Plain-Error Limits on Challenging Misstated Criminal History and Bare Arrest Records in Sentencing: Commentary on United States v. Rodriguez‑Jimenez

Plain-Error Limits on Challenging Misstated Criminal History and Bare Arrest Records in Sentencing: Commentary on United States v. Rodriguez‑Jimenez

I. Introduction

The Fifth Circuit’s unpublished per curiam decision in United States v. Rodriguez‑Jimenez, No. 25‑50090 (5th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025), arises from a common but legally rich context: an illegal reentry prosecution under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) where the defendant received a substantial upward variance to the statutory maximum, far above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range.

Although the opinion is designated as non‑precedential under 5th Cir. R. 47.5, it is instructive in several recurring sentencing disputes:

  • How the Fifth Circuit applies plain‑error review to claims that a district court relied on clearly erroneous factual findings at sentencing;
  • When the consideration of bare arrest records warrants reversal;
  • The degree of deference given to a large upward variance from the Guidelines in illegal reentry cases; and
  • How to handle alleged conflicts between oral and written supervised release conditions, specifically between “immediately” reporting and reporting “within 72 hours.”

The case pits Emiliano Rodriguez‑Jimenez, a noncitizen with a history of domestic violence, alcohol‑related offenses, and multiple immigration contacts, against the United States. The district court sentenced him to the two‑year statutory maximum and imposed supervised release. On appeal, he challenged both the sentence and the supervised release conditions as procedurally and substantively unreasonable and as ambiguous.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed in full. In doing so, the court reinforced a demanding application of the “substantial rights” prong of plain‑error review in sentencing, reiterated the prohibition on reliance on bare arrest records while limiting its remedial bite, and confirmed that there is no material conflict between supervised release conditions requiring reporting “immediately” versus “within 72 hours.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Rodriguez‑Jimenez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), which carries a maximum sentence of two years’ imprisonment. The Presentence Report (PSR) calculated:

  • Total offense level: 6
  • Criminal history category: II
  • Resulting advisory Guidelines range: 1–7 months

The PSR described six prior state convictions:

  • Two convictions for assault family violence;
  • One conviction for driving while intoxicated (DWI);
  • One conviction for failing to identify;
  • Two convictions for possession of marijuana.

Despite these six convictions, only two resulted in criminal history points under the Sentencing Guidelines. The PSR also noted:

  • Three prior apprehensions by immigration authorities;
  • Prior arrests (without convictions) for interfering with an emergency call, public intoxication, and criminal mischief;
  • Evidence of alcohol use and intoxication in connection with at least one assault offense.

The key temporal fact was that Rodriguez‑Jimenez had been removed on April 15, 2024, and had reentered the United States by July 2024, showing what the district court termed a “quick return” and a lack of respect for U.S. law.

B. Sentencing in the District Court

At sentencing:

  • The defendant requested a time‑served sentence, emphasizing that:
    • he had already served more than six months in custody; and
    • this was his first illegal reentry conviction and he was motivated by the need to support his three minor children.
  • The government requested an above‑Guidelines sentence, stressing:
    • Rodriguez‑Jimenez’s underrepresented criminal history; and
    • his rapid return after removal in April 2024.

The district court imposed:

  • 24 months’ imprisonment (the statutory maximum); and
  • One year of supervised release.

In explaining the upward variance, the court gave six reasons (paraphrased and grouped):

  1. Quick return after removal (April to July 2024), showing a lack of respect for U.S. law;
  2. “Extensive criminal history” of six state convictions (described as assault and drug‑related) and a belief that his criminal history category was underrepresented;
  3. Additional arrests for interfering with an emergency call, public intoxication, and criminal mischief;
  4. Evidence of an alcohol and substance abuse problem;
  5. Extreme violent behavior and a “significant risk to the public,” particularly domestic violence involving hair‑pulling and repeated punching of his ex‑wife for not cooking dinner;
  6. Multiple prior removals without prosecution, evincing a lack of respect for U.S. law and further underrepresentation of his criminal history.

Neither side objected to the sentence or to the explanation at the hearing.

C. Issues on Appeal

On appeal, Rodriguez‑Jimenez raised three overarching arguments:

  1. Procedural unreasonableness:
    • The sentence rested on clearly erroneous facts about:
      • the extent of his criminal history, and
      • whether he had an “alcohol and substance abuse problem.”
    • The district court improperly relied on bare arrest records.
  2. Substantive unreasonableness:
    • The 24‑month sentence, far above the 1–7 month range, was greater than necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
  3. Ambiguous supervised release conditions:
    • The oral pronouncement required him to report to probation “within 72 hours” if not deported or if he later reentered,
    • while the written judgment said he must “immediately report” under the same circumstances, creating a supposed conflict.

D. The Fifth Circuit’s Holding

The Fifth Circuit:

  • Applied plain‑error review to the procedural challenges because no objections were made below;
  • Found some factual misstatements and improper reliance on bare arrest records, but held that none affected the defendant’s substantial rights;
  • Held that the above‑Guidelines sentence was substantively reasonable when viewed through the lens of the § 3553(a) factors;
  • Concluded there is no material difference between requiring the defendant to report “immediately” and “within 72 hours,” citing United States v. Perez‑Espinoza, 31 F.4th 988 (5th Cir. 2022).

Accordingly, the judgment—including both the sentence and the supervised release conditions—was affirmed.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural Reasonableness and Plain‑Error Review

Sentencing appeals in the federal system follow the two‑step framework laid down in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), and frequently repeated by the Fifth Circuit (here via United States v. Nguyen, 854 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2017)):

  1. Determine whether there is any procedural error (e.g., incorrect Guidelines calculation, reliance on clearly erroneous facts, failure to consider § 3553(a), or inadequate explanation); and
  2. If procedurally sound, review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.

Because Rodriguez‑Jimenez did not object at sentencing, his procedural claims were reviewed for plain error under United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), and Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009). Under this standard, he had to show:

  1. An error occurred;
  2. The error was plain (clear or obvious under current law);
  3. The error affected his substantial rights—in this context, a reasonable probability of a lower sentence on remand; and
  4. The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The panel’s core holding is that, even though there were plain errors (misdescribing the criminal history and referencing bare arrests), they did not meet the demanding third prong—no reasonable probability of a lower sentence on remand.

1. Substance Abuse Finding

The defendant argued that the district court clearly erred by finding that he had an “alcohol and substance abuse problem.” The Fifth Circuit disagreed.

The PSR stated that:

  • He began drinking at 18;
  • He consumed approximately six beers bi‑weekly; and
  • He had three convictions involving drugs or alcohol, and was intoxicated during at least one violent offense.

Relying on United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193, 203 (5th Cir. 2005), the court framed the question as whether the district court’s finding was “plausible in light of the record read as a whole.” It held that the inference of substance abuse was supported by the PSR and thus not clearly erroneous.

Key point: District courts may draw reasonable inferences about substance abuse from patterns of alcohol‑ or drug‑related offenses and self‑reported use in the PSR; such inferences will be upheld if at all plausible.

2. Misstatements About Criminal History and Criminal History Points

On the other hand, the panel found two plain factual errors:

  • The district court said that Rodriguez‑Jimenez had six convictions for “assault and drug related offenses,” when only four of the six fell into those categories.
  • The court stated that six offenses received criminal history points, when in fact the PSR awarded criminal history points to only two convictions.

These mistakes directly contradicted the PSR, a reliable and detailed source of sentencing facts. Citing United States v. Ibarra, No. 24‑20071, 2024 WL 5118485, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024), the panel reaffirmed that it is clear error for a district court to describe an offense in a way that is inconsistent with the PSR.

However, under Escalante‑Reyes, 689 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), a defendant must show a “reasonable probability” that the error increased his sentence to satisfy the substantial‑rights prong of plain error. For sentencing, the question is whether correcting the error would likely yield a lower sentence on remand. See also United States v. Garcia‑Quintanilla, 574 F.3d 295, 304 (5th Cir. 2009).

The panel held that this standard was not met:

  • Whether the court counted four versus six assault/drug offenses did not materially change the picture of a serious criminal history with repeated violence and substance involvement.
  • Even if the court misstated how many convictions received criminal history points, the central fact remained that the Guidelines criminal history category underrepresented his record and prior contacts with the criminal justice and immigration systems.

Crucially, the panel noted there was no indication that the sentencing judge “repeatedly emphasized” or heavily relied on the mistaken details; instead, the court cited a cluster of proper reasons for the upward variance (violent conduct, quick return, prior removals, underrepresented history).

This analysis underscores a significant practical rule:

Minor quantitative misstatements about the number or scoring of prior offenses will rarely satisfy the “substantial rights” prong of plain‑error review where the overall narrative of a serious, underrepresented criminal history remains intact and other valid § 3553(a) factors independently support the sentence.

3. Reliance on Bare Arrest Records

The most sensitive procedural issue concerned the district court’s reliance on bare arrest records—records of arrests that did not lead to convictions or factual findings.

Under United States v. Johnson, 648 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2011), it is plain error for a sentencing court to rely on bare arrest records as evidence of criminal conduct. The rationale is straightforward: absent corroborating information, an arrest does not establish that the defendant actually committed the offense.

The panel held that the district court did commit plain error in considering those bare arrests. But, following United States v. Williams, 620 F.3d 483, 495–96 (5th Cir. 2010), it concluded the error did not affect substantial rights.

In Williams, the Fifth Circuit recognized that where the sentencing judge discusses numerous proper sentencing factors at length and only mentions bare arrest records in passing, the improper consideration does not justify reversal. That reasoning was applied here:

  • The district court relied heavily on:
    • the underrepresented criminal history with multiple convictions,
    • the rapid illegal reentry,
    • prior removals,
    • violent domestic conduct, and
    • substance abuse issues.
  • The references to bare arrest records were only part of a broader picture and not the linchpin of the sentencing rationale.

The result is a two‑part rule:

  1. Substantive rule: District courts may not rely on bare arrest records as evidence of criminal behavior at sentencing (Johnson remains good law).
  2. Remedial limitation: On plain‑error review, a sentence will not be vacated unless the consideration of bare arrests is shown to have materially affected the sentence—typically meaning it was a central or heavily emphasized reason for the chosen term.

This makes it significantly harder for defendants, absent contemporaneous objections, to reverse sentences merely because the court referenced arrests without convictions.

B. Substantive Reasonableness and the Upward Variance

Having found no reversible procedural error, the panel turned to substantive reasonableness. A sentence is substantively unreasonable if it:

  1. Fails to account for a factor that should receive significant weight;
  2. Gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor; or
  3. Represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the § 3553(a) factors.

This framework comes from United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 724 (5th Cir. 2015).

The parties disputed the standard of review (plain error vs. abuse of discretion) for the substantive challenge. The panel noted:

  • Under Holguin‑Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020), requesting a lower sentence (such as time served) preserves a general claim that the ultimate sentence is greater than necessary.
  • However, as Justice Alito’s concurrence in Holguin‑Hernandez and United States v. Zarco‑Beiza, 24 F.4th 477 (5th Cir. 2022), explain, a defendant must still specifically identify alleged legal errors at sentencing to preserve particular substantive objections.

The panel found it unnecessary to resolve the debate, holding that Rodriguez‑Jimenez’s sentence was valid even under the more favorable abuse‑of‑discretion standard.

In assessing the substantive reasonableness of the 24‑month sentence (versus the 1–7 month Guidelines range), the Fifth Circuit emphasized the district court’s reliance on proper § 3553(a) factors:

  • History and characteristics of the defendant:
    • Two convictions for assault family violence with disturbing factual circumstances;
    • A pattern of alcohol and drug‑involved criminal conduct;
    • Prior convictions and contacts suggesting a risk of continued dangerousness.
  • Need to protect the public:
    • The court expressly found “extreme violent behavior” and a continuing “significant risk to the public.”
  • Respect for the law and deterrence:
    • Rapid reentry after removal and multiple prior removals without prosecution showed disregard for immigration law.

The panel concluded that:

  • The district court fairly weighed the § 3553(a) factors;
  • There was no evidence it ignored a factor that should have been prioritized;
  • Even if mention of his “first federal offense” were arguably an improper aggravating factor, the court did not assign it “significant weight.”

In short, given the serious domestic violence, repeat criminal activity, rapid illegal reentry, and underrepresented criminal history, the upward variance to the statutory maximum was deemed within the broad range of permissible outcomes. No abuse of discretion was found.

C. Supervised Release Conditions: “Immediately” vs. “Within 72 Hours”

Finally, Rodriguez‑Jimenez argued that his supervised release conditions were ambiguous because:

  • The oral pronouncement at sentencing required him to report to the nearest probation office “within 72 hours” if he was not deported or if he later reentered the United States; but
  • The written judgment required him to “immediately report” to the nearest probation office under the same circumstances.

Ordinarily, if there is a conflict between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment, the oral pronouncement controls. But here, the Fifth Circuit relied on its prior decision in United States v. Perez‑Espinoza, 31 F.4th 988, 989 (5th Cir. 2022):

There is “no material difference between requiring [a defendant] to report ‘immediately’ and requiring him to report ‘within 72 hours.’”

The court therefore found no error or ambiguity. Both formulations effectively require prompt reporting upon presence in the United States, and the written judgment does not materially expand the obligation set orally.

Practically, this confirms that minor linguistic variations of this type—absent any change in substance—do not create an enforceable conflict between oral and written conditions.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is anchored in a network of Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedents, which together shape the outcome:

  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007):
    • Establishes the two‑step review of sentences (procedural first, then substantive) and the abuse‑of‑discretion standard.
    • Influence: Provides the overall framework applied through Nguyen.
  • United States v. Nguyen, 854 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 2017):
    • Reiterates Gall’s two‑step approach for the Fifth Circuit.
    • Influence: Cited to frame the appellate review sequence.
  • United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), and Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009):
    • Set out the four‑prong plain‑error standard.
    • Puckett stresses that satisfying this standard “is difficult, as it should be.”
    • Influence: Provide the basic test under which the procedural challenges were analyzed.
  • United States v. Villanueva, 408 F.3d 193 (5th Cir. 2005):
    • Articulates the “plausible in light of the record read as a whole” standard for reviewing factual findings at sentencing.
    • Influence: Used to uphold the district court’s inference of substance abuse.
  • United States v. Ibarra, No. 24‑20071, 2024 WL 5118485 (5th Cir. Dec. 16, 2024) (unpublished):
    • Holds that a district court clearly errs by describing an offense in a way that contradicts the PSR.
    • Influence: Supports the finding that the district court plainly misstated aspects of the criminal history.
  • United States v. Escalante‑Reyes, 689 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and United States v. Garcia‑Quintanilla, 574 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2009):
    • Clarify that, in sentencing, substantial rights are affected if there is a reasonable probability of a lower sentence on remand.
    • Influence: Provide the standard under which the misstatements and bare arrest reliance were found non‑prejudicial.
  • United States v. Johnson, 648 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2011):
    • Forbids reliance on bare arrest records as evidence of wrongdoing at sentencing.
    • Influence: Basis for finding plain error in considering the defendant’s bare arrests.
  • United States v. Williams, 620 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2010):
    • Holds that consideration of bare arrest records does not necessarily affect substantial rights if the sentencing court relied primarily on permissible factors.
    • Influence: Used to deny relief despite the Johnson error.
  • United States v. Navarro‑Jusino, 993 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2021):
    • Restates that a sentence must be reasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
    • Influence: Citation for the substantive reasonableness standard.
  • United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2015):
    • Articulates the test for when a sentence is substantively unreasonable (failure to consider important factors, reliance on improper factors, or clear error in weighing factors).
    • Influence: Governs the review of the upward variance.
  • Holguin‑Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020):
    • Holds that asking for a shorter sentence preserves a general substantive‑reasonableness challenge.
    • Influence: Provides the backdrop for the panel’s discussion of preservation, though the court sidestepped choosing a standard of review.
  • United States v. Zarco‑Beiza, 24 F.4th 477 (5th Cir. 2022):
    • Clarifies that to preserve specific objections, defendants must identify the particular legal error at sentencing.
    • Influence: Cited (with Justice Alito’s concurrence in Holguin‑Hernandez) to suggest that not all specific claims are preserved by a general request for a shorter sentence.
  • United States v. Perez‑Espinoza, 31 F.4th 988 (5th Cir. 2022):
    • Holds that there is no material conflict between requiring reporting “immediately” and “within 72 hours” for supervised release.
    • Influence: Directly controls the resolution of the supervised‑release condition issue here.

Collectively, these authorities reinforce a clear pattern: while the Fifth Circuit polices certain structural sentencing rules (such as the ban on using bare arrests), it also applies a robust “no harm, no foul” approach under plain‑error review, particularly where multiple permissible § 3553(a) factors support the challenged sentence.

E. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

  • Procedural reasonableness asks whether the process of sentencing was correct:
    • Were the Guidelines properly calculated?
    • Did the court consider the § 3553(a) factors?
    • Did the court rely on accurate facts?
    • Did the judge adequately explain the sentence?
  • Substantive reasonableness asks whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the facts and § 3553(a) factors—i.e., is it “greater than necessary” to achieve the purposes of sentencing?

2. Plain‑Error Review

Plain error applies when the defendant did not object in the trial court. The appellate court will correct such an unpreserved error only if:

  1. There was an actual error;
  2. The error was clear or obvious;
  3. The error likely changed the outcome (for sentencing, likely produced a longer sentence); and
  4. Leaving the error uncorrected would seriously damage the fairness or reputation of the judicial system.

This standard is intentionally demanding. It strongly discourages litigants from withholding objections and then raising them for the first time on appeal.

3. “Substantial Rights” in the Sentencing Context

To show that a sentencing error affected substantial rights, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that:

  • Absent the error, the district court would likely have imposed a lower sentence.

In practical terms, defendants must show the error was important to the judge’s reasoning, not merely one of many minor factors. Centrality and emphasis in the sentencing explanation matter greatly.

4. Bare Arrest Records

A bare arrest record is simply a record that someone was arrested, without:

  • a conviction;
  • a factual admission by the defendant; or
  • documented, reliable facts establishing the underlying conduct.

Under Fifth Circuit law, such bare arrest records cannot be used as evidence that the defendant actually committed the alleged crime, because arrest alone does not establish guilt.

5. Underrepresented Criminal History

The Guidelines assign a criminal history category based on points tied to:

  • the number of prior sentences;
  • their length; and
  • their recency.

However, this scoring does not always capture:

  • older convictions beyond the time limits;
  • less serious offenses that nonetheless show a pattern; or
  • prior removals or immigration conduct that does not yield criminal convictions.

When a judge describes a criminal history as “underrepresented,” the judge is indicating that the Guidelines category (here, Category II) does not fully reflect the defendant’s real‑world pattern of offending and risk.

6. Upward Variance vs. Departure

  • An upward departure is a movement above the Guidelines range based on a specific departure provision in the Guidelines themselves.
  • An upward variance is a movement above the Guidelines range based directly on the statutory § 3553(a) factors, independent of any specific Guidelines departing provision.

In Rodriguez‑Jimenez, the sentence was an upward variance justified by the district court’s assessment of the § 3553(a) factors (history, public safety, deterrence, respect for the law).

7. “Immediately” vs. “Within 72 Hours”

Though they look different linguistically, the Fifth Circuit has held there is no material difference between requiring a defendant on supervised release to report:

  • “immediately” upon release or presence in the United States, and
  • “within 72 hours” of that event.

In practice, “immediately” is understood as “without unreasonable delay,” which, in supervised release settings, is commonly operationalized as within 72 hours.

F. Impact and Practical Implications

1. For Defense Counsel

  • Object contemporaneously:
    • If the court misstates the number or nature of prior convictions, or the criminal history scoring, counsel should correct the record at sentencing.
    • If the judge references arrests without convictions as evidence of wrongdoing, counsel should invoke Johnson and state an objection on the record.
  • Build a record of prejudice:
    • When errors occur, make clear how they are central to the judge’s reasoning and would materially affect the sentence.
    • Ask the court to clarify (or, if appropriate, to state on the record that a particular factor is not decisive), thereby shaping the appellate lens.
  • Prepare for “underrepresented history” arguments:
    • Where prior offenses are old, minor, or contextually mitigated, present affirmative evidence and argument explaining why the Guidelines criminal history category is adequate and not underrepresentative.
  • Illegal reentry cases with violence are high‑risk for variances:
    • Counsel should warn clients that domestic violence, alcohol‑related offenses, and rapid return after removals routinely support substantial upward variances, even where the Guidelines range is low.

2. For Prosecutors

  • Focus on convictions and well‑documented conduct:
    • While bare arrest records may be included in a PSR, prosecutors should avoid urging the court to treat them as proof of criminal acts.
  • Emphasize rapid reentry and public safety risk:
    • This opinion reaffirms that rapid return after removal and a pattern of violent or risky behavior are powerful justifications for significant upward variances.
  • Support finding of underrepresented history:
    • Explain how old, unscored, or non‑prosecuted immigration contacts create a mismatch between the defendant’s criminal history category and actual conduct.

3. For District Judges

  • Accuracy in describing criminal history matters:
    • While minor misstatements may be harmless on appeal, carefully tracking the PSR’s numbers and categories minimizes litigation and reinforces confidence in the sentence.
  • Avoid or cabin reliance on bare arrests:
    • Arrests may show contact with law enforcement but should not be treated as proof of underlying wrongdoing absent additional corroboration.
  • Explain the weight of each factor:
    • Where potential errors exist, making clear that other factors independently justify the sentence helps insulate it under plain‑error and abuse‑of‑discretion review.
  • Supervised release wording:
    • Perez‑Espinoza and this case indicate that “immediately” and “within 72 hours” are functionally equivalent, but making the conditions internally consistent between oral and written pronouncements avoids unnecessary appeals.

4. Doctrinal Impact

While nonprecedential, Rodriguez‑Jimenez adds weight to existing Fifth Circuit trends:

  • Plain‑error relief in sentencing is rare where there are multiple, independently sufficient § 3553(a) justifications for the chosen sentence.
  • Johnson’s bar on using bare arrests is reaffirmed, but its reach is constrained by a stringent application of the “substantial rights” requirement, especially where the district court’s explanation is multi‑factorial.
  • Little semantic room exists to challenge routine supervised release formulations like “immediately” versus “within 72 hours.”

IV. Conclusion

United States v. Rodriguez‑Jimenez is a textbook illustration of the modern Fifth Circuit’s sentencing review:

  • It acknowledges and corrects legal standards—such as the prohibition on reliance on bare arrest records and the necessity of accurate fact‑finding—yet
  • applies a rigorous plain‑error doctrine that leaves most sentences intact when alternative, properly considered § 3553(a) factors robustly support the outcome.

The case underscores for litigants that the battlefield for federal sentencing disputes remains primarily in the district court, at the time of sentencing. Absent prompt and specific objections—and absent a clear showing that the challenged factor was central to the judge’s decision—appellate courts will rarely disturb sentences, even substantial upward variances to the statutory maximum, when these can be grounded in a defendant’s history of violence, underrepresented criminal history, and disregard for immigration law.

In the broader legal landscape, Rodriguez‑Jimenez reinforces a theme: formal rules against certain sentencing practices (like using bare arrests) coexist with a highly deferential remedial regime that demands concrete proof of prejudice before granting relief. That balance—between error recognition and remedial restraint—will continue to shape federal sentencing practice in the Fifth Circuit.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

Comments