Pittman v. State (Fla. 2025): Reaffirming Phillips—Hall Is Not Retroactive and Intellectual-Disability Claims Remain Subject to Strict Time and Successiveness Bars

Introduction

In David Joseph Pittman v. State of Florida, decided September 10, 2025, the Supreme Court of Florida summarily affirmed the denial of Pittman’s fourth successive motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and denied his motion for a stay of execution. Pittman, under a death warrant with an execution date of September 17, 2025, reasserted a claim that his execution is constitutionally barred because he is intellectually disabled and sought an evidentiary hearing to prove it.

The Court’s opinion is significant not because it creates a new doctrinal rule, but because it consolidates and reaffirms several controlling principles that currently govern Florida’s capital postconviction landscape. Chief among them is the Court’s refusal to revisit Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020), which receded from Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016), and held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), does not apply retroactively. The Court further underscored that intellectual-disability (ID) claims—although grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s categorical prohibition on executing individuals with intellectual disability—are still subject to Florida’s strict time limitations and successiveness bars in Rule 3.851.

Justice Labarga dissented, as he did in Phillips, warning that maintaining Phillips risks depriving some death-sentenced individuals of meaningful consideration of ID claims and may lead to inconsistent outcomes among similarly situated prisoners.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court affirmed the summary denial of Pittman’s fourth successive Rule 3.851 motion and denied a stay of execution.
• The Court declined to revisit Phillips, reaffirming that Hall is not retroactive in Florida’s postconviction proceedings.
• Pittman’s ID claim was:
  • Untimely: He was required to raise any ID claim no later than 60 days after October 1, 2004 (the effective date of Florida’s ID procedure rule), as previously held in Pittman v. State, 337 So. 3d 776 (Fla. 2022) (“Pittman V”).
  • Procedurally barred: He had already litigated an ID claim and cannot relitigate it in a successive motion absent a new, retroactive change in law or newly discovered evidence.
• Due process and Eighth Amendment arguments failed:
  • Due process was satisfied; Pittman had notice and opportunity to be heard, but his allegations did not overcome Rule 3.851’s procedural hurdles.
  • The Court rejected any argument that adhering to Phillips results in arbitrary and capricious application of the death penalty.
• No evidentiary hearing was required because the claim was both time-barred and procedurally barred; the Supreme Court declined to make any factual determinations about intellectual functioning in the first instance.
• Because Pittman showed no substantial grounds for relief, a stay of execution was denied.

Case Background

Pittman was convicted of three first-degree murders and other offenses in connection with the 1990 stabbing deaths of his former wife’s family members and the subsequent burning of their home. The jury recommended death by a vote of 9–3 for each murder, and the trial court found two aggravators for each: prior violent felony (based on contemporaneous violent felonies) and that the murders were heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC). Mental-health mitigation was presented but rejected as outweighed by the aggravation. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal in 1994 (Pittman I, 646 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1994)), and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.

Over the decades, Pittman pursued state and federal postconviction relief without success. In 2022, the Court affirmed the denial of his third successive motion and a Rule 3.800(a) motion, holding that his ID claim had to have been raised within 60 days of October 1, 2004 (Pittman V, 337 So. 3d at 777). After the Governor signed a death warrant on August 15, 2025, Pittman filed the fourth successive motion seeking an evidentiary hearing to prove ID. The circuit court summarily denied, and the Florida Supreme Court now affirms.

Detailed Analysis

Procedural Posture and Standards

• Summary denial: A successive Rule 3.851 motion may be summarily denied if the motion, files, and records conclusively show the movant is entitled to no relief. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(f)(5)(B), (h)(6); Bogle v. State, 322 So. 3d 44, 46 (Fla. 2021).
• Allegations: Courts accept the defendant’s factual allegations as true to the extent they are not conclusively refuted by the record; conclusory allegations are insufficient. See Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008); Franqui v. State, 59 So. 3d 82, 96 (Fla. 2011).
• Review: Whether an evidentiary hearing is required is reviewed de novo. Marek v. State, 8 So. 3d 1123, 1127 (Fla. 2009).
• Time bar and successiveness: Rule 3.851(d)(1) imposes a one-year time limit (with narrow exceptions), and Rule 3.851(e)(2) prohibits repetitive claims absent qualifying grounds. Claims previously raised and rejected may not be re-litigated. See Hendrix v. State, 136 So. 3d 1122, 1125 (Fla. 2014); Van Poyck v. State, 116 So. 3d 347, 362 (Fla. 2013).

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014):
  • U.S. Supreme Court held Florida’s strict IQ cutoff for intellectual disability (then termed “mental retardation”) was unconstitutional because it failed to account for the standard error of measurement and professional standards.
  • Hall refined the Eighth Amendment analysis originally anchored in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which categorically barred executing people with intellectual disability.
• Walls v. State (Walls I), 213 So. 3d 340 (Fla. 2016):
  • Initially held that Hall applied retroactively under Florida’s retroactivity test (known as Witt retroactivity).
• Phillips v. State, 299 So. 3d 1013 (Fla. 2020):
  • Receded from Walls I, holding Hall is not retroactive in Florida postconviction proceedings. This is the controlling authority the Court applies to Pittman’s claim.
  • Relevant here because Pittman’s successive ID claim relies on retroactive application of Hall.
• Foster v. State, 395 So. 3d 127 (Fla. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1939 (2025), and Walls v. State (Walls II), 361 So. 3d 231 (Fla.), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 174 (2023):
  • Affirm the Court’s commitment to Phillips and its non-retroactivity holding for Hall.
• Pittman v. State (Pittman V), 337 So. 3d 776 (Fla. 2022):
  • Held Pittman was required to raise any ID claim no later than 60 days after October 1, 2004—the effective date of Florida’s procedural rule for ID claims (Rule 3.203). Thus, his later efforts were untimely.
• Dillbeck v. State, 357 So. 3d 94 (Fla. 2023); Barwick v. State, 361 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 2023); Carroll v. State, 114 So. 3d 883 (Fla. 2013):
  • These cases establish that categorical exemption claims (e.g., intellectual disability, insanity to be executed) are not exempt from procedural time limits or successiveness bars in Florida.
• In re Bowles, 935 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2019):
  • Federal Eleventh Circuit precedent consistent with Florida’s approach: to reopen claims federally on the basis of a “new rule” (like Hall), the U.S. Supreme Court must have made the rule retroactive to cases on collateral review—something it has not done for Hall.
• Asay v. State, 210 So. 3d 1 (Fla. 2016), and Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993):
  • Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard; Pittman’s decades of litigation satisfied this, but due process does not eliminate procedural bars.
• Bates v. State, No. SC2025-1127, 50 Fla. L. Weekly S223, 2025 WL 2319001 (Fla. Aug. 12, 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-5370, 2025 WL 2396797 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2025):
  • Recently reaffirmed that due process claims framed around mental status do not overcome time bars in Rule 3.851.
• Miller v. State, 379 So. 3d 1109 (Fla.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 241 (2024):
  • Rejected a claim that developments in Florida case law rendered the death penalty arbitrarily applied; used here to dispose of Pittman’s Eighth Amendment challenge and to emphasize Florida’s death penalty scheme remains constitutional.
• Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867 (Fla. 2014):
  • Cited (through Dillbeck) for the standard governing stays of execution in warrant litigation: a stay issues only where there are substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. No reconsideration of Phillips / Non-retroactivity of Hall:

   Pittman’s core argument sought to relitigate the retroactivity of Hall. The Court, invoking Foster and Walls II, declined to revisit Phillips, which remains the controlling law: Hall does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. Without Hall’s retroactivity, Pittman could not rely on Hall to unlock a successive ID claim.

2. Time bar:

   The Court relied on Pittman V for the proposition that Pittman was required to raise any ID claim no later than 60 days after October 1, 2004. That date corresponds to the effective date of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.203, which provided a formal mechanism and deadline for asserting intellectual-disability claims in capital cases. Because Pittman did not timely comply, his claim is untimely under Rule 3.851(d)(1).

3. Successiveness bar:

   Pittman already pursued an ID claim and lost. Under well-settled law, claims raised and rejected may not be relitigated absent a qualifying exception (newly discovered evidence or new, retroactive law). See Hendrix, 136 So. 3d at 1125; Van Poyck, 116 So. 3d at 362. The Court “flatly” rejected Pittman’s suggestion that ID claims should be exempt from procedural bars, citing its consistent application of time limits to categorical exemption claims and aligning with federal practice as articulated in Bowles.

4. No evidentiary hearing:

   Because the claim was categorically foreclosed by untimeliness and successiveness, the Court held no evidentiary hearing was warranted. The opinion also emphasized the appellate court’s role: it will not undertake de novo factfinding on Pittman’s intellectual functioning.

5. Due process and Eighth Amendment arguments fail:

   The Court held Pittman received the process due: notice and an opportunity to be heard. Time limits do not violate due process merely because they bar a late claim. See Asay; Bates. As for the Eighth Amendment, the Court rejected the contention that adherence to Phillips renders capital punishment arbitrarily applied, citing Miller (which relied upon Lawrence and Bush to reject similar challenges).

6. Stay of execution denied:

   Under Dillbeck and Davis, a stay is warranted only if there are substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted. Because Pittman’s claims were both untimely and procedurally barred—and legally insufficient under controlling precedent—the Court denied the stay. The mandate issued immediately; no rehearing would be entertained, and no oral argument was necessary.

What the Court Did Not Decide

• The Court did not make any factual finding on whether Pittman is or is not intellectually disabled.
• The Court did not abrogate or modify Rule 3.203 (intellectual-disability procedures) or the substantive definition of intellectual disability under Florida law.
• The Court did not narrow the circumstances under which newly discovered evidence or a new, retroactive constitutional rule could open the door to a successive ID claim; it simply found none were present here.

The Dissent (Justice Labarga)

Justice Labarga reiterated the concerns he raised in his Phillips dissent: that refusing to apply Hall retroactively risks depriving certain individuals of meaningful consideration of their ID claims and may result in inconsistent treatment among similarly situated individuals based primarily on timing. He would have allowed Pittman the opportunity “to present a full and complete picture of his intellectual disability.”

Impact and Implications

• Immediate practical effect:
  • For death-sentenced prisoners whose convictions and sentences became final before Hall, reopening ID claims based on Hall is foreclosed in Florida postconviction practice unless there is newly discovered evidence or another qualifying basis that independently satisfies Rule 3.851.
  • Even categorical exemption claims (like ID) remain subject to strict time bars and the prohibition on relitigation of previously denied claims.
• Strategic guidance for capital litigants:
  • Timeliness is crucial. Defendants must comply with the Rule 3.203 framework and the deadlines embedded in Rule 3.851. Failure to do so will likely preclude evidentiary development later, even in warrant-stage litigation.
  • New evidence must truly be “newly discovered” and material; a repackaging of old evidence or arguments will not suffice.
  • Arguments premised on Hall will not permit reopening in Florida absent a U.S. Supreme Court declaration that Hall is retroactive, or a different retroactive change in law.
• Systemic consequences:
  • The decision solidifies the post-Phillips regime: Florida’s Witt-based retroactivity framework remains decisive, and recent Florida cases (Foster, Walls II, Dillbeck, Barwick, Bates) will continue to be invoked to enforce time and successiveness limits.
  • While promoting finality and uniform procedures, the approach may fuel continuing debate—highlighted by Justice Labarga—over fairness for prisoners who did not receive a hearing under the correct Hall-informed standards because their cases were final before 2014.
  • The Eleventh Circuit’s gatekeeping decisions (e.g., Bowles) align with Florida’s approach, reducing the likelihood of federal reopening absent a U.S. Supreme Court retroactivity pronouncement.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Intellectual disability vs. mental illness:
  • “Intellectual disability” (formerly “mental retardation”) is a distinct clinical category with legal significance under the Eighth Amendment: individuals who meet the criteria may not be executed. It requires proof of (1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2) concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning, and (3) onset before age 18.
  • Mental illness does not automatically bar execution, though it may be relevant to mitigation or, separately, to competence to be executed (Ford v. Wainwright concerns).
• Hall v. Florida:
  • Invalidated Florida’s former practice of treating an IQ score of 70 as a rigid cutoff. Hall requires courts to consider the standard error of measurement and to evaluate adaptive functioning under accepted clinical standards.
• Retroactivity:
  • Florida uses the Witt retroactivity framework (from Witt v. State) to decide whether a new constitutional decision applies to final cases. Phillips held Hall is not retroactive under Florida’s test. Without retroactivity, a previously final case cannot be reopened just because the law evolved.
• Rule 3.851 and summary denial:
  • Rule 3.851 governs capital postconviction proceedings, imposes a one-year filing deadline, and restricts successive motions. A court may summarily deny a motion that is untimely, successive without qualifying grounds, or conclusively refuted by the record.
• Rule 3.203 (intellectual-disability procedures):
  • Effective October 1, 2004, it created the mechanism and deadlines for raising ID claims in Florida courts. Defendants with final cases had a limited window (60 days) to invoke it. Missing that window typically bars later ID claims absent a qualifying exception.
• Categorical exemption claims and procedural bars:
  • Even claims asserting a categorical bar to execution (e.g., ID, insanity to be executed) are subject to the same procedural limits as other postconviction claims. Courts consistently reject the idea that such claims are timeless or immune to successiveness rules.
• Stay of execution:
  • A stay is an extraordinary remedy. In warrant litigation, a stay issues only if the movant demonstrates substantial grounds upon which relief might be granted. If the underlying claim is legally foreclosed, no stay will issue.
• Immediate mandate / no rehearing:
  • In death-warrant cases, the Florida Supreme Court often issues the mandate immediately and does not entertain rehearing to ensure timely finality before the scheduled execution date.

Conclusion

Pittman’s case cements, yet again, the governing framework for Florida capital postconviction practice: Hall is not retroactive under Florida law; intellectual-disability claims are subject to Rule 3.851’s time limits and bar on successive litigation; and due process does not erase these procedural constraints. The Court’s decision to deny both an evidentiary hearing and a stay flows directly from these settled principles.

While Justice Labarga continues to voice concerns about fairness and uniformity across similarly situated prisoners—especially those whose cases became final before Hall—the majority underscores finality, adherence to Phillips, and consistency with both Florida and Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence. The upshot for capital litigants is clear: intellectual-disability claims must be timely raised and properly preserved. Absent newly discovered evidence or a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law, successive attempts to relitigate ID will not proceed to evidentiary development, particularly during warrant-stage litigation.