PLRA Grievances Must Signal Retaliation; Evidence Beyond Disagreement or Injury‑Free Delay Needed to Survive Summary Judgment on Prison Medical Claims

Editorial note: This is a Second Circuit summary order, which under Local Rule 32.1.1 has no precedential effect, but it may be cited and is persuasive. It offers a clear, up-to-date illustration of how the court applies PLRA exhaustion and deliberate-indifference standards at the summary judgment stage.

Introduction

In Chimney v. Feder, No. 23-6478-cv (2d Cir. Sept. 12, 2025), the Second Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment for Connecticut prison medical personnel on a pro se incarcerated plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims. Roger Chimney alleged two primary constitutional violations: (1) First Amendment retaliation by prison medical staff for his repeated medical complaints; and (2) deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments. The district court (Meyer, J., D. Conn.) entered summary judgment for the defendants, and the Second Circuit—reviewing de novo—affirmed.

The court’s analysis centers on two bedrock principles:

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), a prisoner’s grievance must alert prison officials to the nature of the claim—including, where relevant, the retaliatory motive—to exhaust that claim before filing suit.
On deliberate indifference, disagreement with medical judgment, conclusory assertions, and delays that cause no injury or obvious risk do not meet the constitutional threshold; at summary judgment, plaintiffs must marshal competent evidence, not merely general denials, to create a triable issue.

Parties included Dr. I. Feder and several nurses and medical supervisors as appellees; Chimney proceeded pro se. The Attorney General’s Office represented several appellees, and private counsel represented APRN Sandra Charles.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying de novo review of summary judgment, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court on all issues:

First Amendment Retaliation: Although the court liberally construed Chimney’s pro se brief to raise retaliation, it held the claim unexhausted under the PLRA because Chimney’s grievances complained of inadequate and delayed treatment but did not allege that care was withheld in retaliation for his complaints. Without grievance content sufficient to alert prison officials to a retaliation theory, exhaustion was not satisfied.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs: Regardless of whether the Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoner) or Fourteenth Amendment (pretrial detainee) standard applied, Chimney failed to produce evidence that could support a jury verdict:
- His general denials of defendants’ declarations could not create genuine issues of material fact.
- An ultrasound-revealed cyst behind the knee was not shown to be a “sufficiently serious” condition, nor was there evidence that the nurse knew or should have known it posed an excessive risk; a disagreement over treatment does not state a constitutional claim.
- A two-day delay in being seen and in receiving medication for high blood pressure and diabetes was unsupported by evidence of injury or knowledge by staff of a substantial risk, foreclosing a constitutional claim based on delay.
- A conclusory assertion of “chest pains” without evidence that a one-time refusal to examine posed an unreasonable risk was insufficient to survive summary judgment.
Procedure: The court rejected Chimney’s challenge to the district court’s decision to hold oral argument on the motion; the summary judgment decision did not rely on the “non clarity” of his comments, and no prejudice was shown.

Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Sotomayor v. City of New York, 713 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam): Confirms de novo review of summary judgment and the requirement to view evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant. The panel applied this standard throughout.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Recites the summary judgment standard—no genuine dispute as to any material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Forms the procedural backdrop for the evidentiary burdens discussed below.
PLRA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642 (2016): Requires exhaustion of “available” administrative remedies. Ross emphasizes that courts may not craft judge-made exceptions, though exhaustion is excused if remedies are truly unavailable. Here, Chimney used the grievance process; the question became the sufficiency of the grievance content for the retaliation claim.
Johnson v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2d Cir. 2004): Explains that PLRA exhaustion is akin to notice pleading—the grievance must contain allegations sufficient to alert officials to the nature of the claim and allow a defense. This was dispositive for retaliation: grievances about inadequate care, without reference to retaliatory motive, do not exhaust retaliation.
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994): Establishes that an Eighth Amendment medical claim requires a “sufficiently serious” deprivation and a culpable mental state. The “seriousness” component anchored the analysis of the cyst and the brief delay in treatment.
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29–36 (2d Cir. 2017): Clarifies that for pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment, the mens rea is objective—officials need not have subjective awareness of risk; instead, liability turns on whether they knew or should have known of an excessive risk. The panel applied this more plaintiff-friendly standard and still found the evidence lacking.
Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 280–81 (2d Cir. 2006): Under the Eighth Amendment, defendants must be subjectively aware of a substantial risk. The panel acknowledged the different mens rea standards but emphasized that “mere negligence” is insufficient under either regime.
Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Foundation, 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995): Once movants make a proper showing, non-movants must come forward with evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict; bare denials do not suffice. This principle undercut Chimney’s generalized denials of defendants’ declarations.
Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2021): A difference of opinion regarding appropriate medical treatment does not state a constitutional violation; negligence and malpractice are not enough. This foreclosed the cyst-related disagreement.
Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 185–86 (2d Cir. 2003): Delay-of-treatment claims require evidence of adverse effects or a substantial risk to health; context matters. The absence of injury from the two-day delay in receiving medication was fatal.
McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam): Courts liberally construe pro se filings to avoid unduly penalizing pleading defects. The panel applied this to deem claims adequately raised, but liberal construction could not substitute for evidentiary support.

Legal Reasoning

1) PLRA Exhaustion for Retaliation Claims

The court accepted that Chimney wished to press First Amendment retaliation. But PLRA exhaustion turns not only on completing the grievance steps; it also turns on whether the content of the grievance apprised officials of the nature of the claim so they could address it internally. Two fully exhausted grievances were in the record. Each alleged insufficient and delayed medical care. Neither said or fairly implied that staff were refusing care because Chimney had filed medical complaints or otherwise engaged in protected activity. Under Johnson v. Testman’s “notice pleading” analogy, that content was not enough to exhaust retaliation. The court did not require “magic words,” but it required sufficient notice of retaliatory motive. Absent such notice, the retaliation claim could not proceed.

2) Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

The court outlined the two-part test: (a) an objectively serious medical condition or risk; and (b) a culpable mental state—subjective recklessness under the Eighth Amendment, or objective recklessness under the Fourteenth. It then applied the more lenient Fourteenth Amendment mens rea standard and still found no triable issues.

Global evidentiary posture: Defendants supported their motion with declarations and records. Chimney’s response largely consisted of general denials. Under Goenaga and Rule 56, that is insufficient; a non-movant must provide competent evidence (affidavits based on personal knowledge, medical records, declarations, or other materials) that would allow a reasonable jury to find for him.
Knee cyst: Chimney argued a nurse failed to treat a cyst shown by ultrasound. The record did not show that the cyst constituted a sufficiently serious condition, nor that the nurse knew or should have known it posed an excessive risk (Darnell). At most, this reflected a disagreement over treatment, foreclosed by Darby as a constitutional claim.
Two-day delay in being seen and in receiving medication (hypertension/diabetes): The record lacked evidence of injury from the delay or evidence that staff knew or should have known he was not receiving medication and was exposed to a substantial risk. Under Smith, absent adverse consequences or a substantial risk, brief delays do not ordinarily amount to constitutional violations.
One-time refusal to examine “chest pain”: Chimney’s conclusory assertion did not create a genuine dispute. He presented no evidence that the doctor’s isolated refusal posed an “unreasonable risk of serious damage” (Darnell). Without specifics (severity, duration, accompanying symptoms, resulting harm), a jury could not infer constitutional liability.

Finally, the court rejected Chimney’s procedural challenge to holding oral argument: the district court did not rely on anything said at argument to grant summary judgment, and no prejudice was shown.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although non-precedential, this decision is a practical roadmap for PLRA exhaustion and deliberate-indifference litigation in the Second Circuit:

Exhaustion specificity for retaliation: Grievances must do more than chronicle poor care; they must signal the retaliatory nature of the alleged misconduct. Absent such notice, retaliation claims will be dismissed as unexhausted even if the prisoner grieved the underlying medical events.
Evidence threshold at summary judgment: Pro se litigants receive liberal construction, not relaxed evidentiary burdens. General denials do not create genuine disputes. Plaintiffs should submit declarations, medical records, or other competent proof to support the seriousness of conditions, the knowledge (or “should-have-known” awareness) of defendants, and the consequences of delays or refusals.
Medical judgment and brief delays: Disagreements over treatment, isolated refusals, and short delays without injury typically fall on the negligence/malpractice side of the line, not the constitutional one. This decision underscores the continuing vitality of Smith and Darby in screening such claims at summary judgment.
Mens rea convergence in practice: Even the Fourteenth Amendment’s more plaintiff-friendly objective mens rea did not salvage the claims; courts still require proof that an official knew or should have known of an excessive risk—mere inadvertence or negligence remains insufficient.
Appeals practice: The panel’s application of McLeod shows the court’s willingness to reach the merits of pro se arguments, but it also demonstrates that liberal construction cannot compensate for gaps in the evidentiary record.

Complex Concepts Simplified

PLRA Exhaustion: Before suing about prison conditions, a prisoner must use the prison’s internal grievance process. The grievance must contain enough information to alert the prison to the type of claim so it can fix the issue internally. To exhaust a retaliation claim, it is not enough to complain about bad care; the grievance must communicate that the bad care was because of protected activity (e.g., “staff are withholding treatment because I filed complaints”).
Summary Judgment: A case can be dismissed before trial if, even taking the non-movant’s evidence in the best light, there is no real factual dispute for a jury. The non-movant must present actual evidence—documents, sworn statements, or admissible records—not just arguments or denials.
Deliberate Indifference:
- Objective seriousness: The medical condition or the risk from not treating it must be substantial (e.g., risk of serious harm, intense pain, or significant deterioration if untreated).
- Mens rea (state of mind):
  - Eighth Amendment (convicted prisoners): The defendant actually knew of and disregarded a substantial risk.
  - Fourteenth Amendment (pretrial detainees): The defendant knew or should have known that their actions posed an excessive risk. But even here, simple negligence is not enough.
- Delay claims: A brief delay without resulting harm or obvious risk usually does not meet the constitutional threshold.
- Disagreement over treatment: Choosing one reasonable course of treatment over another, or even negligent misjudgment, does not amount to a constitutional violation.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Chimney v. Feder reinforces two practical rules that frequently determine the fate of prison-condition claims. First, PLRA exhaustion demands grievance content that communicates the nature of the legal claim; for retaliation, that means signaling retaliatory motive, not just poor care. Second, deliberate-indifference claims require evidence of an objectively serious risk and more than negligence; disagreements with medical judgment, conclusory allegations, and short delays without injury will not survive summary judgment without concrete proof.

For incarcerated litigants and counsel, the case underscores the importance of drafting grievances that clearly describe alleged motives or rights violations, preserving records of symptoms and consequences, and submitting focused, admissible evidence to meet Rule 56 burdens. For correctional defendants, it highlights effective summary judgment strategies: establish procedural defenses like non-exhaustion tied to grievance content, and present detailed medical records and declarations that negate seriousness and culpable awareness. While non-precedential, the order is a cogent, contemporary application of Second Circuit doctrine on PLRA exhaustion and prison medical-care claims.