Post-Ames Uniform Prima Facie Standard Confirmed: Sixth Circuit Affirms Summary Judgment in Howard v. Cherokee Health Systems, Reemphasizing the Honest-Belief Doctrine and Leaving “Selective Favoritism” Under Title VII Unresolved

Introduction

This commentary examines the Sixth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Jeffrey W. Howard v. Cherokee Health Systems (No. 24-5981, September 2, 2025), affirming summary judgment for the employer on Title VII sex discrimination and retaliation claims. The dispute arose when Jeffrey Howard, a decades-long Chief Financial Officer (CFO) at Cherokee Health Systems, sought to apply for the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) position upon the impending retirement of longtime CEO Dr. Dennis Freeman. After Howard indicated his interest—in conflict, according to Freeman, with assurances that he would not disrupt the planned succession—Freeman terminated him. When Howard’s counsel later sent a letter to the Board alleging sex discrimination and requesting consideration for the CEO role, the Board adhered to its internal succession plan and hired the internal clinical candidate, Dr. Parinda Khatri, without interviewing Howard.

On appeal, Howard alleged (1) sex discrimination—claiming Freeman fired him to ensure a female successor—and (2) retaliation—claiming the Board refused to consider him for CEO because he complained of sex discrimination. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment, holding that Cherokee’s reasons were non-discriminatory and non-retaliatory and that Howard failed to show pretext. Importantly, the panel applied the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services to clarify that plaintiffs from historically “majority” groups (e.g., men) are subject to the same prima facie burdens as all others—eliminating the Sixth Circuit’s prior “background circumstances” gloss for so-called “reverse discrimination” claims. The court also declined to decide a significant, still-developing question: whether favoritism toward a subset of women (e.g., “attractive” women) constitutes discrimination “because of sex” post-Bostock.

Summary of the Judgment

The court affirmed summary judgment for Cherokee Health Systems on both sex discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and parallel Tennessee law.
Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework (as clarified by Ames), the court assumed arguendo that Howard could make a prima facie case but held that Cherokee articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions and that Howard failed to demonstrate pretext.
For the termination decision, Cherokee’s reasons included Freeman’s belief that Howard reneged on assurances not to disrupt the transition, alienated leadership, and threatened organizational dissension. The court held the “honest belief” doctrine insulated this rationale from pretext attack.
For the Board’s refusal to interview or consider Howard for CEO, the court credited the internal succession plan favoring internal candidates, the Board’s trust in Freeman’s termination decision, and the search committee’s favorable interview of Khatri as legitimate non-retaliatory reasons. Temporal proximity to the complaint letter was insufficient to show pretext or but-for causation.
Key doctrinal developments acknowledged: after Ames, there is no heightened prima facie requirement for “reverse discrimination” plaintiffs; the panel left unresolved whether “selective favoritism” for a subset of women is discrimination “because of sex” post-Bostock.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Provided the burden-shifting framework for evaluating claims based on indirect evidence. The court applied this three-step process to both the discrimination and retaliation claims.
Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. 303 (2025): The Supreme Court eliminated the “reverse discrimination” extra hurdle requiring “background circumstances” evidence. The Sixth Circuit recognized Ames, explaining that all employees now share the same prima facie burden. Although the district court applied the now-repudiated rule, the panel affirmed on alternative grounds.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020): Clarified but-for causation under “because of sex.” The panel flagged that any analysis of “selective favoritism” should take Bostock’s causation logic seriously, but it declined to decide the issue here.
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998): Confirmed Title VII’s sex discrimination coverage in contexts like same-sex harassment if conduct occurs because of sex. The court used Oncale to challenge the breadth of Cherokee’s “subset favoritism” theory by analogy.
Maner v. Dignity Health, 9 F.4th 1114 (9th Cir. 2021); Schobert v. Illinois DOT, 304 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2002); DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986): These “romantic favoritism” cases generally hold that preferential treatment for paramours does not equal sex discrimination. Cherokee invoked this line to argue that favoring a subset of women isn’t discrimination “because of sex.” The Sixth Circuit expressed skepticism, especially post-Bostock, and did not adopt the proposition.
Chen v. Dow Chemical Co., 580 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2009): Articulated the “honest belief” doctrine—an employer’s honestly held belief in the stated reason can defeat pretext even if mistaken. This was critical to affirming summary judgment on the termination claim.
Vereecke v. Huron Valley School District, 609 F.3d 392 (6th Cir. 2010); Kuhn v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2013): Stand for the proposition that temporal proximity rarely suffices, by itself, to prove pretext or causation in retaliation cases. Applied to defeat Howard’s reliance on timing between his complaint letter and the Board’s decision.
Levine v. DeJoy, 64 F.4th 789 (6th Cir. 2023); Vincent v. Brewer Co., 514 F.3d 489 (6th Cir. 2007): Recited the typical prima facie elements for Title VII claims, now uniformly applicable after Ames.
Kirkland v. City of Maryville, 54 F.4th 901 (6th Cir. 2022): Provided the retaliation framework and but-for causation requirement at the pretext stage.
Adams v. Tennessee Department of Finance & Administration, 179 F. App’x 266 (6th Cir. 2006): Reinforced that Title VII does not police poor business decisions—used to underscore that even if the firing was unwise, it was not unlawful absent evidence of discriminatory motive.
Smith v. Newport Utilities, 129 F.4th 944 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited for the de novo standard of appellate review on summary judgment.
Ferguson v. Middle Tennessee State University, 451 S.W.3d 375 (Tenn. 2014): Along with Kirkland, noted that Tennessee anti-discrimination law generally tracks Title VII, allowing the court to treat the claims together.
McKinley v. Skyline Chili, Inc., 534 F. App’x 461 (6th Cir. 2013); Boykin v. Family Dollar Stores of Michigan, LLC, 3 F.4th 832 (6th Cir. 2021): Addressed the limits of testimony lacking personal knowledge—used to discount a board member’s speculation about Freeman’s motives.

Legal Reasoning

1) Sex Discrimination

The panel proceeded under the McDonnell Douglas framework, assuming without deciding that Howard could meet the prima facie case (and noting Ames’s elimination of any special, heightened burden for male plaintiffs). The employer’s articulated legitimate reason was that Freeman honestly believed Howard had pledged not to disrupt the transition and then did so by seeking the CEO role, thereby alienating leadership and risking organizational dissension. The termination letter and contemporaneous notes documented those reasons.

Pretext was the central battleground. The court found multiple facts undermining any inference that sex was the real reason:

Freeman’s initial preferred successor was a man (Joel Hornberger). If Freeman were biased toward appointing a woman, this choice would make little sense.
Freeman later expressed a preference for a clinician as CEO; Khatri was a clinician; Howard was not. This professional-qualification shift supplied a non-sex-based criterion.
Howard himself had earlier recommended Khatri and wrote that he was “probably not the best choice,” suggesting merit-driven decision-making rather than sex bias.

Against this record, the court emphasized the “honest belief” doctrine: even if Howard never promised not to apply, it was dispositive that Freeman honestly believed he had and acted on that belief. Without evidence of differential treatment tied to sex, or proof that the stated reasons were false and a cover, the pretext showing failed.

The court addressed—but did not resolve—Cherokee’s broader theory that Title VII is not implicated when a supervisor prefers a subset of women (e.g., “attractive” women), analogizing to the “paramour preference” cases. The panel flagged serious concern that, under Oncale and Bostock, targeting only certain women for favorable or unfavorable treatment could still be “because of sex,” and it declined to rest its decision on that controversial ground. This leaves the Sixth Circuit’s position on “selective favoritism” post-Bostock open for future cases.

2) Retaliation

Turning to the refusal to interview or consider Howard for CEO following his counsel’s complaint letter, the court again moved to the latter steps of McDonnell Douglas. The Board had legitimate non-retaliatory reasons:

Howard had just been terminated for cause, and the Board chair testified that the Board trusted Freeman’s judgment on that personnel action.
The succession plan prioritized internal candidates; after Howard’s termination, Khatri was the only internal candidate who remained interested, and the search committee was impressed with her following the interview.

On pretext and causation, temporal proximity of roughly two months was not enough—especially given that interviewing a recently fired executive for the top role would be incongruous with the termination decision the Board had no reason (on this record) to distrust. A Board member’s email suggesting that interviewing Howard could strengthen his belief that termination was wrongful reflected a preference to avoid revisiting a “for cause” firing, not a desire to punish protected activity. That member was not a decision-maker on the search committee in any event. The chair’s email proposing to consider Khatri first adhered to the succession plan’s instruction to give “strong consideration” to internal candidates; the record showed no deviation from policy indicating pretext.

Impact

Ames cemented: Practitioners should treat the reverse-discrimination “background circumstances” requirement as defunct. Male plaintiffs proceed under the same prima facie standard as everyone else in the Sixth Circuit. District courts relying on the old rule risk reversal unless the decision can be affirmed on other grounds.
Pretext remains the fulcrum: This case underscores how contemporaneous documentation, witness concessions, and clear business rationales—particularly those aligning with preexisting succession plans—can defeat pretext claims.
Honest-belief doctrine is robust: Even if an employer’s factual premise is debatable, a well-documented and genuinely held belief will often carry the day absent evidence of discriminatory animus.
Temporal proximity is rarely sufficient: Retaliation plaintiffs need affirmative evidence linking the protected activity to the adverse action beyond timing, such as statements, deviations from policy, or shifting explanations.
Open question on “selective favoritism”: The panel’s refusal to decide whether favoritism toward a subset of women is actionable post-Bostock signals an important developing frontier. Litigants should frame such claims with Bostock’s but-for logic, Oncale’s breadth, and evidence showing that the plaintiff’s sex was a determinative factor in the differential treatment, even if the supposed preference targets only some women.
Succession plans and internal-candidate preferences: Boards may rely on established succession policies without incurring retaliation liability, provided those policies are applied consistently and not as a post hoc justification to avoid protected employees.
Nonprecedential but informative: Although “Not Recommended for Publication,” the opinion offers practical guidance on how courts will apply Ames, the honest-belief doctrine, and McDonnell Douglas in executive-level employment disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Title VII sex discrimination: Prohibits adverse employment actions taken “because of sex.” The plaintiff must show the employer’s stated reason is a cover (pretext) for discrimination.
Title VII retaliation: Prohibits punishing an employee for opposing or reporting unlawful discrimination. The plaintiff must show the protected activity was a but-for cause of the adverse action.
McDonnell Douglas framework:
1. Prima facie case: Minimal initial showing of discrimination/retaliation.
2. Employer reason: Employer must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory (or non-retaliatory) reason.
3. Pretext: Plaintiff must prove the reason is false or not the true reason and that unlawful motive actually drove the decision.
Ames’s uniform prima facie rule: Plaintiffs from any group—majority or minority—face the same prima facie burden. No extra “reverse discrimination” hurdle.
Honest-belief doctrine: If an employer honestly believed its reason for the action—even if mistaken—a pretext claim usually fails unless the plaintiff can show the belief was not honestly held.
Temporal proximity: Close timing between protected activity and adverse action may suggest causation but rarely suffices to prove retaliation by itself.
“Selective favoritism” vs. “paramour preference”: Courts have often held that favoring a romantic partner is not sex discrimination because both men and women are disadvantaged equally. Whether favoring “some women” (e.g., perceived as attractive) rather than all women is actionable under Title VII—especially post-Bostock’s but-for test—remains unsettled in the Sixth Circuit.
Summary judgment: A case can be decided without trial when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellate courts review such decisions de novo.
“Not recommended for publication”: The opinion is nonprecedential in the Sixth Circuit, meaning it is not binding authority, though it may be persuasive.

Conclusion

Howard v. Cherokee Health Systems illustrates the post-Ames landscape in the Sixth Circuit: reverse-discrimination claims are assessed under the same prima facie standard as any other Title VII case, but plaintiffs still must marshal evidence that the employer’s stated reasons are pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The court’s reliance on the honest-belief doctrine and its rejection of temporal proximity as sufficient proof of retaliation underscore enduring obstacles for plaintiffs at the pretext stage. While the panel left unresolved whether “selective favoritism” for some women is actionable under Title VII after Bostock, it emphasized that conclusory or anecdotal assertions disconnected from the employer’s actual decision-making will not carry a case to trial. Succession plans, consistent application of internal-candidate preferences, and contemporaneous documentation remain powerful defenses.

Key takeaways: Ames ensures a uniform prima facie path for all Title VII plaintiffs; honest-belief and well-documented succession processes can defeat claims absent evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory motive; and the scope of “selective favoritism” as sex discrimination is a live, consequential question for future litigation in the Sixth Circuit.