People v. Williams: Illinois Supreme Court Clarifies Limits of “Reasonable Assistance” in Postconviction Proceedings and Rejects “Paucity-of-Record” Remand

Introduction

In People v. Williams, 2025 IL 129718, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed when a defendant is entitled to relief based on the alleged unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel at the second stage of proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act). The case arose from Michael Williams’s negotiated guilty plea to two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm, resulting in consecutive 10-year sentences. After repeated rounds of postplea and appellate litigation concerning procedural compliance and admonishments, Williams filed a postconviction petition asserting three constitutional claims, the most significant being that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing the presiding judge’s son to attend a pre-plea attorney-client meeting at the jail.

The circuit court dismissed the postconviction petition at the second stage. The appellate court reversed, not on the merits of Williams’s claims, but because it found postconviction counsel’s performance “unreasonable,” especially for failing to plead prejudice adequately and for not supplementing the petition in response to the State’s motion to dismiss—a failure that, the appellate court believed, left a “paucity of the record” preventing meaningful review.

The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the circuit court’s dismissal. In doing so, the Court issued an important clarification: postconviction counsel does not render unreasonable assistance simply because counsel does not amend a petition or file a written response to a motion to dismiss, and courts may not presume that additional facts exist merely to support a claim of prejudice. The Court emphasized that a petition’s lack of merit—and not counsel’s performance—can justify dismissal, especially where the defendant fails to articulate a plausible trial defense or assertion of innocence to support a claim that he would have rejected a plea.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court conducted de novo review and held:

The appellate court erred by finding that postconviction counsel’s assistance was unreasonable at the second stage.
There is no per se requirement that postconviction counsel must amend a petition or file a written response to the State’s motion to dismiss. The failure to do so, standing alone, does not establish unreasonable assistance.
Courts may not assume additional facts exist to cure a petition’s deficiencies. Where the record does not suggest a viable defense or facts to support prejudice, counsel is not unreasonable for failing to plead them.
Because Williams did not articulate a plausible defense or assertion of innocence to support his claim that he would have gone to trial but for counsel’s alleged errors, the prejudice element of Strickland v. Washington was not met.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and affirmed the circuit court’s second-stage dismissal of the postconviction petition.

Background and Procedural History

2009–2011: Williams was charged with two counts of armed robbery and two counts of aggravated battery with a firearm. On the day set for trial in March 2011, after rulings on suppression motions, he entered a negotiated plea to the two aggravated battery counts for consecutive 10-year terms. The court gave Rule 402 admonishments.
Postplea litigation: Williams moved to withdraw his plea, first pro se and then through appointed counsel, with multiple remands by the appellate court over Rule 604(d) compliance. Ultimately, in 2020, the appellate court affirmed the denial of his motion to withdraw the plea.
Postconviction petition (2021): Through retained counsel, Williams filed a petition alleging (1) inadequate Rule 402 admonishments on consecutive sentences; (2) failure to state the statutory basis for consecutive terms; and (3) ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel brought the judge’s son (C.J. Baricevic) to a privileged jail meeting where plea options were discussed. Williams averred he could not proceed to trial with counsel after learning of Baricevic’s identity.
Second-stage dismissal: The circuit court dismissed the petition for failure to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. On appeal, Williams challenged only the reasonableness of postconviction counsel’s assistance as to the trial-counsel-ineffectiveness claim concerning the jail meeting.
Appellate ruling: The appellate court reversed and remanded, adopting a “paucity-of-record” rationale (drawn from Johnson) and faulting counsel for not sufficiently pleading prejudice, not filing a written response, and not seeking to amend.
Supreme Court decision (2025): Reversal of the appellate court. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal and clarified the scope of postconviction counsel’s duties and the proper prejudice showing after a guilty plea.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Post-Conviction Hearing Act; Three-Stage Framework (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.): The Court recapped the Act’s stages—(1) initial screening for frivolity; (2) second-stage adversarial testing where the State may move to dismiss and the court asks whether there is a “substantial showing” of a constitutional violation; and (3) evidentiary hearing if such showing is made.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987): No federal constitutional right to counsel in postconviction proceedings. Illinois, however, requires “reasonable assistance” by statute and court rule.
People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406 (1999); People v. Cotto, 2016 IL 119006; People v. Agee, 2023 IL 128413: Illinois recognizes a state-law right to reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel, applicable to both appointed and retained counsel. The standard is case-specific and context-dependent.
People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34 (2007); People v. Spreitzer, 143 Ill. 2d 210 (1991): Counsel’s assistance is not unreasonable merely because arguments lack merit or fail to persuade; the question is whether counsel’s performance was reasonable under the circumstances.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 468 (1984): Governs ineffective-assistance claims: a petitioner must show both deficient performance and prejudice. In the guilty-plea context, prejudice generally requires a showing that the defendant would have rejected the plea and gone to trial, supported by an assertion of innocence or a plausible trial defense.
Agee, 2023 IL 128413, ¶ 51: In a post-plea ineffective-assistance claim, a bare statement that “I would have gone to trial” is insufficient; a defendant must articulate a plausible defense or assertion of innocence to make the prejudice showing.
People v. Johnson, 2022 IL App (1st) 190258-U (unpublished): Relied upon by the appellate court for a “paucity-of-record” remand when the record is allegedly too thin (due to counsel’s performance) to determine prejudice. The Supreme Court in Williams disapproved of the appellate court’s application of this reasoning on these facts.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps: the legal framework, the petition’s content and record constraints, and the assessment of counsel’s performance against the “reasonable assistance” standard.

1) The Postconviction Framework and Standards of Review

The Court reviewed de novo both the second-stage dismissal and the reasonableness of postconviction counsel’s assistance. At the second stage, the question is whether the petition and its supporting materials make a “substantial showing” of a constitutional violation. If not, dismissal is warranted without an evidentiary hearing.

2) The Petition’s Content and the Prejudice Requirement

Williams’s third claim alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for allowing the presiding judge’s son to attend a confidential jail meeting where the State’s evidence and plea options were discussed. The petition asserted prejudice by contending there was a “substantial likelihood” that the plea and sentencing would have turned out differently and included an affidavit stating that Williams could not continue to trial with counsel after learning the attendee’s identity.

The Court emphasized that, under Strickland and Agee, a post-plea claim of ineffective assistance must be supported by more than a conclusory statement that the defendant would have gone to trial. The petition must include an assertion of innocence or a plausible trial defense showing that rejecting the plea would have been rational. Here, there was no indication in the record of a viable defense or any new facts to support prejudice. Indeed, Williams had previously acknowledged at a postplea hearing that the State’s case was strong, his likelihood of success at trial was low, and the negotiated sentence was far more favorable than the potential exposure (31 years to life) on the armed robbery count.

3) Reasonableness of Postconviction Counsel’s Assistance

The appellate court faulted counsel for not amending the petition to add prejudice allegations and for failing to file a written response to the State’s motion to dismiss, concluding that counsel’s “pleading failure” created a record too sparse to evaluate prejudice, necessitating remand. The Supreme Court rejected this approach for several reasons:

No per se duty to amend or file a written response: The Court noted the appellate court cited no authority requiring postconviction counsel to respond in writing to the State’s motion to dismiss or to amend the petition. The absence of these filings, by itself, does not amount to unreasonable assistance.
No assumption of nonexistent facts: The appellate court erred by assuming that additional facts were available to plead prejudice and by treating counsel’s failure to produce those facts as an indicator of unreasonableness. Nothing in the record suggested that Williams had a plausible defense or other facts to meet Strickland’s prejudice requirement.
Counsel pursued the best available argument: Confronted with a sparse factual basis for prejudice, counsel advanced the only argument realistically available—that Williams would have proceeded to trial but for the presence of the judge’s son at the jail meeting. The circuit court rejected this as insufficient without a plausible defense. But unsuccessful advocacy does not equal unreasonable assistance.
No contrary showing regarding consultation: Williams’s general claim that counsel failed to consult was unsupported by the record, which included his sworn affidavit attached to the petition—demonstrating counsel’s engagement.

The Supreme Court also emphasized that the petition had already survived the first-stage screening as nonfrivolous, but that does not mean it necessarily made the “substantial showing” required at the second stage. Critically, the claim’s deficiency lay in the lack of prejudice, not in counsel’s performance.

Impact and Doctrinal Significance

Williams clarifies and narrows the circumstances under which Illinois reviewing courts may order a “do-over” of second-stage postconviction proceedings on the theory that postconviction counsel’s performance created a record too thin to evaluate prejudice. Key impacts include:

Rejection of “paucity-of-record” remands on assumption: Appellate courts may not presume that unpled facts exist and remand to give defendants a second chance based solely on counsel’s failure to amend or respond. A remand premised on a thin record requires some indication that additional facts exist and could be pled to meet the prejudice standard.
No per se rule requiring amendment or written response: Postconviction counsel is not automatically unreasonable for choosing not to amend a petition or for declining to file a written response to a motion to dismiss. Strategy and context matter; courts must focus on the reasonableness of counsel’s overall performance and whether better arguments or facts were realistically available.
Heightened clarity on prejudice after a guilty plea: Petitioners challenging the voluntariness of a plea based on trial counsel’s alleged deficiencies must support the claim with an assertion of innocence or a plausible defense that would make rejection of the plea rational. A bare claim that the defendant would have gone to trial is insufficient.
Equivalence of standards for retained and appointed counsel: Consistent with Cotto, the decision reiterates that all postconviction counsel—retained or appointed—owe “reasonable assistance,” not the Sixth Amendment “effective assistance” standard applicable at trial.
Practical guidance for trial courts: Circuit courts may dismiss at the second stage when the petition and attached materials do not make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation, even if the petition advanced beyond the first stage and even when counsel has not amended the pleadings.
Conflict-adjacent allegations require concrete prejudice: Allegations about third-party presence at privileged meetings—even where the third party is related to the judge—will not justify relief absent a concrete showing of prejudice in line with Strickland. The Court did not endorse a per se rule of structural error on these facts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Three Stages of a Postconviction Proceeding:
- First stage: The court screens the petition for frivolity. Only the “gist” of a constitutional claim is required.
- Second stage: The State may move to dismiss. The petitioner must make a “substantial showing” of a constitutional violation with affidavits, records, or other evidence; mere conclusions are not enough.
- Third stage: If a substantial showing is made, the court holds an evidentiary hearing.
Reasonable Assistance vs. Effective Assistance:
- Reasonable assistance (postconviction): A state-law standard requiring counsel to provide competent, sensible help in presenting the petition; it does not guarantee success or creativity beyond the available facts and law.
- Effective assistance (trial/direct appeal): The constitutional Sixth Amendment standard under Strickland, requiring both deficient performance and prejudice.
Prejudice After a Guilty Plea:
- The petitioner must show that, but for counsel’s mistakes, he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial—and support that assertion with a plausible defense or claim of innocence. Simply saying “I would have gone to trial” is not enough.
“Paucity of the Record” Remands:
- Some appellate decisions have remanded when counsel’s omissions allegedly leave the record too thin to judge prejudice. Williams curtails this practice: courts should not assume missing facts exist to fill gaps. Remand is not a default remedy for thin records absent some basis to believe counsel could reasonably have presented more.
Rule 402 Admonishments and Rule 604(d) Certificates:
- Rule 402 requires trial courts to advise defendants of rights and potential penalties before accepting a plea.
- Rule 604(d) governs postplea motions and imposes duties on counsel (including certifications). While 604(d) compliance animated earlier procedural remands in this case, the 2025 decision focuses on postconviction counsel’s assistance at the second stage, not on Rule 604(d).

Key Takeaways

Postconviction counsel’s assistance is judged by a reasonableness standard tailored to the case’s facts; losing arguments or unamended pleadings do not inherently equal unreasonable assistance.
There is no automatic duty for postconviction counsel to amend a petition or respond in writing to a motion to dismiss; the absence of such filings, without more, is not unreasonable assistance.
Appellate courts should not presume that omitted facts exist to fuel a prejudice finding; “paucity-of-record” remands are improper absent some indication that additional facts could be pleaded.
A defendant who pled guilty must do more than assert, in hindsight, that he would have gone to trial. He must offer an assertion of innocence or a plausible defense to satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong.
Allegations that a judge’s family member attended a privileged meeting—without concrete prejudice tied to trial strategy or a plausible defense—will not suffice for postconviction relief.

Conclusion

People v. Williams reinforces that postconviction litigation is not a vehicle for speculative remands based on assumed facts or dissatisfaction with strategic choices made in the absence of viable defenses. The Illinois Supreme Court held that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance where counsel advanced the only credible argument available and there was no factual basis to plead prejudice beyond a bare assertion that the defendant would have gone to trial. The Court also clarified that neither the failure to amend a petition nor the failure to file a written response to a motion to dismiss creates a per se inference of unreasonable assistance. By rejecting the appellate court’s “paucity-of-record” rationale, Williams provides concrete guidance for practitioners and courts alike: at the second stage, a petition must stand on the facts and plausible defenses it can actually marshal, and counsel’s performance will be judged by what was reasonably possible—not by imagined supplements that the record does not support.