People v. West (2025 CO 61): Prosecutorial Disqualification Requires Record-Proven “Extreme Circumstances” Making a Fair Trial Unlikely—Not Mere Impropriety or Public-Perception Concerns

I. Introduction

Case: People v. West, 2025 CO 61 (Colorado Supreme Court, en banc, Nov. 10, 2025).
Parties: The People of the State of Colorado (Plaintiff-Appellant) v. Rocky Wayne West (Defendant-Appellee).
Posture: Interlocutory appeal from an order disqualifying (1) the primary assigned prosecutor and (2) the entire Fourth Judicial District Attorney’s Office, and appointing a special prosecutor under section 20-1-107(3) and section 16-12-102(2), C.R.S. (2025).

West is charged with first degree murder. Litigation included competency proceedings: an initial evaluation by the Colorado Mental Health Hospital in Pueblo (“CMHHIP”) found West competent; the defense contested that finding and presented a private expert opining incompetency; after a hearing, the district court found West competent. Later, over the People’s objection, the court ordered a second CMHHIP evaluation.

The disqualification motion centered on a hallway statement by the prosecutor to the victim’s family, overheard by defense counsel, to the effect that public defenders were “trying to get [West] out so he can stab more people and hopefully the next people he stabs are public defenders.” The prosecutor promptly apologized, explained he spoke out of frustration, and contacted the victim’s family to clarify he was not condoning violence. Eleven days later, the defense moved for a special prosecutor. The district court granted the motion, disqualifying the prosecutor and the entire office. The People appealed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Colorado Supreme Court reversed. Although condemning the prosecutor’s remark as “unacceptable and indefensible,” the majority held the district court abused its discretion by misapplying section 20-1-107(2). Under the “special circumstances” prong, the defendant must prove with actual facts and record evidence that extreme circumstances exist that make it unlikely the defendant will receive a fair trial. The district court’s ruling, in the majority’s view, rested largely on appearance/public-perception concerns and did not identify record facts demonstrating an unlikely fair trial. The Court also reversed disqualification of the entire district attorney’s office for the same reason.

Justice Gabriel concurred in part and dissented in part: he agreed the office-wide disqualification was improper but would have affirmed disqualification of the individual prosecutor based on the “extreme” nature of the comment and its implications for the prosecutor’s duty to “do justice.”

III. Analysis

A. Governing Statute and Core Holding

Section 20-1-107(2) provides three grounds to disqualify a district attorney in a case: (1) the district attorney’s request; (2) a personal or financial interest; or (3) “special circumstances” making it unlikely the defendant would receive a fair trial. Only the third ground was at issue.

The majority’s central doctrinal reinforcement is this: even actual prosecutorial impropriety—without record-supported, extreme circumstances tied to trial fairness—does not satisfy section 20-1-107(2)’s “special circumstances” standard. The inquiry is not whether conduct looks bad (or even is bad), but whether it is so extreme, supported by actual facts and evidence in the record, that it renders a fair trial unlikely.

B. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

People v. Espinoza, 195 P.3d 1122 (Colo. App. 2008): Cited for the proposition that prosecutor-disqualification orders are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
People v. Kent, 2020 CO 85, 476 P.3d 762: A central comparator. The Court used Kent both for the abuse-of-discretion standard (misapplication of law is an abuse) and for substance: even substantial concerns about prosecutorial motives/strategies and potential animus did not justify disqualification absent a showing that a fair trial was unlikely. The majority analogized the district court’s speculation here (e.g., future plea bargaining unfairness) to the insufficient showing in Kent.
People v. Loper, 241 P.3d 543 (Colo. 2010): Treated as a doctrinal anchor on section 20-1-107(2): the defendant bears a heavy burden; must present “actual facts and evidence in the record”; special circumstances “must be extreme”; “bad smell”/appearance concerns do not equate to an unlikely fair trial.
People v. Jimenez, 217 P.3d 841 (Colo. App. 2008): Cited to illustrate that even allegations of prosecutor wrongdoing do not automatically require disqualification.
People v. Chavez, 139 P.3d 649 (Colo. 2006): One of the rare cases upholding disqualification—where the district attorney previously represented the defendant in a substantially related matter and received confidential communications—an extreme conflict directly threatening fairness.
People v. Arellano, 2020 CO 84, 476 P.3d 364: The second rare case upholding disqualification—where a district attorney’s office employee was married to (though separated from) the victim and was a significant witness, creating an extraordinary institutional conflict.
People in Interest of N.R., 139 P.3d 671 (Colo. 2006): Critical to the “appearance of impropriety” point. The Court reiterated that after the 2002 amendment to section 20-1-107(2), appearance of impropriety is not the test; disqualification must fit one of the three statutory grounds.
People v. Kendrick, 2017 CO 82, 396 P.3d 1124: Reinforced that disqualification cannot rest on “appearance” that the defendant would not receive a fair trial.
People v. Perez, 201 P.3d 1220 (Colo. 2009): Used to show that appearance concerns—such as prior representation by a prosecutor—do not suffice absent the statutory showing.
Dunlap v. People, 173 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2007): Further authority rejecting appearance-based disqualification, even where serious accusations were leveled at the office.
People v. Chapman, 2025 CO 19, __ P.3d __ (per curiam): Discussed in the partial dissent as the operative articulation of the “no appearance-only” principle and the “extreme” requirement; the dissent argued the district court applied that standard and properly found extremity here.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), and Domingo-Gomez v. People, 125 P.3d 1043 (Colo. 2005): Cited in the dissent to underscore the prosecutor’s ethical role: not merely to win, but to do justice—supporting the dissent’s view that the comment necessarily implicated fair-trial likelihood.

C. Legal Reasoning

Statutory primacy and a narrow remedy. The Court emphasized the constitutional status of district attorneys (Colo. Const. art. VI, § 13) and the legislature’s expressed need to protect prosecutorial independence (§ 20-1-107(1)). Disqualification is “drastic” and available only in “narrow circumstances” (People v. Kent; People v. Loper).
The proper question is trial fairness likelihood—proved by record evidence. The “pivotal question” under the special-circumstances prong is whether the defendant is likely to receive a fair trial without disqualification (People v. Loper). The defendant must show this with “actual facts and evidence in the record,” not hypotheticals.
Appearance and even impropriety are insufficient without the missing link to unfair trial likelihood. The district court correctly recited that “appearance of impropriety” is no longer the standard (People in Interest of N.R.), but, in the majority’s view, it effectively decided the motion based on how the case would “be seen” (public/system “prism”). The majority treated that as the wrong inquiry. Even accepting that the comment was “impropriety itself,” the majority held the district court failed to “bridge the analytical gap” by explaining—based on record evidence—why this made a fair trial unlikely.
Speculation about future plea bargaining is not the statutory showing. The district court worried the prosecutor might be unable to “back off” or negotiate fairly. The majority rejected this as speculative and, relying on People v. Kent, held that suspicions about motives, strategies, or potential future unfairness do not establish that a fair trial is unlikely.
Office-wide disqualification requires the same statutory showing. The district court extended disqualification to the entire office because the prosecutor was a supervisor and the office would “be seen” the same way. The majority held this repeated the same error: appearance/perception is not the legal test, and the defendant did not prove the “unlikely fair trial” requirement as to the office.

D. Impact

Reinforced evidentiary burden: Defendants seeking a special prosecutor must build a record that connects alleged misconduct to a concrete, trial-fairness risk—beyond public perception, outrage, or generalized distrust.
Limits on trial-court discretion in sanction-like disqualification: Even when conduct is condemned, section 20-1-107(2) is not a general vehicle for disciplining prosecutors; it is a fairness-protection mechanism with a high threshold.
Office-wide disqualification remains exceptionally rare: The decision underscores that institutional disqualification cannot rest on the prominence of the offending prosecutor or reputational spillover; it still requires a record-based showing of likely unfair trial.
Parallel accountability pathways: The majority expressly pointed to the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel as the appropriate body to address potential professional-rule violations—signaling separation between bar discipline and section 20-1-107(2) relief.
Future litigation focus: Parties should expect courts to scrutinize whether proposed “special circumstances” resemble the extreme conflicts in People v. Chavez and People v. Arellano, rather than indignities or even serious misconduct unmoored from demonstrable trial unfairness.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Interlocutory appeal: An immediate appeal taken before the criminal case ends, allowed here by statute when a district attorney is disqualified.
Special prosecutor / disqualification (section 20-1-107(2)): A court-ordered replacement of the elected district attorney (or assigned prosecutor) in a particular case. It is permitted only on limited statutory grounds, including “special circumstances” making a fair trial unlikely.
“Appearance of impropriety” vs. “special circumstances”: “Appearance of impropriety” asks whether conduct looks unethical to observers. Colorado law (post-2002 amendment) requires more: “special circumstances” that are extreme and supported by record facts showing a fair trial is unlikely.
Abuse of discretion: A deferential appellate standard. But a court abuses discretion if it applies the wrong legal test—even if its concerns are understandable.
Competency evaluation (CMHHIP): A process assessing whether a defendant is competent to proceed (able to understand the proceedings and assist counsel). The prosecutor’s remark arose after a second evaluation was ordered.
Office-wide disqualification: Removing an entire district attorney’s office from a case. Colorado treats this as extraordinary and subject to the same rigorous “unlikely fair trial” showing.

V. Conclusion

People v. West forcefully condemns egregious prosecutorial rhetoric while simultaneously tightening (and reaffirming) the doctrinal boundary between misconduct and disqualification. The majority’s controlling lesson is that section 20-1-107(2) is not triggered by outrage, public-perception harm, or even “impropriety itself” unless the defendant proves—through actual facts and record evidence—extreme circumstances making a fair trial unlikely. The partial dissent, invoking the prosecutor’s duty to do justice (Berger v. United States; Domingo-Gomez v. People), would treat the prosecutor’s conduct as sufficiently extreme to justify disqualifying the individual prosecutor, but not the entire office. Going forward, the decision directs litigants and trial courts to ground disqualification rulings in demonstrable trial-fairness risk, not reputational or appearance-based concerns.