Perkins v. North American Stainless: Kentucky Supreme Court Adopts a Three‑Prong Test for Workers’ Compensation Claims Involving Communicable Diseases

Introduction

In Estate of Kyle Perkins by Megan Perkins, Administrator v. North American Stainless (Supreme Court of Kentucky, rendered October 23, 2025), the Court addresses a pressing pandemic-era question that Kentucky’s earlier workers’ compensation jurisprudence did not squarely answer: When, if ever, is a communicable disease compensable under Chapter 342? The case arises from the tragic death of Kyle Perkins, a mechanical maintenance technician at North American Stainless (NAS), following COVID-19 infection, hospitalization, a double-lung transplant, and subsequent infection leading to his death.

After the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied benefits, finding that the claim failed under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 342.0011(1) and (3), the Workers’ Compensation Board and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court of Kentucky now affirms as well. Most significantly, the Court crystallizes a new, explicit three-prong framework for evaluating the compensability of communicable disease claims under Chapter 342 and clarifies how existing doctrines such as “increased risk” and “occupational disease” operate in this context.

Key issues included:

Whether the claimant proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that COVID-19 was contracted in the course and scope of employment;
Whether the risk of contracting COVID-19 was increased by the “nature of the employment” within the meaning of KRS 342.0011(1) and (3);
Whether older precedents on occupational disease (Princess) and work-related aggravation of disease (Dealers) support compensability on this record; and
The appropriate standard of review of ALJ fact-finding in this setting.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirms the denial of benefits. It holds that the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence, that controlling statutes and caselaw were neither misconstrued nor overlooked, and that no legal error occurred. The Court endorses the ALJ’s findings that:

The claimant did not meet the threshold burden of proving that the illness arose out of and in the course of employment (work-related causation);
COVID-19, as a communicable disease, is excluded from “injury” under KRS 342.0011(1) unless the risk of contraction is increased by the nature of the employment—and the record did not establish such increased risk at NAS; and
There was no evidence that the required duties of employment aggravated or exacerbated Kyle’s condition in the manner contemplated by Dealers Transport Co. v. Thompson.

Importantly, the Court articulates a new, clear test for communicable disease compensability under Kentucky law. To prevail, a claimant must show:

Work-relatedness: The “injury” arose out of and in the course of employment (burden on claimant; preponderance standard);
Nature-of-the-employment increased risk: The risk of contracting the communicable disease was increased by the required duties of the job such that the worker’s probability of contracting the disease was greater than that of the general public; and
Extent beyond ordinary: The extent of the injury is beyond the normally anticipated effects of a general communicable disease (and the claim must satisfy the durational requirement in KRS 342.040).

On this record, the Court stops at prong one, concluding the claimant did not prove work-related causation by a preponderance of the evidence; hence, the analysis need not proceed to prongs two or three.

Detailed Analysis

1. Statutory Framework and Doctrinal Anchors

KRS 342.0011(1): Excludes communicable diseases from the definition of “injury” unless “the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the nature of the employment.”
KRS 342.0011(2)–(3): Defines “occupational disease” as a disease “arising out of and in the course of the employment,” requiring a causal connection to conditions of the work and a risk “connected with the employment” that “flowed from that source as a rational consequence.”
KRS 342.285; KRS 13B.090: Burdens of proof and standards governing administrative adjudication (preponderance; claimant bears burden).
KRS 342.040: Durational requirement for benefits (referenced for completeness of the newly announced test).

The Court harmonizes these statutes: A communicable disease may be compensable either as an “injury” (if the increased risk by nature of employment is proven under KRS 342.0011(1)) or as an “occupational disease” (if it meets KRS 342.0011(2)–(3)), but in all events the claimant must first carry the threshold burden to prove work-relatedness by a preponderance of the evidence.

2. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1985); Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1977): Confirm the ALJ’s exclusive role as factfinder with authority to weigh credibility, draw inferences, and accept or reject parts of the evidence.
Ira A. Watson Dep’t Store v. Hamilton, 34 S.W.3d 48 (Ky. 2000); French v. Rev-A-Shelf, 641 S.W.3d 172 (Ky. 2022); U.S. Bank Home Mortg. v. Shrecker, 455 S.W.3d 382 (Ky. 2014): Define the circumstances for reversing ALJ decisions—clear misapplication of law, overlooked controlling law, or unreasonable evaluation causing gross injustice.
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735 (Ky. App. 1984); Kentucky Comm’n on Human Rights v. Fraser, 625 S.W.2d 852 (Ky. 1981); Smyzer v. B.F. Goodrich Chem. Co., 474 S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1971): Substantial evidence standard and deference principles.
Campbell v. Universal Mines, 963 S.W.2d 623 (Ky. 1998); Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685 (Ky. 1992); Cumberland Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Bell Cnty. Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644 (Ky. 2007); Bowerman v. Black Equip. Co., 297 S.W.3d 858 (Ky. App. 2009): Statutory construction is reviewed de novo; the Court’s role includes clarifying unsettled statutory questions.
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 132 (Ky. 2021); Fitzpatrick v. Crestfield Farm, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 44 (Ky. App. 1978); Kindred Healthcare v. Harper, 642 S.W.3d 672 (Ky. 2022): Canons of construction—read the statute as a whole; avoid absurd results; clear text controls; construe fairly to both employer and employee.
City of Prestonsburg v. Gray, 341 S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1960): “Nature of the employment” means the exposure must issue from the performance of duties owed to the employer; personal choices or conditions not required by the job do not qualify.
Champion v. Beale, 833 S.W.2d 799 (Ky. 1992): To prove a disease arises out of employment, it must exist at work “to a greater degree than in other places generally,” tying the disease to a distinctive feature of the job.
Dealers Transport Co. v. Thompson, 593 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. App. 1979): Recognizes compensability where work aggravates an illness (even if the illness’s origin is not work-related) due to increased risk from job-imposed conditions (e.g., repeated extreme temperature exposure exacerbating pneumonia). The Court explains why this aggravation route does not apply on this record.
Princess Mfg. Co. v. Jarrell, 465 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1971): Two alternative ways to show an occupational disease—(1) substantial evidence that specific employment conditions caused the disease in this worker, or (2) that employment conditions generally cause the disease in the class of workers. The claim fails under both here.
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641 (Ky. 1986); Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v. Pigman, 473 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1971); Marcum v. General Elec. Co., 479 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1972); Holman Enter. Tobacco Warehouse v. Carter, 536 S.W.2d 461 (Ky. 1976): Emphasize burdens of proof and that mere possibility or speculation is insufficient; the evidence must compel a different result to overturn an ALJ’s adverse finding.

These authorities shape the Court’s analysis in two principal ways: they anchor the deference owed to the ALJ’s factual determinations and supply the doctrinal contours for “nature of employment,” increased risk, occupational disease, and work-related aggravation.

3. The Court’s Legal Reasoning Applied

a) Threshold work-relatedness. The Court begins by restating the claimant’s burden to prove, by a preponderance, that the illness arose out of and in the course of employment. The ALJ credited evidence—including timing of symptom onset, text messages about non-work exposures (e.g., a social gathering at the Parkers), and the fact that both Kyle and his spouse tested positive on the same date—that supported non-work sources of exposure. Because the claimant bore the burden, the question on appeal is whether the contrary evidence compelled a finding for the claimant. It did not.

b) Nature of the employment and increased risk. KRS 342.0011(1) excludes communicable diseases from “injury” absent proof that the nature of employment increased the risk of contraction. The Court emphasizes that:

NAS required masking within six feet if unvaccinated; it offered vaccine access and incentives;
Working unmasked within six feet contrary to policy reflected personal noncompliance, not a risk inherent in or required by the job; and
No proof showed that conditions at NAS exposed Kyle to COVID-19 at a greater degree than the general public (Champion), or that the risk issued from duties owed to the employer (City of Prestonsburg).

c) Dealers and aggravation theory. Dealers recognizes an independent path to compensability when work aggravates a pre-existing or non-occupational illness due to conditions inherent in the job (e.g., heat stress, extreme temperature swings). Here, the record lacked evidence that Kyle’s work aggravated COVID-19 after onset of symptoms; he did not continue working once ill, so the job did not exacerbate his disease in the manner contemplated by Dealers.

d) Princess tests for occupational disease. Neither Princess path supported compensability. There was neither substantial evidence that Kyle’s particular working conditions (e.g., riding golf carts, occasional close proximity to a coworker) specifically caused his COVID-19, nor evidence that such conditions generally cause COVID-19 in the class of workers.

e) The new three-prong test. Recognizing the gap in legacy caselaw with respect to communicable diseases, the Court announces an explicit framework:

Work-relatedness: Did the illness arise out of and in the course of employment (preponderance; KRS 342.0011(2)–(3))?
Nature-of-employment increased risk: Was the risk of contracting the disease increased by the required duties of the job such that the worker’s probability of contracting it exceeded that of the general public (KRS 342.0011(1), City of Prestonsburg, Champion)?
Extent beyond ordinary: Did the injury extend beyond the ordinarily anticipated effects of the communicable disease (with durational compliance per KRS 342.040)?

Because prong one failed here, the claim could not proceed.

4. Standard of Review

The Court reiterates that statutory interpretation is de novo, but factual determinations are for the ALJ. Where the party with the burden loses before the ALJ, the appellate inquiry is whether the evidence compelled a contrary result. So long as substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s outcome, courts must affirm even if the record could support a different result. The Court thus underscores fidelity to the “substantial evidence” and “compelled result” tests, resisting invitations to reweigh credibility or reinterpret contested communications (such as the “we got it from Parkers” texts).

The New Rule Announced

The Court establishes a controlling, three-prong test for communicable disease compensability under Chapter 342:

Work-Relatedness: The claimant must prove by a preponderance that the disease arose out of and in the course of employment.
Nature-of-Employment Increased Risk: For communicable diseases excluded by KRS 342.0011(1), the claimant must show the risk of contraction was increased by duties required by the employer such that the probability of contraction was greater than for the general public.
Extent Beyond Ordinary: The claimant must show the extent of injury exceeds the normally anticipated effects of the communicable disease; the claim must also satisfy KRS 342.040’s durational requirement.

This framework synthesizes statutory text with Kentucky’s “nature of employment,” “increased risk,” and “occupational disease” doctrines, while cabining the “flood of claims” risk long recognized in Dealers.

Impact and Practical Implications

a) Doctrinal clarity. Kentucky now has a clearly articulated, binding framework for communicable disease claims. This will guide ALJs, the Board, and the Court of Appeals in COVID-19 and future contagion claims (e.g., influenza variants, RSV, norovirus).

b) Employer policies matter—but are not dispositive. The Court’s reasoning distinguishes between risks inherent in required duties and risks arising from noncompliance with safety policies. A policy requiring masking and encouraging vaccination, if reasonably enforced, supports an employer’s position that increased risk is not an inherent feature of the job. Conversely, evidence that the job required close-proximity, unmasked interaction with contagious populations (e.g., healthcare, corrections, congregate care) may satisfy prong two.

c) Aggravation claims remain viable. Dealers remains good law: if a communicable disease is acquired from any source, and the employee’s required duties exacerbate it (e.g., heat stress, extreme exertion, environmental exposures) beyond ordinary progression, compensability may attach for the aggravation, provided prongs one and three are satisfied and the aggravation is causally linked to required duties.

d) Evidence in future cases. Successful claims will likely marshal:

Job-duty proof tying exposure to required tasks (e.g., direct patient care for infectious disease; mandated prolonged close contact; required entry into known outbreak settings);
Epidemiological or cluster evidence showing heightened workplace transmission relative to the general public (outbreak logs, contact tracing, public health data, OSHA citations, internal incident reports);
Temporal and medical causation evidence stronger than speculation (expert opinions grounded in objective data, not solely family-supplied histories); and
Aggravation evidence showing that work conditions worsened the disease beyond ordinary course (physiologic stressors, environmental extremes, required exposures during symptomatic periods).

e) Claimant strategy. Practitioners should address all three prongs explicitly, not just source-of-exposure. Even with persuasive evidence of workplace exposure, prong two (increased risk by nature of employment) and prong three (extent beyond ordinary effects) demand targeted proof. Where exposure source is contested, begin with prong one and build corroboration beyond self-reported histories (e.g., coworker positives, timing, duty logs).

f) Employer strategy. Document policy requirements and enforcement (masking, distancing, vaccination programs), show that close-contact risks were not job-required where feasible, and compile evidence that workplace risk was not materially greater than the general public’s baseline. Where outbreaks are documented, be prepared to address prong two directly.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Arising out of and in the course of employment: The illness must be caused by job-related conditions and occur within the scope of performing job duties.
Nature of the employment increased risk: A communicable disease is generally not compensable unless the job’s required duties expose the worker to a higher-than-public risk of contracting it.
Occupational disease (KRS 342.0011(3)): A disease linked to job conditions—there must be a rational, proximate causal connection to the employment, not merely the possibility of exposure while at work.
Princess tests: Two ways to prove an occupational disease—(1) specific employment conditions caused this worker’s disease; or (2) employment conditions generally cause this disease in the class of workers.
Dealers aggravation theory: Even if a disease is not work-caused, it can be compensable if required work conditions aggravate it beyond its ordinary course.
Substantial evidence and compelled result: Appellate courts defer to the ALJ’s fact-finding if supported by evidence a reasonable person could accept; reversal requires that the opposite result is compelled by the record.

Application to the Case Facts

Work setting: Large indoor facility; Kyle worked 12-hour shifts with one partner (Springer); NAS required masking within six feet for unvaccinated employees and encouraged vaccination with incentives.
Noncompliance: Evidence showed instances of unmasked proximity contrary to policy; the Court treats this as a personal choice, not a job-required condition.
Timeline and alternative exposures: Symptom onset and text messages suggested non-work exposures (e.g., social gathering at the Parkers); both Kyle and his spouse tested positive on the same day, weakening exclusive workplace causation.
No aggravation after onset: Kyle did not continue working after feeling ill; thus, no Dealers-style exacerbation by required duties was shown.
Outcome: The claimant failed at prong one (work-relatedness) and also lacked proof for prong two (increased risk by nature of employment); prong three was not reached.

Unresolved Questions and Boundaries

What qualifies as “beyond the normally anticipated effects” of a communicable disease? The Court identifies this as a necessary element (prong three) but does not elaborate in detail. Future cases may clarify whether “beyond ordinary” is satisfied by severity alone (e.g., ICU stay) or requires proof of work-caused exacerbation.
Role of community prevalence: While the Court resists reliance on broad inferences about public exposure, it is clear that high community transmission complicates causation. Future opinions may refine the evidentiary thresholds for linking workplace clusters to individual claims during high-prevalence periods.
Essential workers: The Court notes no evidence that Kyle’s job was an “essential worker” role. Whether that designation (by itself) meaningfully informs prong two remains to be defined in subsequent litigation.

Conclusion

Perkins delivers much-needed clarity for Kentucky workers’ compensation law in the wake of COVID-19. The Supreme Court affirms the ALJ’s denial of benefits, finding substantial evidence supported the conclusion that the claimant failed to prove work-related causation and that the “nature of the employment” did not increase the risk of COVID-19. More importantly, the Court articulates a definitive three-prong test for communicable disease claims:

Work-relatedness under KRS 342.0011(2)–(3);
Increased risk by the nature of the employment under KRS 342.0011(1); and
Extent of injury beyond the ordinary effects of the disease (with KRS 342.040’s durational requirement).

By reaffirming the ALJ’s central role and integrating long-standing doctrines (Prestonsburg, Champion, Dealers, Princess) into a modern framework, the Court balances the beneficent purpose of the Act with statutory constraints designed to avoid a “flood of claims” for common illnesses. In practice, claims will turn on robust, job-specific proof of exposure and increased risk tied to required duties, and—where relevant—clear evidence of work-related aggravation that pushes the disease beyond its expected course.

This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.