The record showed that defense counsel:

• objected only on relevance when Parker began describing his training and experience with recording devices; and
• at sidebar, merely remarked that she did not yet know whether the government had “established him as an expert.”

Critically, the panel interprets this sidebar remark as not being an objection—either to expert qualification or to admissibility under Rule 702. The judge understood it as a comment on the ongoing foundation; the prosecutor continued; and defense counsel said, “Okay,” making no further objections as Parker’s testimony continued.

Relying on United States v. Echols, 104 F.4th 1023 (7th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2012), the court reiterated that:

“A party … cannot preserve one specific objection by making a different specific objection in the trial court.”

In other words:

• an objection on relevance grounds does not preserve a separate objection that the same testimony fails Rule 702’s reliability or qualification standards; and
• a generalized expression of uncertainty (“I don’t know if she has established him as an expert yet”)—without a request for exclusion or a ruling—does not amount to a Rule 702 objection.

Because he never expressly invoked Rule 702 or objected to Parker’s qualifications or methodology, Owens forfeited his expert‑admissibility argument as to both witnesses, leaving him with only plain‑error review on appeal.

2. Plain‑error framework: Page, Greer, and Rosales‑Mireles

Once in the plain‑error posture, the court applied the now‑standard four‑part test, citing:

• United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc), and
• Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021), which in turn quotes Rosales‑Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018).

Under that framework, Owens could obtain relief only if he showed:

1. an error;
2. that was plain (clear or obvious under current law);
3. that affected his substantial rights (i.e., a reasonable probability of a different outcome); and
4. that seriously affected “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

The Seventh Circuit has also emphasized (citing Page and Greer) that this is a “difficult burden” for a defendant to meet, especially where the record is strong and the legal error is debatable or marginal.

3. No sua sponte Rule 702 duty, and the need to show inadmissibility

Owens essentially faulted the district court for not on its own initiative performing a formal Rule 702 analysis, even though no one challenged the witnesses’ expertise or methods. The panel rejected this, relying on prior Seventh Circuit authority:

• United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252 (7th Cir. 2018); and
• Christian, 673 F.3d at 711.

Those cases make clear that:

“District courts need not conduct [Rule 702] inquiries sua sponte,” especially when the parties do not challenge expert status or qualifications.

The panel then makes a more subtle but practically important move: it focuses not just on the absence of a sua sponte obligation, but on Owens’s failure to argue on appeal that the testimony actually violated Rule 702.

The opinion notes that:

• Detective Dukes had used informants in at least one hundred controlled buys.
• Special Agent Parker had conducted over five hundred controlled buys, with at least fifty involving the same sort of recording device.

Against this backdrop, the court cites:

• United States v. Tingle, 880 F.3d 850 (7th Cir. 2018), and
• United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 2009)

for the proposition that, where an expert’s qualifications are strong and undisputed, the failure to conduct a formal Rule 702 analysis is at most harmless:

In York, any error in failing to conduct a Rule 702 analysis was harmless, “given [the expert’s] qualifications, and no attempt to disparage them here on appeal,” such that he “would have easily qualified as an expert had the court conducted the formal Rule 702 analysis.”

Applying that logic, the panel concludes:

• Owens did not even attempt to explain how Dukes’s or Parker’s testimony would fail Rule 702’s reliability or qualification requirements.
• Given their extensive experiences, it is highly likely they would have “easily qualified” as experts even under a rigorous Daubert/Rule 702 inquiry.

Thus, even if the district court erred by not explicitly invoking Rule 702, the error would not be plain (because the law does not require sua sponte analysis) and, more importantly, Owens cannot show:

• a reasonable probability of a different outcome had a formal Rule 702 hearing occurred; or
• any serious impact on the fairness or integrity of the proceeding.

4. Impact and practice implications

This portion of the decision carries several practical implications:

• Specificity of objections is critical.
  A defense lawyer who is concerned about law‑enforcement “expert” testimony must:
  • explicitly invoke Rule 702 (or Daubert);
  • challenge qualification, methodology, or fit; and
  • seek a ruling on those grounds.
  An objection on different grounds (e.g., relevance) does not preserve a later Rule 702 challenge.
• Plain‑error review is inhospitable to undeveloped Rule 702 claims.
  On appeal, a defendant must do more than assert that the district court failed to utter the words “Rule 702.” The appellant must show:
  • why the testimony would have been excluded under Rule 702; and
  • how that exclusion would likely have changed the result.
  Absent such a showing, Seventh Circuit cases like York and now Owens will treat any procedural shortfall as harmless or non‑plain.
• No automatic sua sponte Daubert duty for trial judges.
  The opinion reinforces that trial courts are working in an adversarial system; they are not required to police expert‑qualification issues unasked. That shifts the burden squarely onto counsel to raise and develop Rule 702 challenges.

B. The Opinion Testimony Instruction and Officer Herzing

1. The error: mislabeling a witness as giving drug‑trafficking opinions

Next, Owens challenged a jury instruction on “opinion testimony,” which erroneously listed Officer Herzing as a witness who “gave opinions and testimony about drug trafficking.” In reality:

• Herzing testified only about the witness‑tampering investigation and
• introduced recorded jail calls where Owens discussed bribing the informant.

The government conceded the error. Owens, however, had not objected at trial, so plain‑error review again governed.

2. Application of the “substantial rights” prong

The panel assumed, without definitively deciding, that the error was “plain” but focused on the third prong: whether the mistake affected Owens’s substantial rights. For that, the court again invoked the Page/Greer standard: was there a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for the error?

Several factors led the panel to say “no”:

• Content of the instruction itself. The wording tracked Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 3.13. It:
  • did not call Herzing an “expert”;
  • told jurors they did not have to accept any opinion testimony; and
  • instructed them to judge opinion testimony as they would any other.
• Scope of Herzing’s testimony. Herzing’s evidence was limited to the witness‑tampering count, whereas Owens’s prejudice argument was largely rooted in his theory about the drug‑distribution count (that the informant manipulated the recording).
• Strength of the evidence on witness tampering. The jury heard:
  • Owens’s own recorded statements with his girlfriend Reed plotting to pay $10,000 for the informant’s silence; and
  • corroborating testimony from the informant and a jailhouse informant.
  Against this backdrop, the likelihood that a confusing reference to “drug‑trafficking opinions” tipped the scales was vanishingly small.

Accordingly, even taking the error as plain, the panel found no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted on witness tampering had Herzing been omitted from the instruction. The third prong of plain error was not satisfied, and thus no relief was warranted.

3. Lessons for trial judges and counsel

The mislabeling here was minor but nonetheless a useful caution:

• Instruction drafting and customization matter. Pattern instructions are only templates. When they are adapted to identify specific witnesses or topics (e.g., “witnesses who gave opinions about drug trafficking”), counsel and the court should verify that every listed witness truly fits the description.
• Defense counsel should preserve instructional errors. Had Owens objected at trial, the court would have been required to address the mischaracterization immediately, and review on appeal would have been more favorable than plain error.

Still, the holding underscores a recurring theme: under plain‑error review, even recognized mistakes will not result in reversal absent a practical showing that the verdict may well have differed.

C. Dual‑Role Witnesses: Applying Jett and Bard Under Plain Error

1. The dual‑role problem and its risks

A “dual‑role” witness is one who testifies both:

• as a fact witness based on firsthand knowledge of the case; and
• as an expert or experiential witness drawing on specialized training or experience.

The panel cites United States v. Thomas, 970 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2020) for this definition. The Seventh Circuit has long recognized that combining these roles poses particular risks:

• Jurors may be “smitten by [the] expert’s ‘aura of special reliability’” and over‑credit both the expert’s opinions and their fact testimony, as noted in York, quoting United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 1993).
• Jurors may think the expert’s opinions are secretly based on unpresented facts, as emphasized in Jett, 908 F.3d at 267.
• Jurors may be confused about whether a particular statement is:
  • case‑specific fact testimony; or
  • generalized expert opinion from other investigations.
  This confusion was a central concern in United States v. Parkhurst, 865 F.3d 509 (7th Cir. 2017).

2. The Jett/Bard three‑part safeguard framework

To manage these risks, Jett and Bard, 73 F.4th 464 (7th Cir. 2023), prescribe three precautionary measures when law‑enforcement witnesses testify in dual roles:

1. Separate the lay and expert testimony in structure.
   The government should elicit opinion/expert background and then, clearly separately, the case‑specific fact testimony. This helps jurors parse which answers are based on:
   • firsthand case knowledge; and
   • generalized expertise and experience.
2. Immediate limiting explanation when expert testimony begins.
   After the witness’s qualifications are established, the district court should explain to the jury that:
   • the testimony they are about to hear is opinion based on training and experience, not firsthand knowledge of the case; and
   • it is up to the jury to determine how much weight, if any, to give that opinion.
3. Final jury instruction distinguishing fact and expert testimony.
   At trial’s end, the court should instruct jurors explicitly to:
   • separately evaluate fact testimony and opinion/expert testimony of such witnesses; and
   • apply the appropriate evaluative standard to each.
   This third safeguard is the focus of Bard, which emphasizes the importance of reinforcing the distinction at the close of evidence.

3. The Owens court’s application: incomplete safeguards, but no plain error

Owens argued that the district court plainly erred in handling the dual‑role testimony of Detective Dukes and Special Agent Parker. He conceded that the standard of review was plain error, because he sought no dual‑role instructions and made no contemporaneous objection to the manner in which the testimony was presented.

The panel candidly acknowledged that the trial court did not fully implement all Jett safeguards:

• The government complied with the first precaution: it structured each direct examination to begin with training/experience and then proceed to case‑specific facts, a practice the court praised earlier in United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455, 484–85 (7th Cir. 2022).
• However, the court did not:
  • issue a mid‑testimony limiting explanation explicitly identifying when the witnesses were testifying as experts (the second precaution); or
  • give an end‑of‑trial instruction that expressly flagged both witnesses as “dual‑role” and directed jurors to weigh their fact and opinion testimony separately (the third precaution as articulated in Bard).

Still, the panel emphasized that “perfect compliance is not the test for reversal.” Under plain‑error review, the question is whether any imperfections had a reasonable probability of affecting the verdict.

The court then identified several mitigating circumstances and alternative safeguards:

• Structured testimony and question framing (first Jett step).
  The agents’ testimony was indeed organized so that:
  • their professional experience and “best practices” were elicited first; and
  • their specific observations and actions in Owens’s investigation came later.
  In addition, the prosecutor’s questions often flagged the basis of the answer. For example:
  • Parker was asked about “the practice of the FBI or DEA” regarding informants’ lack of control over recording devices, followed by a clarifying question that he was not in charge of the specific camera system used in this case.
• No “expert” label (relying on Garrett).
  Neither the court nor the parties formally designated Dukes or Parker as “experts.” Citing United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 569 (7th Cir. 2014), the panel notes that absence of the “expert” label “substantially reduces any potential prejudice” because it tempers the aura of special reliability.
• Simple, brief opinion testimony.
  The “expert‑like” opinions were concise and straightforward, arguably straddling the line between lay and expert testimony. This dampened the risk of jurors becoming confused about which hat the witness was wearing.
• Clarifying follow‑ups and cross‑examination (see Jones, Tinsley).
  The government’s clarifying questions and defense counsel’s cross‑examination further delineated:
  • which statements were grounded in case knowledge and
  • which derived from general practices and experience.
  The panel cites United States v. Tinsley, 62 F.4th 376, 385 (7th Cir. 2023) for the proposition that effective cross‑examination is an important safeguard against dual‑role confusion.
• Generic opinion‑testimony instructions.
  Although the final instructions did not explicitly name Dukes and Parker as dual‑role witnesses, they:
  • told the jury that some witnesses gave opinions;
  • emphasized that jurors need not accept those opinions; and
  • directed jurors to evaluate opinions as they would any other testimony.

Finally, the strength of the government’s case weighed heavily against a finding of prejudice:

• Evidence contradicting the defense theory about the recording device.
  Owens’s core defense was that the informant, Anderson, had turned off the recording device, bought meth from someone else, and then rejoined law enforcement. But:
  • Lieutenant James—whose testimony was unchallenged—testified that Anderson did not know how to operate the recording equipment.
  • Both officers maintained visual or telephonic surveillance assuring that Anderson did not meet with anyone else during the relevant time.
• Evidence of witness tampering as consciousness of guilt.
  The panel notes that Owens’s attempts to bribe the informant were independently admissible and probative of guilty conscience regarding the underlying drug offense. Citing:
  • United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 1995); and
  • United States v. Mokol, 646 F.3d 479, 483 (7th Cir. 2011),
  the court underscores that efforts to tamper with witnesses can be powerful circumstantial evidence of guilt.
• Corroboration from the jailhouse informant.
  Jailhouse informant Crawford testified that Owens admitted the details of the drug deal consistent with law‑enforcement testimony and described the $10,000 plan to silence Anderson.

Given these safeguards and the weight of the evidence, the court held that any deficiencies in implementing Jett/Bard precautions did not amount to plain error.

4. Broader implications

The decision communicates several messages to trial courts and practitioners:

• Jett/Bard is prescriptive, but not self‑executing.
  The dual‑role framework remains the governing law in the Seventh Circuit, but where:
  • defense counsel does not seek limiting instructions, and
  • the government reasonably structures testimony and avoids overt “expert” branding,
  imperfect compliance will often be deemed non‑prejudicial under plain‑error review.
• Defense counsel must be proactive.
  To obtain robust dual‑role protections:
  • request a specific instruction when an officer begins to testify beyond simple case facts; and
  • propose a clear end‑of‑trial dual‑role instruction naming the witnesses and distinguishing their roles.
  Absent such steps, it will be difficult to show on appeal that the court “plainly erred” in failing to implement Jett on its own.
• Prosecutors should continue to heed Jett, even if plain error is forgiving.
  While Owens finds no reversible error, it endorses best practices:
  • separating background and case‑specific testimony;
  • careful question‑framing to clarify the basis of opinions; and
  • avoiding the “expert” label unless absolutely necessary.
  These measures protect convictions from challenge and maintain the perceived fairness of proceedings.

D. Sentencing: Career‑Offender Enhancement and Waiver

1. The career‑offender guideline and the disputed prior

At sentencing, Owens received a 360‑month term on each count, concurrent, after being classified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. That guideline applies when, among other things, “the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.”

One of the predicate prior convictions was an Illinois cocaine offense. On appeal, Owens contended that this state conviction is not a “controlled substance offense” for § 4B1.1 purposes, urging the court to depart from (or reconsider) its earlier decision in United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020), which (as summarized in this opinion) held otherwise.

2. Waiver vs. forfeiture: Flores, Syms, and Schrode

The panel never reached the substantive guideline issue because it found the claim waived. Here the opinion draws a sharp line between:

• forfeiture: failure to timely assert a right (subject to plain‑error review); and
• waiver: intentional relinquishment of a known right (which extinguishes error and precludes review).

Citing United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 2019), the court reiterates that:

“Waiver occurs when a party intentionally relinquishes a known right,” and it “extinguishes error and precludes appellate review.”

They then point to two key cases where explicit withdrawal of objections was treated as waiver:

• United States v. Syms, 846 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2017); and
• United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 555 (7th Cir. 2016).

In both, the court held that when a party:

• initially objects to a particular aspect of sentencing (or other ruling), and then
• affirmatively withdraws that objection at the hearing,

the defendant has intentionally relinquished the right and cannot resurrect it on appeal.

3. Application to Owens: “textbook waiver”

In Owens’s case:

• Defense counsel had initially objected, in writing, to the paragraph of the PSR applying the career‑offender enhancement.
• At the sentencing hearing, however, counsel expressly withdrew that objection on the record.

The panel describes this as “textbook waiver,” squarely within the pattern of Syms and Schrode. As a result:

• The appellate court treated the issue as unreviewable, not merely subject to plain‑error review.
• Owens could not obtain any review—plain or otherwise—of his argument that his Illinois cocaine conviction no longer qualifies under § 4B1.1(a).

4. Practice and impact

This aspect of the decision is a stark reminder for defense practitioners:

• Withdrawing a PSR objection is extremely consequential.
  If counsel believes there is a plausible argument against career‑offender status, they should:
  • maintain the objection and argue it fully; or
  • if strategic considerations favor narrowing issues, at least clarify that the objection is being “submitted on written grounds” rather than withdrawn.
  Once an objection is explicitly withdrawn, Seventh Circuit law treats it as an intentional waiver, closing the door to appellate review.
• Preserving guideline issues in an evolving legal landscape.
  Given that drug‑guideline jurisprudence can change rapidly, even a losing objection under current precedent (such as Ruth) may be worth preserving to:
  • allow possible future benefit if the law shifts; and
  • permit review under current law in an en banc or Supreme Court setting.
  Owens demonstrates that withdrawing the objection forfeits all such possibilities.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

For readers less familiar with federal criminal procedure, several key concepts in the opinion merit simplified explanations:

1. Plain‑Error Review

• Applies when a defendant did not object to an issue at trial.
• To win under plain‑error review, the defendant must show:
  1. The court made a legal error.
  2. The error is clear or obvious under current law.
  3. The error likely changed the outcome of the trial or sentencing.
  4. Correcting the error is necessary to protect the fairness or integrity of the justice system.
• This is a very demanding standard; many errors, especially minor or technical ones, will not qualify.

2. Rule 702 and Expert Testimony

• Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs when an expert can testify.
• To be admissible under Rule 702, expert testimony must:
  • come from a qualified expert (knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education);
  • be based on reliable principles and methods; and
  • help the jury understand the evidence or decide a fact in issue.
• In law‑enforcement cases, officers often testify as “experiential experts” based on extensive field experience (e.g., how controlled buys work, how traffickers operate).

3. Dual‑Role Witnesses

• A witness is “dual‑role” when they:
  • testify about what they personally did or saw in the case; and
  • also offer expert‑style testimony based on their general experience.
• This can confuse jurors about:
  • whether statements are grounded in case facts or in general expertise; and
  • how much weight to give each type of statement.
• The Jett/Bard framework tells judges and lawyers to keep these two roles as distinct and clearly labeled as possible.

4. Career‑Offender Enhancement

• Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, a defendant is a “career offender” if:
  • they were at least 18 at the time of the offense;
  • the current offense is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled‑substance offense; and
  • they have at least two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled‑substance offenses.
• Being classified as a career offender usually raises the guideline range substantially, often by many years.

5. Waiver vs. Forfeiture

• Forfeiture = failing to assert a right in time (e.g., not objecting at trial). The issue can still be reviewed for plain error.
• Waiver = intentionally giving up a known right (e.g., explicitly withdrawing an objection). The issue is usually not reviewable at all.
• In Owens, the failure to object to expert/dual‑role issues was treated as forfeiture, but the express withdrawal of the career‑offender objection was treated as waiver.

6. Controlled Buy and Recording Equipment

• A “controlled buy” is a drug purchase set up and monitored by law enforcement, with a cooperating individual (the informant) making the purchase.
• Standard safeguards include:
  • searching the informant before and after the buy;
  • providing pre‑recorded buy money;
  • using audio or video recording devices; and
  • continuous surveillance to ensure no unauthorized contact with others.
• In Owens, officers testified that only law enforcement, not the informant, could turn the recording equipment on and off—central to rejecting the defense’s theory of a swapped drug source.

V. Conclusion: Significance of United States v. Owens

United States v. De’Andre Owens does not announce a sweeping new doctrinal rule, but it meaningfully consolidates and applies existing Seventh Circuit law in several important ways:

• On expert and dual‑role testimony, the case underscores:
  • the need for precise objections to preserve Rule 702 and dual‑role issues;
  • that district courts are not obliged to initiate Rule 702 inquiries sua sponte; and
  • that under plain‑error review, imperfect implementation of Jett/Bard safeguards will not warrant reversal where:
    • testimony is structured reasonably;
    • the “expert” label is avoided;
    • clarifications and cross‑examination mitigate confusion; and
    • the government’s case is strong.
• On jury instructions, the opinion confirms that minor mislabeling in an otherwise standard instruction will rarely meet the “substantial rights” threshold under plain‑error review when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming.
• On sentencing and waiver, the decision sends a clear message:
  • withdrawing a PSR objection—as with the career‑offender enhancement here—constitutes intentional waiver, completely foreclosing appellate review of that issue;
  • defense counsel must weigh carefully whether to withdraw substantive objections, especially in areas like guideline interpretation that are legally fluid.

Taken together, Owens reinforces the adversarial nature of federal criminal litigation: the quality and specificity of trial‑level advocacy largely determines what issues remain open on appeal and how rigorously appellate courts will examine alleged errors. For practitioners in the Seventh Circuit, the case functions as a practical roadmap—and a cautionary tale—on preserving objections, managing dual‑role law‑enforcement witnesses, and handling high‑stakes sentencing enhancements.