure the identified deficiencies. Regardless of that outcome, the Third Circuit’s procedural clarifications will guide litigants and courts well beyond this dispute.