Plain View Through a One‑Inch Curtain Gap: Tenth Circuit Rules Motel Exterior Walkways Are Not Curtilage and Unaided Peering Is Not a Search

Case: United States v. Watkins, No. 23-6210 (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025) (published)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

Panel: Judges Hartz (majority), Phillips, and Moritz (dissent)

Introduction

In a published decision with significant Fourth Amendment implications for transient lodging and shared-access buildings, the Tenth Circuit affirmed two felon-in-possession convictions after rejecting a suppression challenge centered on an officer’s late-night visual observation through a one‑inch gap in drawn motel curtains. The case squarely presented whether a police officer, standing on an exterior, open-air motel walkway accessible from the parking lot and using only his unaided vision, conducts a “search” by peering through a minimal gap in curtains into an occupied room.

The majority held that no “search” occurred because the officer stood in a public space rather than the room’s curtilage and relied on his natural senses. The dissent would have found a search under Katz, reasoning that society recognizes a robust expectation of privacy in a motel bedroom behind a locked door and closed drapes, and that pressing one’s face close enough to exploit a tiny gap is an intrusive observation rather than ordinary plain view. The court’s resolution cements two propositions in the Tenth Circuit: (1) exterior hotel/motel walkways open to general access are not curtilage of individual rooms; and (2) unaided visual observations from such public vantage points, even through very small window-covering gaps, do not implicate the Fourth Amendment.

Summary of the Opinion

Police investigating a violent carjacking received a tip from a motel manager that a guest matched the suspect’s description. Officers approached the second-floor room via an exterior staircase and open-air walkway. From the walkway’s “dead-end” extension—unfenced, unenclosed, and open to staff, guests, and visitors—an officer looked at a room window and saw that the curtains were open about an inch. Through that gap, he observed Cameron Watkins, partially undressed on a bed, next to a handgun with an extended magazine.

After a prolonged standoff and arrest, officers secured a search warrant and recovered a loaded 9mm Glock, an extended magazine, and 28 rounds of ammunition. Watkins was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm (related to the motel incident). A superseding indictment added a felon-in-possession-of-ammunition count tied to a later homicide scene, where brands of spent cartridges overlapped with those recovered in the motel search. Watkins pled guilty to the firearm count (preserving his suppression challenge) and went to trial on the ammunition count; a jury convicted him. He received consecutive sentences of 120 months (firearm) and 180 months (ammunition).

On appeal, Watkins argued the initial window observation was an unlawful Fourth Amendment search because the officer intruded on the room’s curtilage and invaded a reasonable expectation of privacy by peering through closed curtains. The Tenth Circuit affirmed:

No curtilage intrusion: The exterior, open-air walkway (including its “dead-end” spur by the window) was a public, common-access area and not curtilage.
No search under Katz: Observations from a public vantage point with unaided senses—even through a small gap in curtains—do not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Good‑faith backdrop: The majority added that, given the weight of precedent permitting such observations, the good-faith exception would foreclose suppression even if a new rule were announced (though the court did not need to rely on this alternative holding).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013): Jardines held that bringing a drug-sniffing dog onto the curtilage (home’s front porch) was a search under a property-based theory. The majority distinguished Jardines: it involved a house’s porch—core curtilage—not a motel’s exterior walkway open to all. Jardines’ examples (porch, side garden, “just outside the front window”) are specifically about the home. Motel walkways are common areas, qualitatively unlike the protected spaces abutting a private dwelling.
Collins v. Virginia, 584 U.S. 586 (2018); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987): These cases define curtilage and emphasize its tie to intimate home life. The majority used Dunn’s “intimately tied” concept to conclude the walkway extension was not used for intimate activities, was unenclosed, and was readily accessible—thus, not curtilage.
Reeves v. Churchich, 484 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2007): Reeves recognizes that officers do not conduct a search by observing from a public place with unaided senses, even if the interior they see is within a protected space. The opinion analogized to Reeves in both the public vantage and unaided senses propositions.
United States v. Lewis, 38 F.4th 527 (7th Cir. 2022): Lewis treated exterior hotel hallways adjacent to parking lots as more akin to public settings than to a home’s porch. The majority adopted similar reasoning to classify the motel walkway here as public and non-curtilage.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001): Kyllo held that using sense-enhancing technology (thermal imaging) not in general public use to glean details of the home’s interior is a search. The majority contrasted Kyllo’s “extraordinary means” with mere unaided visual observation; only the former triggers Fourth Amendment scrutiny from a public vantage point.
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989): Aerial observations from lawful public airspace did not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, notwithstanding measures taken to restrict views (fences, roofs). The majority relied on Ciraolo’s principle: the mere fact an occupant tries to block some views does not bar observations from a lawful public vantage using natural senses.
United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95 (10th Cir. 1980): No search where officers eavesdropped outside a motel-room door from a rightful vantage. The majority used Burns to underscore that hotels’ shared spaces reduce privacy as to what is perceptible from those spaces.
United States v. Mathias, 721 F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2013): Viewing through quarter-inch gaps in a fence with the unaided eye defeated the claimed privacy expectation. Supports the larger principle that small openings visible from public vantage points do not create constitutional privacy.
United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638 (6th Cir. 2002): Peering through a sub-one-inch exposed wall gap into a business with the unaided eye was not a search—again reinforcing that unaided vision through small openings from public places falls within plain-view observation.
United States v. Fields, 113 F.3d 313 (2d Cir. 1997): Observations through a five-to-six-inch opening beneath blinds from a common area did not violate reasonable expectations of privacy, especially where occupants could have fully closed blinds.
United States v. Pace, 955 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc proceedings noted): Officers peering through a small opening into a barn from “open fields” engaged in no search; the fact they pressed their faces close was “of no consequence.” The majority cited this to reject a closeness-based objection.
United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969): Observations through gaps or partially open motel windows from lawful public vantage points were not searches under the plain-view doctrine.
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring): Looking through a small gap in blinds from a place used by the public does not offend reasonable expectations of privacy if ordinary passersby might see the same. The majority drew on this concurrence for its “ordinary passerby” framing.
Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989): The defense invoked Pleasant to argue that steps taken to avoid snooping can establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. The majority limited Pleasant to its specific trash-disposal context and found it inapposite to window gaps left unclosed.
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981): The majority referenced Davis’s good-faith exception (when officers act under then-binding precedent) and Belton’s call for clear, administrable rules to caution against “gap-size” standards that are difficult to apply in the field.

Legal Reasoning of the Majority

1) Curtilage. The court rejected Watkins’s claim that the officer stepped into the room’s curtilage. Key points:

The exterior walkway and its short extension past the door were open-air, unenclosed, and directly accessible via exterior stairs from the parking lot; there were no fences, gates, furniture, or markers restricting access or suggesting exclusive use by room occupants.
Under Dunn’s curtilage concepts and cases like Reeves and Lewis, common-access motel walkways are public or quasi-public zones, not areas “intimately tied” to the room’s sanctity and “privacies of life.”
Jardines did not convert any area “just outside the front window” of every dwelling into curtilage; the Supreme Court’s examples there concerned homes, not motel rooms fronting common walkways.

2) Reasonable expectation of privacy (Katz). The officer’s action did not constitute a “search” because:

He used unaided senses from a public vantage point. Citing Ciraolo, Kyllo, and Reeves, the court emphasized that plain visual observation from public places typically does not implicate the Fourth Amendment absent sense-enhancement or other extraordinary methods.
Multiple circuit decisions approve observations through small openings (quarter-inch gaps, sub-one-inch cracks, several-inch blind openings) so long as the observer is in a place they lawfully may be.
The treatise view (LaFave) disfavoring “minute-opening” observations is normative and inconsistent with the weight of federal appellate precedent the court canvassed.
Concerns about drones or high-tech surveillance are inapposite; drones are not the “unaided senses.”

3) Administrability and good-faith. The court underscored the need for clear rules. Adopting a standard that hinges on measuring gap sizes, estimating how often passersby peep, or parsing inches of opening would be unworkable for officers in the field. Even if a novel standard were plausible, suppression would be foreclosed by the good-faith exception, given “ample precedent” authorizing such observations at the time.

The Dissent’s Countervailing Framework

Judge Moritz would find a search occurred under Katz. Her analysis turns on everyday privacy expectations in motel bedrooms:

Subjective expectation: Watkins locked the door and drew the curtains; he was partially undressed on the bed. This clearly exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy.
Objective reasonableness: Society recognizes motel rooms as a “home away from home,” especially bedrooms and bathrooms—core intimate spaces. People do not expect strangers to press their faces to the glass to peer through a one‑inch gap in drawn curtains.
Intrusiveness matters: This was not “plain view.” The drapes were closed. The dissents analogize to public restroom cases: observations from normal vantage points are not searches, but “extraordinary methods”—peering through cracks up close, over or under partitions—can be. The dissent cites United States v. Billings (10th Cir.) and United States v. White (8th Cir.) to show courts distinguish ordinary observation from intrusive vantage points.
Precedent quality over quantity: The dissent critiques the majority’s string of cases as factually distinguishable: some dealt with sounds or smells, business interiors, garages, fenced yards, or larger gaps plainly visible—none capturing the totality here (a motel bedroom, closed drapes, and a one‑inch gap).
Norms and policies: Pressing one’s face to a window is not behavior an occupant would reasonably expect from members of the public. The dissent warns the majority’s rule erodes privacy and potentially conflicts with state “Peeping Tom” norms.

Reconciling the Competing Views

The divide is less about doctrinal labels than about where “plain view” ends and “intrusive peering” begins:

Vantage point: The majority treats public accessibility as dispositive; if any member of the public could lawfully stand where the officer stood, then unaided seeing is plain view. The dissent stresses how close the officer must be to leverage a tiny gap—a proximity not typical of ordinary passersby.
Means used: For the majority, the key is the absence of technology or enhancement; for the dissent, physical maneuvers that exploit tiny openings can be “extraordinary” even without tools.
Administrability vs. factual nuance: The majority prefers clear, bright-edged guidance and rejects gap-size rules; the dissent emphasizes the case-specific nature of reasonableness and is willing to draw lines based on ordinary social expectations and intrusiveness.
Precedential foundation: The majority leans on a broad, cross-circuit consensus that unaided observation from public vantage points—even through small openings—is not a search. The dissent observes that none of those decisions involved a motel bedroom with drapes drawn and a one‑inch gap, urging that the context of intimate domestic space should tip the balance.

Impact

Watkins meaningfully extends and clarifies Fourth Amendment doctrine in the Tenth Circuit on two axes: curtilage boundaries for transient lodging and the scope of “plain view” from public vantage points.

Curtilage of hotel/motel rooms: Exterior, open-air walkways (including “dead-end” spurs) accessible from parking areas are non-curtilage, common spaces. Officers may stand there, knock, and make unaided observations without implicating the Fourth Amendment.
Plain view through small gaps: Officers may lawfully peer through small (even one‑inch) gaps in curtains or blinds from public vantage points using their natural senses. The court declines to police gap size or viewer proximity absent technology or trespass.
Multi-unit and shared-access buildings: Although the opinion concerns an exterior motel corridor, its logic likely reaches apartment or dormitory common areas, exterior landings, or publicly accessible hallways: if the vantage is lawful and open, unaided observation remains non-search plain view.
Technology line remains intact: Kyllo’s prohibition on sense-enhancing tools and likely similar constraints on drones/zoom optics endure. Watkins expressly disclaims authorization for technological surveillance: drones are not “unaided senses.”
Law enforcement guidance: Officers have clear, administrable guidance in the Tenth Circuit: they may look through naturally occurring gaps visible from public/common areas, even up close, so long as they do not intrude into curtilage or use technological enhancements.
Defense strategy implications: Suppression arguments premised solely on peering through small natural gaps from public/common corridors will face an uphill battle. Challenges may need to focus on trespass, use of technology, or non-public vantage points.
Potential friction with state privacy norms: The dissent flags tension with “Peeping Tom” statutes and social expectations. While state criminal norms do not define the Fourth Amendment, practical community standards could influence future case-specific analyses (especially where vantage points are less public or observers employ artificial aids).
Good-faith buffer: Even if future courts refine or narrow Watkins, the majority’s good-faith discussion signals a strong reluctance to suppress evidence where officers relied on then-existing precedent allowing unaided observation from public vantage points.
Supreme Court interest: The opinion collects many circuit authorities; the dissent articulates a principled, context-sensitive counterview. If other circuits adopt the dissent’s perspective—especially in intimate spaces with fully drawn coverings—the resulting tension could invite further review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Curtilage: The area immediately surrounding a dwelling that is associated with the intimate activities of home life (e.g., a home’s porch or side yard). Police intrusions into curtilage without a warrant can be searches. Common, publicly accessible spaces outside motel rooms are generally not curtilage.
Public vantage point: A place where any member of the public can lawfully be (e.g., exterior hotel walkways, open parking lots, navigable airspace). Observations from these spots with unaided senses are typically not searches.
Plain view: If an officer is lawfully present and perceives something with natural senses without intruding or using technology, the observation is not a “search,” even when the object or activity is inside a protected space.
Reasonable expectation of privacy (Katz): A two-part test: did the person actually expect privacy, and is that expectation one society recognizes as reasonable? Technology-enhanced or intrusive methods can convert observation into a search even from public places.
Sense-enhancing technology: Tools like thermal imagers, specialized optics, or drones (depending on use) can trigger Fourth Amendment protections because they reveal information not available to ordinary human senses from lawful vantage points.
Good-faith exception: Evidence is not suppressed when officers reasonably rely on binding precedent or a warrant later found invalid. It aims to deter culpable police misconduct, not to penalize officers who follow existing law.
Publish vs. non-publish: A “published” circuit decision is precedential within that circuit. Watkins is binding on federal courts in the Tenth Circuit unless and until abrogated.

Conclusion

United States v. Watkins announces a clear, administrable rule in the Tenth Circuit: an officer’s unaided visual observation through a one‑inch gap in drawn curtains from an exterior motel walkway that is open to public use is not a “search,” and such walkways are not curtilage. The majority’s reasoning draws heavily on the public-vantage/unaided-senses line of cases and resists turning inches of fabric gap or viewer proximity into constitutional thresholds. The dissent, invoking Katz’s protection of people rather than places, would treat face‑to‑window peering into a motel bedroom with closed curtains as an intrusive search, underscoring societal norms and the intimate character of the space.

Practically, Watkins strengthens law enforcement’s ability to exploit naturally visible openings from public or common-access vantage points without a warrant or probable cause, while reaffirming technological limits set by Kyllo. It also delineates curtilage boundaries in transient-lodging contexts. Whether other circuits will embrace the majority’s administrability-first approach or pivot toward the dissent’s context-driven privacy analysis—especially in intimate interior spaces—remains a live question. For now, in the Tenth Circuit, plain view truly means what the unaided eye can see from where the public may lawfully stand—even through a narrow sliver in the drapes.