Pohl v. Cheatham and the Territorial Reach of Texas’s Civil Barratry Statute

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in Michael A. Pohl v. Mark Kentrell Cheatham, Sr., No. 23‑0045 (May 9, 2025), squarely addresses a modern problem in multi‑state law practice: when Texas lawyers use case runners to solicit clients located in other states, can Texas’s civil barratry statute be used to void those lawyers’ fee contracts?

The opinion text provided is Justice Busby’s dissent, joined by Justices Lehrmann and Boyd. From that dissent, we can reconstruct the key dispute:

Texas lawyers, working from their Texas offices, allegedly hired and funded “case runners” to solicit personal‑injury clients in other states.
The clients—who ultimately retained these Texas lawyers—later sued the lawyers in Texas, seeking to void their fee agreements and obtain civil remedies for barratry under Texas Government Code § 82.0651(a).
The central legal issue is whether applying § 82.0651(a) to this conduct would be an impermissible extraterritorial application of Texas law, given that the in‑person solicitation took place outside Texas.

The majority held that the civil barratry statute cannot be used in these circumstances because its “focus” is the acts of solicitation themselves, which occurred in other states. Justice Busby’s dissent argues that this misreads the statute, which by its terms reaches the broader “conduct violating” Penal Code § 38.12(a) and (b)—including financing and offers to pay case runners that allegedly occurred in Texas.

This commentary explains the statutory framework, reconstructs the Court’s holding as reflected in the dissent, and then analyzes Justice Busby’s reasoning, the precedents he invokes, and the likely impact of the decision on Texas law and multi‑state legal practice.

II. Summary of the Decision

A. The Statutory and Factual Setting

Two sets of statutes are central:

Texas Penal Code § 38.12 – criminal barratry:
- Subsection (a) makes it a third‑degree felony for a person, with intent to obtain an economic benefit, to engage in various forms of improper pursuit of clients, including:
  - Soliciting employment in person or by telephone (§ 38.12(a)(2)).
  - Paying or offering to pay money or anything of value to a prospective client to obtain employment (§ 38.12(a)(3)).
  - Paying or offering to pay money or anything of value to a person to solicit employment on one’s behalf—i.e., paying case runners (§ 38.12(a)(4)).
  - Paying or offering to pay a family member of a prospective client to solicit (§ 38.12(a)(5)).
  - Accepting money to solicit employment (§ 38.12(a)(6)).
- Subsection (b) adds related offenses, including:
  - Knowingly financing the commission of an offense under subsection (a) (§ 38.12(b)(1)).
  - Investing funds intended to further such an offense (§ 38.12(b)(2)).
  - A professional knowingly accepting employment that results from an illegal solicitation (§ 38.12(b)(3)).
Texas Government Code § 82.0651(a) – civil barratry:
- Creates “an action to void a contract for legal services that was procured as a result of conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b), Penal Code.”
- Subsection (e) states its purpose: “to protect those in need of legal services from unethical, unlawful solicitation and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure that protection.”

Additionally, Texas Penal Code § 1.04(a)(1) gives Texas criminal jurisdiction over an offense if “conduct… that is an element of the offense occurs inside this state.”

In this case, according to the dissent’s account:

The Texas attorneys allegedly:
- From within Texas, offered to pay and financed case runners to solicit clients in other states, in violation of § 38.12(a)(4) and (b)(1).
- Benefited financially from the resulting legal services contracts.
The clients, located outside Texas, sued in Texas under § 82.0651(a) to void the fee agreements and obtain civil remedies.

B. The Majority’s Holding (as Reflected in the Dissent)

Justice Busby reports that the Court:

Adopted the federal two‑step extraterritoriality framework drawn from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in cases like Morrison, RJR Nabisco, WesternGeco, and Abitron.
At step one, found no clear legislative indication that § 82.0651(a) applies extraterritorially to conduct in other states.
At step two, identified the “focus” of § 82.0651 as the acts of solicitation themselves that procure the legal‑services contract—the “in‑person acts of solicitation” (dissent citing the majority at “ante at 23, 25”).
Concluded that the only “conduct violating Section 38.12(a)” in this case was the actual solicitation of the clients under § 38.12(a)(2), and that this solicitation occurred entirely outside Texas.
Held that applying § 82.0651 to these facts would therefore constitute an impermissible extraterritorial application of Texas law, barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality.

As Justice Busby summarizes it:

“Yet today, the Court holds that Texas law has nothing to say about whether these Texas attorneys can still profit from their allegedly criminal and unprofessional conduct—even though the Legislature unanimously passed a civil barratry statute in 2011…” (dissent, p. 2–3).

The practical effect is that out‑of‑state clients allegedly solicited illegally by Texas lawyers through case runners cannot use § 82.0651(a) in Texas courts solely on the basis of that out‑of‑state solicitation, even when the financing and offers to pay case runners emanated from Texas.

C. Justice Busby’s Dissenting Position

Justice Busby concludes that applying § 82.0651(a) here is a permissible domestic application of Texas law:

He emphasizes the statute’s text, which covers contracts procured as a result of “conduct violating” any part of Penal Code § 38.12(a) or (b).
On the pleadings, the “conduct violating” § 38.12(a)(4) (offers to pay a person to solicit employment) and § 38.12(b)(1) (financing the commission of such an offense) occurred in Texas.
Under the federal “focus” analysis, what matters is whether “the conduct relevant to that focus” occurred in Texas; here, it did.
Therefore, in his view, no extraterritorial application is implicated at all, and the presumption against extraterritoriality is not violated.

He criticizes the majority for:

Narrowly redefining the statute’s “focus” as only in‑person solicitation under § 38.12(a)(2), characterized as the “core conduct the Legislature sought to address,” while ignoring the other eight forms of regulated conduct in § 38.12(a)–(b).
Effectively rewriting § 82.0651(a) by treating “conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b)” as if it meant only “the act of solicitation itself.”
Disregarding undisputed allegations that the Texas attorneys’ offers to pay and financing of solicitors—violations of § 38.12(a)(4) and (b)(1)—occurred in Texas.

He would have affirmed the court of appeals’ decision, which, he notes, had treated the case as a permissible domestic application of § 82.0651(a) based on the Texas‑based financing and offers to pay.

III. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. The Texas Framework: Civil and Criminal Barratry

Penal Code § 38.12 – defines criminal barratry and related conduct, as detailed above.
Penal Code § 1.04(a)(1) – Texas has criminal jurisdiction when “conduct… that is an element of the offense occurs inside this state.”
- Busby emphasizes that, because the offers to pay and financing occurred in Texas, Texas could criminally prosecute this barratry, even though other elements occurred elsewhere.
- This underscores the tension he sees between recognizing criminal jurisdiction and denying civil remedies for the same underlying conduct.
Government Code § 82.0651(a), (e) – the civil barratry statute:
- (a) creates the civil action to void contracts procured by conduct violating § 38.12(a) or (b).
- (e) articulates the statute’s purpose: to protect those in need of legal services from unethical, unlawful solicitation and to provide efficient, economical procedures for that protection.
Government Code § 82.062 and Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct:
- Rule 7.03 governs solicitation of professional employment.
- Rule 8.04(a)(9) lists barratry as professional misconduct.
- Rule 8.05(a) addresses disciplinary jurisdiction over lawyers.
- In State Bar of Texas v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1994), the Court upheld discipline for barratry‑related misconduct.
- Busby cites these to show that the same conduct can lead to disbarment and criminal penalties, even if (under the majority’s view) civil fee‑forfeiture is unavailable.

B. U.S. Supreme Court Cases on Extraterritoriality

The Court, according to the dissent, borrows the now‑standard federal two‑step framework for determining the territorial reach of statutes:

Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010):
- Reaffirmed the presumption against extraterritoriality as a “longstanding principle” of statutory interpretation.
- Replaced prior “conduct” and “effects” tests with a focus on the statutory “focus” and adopted a domestic “transactional” test for § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325 (2016):
- Considered the extraterritorial reach of civil RICO.
- Held that because RICO’s predicate crimes incorporated some federal statutes with extraterritorial application, RICO’s criminal provisions could extend to foreign conduct in line with those predicates.
- But it limited private civil RICO claims by requiring a domestic injury.
- Busby invokes RJR Nabisco to show that when a civil statute incorporates criminal predicates, the scope of those predicates is highly relevant to the civil statute’s reach.
WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp., 585 U.S. 407 (2018):
- Held that awarding lost‑profits damages for overseas activities did not constitute an impermissible extraterritorial application of U.S. patent law.
- Emphasized that, when a statutory provision “works in tandem with other provisions,” its “focus” must be assessed in concert with those other provisions.
- Busby applies this logic: § 82.0651(a) must be interpreted together with Penal Code § 38.12(a)–(b), which it expressly incorporates.
Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic Int’l, Inc., 600 U.S. 412 (2023):
- Clarified the two‑step approach for extraterritoriality.
- Step 1: Ask whether Congress clearly indicated that the statute applies abroad.
- Step 2: If not, identify the “focus” of the statutory provision and determine whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred domestically.
- Importantly, Abitron reiterated that a statute’s “focus” can include both:
  - The conduct it seeks to regulate, and
  - The parties and interests it aims to protect or vindicate.
- Busby quotes this language and stresses that a statute may have more than one focus.

C. Texas Authorities on Territorial Scope and Textualism

Citizens Ins. Co. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2007), and Coca‑Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006), and Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968):
- These decisions addressed the territorial reach of Texas statutes (e.g., securities, antitrust, wrongful‑death statutes).
- Busby cites them as examples of using traditional tools of statutory construction—rather than a Court‑invented “core focus” test—to determine territorial scope.
Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1999):
- Warned that when courts “stray from the plain language of a statute,” they risk intruding on the Legislature’s role.
- Busby uses this to chastise the majority for picking a single “core conduct” (solicitation) and ignoring other statutory text.
In re Department of Family & Protective Services, 273 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2009):
- Reaffirmed that courts should not decide whether legislative enactments are wise or whether they could be better worded to reach perceived “better” results.
- Busby references this in arguing that it is not the Court’s job to narrow the scope of § 82.0651(a) based on policy concerns.
In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 346 (Tex. 2000):
- Discussed the “dialogue” between courts and Legislature, where legislative amendments follow judicial decisions.
- Busby concedes the Legislature may respond to the Court’s decision by amending § 82.0651, but views that as unnecessary given the clarity he sees in the existing text.

D. Other Authorities

A.S. v. Salesforce, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 3d 970 (N.D. Tex. 2024):
- A federal district court decision (not reproduced here) that, according to Busby, made “a thorough case for extraterritoriality” as to another Texas statute that incorporates Penal Code provisions.
- He cites it, along with RJR Nabisco, as supporting the idea that civil statutes incorporating criminal laws can have partial extraterritorial reach based on those criminal predicates’ text.
- The majority, per Busby, criticized him for “tellingly ignor[ing]” counter‑authorities; he responds that he simply finds it unnecessary to reach step one in this case because he resolves the issue at step two.
Academic criticism of the “focus test”:
- Franklin A. Gevurtz, Extraterritorial Application of Statutes and Regulations, 70 Am. J. Comp. L. 1347 (2022).
- Aaron D. Simowitz, The Extraterritoriality Formalisms, 51 Conn. L. Rev. 375 (2019).
- Busby notes that scholars view the focus test as indeterminate, manipulable, and difficult to apply consistently—criticisms that echo the U.S. Supreme Court’s own complaints about the old “conduct” and “effects” tests in Morrison.

IV. Legal Analysis

A. The Core Question: What “Conduct” Does § 82.0651(a) Regulate?

At the heart of the dispute is the meaning of the phrase in Government Code § 82.0651(a) authorizing civil actions to void contracts “procured as a result of conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b), Penal Code.”

Justice Busby emphasizes three textual features:

The statute explicitly refers to “conduct”—not merely to “solicitation.”
It incorporates all of Penal Code § 38.12(a) and (b), not just subsection (a)(2) (in‑person or telephonic solicitation).
The Legislature itself stated in § 82.0651(e) that its purpose is “to protect those in need of legal services from unethical, unlawful solicitation and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure that protection,” implying a broad regulatory goal rather than a narrow focus on a single act.

From this, he infers that the statute’s regulatory “focus,” for extraterritoriality purposes, must encompass the entire suite of conduct that constitutes a § 38.12 offense—including:

Offers to pay someone to solicit clients (§ 38.12(a)(4)).
Financing or investing in such solicitation (§ 38.12(b)(1)–(2)).
Accepting employment that results from unlawful solicitation (§ 38.12(b)(3)).

The majority, by contrast (as described by the dissent), narrows the statute’s focus to only one piece of that list: “the in‑person acts of solicitation” that procured the legal‑services contracts, i.e., § 38.12(a)(2).

Busby views this as an unjustified judicial truncation of the statute:

“It is neither this Court’s role nor a feasible task to read a collective legislative mind and select only one type of conduct from this statutory list, elevating it as ‘core’—and therefore the sole touchstone…—while discarding the other eight types of conduct the Legislature chose to regulate.” (dissent, p. 7–8)

B. Applying the Two‑Step Extraterritoriality Framework

1. Step One: Clear Indication of Extraterritorial Application?

Under Morrison and its progeny, courts first ask whether the Legislature has clearly expressed an intent for the statute to apply to conduct in other sovereigns’ territories. If not, a presumption against extraterritoriality applies.

According to Busby, the majority concluded that:

§ 82.0651(a) contains no clear statement authorizing its application to foreign (i.e., out‑of‑state) conduct.
Therefore, it is presumed to apply only domestically unless a domestic application can be identified at step two.

Busby himself declines to decide this first step, because he believes that, even if the statute is not extraterritorial, the application here is entirely domestic:

“Because I conclude at step two that no extraterritorial application of Section 82.0651(a) is involved here, it is unnecessary for me to reach the step‑one question whether that statute applies extraterritorially.” (dissent, p. 3–4 & n.2)

2. Step Two: Identifying the Statute’s “Focus”

The second step, per Abitron and WesternGeco, is to:

Identify the “focus” of the statutory provision.
Ask whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred within the forum (here, Texas).

The “focus” is defined as the “object of [the statute’s] solicitude,” which can include both:

The conduct the statute regulates, and
The parties or interests it protects.

Busby’s methodology:

He starts with § 82.0651(e), where the Legislature itself states the statute’s purpose: “to protect those in need of legal services from unethical, unlawful solicitation and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure that protection.”
He notes that § 82.0651(a) operationalizes that purpose by targeting contracts “procured as a result of conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b).”
He then reads § 82.0651 and § 38.12 “in concert,” as WesternGeco requires when statutes “work in tandem with other provisions.”
From § 38.12’s breadth, he concludes that the statute’s focus encompasses a wide array of barratrous behavior—not just in‑person solicitation.

The majority’s methodology, as described in the dissent, is very different:

They locate the “core conduct” as the act of in‑person solicitation of the client.
They treat the other conduct described in § 38.12 (financing, offers to pay, accepting employment, etc.) as peripheral for purposes of focus.
On that narrowed view, the focus conduct occurred entirely outside Texas, so applying § 82.0651(a) would be extraterritorial.

Busby criticizes this as an example of the “manipulability” of the focus test:

“This ‘focus of legislative concern’ test has been criticized as indeterminate, difficult to apply consistently…, and subject to manipulation by courts that choose their own preferred focus over other alternatives without tying that choice to the statutory language.” (dissent, p. 4–5)

3. Domestic vs. Extraterritorial Application in This Case

Once the focus is defined, the second part of step two is straightforward: did the relevant conduct occur in Texas?

Busby’s answer: Yes.
- The plaintiffs alleged that the Texas attorneys:
  - “Offer[ed] to pay or give a person money or anything of value to solicit employment” (§ 38.12(a)(4)); and
  - “Knowingly finance[d] the commission of [such] an offense” (§ 38.12(b)(1)).
- These alleged offers to pay and financing occurred in Texas, at the lawyers’ Texas offices.
- Those acts are themselves “conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b),” and thus within the statute’s focus.
- Therefore, applying § 82.0651(a) here is a domestic application, not an extraterritorial one, even though other aspects of the scheme (the in‑person solicitation of clients) occurred in other states.
The majority’s answer (as reported): No.
- The majority, according to Busby, treated “the actual solicitation of the clients” under § 38.12(a)(2) as the only relevant “conduct violating Section 38.12(a).”
- Because that solicitation took place outside Texas, they saw no domestic conduct at the statute’s focus.
- Thus, they characterized any application of § 82.0651(a) here as extraterritorial, and rejected it in the absence of a clear statement authorizing such reach.

Busby also notes that no one disputed, at this procedural stage, that the offers to pay and financing occurred in Texas. He suggests the Court effectively ignored the pleadings by refusing to treat those acts as relevant “conduct violating Section 38.12(a).”

C. Critique of the Focus Test and Judicial Role

The dissent is not only about the outcome; it is also about methodology.

Indeterminacy of the focus test.
- Busby echoes academic commentary that the “focus of legislative concern” inquiry is highly malleable.
- Citing Simowitz and Gevurtz, he notes that courts can select a favored “focus” from several plausible candidates, effectively choosing the outcome first and then back‑filling the justification.
- He points out that this replicates the problems the U.S. Supreme Court criticized in the old conduct/effects tests in Morrison.
Preference for traditional statutory interpretation.
- Busby references prior Texas cases (Daccach, Harmar, Marmon) as examples of analyzing a statute’s territorial scope by ordinary textual and structural tools.
- He suggests that Texas courts should not abandon those tools in favor of a more free‑floating focus test, especially when the statute—like § 82.0651(e)—expressly states its own purpose.
Separation of powers and respect for legislative choices.
- Quoting Fitzgerald and In re Department of Family & Protective Services, he warns that courts risk encroaching on the Legislature’s role when they select a “core” focus contrary to the statute’s comprehensive wording.
- By narrowing § 82.0651(a) to only in‑person solicitation, Busby argues, the Court effectively rewrites the statute and undercuts the Legislature’s chosen enforcement scheme.

D. Relationship Between Criminal Jurisdiction and Civil Remedies

One of the dissent’s more pointed observations is that the same conduct:

Can be prosecuted criminally in Texas under Penal Code § 1.04 because elements of the offense (offers to pay, financing) occurred in Texas.
Can lead to professional discipline and disbarment under the Government Code and Disciplinary Rules.
But, under the majority’s reasoning, cannot trigger civil fee‑voiding under § 82.0651(a) if the actual in‑person solicitation happened in another state.

Busby finds this asymmetry striking. To him, it suggests that the Court is narrowly reading the civil remedy in a way that is not compelled by textual differences between the civil and criminal schemes.

He anticipates that the Legislature might respond by amending § 82.0651 to make its territorial reach even more explicit, but he views such a step as “wasteful” given, in his view, the clarity of the existing text:

“Because the Legislature spoke clearly and should not have to expend its limited time and resources to act again, I respectfully dissent.” (dissent, p. 9)

V. Impact and Implications

A. For Texas Attorneys and Multi‑State Law Practice

The Court’s holding (as described in the dissent) materially narrows the exposure of Texas attorneys under the civil barratry statute when:

The targets of solicitation are out‑of‑state clients, and
The in‑person solicitation occurs outside Texas, even if:
- The lawyers are Texas‑licensed and based in Texas.
- The financing, direction, and coordination of case runners occur in Texas.

Consequences:

Texas lawyers engaging in cross‑border mass‑tort or personal‑injury solicitation may view § 82.0651 exposure as limited to cases where:
- Solicitation occurs in Texas, or
- Clients are located in Texas when solicited.
They may feel freer, from a Texas civil‑liability standpoint, to use case runners to target residents of other states, so long as the runners’ in‑person activity stays outside Texas.
However, criminal and disciplinary exposure remains, which may still deter such conduct if enforced.

B. For Clients and Consumer Protection

From the perspective of clients solicited outside Texas:

They may no longer be able to rely on Texas’s civil barratry statute—despite Texas being the home base of the lawyers and the nerve center of the scheme—to void fee contracts tainted by barratry.
They must instead:
- Invoke the law of their own state (if that state has comparable barratry or solicitation statutes), or
- Rely on general contract, fraud, or professional‑negligence theories.
This potentially undercuts what § 82.0651(e) describes as the Legislature’s goal of providing “efficient and economical procedures” to protect those in need of legal services from unethical solicitation.

In short, the decision narrows the reach of a Texas consumer‑protection measure in the specific context of cross‑border attorney solicitation.

C. For the Development of Texas Extraterritoriality Doctrine

Pohl v. Cheatham is significant as a state‑court adoption of the federal extraterritoriality framework:

Texas courts are now clearly aligning with the Morrison/RJR/WesternGeco/Abitron two‑step approach for state statutes.
This will likely affect future litigation under other Texas statutes with potential cross‑border application, such as:
- Consumer‑protection statutes.
- Antitrust or securities provisions (building on Harmar and Daccach).
- Civil‑remedy provisions that incorporate Penal Code offenses, as in A.S. v. Salesforce.
Litigants will need to:
- Frame their arguments around the statutory “focus,”
- Identify which conduct is at that focus, and
- Show that such conduct occurred in Texas.

Busby’s dissent highlights that, depending on how the “focus” is characterized, the same statutory text can be read as:

Reaching multi‑state schemes (when the focus includes financing and offers to pay), or
Stopping at the state line (when the focus is narrowed to only in‑person solicitation or the last act in the chain).

D. For Statutes Incorporating Criminal Predicates

Relying on RJR Nabisco and A.S. v. Salesforce, Busby suggests that civil statutes incorporating Penal Code offenses may, in principle, reach conduct wherever those criminal laws apply:

In RJR Nabisco, the U.S. Supreme Court held that civil RICO’s reach depends in part on the extraterritorial scope of its predicate offenses.
Similarly, if a Texas civil statute incorporates Penal Code offenses that themselves can be prosecuted based on in‑state elements (§ 1.04), then:
- It is at least plausible that the civil statute’s reach should track that criminal jurisdiction.

The majority’s resistance to that approach in Pohl likely signals caution about civil extraterritoriality, even where criminal statutes are broader. That could constrain other civil remedies pegged to Penal Code violations, unless and until the Legislature explicitly signals extraterritorial intent.

E. Likely Legislative Response

Busby predicts that the decision may spur legislative clarification, as has often occurred in the federal context after Supreme Court extraterritoriality rulings:

He notes scholarship showing that Congress has repeatedly expanded statutory reach in response to Supreme Court limitations (Simowitz).
He characterizes such a dialogue as “often salutary and clarifying,” but unnecessary here because he views § 82.0651’s text as already clear.

If the Texas Legislature disagrees with the majority’s narrow focus on in‑person solicitation, it could:

Amend § 82.0651 to state explicitly that:
- The statute applies to contracts procured by any conduct violating § 38.12(a) or (b) that occurs in whole or in part in Texas, regardless of where the client is located or where the in‑person solicitation occurs; or
- It applies whenever a Texas lawyer, licensed by Texas, engages in such conduct, regardless of geographic locus.

Such amendments would effectively override the majority’s construction and align the statute more closely with the dissent’s reading.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is “Barratry”?

In everyday terms, barratry—in the attorney‑conduct context—means improperly chasing business. It includes:

Lawyers, or their agents, approaching accident victims or other potential clients in person or by phone to urge them to hire that lawyer—often soon after an accident or disaster.
Paying “runners” or “cappers” to find and deliver clients.
Offering money or gifts to potential clients just to secure their signatures on fee contracts.

Texas criminalizes this conduct, and separately gives clients civil remedies when their contracts were procured by such conduct.

2. What Is a “Case Runner”?

A case runner (sometimes called a “capper”) is a non‑lawyer hired by a lawyer or law firm to find potential clients and steer them to that lawyer in exchange for payment or other benefits. Often, they:

Show up at accident scenes or hospitals.
Make unsolicited calls to recent accident victims.
Offer money or help with bills in exchange for signing a contingency fee contract.

Paying or offering to pay such runners is illegal under Texas Penal Code § 38.12(a)(4).

3. What Is the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality?

Courts generally assume that:

A legislature enacts laws for its own territory—here, Texas—unless it clearly says otherwise.
This prevents one state’s laws from casually overriding another state’s sovereignty.

So, unless a statute says it applies to out‑of‑state conduct, courts:

Look for a domestic application of the statute—where the key conduct occurred in the forum state, and
Avoid applying the statute to regulate conduct that is essentially foreign.

4. What Is the “Focus” Test?

When a statute doesn’t clearly apply outside the state, courts:

Identify the statute’s “focus”—the main thing it is trying to regulate or protect. This might be:
- Certain kinds of conduct (e.g., making false statements in securities filings).
- Certain protected interests (e.g., U.S. investors, U.S. markets).
Then ask: Did the conduct at that focus happen in this state?

If yes, applying the statute is considered domestic (permissible). If no, it is considered extraterritorial (presumptively impermissible unless the statute clearly says otherwise).

In Pohl:

The majority saw the focus as in‑person solicitation of the client.
The dissent saw the focus as all the conduct that constitutes barratry, including financing and offers to pay case runners.

5. What Does It Mean to “Void a Contract for Legal Services”?

When a client “voids” a contract under § 82.0651(a), it means:

The fee agreement is treated as legally ineffective, as if it never properly came into existence (at least from the client’s standpoint).
Depending on the statute’s remedial scheme (not fully reproduced in the dissent), the client may:
- Owe no attorney’s fees under that contract.
- Potentially recover money already paid or other statutory damages.

This is a powerful remedy; it gives clients leverage to avoid paying lawyers who obtained their business through illegal solicitation.

VII. Conclusion

Michael A. Pohl v. Mark Kentrell Cheatham, Sr. marks an important moment in Texas law at the intersection of attorney ethics, consumer protection, and extraterritoriality doctrine.

The majority, as described by Justice Busby’s dissent, adopts the U.S. Supreme Court’s two‑step extraterritoriality framework and construes the civil barratry statute’s “focus” narrowly as the act of in‑person solicitation of clients. On that understanding, civil barratry actions under Government Code § 82.0651(a) cannot be used when the solicitation of out‑of‑state clients occurs entirely outside Texas, even if Texas‑based lawyers designed, financed, and directed the scheme from within Texas.

Justice Busby, joined by Justices Lehrmann and Boyd, would instead read § 82.0651(a) according to its full text and stated purpose, treating all of the “conduct violating Section 38.12(a) or (b)”—including offers to pay and financing that took place in Texas—as part of the statute’s focus. In his view, the application here is plainly domestic, and the majority’s narrower view of the statute’s core conduct is an unwarranted judicial rewrite that diminishes the Legislature’s effort to protect those in need of legal services from unethical solicitation.

Going forward, the decision narrows the reach of Texas’s civil barratry remedy in cross‑border cases, even as criminal and disciplinary tools remain available. It also signals that Texas courts will apply the federal “focus”‑based extraterritoriality framework to state statutes, making the characterization of a statute’s focus—and the geographic location of the corresponding conduct—central in many future cases.

Whether the Legislature will respond by clarifying or expanding the territorial reach of § 82.0651 remains to be seen. For now, Pohl v. Cheatham stands as a leading authority on the territorial limits of Texas’s civil barratry statute and illustrates both the power and the perils of the modern “focus” test in extraterritoriality analysis.