Plain Meaning Over “Spirit”: Pennsylvania High Court Bars ARD Revocation for Pre‑Admission Conduct or Implied Conditions

Introduction

In Commonwealth v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Middle District) reversed a Superior Court affirmance of an Adams County order removing Benjamin Jordan Jenkins from the accelerated rehabilitative disposition (ARD) program. The case centers on whether a defendant’s ARD participation may be revoked based on (a) conduct that occurred before the defendant entered ARD, and (b) an “implied” condition inferred from the program’s perceived “spirit,” rather than an express condition imposed by statute, rule, or court order.

The Commonwealth argued that allowing Jenkins to remain in ARD would offend the “spirit and intent” of the program, pointing to his second DUI arrest—an event that occurred before he applied for, and was accepted into, ARD on the first DUI. The trial court accepted that rationale and also faulted Jenkins for alleged “deception by omission” on his ARD application. The Superior Court agreed. The Supreme Court did not. The Majority (per Chief Justice Todd) held that ARD may not be revoked based on an implied condition, and that pre‑admission conduct cannot constitute a violation of ARD conditions. Justice Wecht’s concurring opinion (joined by Justice Mundy) underscores the primacy of statutory text over perceived “spirit,” and clarifies that truthfully answering an ARD application that asks about pending charges and prior convictions does not require disclosure of uncharged arrests.

The decision delineates the legal boundary between prosecutorial discretion to recommend ARD entry and the strictly governed grounds for ARD removal: the latter is controlled by statute (75 Pa.C.S. § 3807) and court rule (Pa.R.Crim.P. 318), not by equitable appeals to program “spirit” or fairness.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court reversed the Superior Court, holding that ARD participation cannot be revoked for violating an “implied” condition or based on conduct that predated program entry. Jenkins, who had a first DUI charge (July 9, 2021) and a later DUI stop (July 31, 2021) for which he was not charged until March 22, 2022, entered ARD on the first case. The ARD conditions included not violating the law “during” ARD. Because the second DUI event preceded ARD, it could not constitute a violation of an ARD condition. Nor did Jenkins misrepresent anything on the ARD application: he truthfully stated he had no prior convictions or pending charges; an uncharged arrest is neither.

Justice Wecht’s concurrence endorses the Majority’s holding and stresses that courts may not disregard the clear statutory text “under the pretext of pursuing [the] spirit” of the law. If prosecutors want to consider uncharged arrests when screening for ARD, they must ask about them; the defendant has no duty to volunteer information not requested. And while DAs retain discretion to recommend ARD admission, removal from ARD is only permitted under the express terms of § 3807(e) and Rule 318.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• 75 Pa.C.S. § 3807 (ARD for DUI)
  • § 3807(a) authorizes ARD as a diversionary option for DUI defendants.
  • § 3807(b) sets program requirements and conditions.
  • § 3807(e) specifies consequences for failing to complete “conditions of participation contained in this section,” including that the criminal record will not be expunged and the Commonwealth may proceed on the charges.
• Pa.R.Crim.P. 318
  • Rule 318(A) authorizes the Commonwealth to move for removal when a defendant “during the period of the program” violates a condition.
  • Rule 318(C) requires a hearing and permits termination if a violation is found.
• Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.
  • § 1921(b): When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the letter of the law controls and may not be disregarded in pursuit of its spirit.
  • § 1903: Words and phrases are to be construed according to their common and approved usage.
• Case law affirming the primacy of statutory text over policy appeals:
  • Sivick v. State Ethics Comm’n, 238 A.3d 1250, 1263 (Pa. 2020) (courts may not disregard unambiguous language to serve perceived spirit).
  • Cherry v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 642 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. 1994) (no ambiguity justifies discarding the legislature’s words).
  • Commonwealth v. Revtai, 532 A.2d 1, 11 (Pa. 1987) (courts cannot change the clear letter of the law under the guise of pursuing its spirit).
• Commonwealth v. Berry, 323 A.3d 641, 654 (Pa. 2024)
  • Arrests are not convictions and, as a general matter, evidence of arrest records is inadmissible and irrelevant in nearly every criminal law context. In this case, the principle supports the textual distinction between arrests and pending charges/convictions.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s analysis proceeds from text to application:

• Express statutory and rule limits on ARD removal:
  • Section 3807(e) and Rule 318 are the exclusive vehicles for terminating ARD participation. Both contemplate a violation of program conditions.
  • Rule 318, in particular, keys removal to conduct “during the period of the program,” foreclosing revocation based on pre‑admission events.
• No violation occurred here:
  • The second DUI stop happened before Jenkins entered ARD and accepted the condition not to violate the law. Pre‑admission conduct cannot breach a condition that did not yet govern him.
  • There was no express condition requiring disclosure of uncharged arrests, and there is no legal basis for reading one into the program as an “implied” term.
• Truthful ARD application; no “deception by omission”:
  • The ARD application asked whether Jenkins had prior convictions or pending charges; he truthfully answered “no.”
  • An uncharged arrest is neither a conviction nor a pending charge. Under ordinary usage (and consistent with Berry), the Commonwealth cannot treat “arrest” as synonymous with these terms.
  • The Commonwealth bears the burden of asking what it wants to know. If prosecutors deem uncharged arrests material to ARD screening, they must ask about them. A defendant has no duty to volunteer information the form does not solicit.
• “Spirit of the law” cannot override clear text:
  • Invocations of the ARD program’s “spirit and intent” cannot justify departure from § 3807(e) and Rule 318’s unambiguous terms.
  • Under 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b), courts may not disregard the letter of the law in pursuit of its spirit. Sivick, Cherry, and Revtai reinforce this rule.
  • Labeling statutory commands as “technicalities” invites error; courts necessarily apply technical requirements to effectuate legislative directives.
• Admission discretion versus removal authority:
  • The District Attorney has broad discretion to recommend admission into ARD. But once admitted, removal is governed by the statute and rule, not by amorphous policy concerns.
  • The Commonwealth’s prediction of a “chilling effect” on admissions if removal is curtailed is a policy contention, not a legal basis to rewrite clear law. If policy needs have changed, the remedy lies in amending the statute or revising forms and screening practices, not in judicial re‑drafting.

Addressing the Commonwealth’s Arguments

• “Spirit and intent” of ARD:

  The trial court and Superior Court reasoned that allowing Jenkins to remain in ARD would offend the program’s “spirit” by effectively treating him as a first‑time offender when he had been stopped a second time. The Supreme Court rejected this, emphasizing that the “spirit” is embodied in the text the legislature and rules committee adopted. Where the text is clear, the inquiry ends.

• “Technicalities” and procedural minutiae:

  The Commonwealth characterized Jenkins’ position as relying on technicalities. The Court responded that technical compliance with statutes and rules is the core of judicial duty. Dismissing statutory prerequisites as “technicalities” does not authorize courts to ignore them.

• Alleged “deception by omission”:

  The trial court conceded there was “no overt misrepresentation” but posited deception by omission. The Court rejected this: omission cannot be deceptive where the Commonwealth chose not to ask about arrests. The defendant’s truthful answers to the questions posed cannot be transmogrified into concealment.

• Prosecutorial discretion to admit versus remove:

  The Commonwealth conflated its broad discretion to recommend ARD admission with authority to remove a participant based on policy concerns. The Court drew a firm line: removal must rest on a violation of an express condition during ARD under § 3807(e) and Rule 318.

What This Decision Does Not Do

• It does not bar the Commonwealth from prosecuting the second DUI; it simply prevents using that pre‑admission conduct to revoke ARD on the first case.
• It does not prevent DAs from asking about (and considering) uncharged arrests in ARD applications going forward. The concurrence expressly invites the Commonwealth to revise its forms to elicit this information.
• It does not limit removal where a defendant commits a new offense during ARD or violates explicit court‑imposed conditions post‑admission. Those remain valid grounds for termination under Rule 318 and § 3807(e).
• It does not bind admission decisions; prosecutors retain broad discretion to deny ARD at the outset based on their screening criteria, provided any criteria comply with law.

Practical Impact and Guidance

For District Attorneys and ARD Administrators

• Revise ARD application forms to ask directly about arrests, police contacts, or uncharged conduct relevant to screening, if you intend to consider them.
• Establish clear, written screening policies that align with § 3807 and Rule 318, distinguishing pre‑admission considerations (admission discretion) from post‑admission grounds (removal authority).
• Ensure that any conditions you expect to enforce during ARD are explicit, written, and acknowledged by the defendant at entry.
• If an additional incident exists but has not yet been charged, consider the timing of charging decisions relative to ARD recommendations to avoid later disputes about pre‑admission conduct.

For Trial Courts

• Anchor removal decisions in the text of § 3807(e) and Rule 318: identify the express condition and verify the violation occurred during ARD.
• Do not infer “implied” conditions from general notions of program spirit or institutional fairness.
• Be cautious about conflating preludes to admission (screening) with grounds for termination (removal).

For Defense Counsel and Defendants

• Answer ARD applications truthfully and precisely according to the questions asked. If a form does not ask about arrests, no duty to volunteer that information exists—unless the form or court imposes such a requirement.
• Educate clients that any post‑admission misconduct can jeopardize ARD; the protection recognized here is limited to pre‑admission events and the absence of express conditions.
• If prosecutors seek removal based on “spirit of the law” or pre‑admission conduct, invoke § 3807(e), Rule 318, and the plain‑meaning cases (Sivick, Cherry, Revtai) to resist termination.

For the General Assembly and Rulemakers

• If policy makers want pre‑admission conduct to be an explicit ground for removal, legislative or rule amendments would be necessary. Courts will not imply such a basis absent textual authorization.
• Any future reform should define terms (e.g., “arrest,” “pending charge”) and timing triggers (“during the period of the program”) with precision to avoid ambiguity.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• ARD (Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition):

  A pretrial diversion program that emphasizes rehabilitation over punishment for eligible offenses (including DUI). Successful completion often leads to dismissal and expungement; failure can result in prosecution and non‑expungement.

• Arrest vs. Pending Charge vs. Conviction:

  An arrest is a custodial event; a pending charge exists when formal charges are filed; a conviction is a final adjudication of guilt. They are not interchangeable, and legal consequences often turn on the distinction.

• Express vs. Implied Conditions:

  Express conditions are written, specific requirements imposed by statute, rule, or court order. Implied conditions are unstated expectations. The Court held ARD removal may rest only on express conditions.

• “During the period of the program”:

  A temporal limiter in Rule 318: only conduct occurring after ARD entry and before completion can violate ARD conditions for removal purposes.

• Plain‑Meaning Rule of Statutory Interpretation:

  When statutory text is clear, courts must apply its ordinary meaning and may not look to policy or “spirit” to alter it (1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b)).

Conclusion

Commonwealth v. Jenkins clarifies and tightens the legal framework for ARD removals. The Supreme Court emphatically holds that removal must be grounded in a violation of an express condition “during the period of the program,” as specified by 75 Pa.C.S. § 3807(e) and Pa.R.Crim.P. 318. Pre‑admission conduct does not qualify, and courts cannot conjure “implied” conditions or invoke the ARD program’s “spirit” to circumvent clear statutory and rule text. Moreover, truthful answers on ARD applications cannot be repackaged as “deception by omission” when the Commonwealth did not ask about the information it now deems material.

The decision reinforces separation of roles: prosecutors may set admission criteria and revise forms; courts must enforce statutes and rules as written. The immediate impact will likely be administrative rather than doctrinal—expect revised ARD applications and more deliberate screening by prosecutors. The broader significance lies in the Court’s reaffirmation of the plain‑meaning canon: technical statutory guardrails are not expendable; they are the law. By drawing that line in the ARD context, the Court provides a clear template for future diversion‑program disputes and, more generally, a reminder that the Commonwealth’s policy choices must be implemented through clear text, not inferred “spirit.”

Key Takeaways

• No ARD revocation based on implied conditions or pre‑admission conduct.
• Removal requires violation of an express condition during ARD under § 3807(e) and Rule 318.
• Truthful ARD applications cannot be deemed deceptive for not disclosing unasked‑for information (e.g., uncharged arrests).
• Prosecutors retain discretion at admission and can revise forms to capture arrest information prospectively.
• Courts will not disregard clear statutory text in pursuit of program “spirit.”