Introduction

In this immigration case, the Sixth Circuit denies a petition for review brought by Erik Ceniceros, a Mexican national who has lived in the United States since childhood. Ceniceros sought cancellation of removal based on the hardship his deportation would cause his mother, Adela, a lawful permanent resident (LPR). After an Immigration Judge (IJ) found that his mother’s anticipated hardship was not “exceptional and extremely unusual,” and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, the Sixth Circuit upheld the agency’s rulings.

The opinion is noteworthy for three interrelated reasons in the evolving post–Chevron and post–Wilkinson landscape:

• It reaffirms, after Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), the Sixth Circuit’s de novo interpretation (in Moctezuma-Reyes (2024)) of the statutory phrase “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” and confirms continued reliance on the BIA’s framework in Monreal-Aguinaga (2001).
• It applies Wilkinson v. Garland (2024) to recognize that the application of the hardship standard to established facts presents a reviewable mixed question of law and fact—while explicitly leaving open the precise level of deference owed to the agency on that mixed question.
• It clarifies that an IJ sufficiently applies the “aggregate” hardship framework without needing a hyper-detailed opinion, and that country conditions in the country of removal matter only insofar as they affect the qualifying relative.

The parties are: Petitioner Erik Ceniceros, a long-term U.S. resident without current legal status, and Respondent Pamela Bondi, the Attorney General. Ceniceros conceded removability but sought cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The key issue was whether the IJ and BIA legally erred in finding that his mother’s prospective hardship does not meet the high statutory threshold.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit denies the petition for review. The court recognizes that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) and Wilkinson, it may review the application of the statutory hardship standard to established facts as a mixed question of law and fact, but it lacks jurisdiction to revisit pure factual findings (e.g., how serious a medical condition is or how much support a petitioner currently provides). Reviewing the IJ’s decision (as adopted by the BIA) for legal error, the court holds:

• Monreal-Aguinaga remains the correct framework for determining “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” a view the Sixth Circuit has already embraced de novo in Moctezuma-Reyes after Loper Bright.
• The IJ properly considered all hardship factors in the aggregate and provided adequate reasoning. The agency did not ignore material evidence.
• The court owes “some deference” to the agency’s mixed-question determination but declines to decide the precise deference standard because the outcome would be the same “under any level of deference.”
• Country conditions in Mexico were not shown to affect the qualifying relative (the mother) and thus were not relevant here.

Because the agency applied the correct legal framework and did not commit a legal or constitutional error, the petition is denied.

Factual and Procedural Background

Ceniceros entered the United States at age seven in 1993 and has lived in Michigan ever since. He resides with his mother Adela (an LPR), his U.S.-citizen brother, and extended family. He earns roughly $1,200–$1,400 per week as a concrete finisher/foreman, pays taxes, and contributes about $600 per month toward rent and household bills. He provides transportation and translation for Adela’s medical appointments. Adela, now 64, has diabetes and hypertension managed with medication, and a history of cervical cancer in remission for at least five years. She does not drive and has relied on her sons for financial and logistical support.

After earlier proceedings were administratively closed in 2016, DHS reopened removal in 2018. Ceniceros conceded removability but sought cancellation under § 1229b(b), claiming his removal would cause Adela exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. The IJ denied cancellation but granted voluntary departure. The BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasoning. This petition for review followed.

Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

• 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (Cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent residents): Requires (1) 10 years’ continuous physical presence; (2) good moral character; (3) no disqualifying offenses; and (4) that removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying U.S. citizen or LPR relative.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D) (Judicial review): Bars review of discretionary judgments (including cancellation) but preserves review for constitutional claims or questions of law.
• Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024): Clarifies that applying the hardship standard to established facts presents a reviewable mixed question of law and fact, and that the inquiry is “primarily factual,” implying a deferential appellate posture.
• Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020): “Questions of law” in § 1252(a)(2)(D) include the application of a legal standard to undisputed/established facts.
• Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022): Courts lack jurisdiction to review underlying factual findings tied to discretionary relief decisions.
• U.S. Bank N.A. v. Village at Lakeridge, LLC, 583 U.S. 387 (2018): Explains mixed questions of law and fact and their standards of review.
• In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001): Foundational BIA decision providing factors and an aggregate approach for assessing “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”; country conditions are relevant only insofar as they affect the qualifying relative.
• Moctezuma-Reyes v. Garland, 124 F.4th 416 (6th Cir. 2024): Post–Loper Bright, the Sixth Circuit interpreted “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” de novo and concluded that Monreal-Aguinaga “squares with the best reading” of the statute; observes that differences in degree can amount to differences in kind when considered in the aggregate.
• Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Eliminated Chevron deference; courts interpret statutes independently.
• Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142 (6th Cir. 2021): Courts look to the substance of a claim to determine reviewability under § 1252; factual and discretionary challenges cannot be cloaked as questions of law.
• Harmon v. Holder, 758 F.3d 728 (6th Cir. 2014): When the BIA issues its own decision and adopts portions of the IJ’s reasoning, the court reviews the BIA decision and the adopted portions of the IJ’s decision as the final agency action.
• Other Sixth Circuit citations highlighting the ongoing deference question: Fernandez-Villafan v. Garland, No. 23-3223, 2023 WL 8651267 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2023); Pinales-Salas v. Garland, No. 23-3675, 2024 WL 1510662 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2024).
• Sister-circuit commentary on unresolved deference: Cortes v. Garland, 105 F.4th 124 (4th Cir. 2024); Santibanez-Sanchez v. Garland, No. 21-60958, 2024 WL 4471737 (5th Cir. Oct. 11, 2024).
• Champion v. Holder, 626 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2010): Example of reversible error where the IJ actually failed to consider material evidence.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction and the mixed-question frame (post-Wilkinson).

   The court reiterates that it has jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D) to review the application of a legal standard to established facts concerning hardship (Wilkinson; Guerrero-Lasprilla). It cannot revisit factual determinations (Patel), such as the severity of the mother’s medical conditions or the credibility of witnesses. Thus, the court takes the IJ’s factual findings as given and asks whether the legal standard was properly applied.

2. Standard of review remains unsettled, but “some deference” is owed.

   Although Wilkinson signals a deferential posture for the mixed question because the hardship inquiry is “primarily factual,” the Sixth Circuit again declines to fix a precise label (e.g., “substantial evidence” or “clear error” on the mixed question). It holds the outcome is the same under any plausible level of deference: the agency committed no legal error.

3. Statutory interpretation after Loper Bright: Monreal-Aguinaga still governs.

   Petitioner’s argument for a “more liberal” reading of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” fails. The Sixth Circuit, citing its own post–Loper Bright decision in Moctezuma-Reyes, reiterates that the phrase is to be construed strictly and that Monreal-Aguinaga is consistent with the statute’s best reading. The court emphasizes the aggregate nature of the analysis and the insight that “differences in degree can be differences in kind.”

4. Aggregate analysis and sufficiency of the IJ’s reasoning.

   The court rejects the claim that the IJ failed to aggregate hardship factors or to provide a sufficiently “very detailed” explanation. The IJ’s oral decision identified and weighed: (a) medical assistance (transportation, translation, medication management), (b) financial contribution (~$600/month plus household expenses), and (c) emotional support after the father’s death. The IJ then explained why those hardships, in the aggregate, did not meet the exceptional-and-extremely-unusual threshold:

   • Medical: Adela’s diabetes and hypertension are “essentially controlled” by medications; her cancer is in remission with infrequent checkups; the brother, who lives in the same home and has a license, can drive and assist; Adela maintains state-sponsored health coverage.
   • Financial: Although Ceniceros is currently the primary contributor, nothing in the record shows Adela is incapable of working; family members can mitigate the loss of income; record does not show resulting “destitution.”
   • Emotional: Extended family ties and cohabitation reduce the risk of abandonment; although transitions will be difficult, they will not be “exceptional” within the statutory meaning.

   This sufficed to show an aggregate analysis without reweighing facts—something appellate courts may not do (Patel).

5. No ignoring of material evidence.

   The court distinguishes Champion and finds the IJ did not ignore material evidence. The IJ considered the brother’s circumstances and potential availability to assist. As to country conditions in Mexico, the court notes that such conditions matter only if they affect the qualifying relative (Monreal-Aguinaga), and the record did not connect Mexico’s conditions to any hardship to Adela, who resides in the United States. Finally, the IJ addressed economic arguments and found mitigation possible through Adela’s ability to work and family support.

C. What This Decision Means: Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished, the decision reflects and consolidates several important post-2024 developments in the Sixth Circuit’s immigration jurisprudence:

• Hardship remains a high bar, even post–Loper Bright. The Sixth Circuit has already interpreted the statutory phrase de novo (Moctezuma-Reyes) and concluded the BIA’s aggregate framework is correct. Litigants should not expect a more lenient construction of “exceptional and extremely unusual” in this circuit.
• Mixed question review is available but deferential in practice. After Wilkinson, courts can review the legal application of the hardship standard to established facts, but will rarely second-guess the agency in the absence of legal error—especially when the IJ methodically aggregates factors and explains mitigation.
• The precise level of deference remains formally unresolved. The court again sidesteps whether the standard is “substantial evidence,” “clear error,” or something else for mixed hardship determinations. Practitioners should preserve arguments on the standard but frame appellate issues as legal errors (misapplication of the standard, failure to aggregate, or ignoring material evidence) rather than disagreements with fact-finding.
• Mitigation matters. Evidence that other family members can assume tasks (driving, translation, care coordination), that medical conditions are controlled, that public benefits or insurance will remain, or that the qualifying relative can work will typically defeat claims of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”
• Country conditions must be linked to the qualifying relative. If the qualifying relative will remain in the U.S., generalized conditions in the country of removal are usually irrelevant unless there is a concrete, record-based way those conditions will materially worsen the qualifying relative’s situation in the United States.
• Record-building is decisive. Given the rigid threshold, respondents must develop detailed, corroborated evidence of irreplaceability (e.g., physician affidavits on functional limitations, proof of lack of alternative caregivers or services, documentation of why other family cannot assume responsibilities, and evidence that loss of support would lead to concrete harms beyond ordinary hardship).

D. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Cancellation of removal (non-LPR): A discretionary form of relief allowing certain noncitizens to avoid removal if they meet strict statutory criteria, including proving that their removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying U.S. citizen or LPR family member (often a spouse, parent, or child).
• “Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”: Not ordinary or typical hardship from deportation. It must be significantly greater than what most families experience—considering all circumstances together. Factors include health, special needs, financial dependencies, caregiving roles, and availability of alternatives or mitigation.
• Aggregate analysis: The IJ must look at all hardship factors together, not isolate them. Seemingly “ordinary” factors can, in combination and degree, amount to an exceptional hardship; conversely, individually serious factors may be mitigated enough to fall short collectively.
• Mixed question of law and fact: A legal standard applied to a specific set of established facts. Courts can review whether the right standard was applied correctly, but cannot reweigh the underlying facts or revisit credibility determinations.
• Administrative closure: A procedural pause in removal proceedings that does not resolve the case; DHS can later move to reopen.
• Voluntary departure: Allows a noncitizen to leave the U.S. at their own expense within a set period instead of being formally removed, potentially avoiding some legal consequences of a removal order.
• Country conditions relevance: Conditions in the country of removal matter only if they directly impact the qualifying relative’s hardship (e.g., if the qualifying relative would relocate, or if the conditions materially affect the relative’s health, safety, or support while remaining in the U.S.).
• “Not recommended for publication”: An unpublished decision generally lacks precedential force, though it can be persuasive, especially when it synthesizes recent Supreme Court and circuit authority.

E. Practical Guidance for Future Cases

• Develop irreplaceability evidence: Show why no one else can provide the same care or support. Document the other family members’ concrete constraints (work schedules, health, language proficiency, legal status, transportation), and the lack or unaffordability of substitute services.
• Link medical needs to daily functioning: Obtain physician letters that detail specific functional limitations, frequency of appointments, necessity of a particular caregiver’s assistance, risks if assistance ceases, and why alternatives (e.g., medical transport, professional interpreters) are unavailable or inadequate.
• Prove financial consequences exceed ordinary hardship: Provide budgets, debts, fixed expenses, and evidence that loss of the petitioner’s contribution would lead to concrete harms beyond belt-tightening—eviction risk, loss of essential care, interruption of utilities or medications.
• Address mitigation head-on: Anticipate the IJ’s inquiry into alternatives. Show the unavailability or insufficiency of family assistance, community resources, insurance coverage changes, or public programs.
• Make country-conditions evidence relevant: If relying on it, demonstrate how those conditions will affect the qualifying relative (e.g., necessity to relocate due to dependency, loss of cross-border remittances that are crucial to the relative’s survival, or the impact on the relative’s medical care if relocation is unavoidable).
• Frame appellate issues as legal, not factual: On petition for review, focus on legal errors: misinterpretation of the statutory standard, failure to aggregate, or ignoring materially probative evidence. Avoid invitations for the court to reweigh facts.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Ceniceros v. Bondi reinforces that, even after the demise of Chevron deference in Loper Bright and the Supreme Court’s mixed-question framework in Wilkinson, the controlling approach to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” in this circuit remains the aggregate, high-threshold standard rooted in Monreal-Aguinaga and affirmed in Moctezuma-Reyes. The court acknowledges that the precise degree of deference on the mixed question is unsettled but finds that, under any plausible level, the agency did not commit legal error.

For future cancellation cases, this decision underscores the necessity of meticulous record development demonstrating that the qualifying relative’s hardship surpasses the typical consequences of removal and that mitigation by family, community, or public benefits is unavailable or inadequate. Generalized hardship, even when heartfelt and substantial—transportation, translation, financial support, and emotional reliance—will often fall short absent proof of irreplaceability and outsized, concrete harm. The opinion thus fits squarely within the Sixth Circuit’s emerging post-2024 framework: courts will review the legal application of the hardship standard but will not displace the agency’s assessment unless the record shows a clear legal misstep.