People v. Williams (2025): Inaccurate CPL 30.30 (5‑a) Certifications Do Not Invalidate Statements of Readiness

People v. Williams (2025): Inaccurate CPL 30.30 (5‑a) Certifications Do Not Invalidate Statements of Readiness

I. Introduction

In People v. Williams, 2025 NY Slip Op 06535 (NY Ct App Nov. 25, 2025), the New York Court of Appeals resolved an important and previously unsettled question at the intersection of statutory speedy trial law and accusatory instrument sufficiency. The case interprets Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 30.30 (5‑a), a relatively recent provision requiring prosecutors, when declaring trial readiness on a local criminal court accusatory instrument, to certify that all counts are facially sufficient and that any noncompliant counts have been dismissed.

The specific issue was: What happens when the People file a timely statement of readiness (SOR) accompanied by the required CPL 30.30 (5‑a) certification, but that certification turns out to be wrong as to at least one count? Does this error:

  • Invalidate the SOR so that the People are deemed not ready, causing the entire case to be dismissed on speedy-trial grounds once the 30.30 time expires, or
  • Leave the SOR intact, with the remedy limited to dismissal of the defective count?

A divided Court answered that question in favor of the prosecution. Writing for the majority, Judge Cannataro held that CPL 30.30 (5‑a) does not require the prosecutor’s certification to be substantively correct in order for the SOR to be valid. The only remedy for a mis-certified, facially insufficient count is dismissal of that count, not invalidation of the SOR or dismissal of the entire accusatory instrument.

Judge Rivera, joined by Chief Judge Wilson, dissented. In her view, the statutory term “certifies” necessarily means attesting to the truth of the assertion. An SOR that rests on an incorrect certification is therefore invalid and cannot stop the speedy trial clock, requiring dismissal of the instrument once the CPL 30.30 time has run.

This decision establishes a significant precedent on the remedial structure of CPL 30.30 (5‑a) and clarifies the limits of speedy trial relief when prosecutors incorrectly, even admittedly incorrectly, certify facial sufficiency.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Incident and Charges

The case arose from an incident in Brooklyn in which the defendant, Locksley Williams, struck a pedestrian with his vehicle in an intersection. As a result, a misdemeanor complaint charged him with:

  • Aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the second degree (VTL § 511[2][a][iv])
  • Aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree (VTL § 511[1][a])
  • Unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle (VTL § 509[1])
  • Failure to obey a traffic control signal (VTL § 1111[b][1])

The complaint contained factual allegations supporting the unlicensed operation counts, but it contained no facts at all to support the “failure to obey a traffic control signal” count. Thus, that count was facially insufficient on its face.

B. Filing of the Information and Certification

Later, the People filed a misdemeanor information to replace the complaint. Again, they failed to allege any facts supporting the traffic-signal violation. At the same time, they filed:

  • a statement of readiness under CPL 30.30, and
  • a CPL 30.30 (5‑a) certification stating that
    “all counts in the accusatory instrument … meet the requirements of CPL §§ 100.15 and 100.40, and that any counts not meeting those requirements had been dismissed.”

Everyone ultimately agreed that the traffic-signal count did not meet CPL 100.40’s requirements and was facially insufficient.

C. Defense Motion After 30.30 Time Expired

After the People’s 30.30 time had run, the defendant moved to dismiss:

  • for facial insufficiency, and
  • on statutory speedy trial grounds (CPL 30.30).

Defense counsel argued that because the certification was plainly wrong as to the traffic-signal count, the SOR was invalid under CPL 30.30 (5‑a). If the SOR was invalid, the People were never legally “ready” within the statutory time, and the information should be dismissed in its entirety.

In response, the People:

  • conceded that the traffic-signal count was facially insufficient and should be dismissed, but
  • argued that an inaccuracy in the certification does not invalidate the SOR or require dismissal of the entire instrument.

D. Lower Courts and Leave to Appeal

Criminal Court:

  • dismissed the defective traffic-signal count, but
  • denied dismissal of the remaining counts and rejected the speedy trial argument, holding that:
    • the statute requires only that a certification be filed, and
    • inaccuracies within that certification do not, by themselves, invalidate the SOR.

The Appellate Term affirmed (83 Misc 3d 21 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2024]), reading CPL 30.30 (5‑a) as:

  • imposing a certification filing requirement, but
  • not specifying any SOR-related sanction for mistakes in the certification.

A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal (42 NY3d 941 [2024]), and the case proceeded to the state’s highest court.

III. Summary of the Court’s Holding

A. Majority Holding

The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term. The core holding is:

When the People file a statement of readiness under CPL 30.30 on a local criminal court accusatory instrument, accompanied by a CPL 30.30 (5‑a) certification that later proves inaccurate as to one or more counts, the SOR remains valid. The appropriate remedy is dismissal of any facially insufficient count, not dismissal of the entire instrument on speedy trial grounds.

Key aspects of the majority’s reasoning:

  • CPL 30.30 (5‑a) makes the filing of the certification a condition of a valid SOR, but does not condition validity on the certification’s accuracy.
  • The statute contains no express remedy invalidating the SOR when the certification is incorrect.
  • Facial sufficiency is a legal question often subject to reasonable disagreement; the Legislature did not intend automatic dismissal of entire instruments because of errors about one count’s facial sufficiency.
  • Existing law already supplies the remedy of dismissing facially insufficient counts.

B. The Dissent

Judge Rivera dissented, joined by Chief Judge Wilson. Their central position:

  • The ordinary meaning of “certifies” is to attest that a statement is true; a false certification is not a certification at all.
  • Under the plain text of CPL 30.30 (5‑a), a valid SOR “shall not be valid unless” the prosecutor certifies the accusatory instrument complies with CPL 100.15 and 100.40 and that noncompliant counts have been dismissed.
  • Because the prosecutor’s certification here was concededly wrong, the SOR was invalid and did not stop the speedy trial clock.
  • Once the statutory time expired without a valid SOR, the entire accusatory instrument should have been dismissed.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Statutory Speedy Trial under CPL 30.30

CPL 30.30 is New York’s statutory speedy trial scheme. It sets time limits by offense level (e.g., 90 days for most class A misdemeanors) within which the People must be “ready for trial.” It is distinct from the constitutional speedy trial right.

A statement of readiness generally:

  • is filed or announced on the record by the prosecutor, and
  • tolls the speedy trial clock from further running (or pauses it for that adjournment period).

Under People v. Labate, 42 NY3d 184 (2024), an SOR must reflect actual readiness, not mere words: “a declaration of readiness must be more than merely mouthing those words.” If the People are not, in fact, able to proceed to trial, any purported SOR is “illusory” and does not stop the clock.

B. Local Criminal Court Accusatory Instruments and Facial Sufficiency

In local criminal courts, prosecutions commonly begin with:

  • a misdemeanor complaint (which may include hearsay), that must be “converted,” for purposes of prosecution, into
  • a misdemeanor information (which must comply with strict non-hearsay, facial sufficiency requirements).

Relevant provisions:

  • CPL 100.15: sets general form and content requirements for accusatory instruments, including a factual part that alleges facts of the offense.
  • CPL 100.40 (1)(c): for informations, the factual allegations must:
    • be non-hearsay, and
    • establish each element of the offense and the defendant’s commission thereof.
  • CPL 170.65: provides that a misdemeanor complaint must be replaced by an information “[f]or purposes of prosecution.”

A count that fails those requirements is facially insufficient and may be dismissed on motion under CPL 170.30 and 170.35. Facial insufficiency concerns the adequacy of the accusatory instrument on its face, not whether the People can ultimately prove the case at trial.

C. CPL 30.30 (5), CPL 245.50, and CPL 30.30 (5‑a)

1. Discovery and Readiness (CPL 30.30 (5) & CPL 245.50)

In the 2019 discovery reforms, the Legislature linked readiness to discovery compliance:

  • CPL 30.30 (5) (as originally enacted in 2019) required that an SOR “must be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure requirements” of CPL 245.20.
  • CPL 245.50 (3) provided that the prosecution shall not be deemed ready for trial for purposes of CPL 30.30 “until it has filed a proper certificate of compliance.”

In People v. Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023), the Court read those provisions together and held that:

  • the certificate of compliance must reflect due diligence and actual good-faith compliance, and
  • an invalid certificate means that the SOR is not effective for 30.30 purposes.

The Legislature later amended “proper” to “valid” in CPL 245.50 (3), but the connection between certificate validity and readiness was preserved.

2. Facial Sufficiency Certification (CPL 30.30 (5‑a))

CPL 30.30 (5‑a), enacted as part of the same reform package but distinct in structure, provides:

“Upon a local criminal court accusatory instrument, a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter and those counts not meeting the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 of this chapter have been dismissed.”

Thus, for local court cases:

  • the People must file both:
    • a CPL 30.30 statement of readiness, and
    • a CPL 30.30 (5‑a) certification regarding facial sufficiency;
  • without that certification, the SOR is expressly declared “not valid.”

Williams addresses a gap: what if the required certification is filed, but is wrong?

V. Analysis of the Majority Opinion

A. The Text of CPL 30.30 (5‑a) and the Absence of an Express Sanction

The majority starts from familiar principles of statutory interpretation. Quoting Majewski v. Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577 (1998), it emphasizes that:

“the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof.”

CPL 30.30 (5‑a) says an SOR “shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies” certain things. The majority reads this literally: what is required is:

  • the act of certifying as part of the SOR filing, not
  • a guarantee that the certified assertions will ultimately be judicially confirmed as correct.

Key move: the majority treats the statute as procedural (a condition to be met at the time of SOR) rather than substantive (guaranteeing the truth of the certification).

Critically, the Court notes that CPL 30.30 (5‑a) is “silent” as to what happens if the certification is later shown to be inaccurate. In the majority’s view:

  • Courts are not free to infer a remedy—particularly the harsh remedy of invalidating readiness and dismissing an entire case—that the Legislature did not expressly provide.
  • To do so would, in its words (citing Judge Rivera’s dissent in Russell v. New York University, 42 NY3d 377 [2024]), be to “rewrite the law” by “discovering” an unintended meaning.

Thus, the statute requires a certification; it does not, on the majority’s reading, require an accurate certification as a condition of SOR validity.

B. The Nature of Facial Sufficiency as a Legal Question

The majority underscores that facial sufficiency is:

  • a legal question about the adequacy of the accusatory instrument, not a pure question of fact, and
  • often genuinely debatable.

Invoking decisions such as:

  • People v. Arroyo, 78 Misc 3d 1239(A), 2023 NY Slip Op 50482(U) (Crim Ct, Kings County 2023), where the court had to parse “numerous, often conflicting cases” before concluding a count was insufficient, and
  • its own cases like People v. Farrell, 44 NY3d 1 (2025); People v. Willis, 44 NY3d 14 (2025); and People v. Hill, 38 NY3d 460 (2022), cited as examples of complex sufficiency issues,

the Court suggests that:

  • it is not reasonable to expect prosecutors to anticipate exactly how courts will resolve all facial sufficiency challenges in advance, and
  • it would be too severe to say a prosecutor “was never ready” for speedy-trial purposes simply because a court later disagreed with their legal assessment of sufficiency on one count.

C. Comparison with the Discovery-Readiness Framework (CPL 30.30 (5) and CPL 245.50)

A major plank of the majority’s reasoning is a comparison with the discovery regime:

  • CPL 245.50 (3) (as originally enacted) expressly provided that the People are “not deemed ready” until they file a proper certificate of compliance.
  • CPL 30.30 (5) explicitly tied SOR validity to a “certification of good faith compliance” with discovery.

Reading those provisions together in People v. Bay, the Court concluded that:

  • one cannot be “ready” if discovery was not diligently complied with and the certificate is invalid; the SOR is therefore illusory.

The majority emphasizes that:

  • the Legislature there chose to spell out that a discovery-related defect in the certificate defeats readiness, but
  • did not use similar language in CPL 30.30 (5‑a) regarding facial sufficiency.

From this contrast, the majority infers a deliberate legislative choice:

  • When the Legislature intends certification accuracy to be a condition of readiness, it says so (as in CPL 245.50/30.30 (5)).
  • Its silence in CPL 30.30 (5‑a) about the consequences of a mistaken certification must be respected, rather than filled in by courts.

D. Legislative History: The 2019 “Dead Bill” (Senate Bill S1738)

The majority turns to a prior version of the legislation, 2019 Senate Bill S1738, which proposed that:

“a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements of [CPL 100.40] … and the prosecution moves to dismiss any counts not meeting such.”

This earlier draft would have:

  • tied SOR validity to the actual sufficiency of the accusatory instrument, not merely to a certification of sufficiency.

By contrast, the enacted CPL 30.30 (5‑a) instead provides that an SOR is not valid unless the prosecutor “certifies” that the counts meet CPL 100.15 and 100.40 and that noncompliant counts have been dismissed.

The majority, invoking Kimmel v. State, 29 NY3d 386 (2017), treats this drafting evolution as significant:

  • Earlier bills “may shed light on the critical differences” in the final version.
  • The Legislature “considered, and rejected, language tying the People’s readiness to the actual facial sufficiency of the accusatory instrument in favor of a requirement that they ‘certif[y]’ its sufficiency.”

This reinforces the majority’s textual conclusion: the Legislature chose a certification-based condition, not an outcome-based condition, for readiness.

E. The Function of CPL 30.30 (5‑a): Ending Partial Conversion

The majority explains that, even without an accuracy-based sanction, CPL 30.30 (5‑a) has real work to do. Citing William C. Donnino’s Practice Commentaries and cases like People v. Minor, 144 Misc 2d 846 (App Term 2d Dept 1989), it describes the historical practice of:

  • “partial conversion”: the People would convert some counts of an accusatory instrument into a facially sufficient information (by removing hearsay), declare readiness on those counts, and leave other counts in a complaint posture.

As interpreted by some courts, this allowed prosecutors to:

  • toll the 30.30 clock as to the converted counts, while
  • keeping the case in a pretrial posture as to unconverted counts, frustrating the purpose of speedy-trial protections.

CPL 30.30 (5‑a), in the majority’s view, cures this by:

  • forcing the People to make a binary choice:
    • either declare readiness on the entire accusatory instrument, certifying that all remaining counts are facially sufficient and converted to information form, or
    • not declare readiness on any count.

Thus, trial readiness becomes a “singular event for the entire accusatory instrument.” This eliminates the piecemeal approach that undermined 30.30, even if the certification’s accuracy is not policed by invalidating the SOR.

F. Choice of Remedy: Dismissal of the Defective Count

The majority stresses that the CPL already contains a remedy for facial insufficiency:

  • Under CPL 170.35 (1)(a), (b) and related provisions, a facially insufficient count may be dismissed.

Given that:

  • facial sufficiency is often disputable, and
  • a mistaken judgment on one count can be made in good faith,

it is “reasonable to conclude that the legislature did not want to require the severe sanction of dismissal of the entire accusatory instrument as a consequence of the insufficiency of a single count.”

Accordingly:

  • A defective count is dismissed.
  • The SOR stands, and the other counts remain viable if they are facially sufficient and timely.

The Court tempers this outcome by expressing an expectation that prosecutors will nevertheless “carry out this statutory command with the diligence and care attendant to their positions,” reviewing accusatory instruments for facial sufficiency before certifying them.

VI. The Dissent’s Competing Interpretation

A. “Certifies” Must Mean “Truthfully Attests”

Judge Rivera begins with the same text but reads it differently, grounded in dictionary definitions. CPL 30.30 (5‑a) requires that:

“a statement of readiness shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts charged in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements of sections 100.15 and 100.40 … and those counts not meeting the requirements … have been dismissed.”

“Certifies” is not defined in the CPL. The dissent therefore consults:

  • Merriam-Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary, which defines “certify” as to “confirm or attest … as being true, meeting a standard, or being as represented,” and
  • Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “certify” as “to authenticate or verify in writing” and “to attest as being true or as meeting certain criteria.”

From this, the dissent concludes:

  • a “certification” is an attestation that the statements made are in fact true, not a mere formula of words; and
  • a false or baseless certification is not a “certification” within the meaning of the statute at all.

Thus, because the prosecutor here certified that all counts were facially sufficient and that noncompliant counts had been dismissed, when in fact a concededly defective count remained, there was no valid certification. The statutory condition for SOR validity was unmet; therefore, the SOR was invalid from the outset.

B. Avoiding Surplusage: Giving 30.30 (5‑a) Real Consequences

The dissent relies on the anti-surplusage canon, citing Anonymous v. Molik, 32 NY3d 30 (2018):

“a statutory construction which renders one part meaningless should be avoided.”

If an inaccurate certification has no 30.30 consequence, the dissent argues:

  • CPL 30.30 (5‑a)’s certification requirement becomes “a meaningless formality.”
  • The Legislature could achieve the same result simply by requiring the filing of an SOR, without any certification at all.

By contrast, interpreting the statute to automatically invalidate an SOR that rests on a false certification:

  • gives concrete meaning to “shall not be valid unless,” and
  • ties the certification requirement directly to the statute’s speedy trial mechanism.

C. Link to “Actual Readiness” Under CPL 30.30 (5)(a)

The dissent also invokes CPL 30.30 (5)(a), which requires courts to inquire into the People’s “actual readiness” when they declare ready. Under cases like Labate, an SOR that does not reflect actual readiness is invalid and fails to toll the speedy trial clock.

Judge Rivera argues:

  • If the accusatory instrument includes an obviously facially insufficient count that has not been dismissed, the prosecution is not actually ready to proceed to trial “upon” that accusatory instrument in the sense contemplated by CPL 30.30 (5‑a).
  • Thus, the SOR here was illusory—both because there was no valid certification and because the People were not actually in a posture to try the case on a fully facially sufficient instrument.

D. Legislative Purpose: Controlling Prosecutorial Delay

The dissent emphasizes the overarching purpose of CPL 30.30, citing People v. Price, 14 NY3d 61 (2010): to discourage prosecutorial inaction and delay. From this perspective:

  • CPL 30.30 (5‑a) is designed to force prosecutors to diligently vet accusatory instruments for facial sufficiency before the 30.30 clock expires.
  • The “automatic invalidation” of an SOR based on a false certification is the intended pressure mechanism: fail to get your house in order in time, and you lose the entire case.

The dissent notes that the prosecutor here could have:

  • reviewed the accusatory instrument prior to the 30.30 deadline,
  • either dismissed the defective count or filed a superseding instrument curing the defect (CPL 100.50), and
  • filed a new, accurate certification and SOR.

That did not happen. Allowing the prosecutor to escape the 30.30 consequence—total dismissal—undermines the statute’s role in deterring prosecutorial delay.

E. Critique of the Majority’s Legislative History Approach

The dissent is skeptical of the majority’s reliance on the “dead bill” (S1738), noting:

  • Courts should be cautious about drawing inferences from unenacted legislation (Clark v. Cuomo, 66 NY2d 185 [1985]; Matter of NYC C.L.A.S.H., Inc. v. NYS Off. of Parks, 27 NY3d 174 [2016]; United States v. Price, 361 US 304 [1960]).
  • The Sponsor’s Memorandum for the dead bill actually uses language almost identical to the enacted statute: a statement of readiness “shall not be valid unless the prosecuting attorney certifies that all counts are converted and facially sufficient.”

In the dissent’s view:

  • The legislative history does not compel the majority’s conclusion that the Legislature intended to decouple SOR validity from actual facial sufficiency; if anything, it supports the idea that a false certification invalidates the SOR.

F. Disagreement with Majority’s “Window for Facial Sufficiency Motions” Theory

The majority suggests CPL 30.30 (5‑a) “opens a window” during which defendants can move to dismiss facially insufficient counts once the People certify readiness. The dissent responds:

  • Defendants already have the right to move to dismiss facially insufficient counts under CPL 170.35 and CPL 255.10 at any time; 30.30 (5‑a) does not create that power.
  • Therefore, treating 30.30 (5‑a) as merely “opening a window” misstates its role and does not justify stripping the certification of real 30.30 consequences.

Ultimately, the dissent sees the majority’s approach as:

  • undermining CPL 30.30’s core policy of combating delay,
  • encouraging prosecutorial laxity in reviewing accusatory instruments, and
  • “resuscitating” illusory statements of readiness by insulating them from the statutory penalty for mis-certification.

VII. Clarifying Key Concepts and Terminology

A. Facial Sufficiency vs. Proof at Trial

Facial sufficiency refers to whether the accusatory instrument:

  • alleges non-hearsay facts establishing each element of the offense and the defendant’s commission of it (CPL 100.40), and
  • provides “reasonable cause” to believe the defendant committed the offense.

It does not ask whether the People can actually prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. An accusatory instrument may be facially sufficient yet weak evidentially, or vice versa.

B. Misdemeanor Complaint vs. Information; “Conversion”

  • A misdemeanor complaint may rely on hearsay; it is often used at arraignment to start a case quickly.
  • A misdemeanor information must be based on non-hearsay factual allegations satisfying CPL 100.40.

The process of replacing the complaint with an information is colloquially called “conversion”. Before the 2019 reforms, prosecutors sometimes “partially converted” a complaint—converting some counts but leaving others unconverted. CPL 30.30 (5‑a) was intended to curb that practice in the context of readiness.

C. Statement of Readiness and “Illusory” Readiness

A statement of readiness is the prosecutor’s formal representation that they are ready to proceed to trial. It has crucial 30.30 consequences, as it typically stops the statutory clock from running, at least for an adjournment period.

An SOR is illusory if:

  • the People are not actually in a position to proceed to trial despite having announced readiness (e.g., they have no witnesses, have not provided discovery, or otherwise cannot legally go forward).

Under Labate and related cases, an illusory SOR does not toll the 30.30 clock.

D. Superseding Accusatory Instruments (CPL 100.50)

CPL 100.50 allows the prosecution to file a superseding information prior to plea or trial commencement, correcting defects or reorganizing charges. In practice, a diligent prosecutor who discovers a facial insufficiency problem can cure it by filing a superseding instrument and a new, accurate 5‑a certification and SOR before the 30.30 deadline runs.

VIII. Precedents Cited and Their Roles

The opinion and dissent reference several notable cases:

  • Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577 (1998)
    • Articulates the rule that statutory interpretation begins with the text and its plain meaning.
    • Used by the majority to justify a strongly text-centered analysis of CPL 30.30 (5‑a).
  • Russell v New York University, 42 NY3d 377 (2024)
    • Majority cites Judge Rivera’s dissent in Russell for the idea that courts should not “rewrite the law” by discovering unintended meanings.
    • Used somewhat pointedly to support refusing to read an unexpressed sanction into CPL 30.30 (5‑a).
  • People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200 (2023)
    • Key discovery-readiness case. The Court held that, under CPL 245.50 (3) and CPL 30.30 (5), the People are not “ready” unless they have filed a proper (now “valid”) certificate of compliance after due diligence.
    • Majority uses Bay to show that where the Legislature wants certificate validity to be a readiness condition, it expressly says so—unlike in CPL 30.30 (5‑a).
    • Dissent uses Bay to support the idea that certifications in this regime must reflect actual compliance, not mere formulaic recitations.
  • People v Labate, 42 NY3d 184 (2024)
    • Held that a statement of readiness must reflect genuine readiness and must be more than “mouthing those words.”
    • Heavily relied on in the dissent to argue that readiness here was illusory and the SOR must be treated as invalid.
  • Anonymous v Molik, 32 NY3d 30 (2018)
    • Reaffirms the anti-surplusage canon: avoid constructions that render statutory language meaningless.
    • Cited by the dissent in arguing that a non-consequential “certification” requirement violates this principle.
  • People v Williams, 19 NY3d 100 (2012)
    • Earlier Court of Appeals decision (different Williams) reinforcing the primacy of plain meaning when statutory language is clear.
    • Referenced in the dissent to ground its dictionary-based reading of “certifies.”
  • People v Holz, 35 NY3d 55 (2020) and People v Teri W., 31 NY3d 124 (2018)
    • Illustrate the Court’s practice of using dictionary definitions to interpret undefined statutory terms.
    • Support the dissent’s reliance on ordinary-meaning analysis for “certifies.”
  • People v Hill, 38 NY3d 460 (2022); People v Farrell, 44 NY3d 1 (2025); People v Willis, 44 NY3d 14 (2025)
    • Cited by the majority as examples of how questions of legal sufficiency can be complex and contested.
    • Used to support the view that prosecutors cannot be expected always to predict how courts will rule on sufficiency challenges.
  • People v Minor, 144 Misc 2d 846 (App Term 2d Dept 1989)
    • One of the cases that allowed “partial conversion”—readiness on some counts but not others.
    • Used by the majority to show the problematic background practice that 30.30 (5‑a) was designed to end.
  • People v Ward, 79 Misc 3d 129(A), 2023 NY Slip Op 50688(U) (App Term 2d Dept 2023)
    • Appellate Term case that looked to the legislative memorandum for S1738 and described 30.30 (5‑a) as a measure to ensure timely trials.
    • Cited by the dissent to support interpreting 30.30 (5‑a) as a strict tool against prosecutorial delay.
  • People v Price, 14 NY3d 61 (2010)
    • Explains the “dominant legislative intent” of CPL 30.30 as discouraging prosecutorial inaction.
    • Supports the dissent’s policy argument for a strong sanction (dismissal) when prosecutors mis-certify readiness.
  • Kimmel v State, 29 NY3d 386 (2017)
    • Approves use of prior, unenacted bills to highlight “critical differences” in enacted language.
    • Relied on by the majority to justify looking to S1738 and inferring legislative rejection of a stricter readiness rule.

IX. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Prosecutors

  • No automatic 30.30 penalty for an erroneous 5‑a certification.
    • The primary remedial risk is dismissal of defective counts, not dismissal of the entire case as untimely.
  • Continuing duty of diligence.
    • While the majority expects “diligence and care,” the legal incentive is weaker than the dissent envisioned.
    • Ethical rules, internal office policies, and reputational concerns will be the main drivers of careful review.
  • Strategic considerations in close sufficiency cases.
    • Prosecutors may be more willing to take reasonable positions that some counts are sufficient, knowing that an adverse ruling will result in dismissal of the count but not in retroactive invalidation of their SOR.
    • However, repeatedly including obviously defective counts may draw judicial or disciplinary criticism.

B. For Defense Counsel

  • Speedy trial leverage is narrower.
    • Defense cannot automatically convert a mis-certified count into a 30.30 victory on the entire case.
    • They must continue to independently track 30.30 time and litigate facial sufficiency directly.
  • Facial sufficiency motions remain essential.
    • Counsel should not assume that 30.30 (5‑a) will police sufficiency; they must affirmatively move to dismiss defective counts under CPL 170.35, 170.30, or 255.10.
    • Challenging weak counts early can narrow the case and reduce plea leverage.
  • Focus on “illusory readiness” remains relevant.
    • Even after Williams, defendants can argue that an SOR is illusory on other grounds (e.g., discovery noncompliance under CPL 245.50, lack of witnesses, or inability to proceed).
    • Williams limits only one particular theory: that an inaccurate 5‑a certification, by itself, invalidates readiness.

C. For Trial Courts

  • Clarified rule on 30.30 (5‑a) challenges.
    • When a defendant shows that a certified count is facially insufficient, courts should:
      • dismiss that count, but
      • not retroactively invalidate the People’s SOR or dismiss the entire instrument solely on that basis.
  • Continuing obligation to assess “actual readiness.”
    • Courts must still conduct an “actual readiness” inquiry under CPL 30.30 (5)(a) and existing case law.
    • If other circumstances show the SOR is illusory, the SOR may still be invalid notwithstanding Williams.

D. Broader Doctrinal Significance

  • Certification regimes distinguished.
    • Bay (discovery) and Williams (facial sufficiency) show that not all statutory certifications are treated alike:
      • Some (e.g., discovery certificates) are tightly linked to readiness validity.
      • Others (5‑a certifications) are conditions of form whose inaccuracy does not retroactively defeat readiness.
  • Judicial restraint in implying sanctions.
    • The majority’s methodology reinforces a pattern: absent explicit legislative language, courts are hesitant to infer drastic remedies (like dismissal) from structural or purpose-based arguments alone.
  • Ongoing role of 30.30 (5‑a).
    • Despite the dissent’s criticism, 5‑a still meaningfully changes practice by:
      • requiring a single, instrument-wide readiness event, and
      • curbing partial readiness tactics that previously diluted 30.30’s protections.

E. Potential Unresolved Questions

  • Good faith vs. bad faith certifications.
    • Williams deals with an admittedly incorrect certification, but does not differentiate between good-faith legal mistakes and reckless or knowing falsity.
    • Ethical rules and potential sanctions for knowingly false statements to the court remain in play outside the 30.30 framework.
  • Multiple defective counts.
    • The opinion addresses at least one defective count; in principle, even if several counts are invalidated, the SOR stands as long as at least one viable count remains and other readiness requirements are met.
  • Interaction with future legislative amendments.
    • The Legislature may respond by clarifying whether 5‑a certifications must be accurate to support readiness, much as it did in refining CPL 245.50.

X. Conclusion

People v. Williams establishes a clear and consequential rule in New York’s statutory speedy trial jurisprudence: an inaccurate CPL 30.30 (5‑a) certification does not, by itself, invalidate the People’s statement of readiness or mandate dismissal of the entire accusatory instrument. Instead, the remedy is limited to dismissal of any facially insufficient counts identified.

The majority grounds its decision in a close reading of statutory text, a comparison with the expressly sanction-laden discovery readiness regime, and the legislative history showing that a stricter actual-sufficiency requirement was considered and rejected. It emphasizes that 30.30 (5‑a) still has significant bite by ending partial conversion and requiring a single, instrument-wide readiness moment.

The dissent, in contrast, insists that “certifies” must mean truthfully attests; otherwise 30.30 (5‑a) becomes an empty ritual and fails to serve the statute’s core purpose of deterring prosecutorial delay. On that reading, the prosecutor’s erroneous certification here rendered the SOR invalid and required dismissal of the entire information once the 30.30 time had expired.

Going forward, Williams will guide trial courts and practitioners in framing speedy-trial arguments involving facial sufficiency and 5‑a certifications. While it narrows the availability of 30.30 dismissal based on mis-certification, it also reinforces the CPL’s structure: illusory readiness remains impermissible; facially insufficient counts remain subject to dismissal; and the Legislature retains the prerogative to calibrate the sanctions attaching to certification regimes.

In the broader legal context, the decision exemplifies a restrained, text-focused approach to statutory remedies, particularly where dismissal of criminal charges is at issue. It marks a significant step in the ongoing refinement of New York’s speedy trial law after the 2019 reforms and will undoubtedly shape litigation strategy and prosecutorial practice in local criminal courts across the state.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: New York Court of Appeals

Judge(s)

Cannataro, J.

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