People v. Steinhauser: Minister-of-Justice Aggravation, Dominant Victim-Vulnerability Weighting, and a Split-Suspension Model Allowing Reinstatement by Motion Despite a “One Year and a Day” Term

People v. Steinhauser: Minister-of-Justice Aggravation, Dominant Victim-Vulnerability Weighting, and a Split-Suspension Model Allowing Reinstatement by Motion Despite a “One Year and a Day” Term

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge’s opinion in People v. Steinhauser, 25PDJ4 (Colo. Oct. 30, 2025), imposing discipline on a Colorado lawyer under Colo. RPC 8.4(b) following his 2024 criminal conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The case arises from a juvenile prosecutor’s sustained, clandestine communications with a fourteen-year-old, including encouragement of illegal marijuana use and attempts to conceal the communications from the boy’s parents.

Core issues included: (1) the appropriate sanction for a prosecutor’s knowing criminal conduct that adversely reflects on fitness; (2) the weight to assign aggravating and mitigating factors under the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions; (3) how the victim’s age and vulnerability, and the respondent’s role as a “minister of justice,” shape the discipline analysis; and (4) whether a split suspension with a lengthy probationary tail can be crafted to avoid a reinstatement petition notwithstanding a “one year and one day” total suspension.

After judgment on the pleadings established the rule violation, a two-day sanctions hearing was held. The Hearing Board suspended the respondent for one year and one day, ordered seven months to be served, and stayed the balance subject to successful completion of thirty months of probation with conditions, including compliance with criminal probation and ethics school. The suspension was scheduled to take effect December 4, 2025.

Summary of the Opinion

The Hearing Board found that the respondent—a juvenile prosecutor at the time—knowingly engaged in a pattern of inappropriate and illegal conduct with a minor. The conduct included numerous messages initiated by the respondent, references to alcohol and drugs, explicit guidance on evading drug testing, and directions to delete messages and migrate communications to Snapchat for its “invisible” quality. This conduct resulted in a 2024 guilty plea to a class-one misdemeanor and violated Colo. RPC 8.4(b), which prohibits criminal acts reflecting adversely on a lawyer’s fitness.

Applying the ABA Standards, the Board:

  • Identified the duty breach: personal integrity and obedience to law, heightened by the respondent’s role as a prosecutor.
  • Found a knowing mental state but not a specific intent to accomplish a particular wrongful result.
  • Found significant injury to the child, the child’s family, the legal profession, and the reputation of prosecutors and the criminal justice system.
  • Deemed suspension the presumptive sanction under ABA Standard 5.12 (knowing criminal conduct that seriously adversely reflects on fitness, without elements listed in 5.11).
  • Weighed aggravation and mitigation, with victim vulnerability and minister-of-justice status providing strong aggravation, and criminal penalties already imposed providing significant mitigation.

In the end, the Board ordered a one year and one day suspension with seven months to be served and the balance stayed during a thirty-month probationary period. Notably, the Board declined to require a formal reinstatement petition, instead providing for reinstatement by motion and affidavit under C.R.C.P. 242.38(b)(1), while warning that any probation violation would lift the stay and trigger the remaining suspension and a petition requirement under C.R.C.P. 242.39.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions: The opinion is organized around the ABA Standards. The Board used Standard 3.0 (duty, mental state, injury) to frame the analysis, Standard 5.12 to identify suspension as the presumptive sanction for knowing criminal conduct that seriously adversely reflects on fitness, and Standard 2.3 to recognize that suspensions should generally be six months or more. The aggravating and mitigating framework in Standards 9.21–9.32 guided factor selection and weighting.
  • In re Roose, 69 P.3d 43 (Colo. 2003): Cited for the principle that Colorado disciplinary sanctions are guided by the ABA Standards and state case law. This provides the doctrinal foundation for the Board’s structured, standards-based analysis.
  • In re Rosen, 198 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2008): Quoted to emphasize that aggravating and mitigating factors are exemplary rather than exhaustive and should not be applied mechanically. This opens the door to the Board’s tailored use of “additional aggravation” based on the prosecutor’s special role, beyond the enumerated factors, under the nonexhaustive nature of Standard 9.22.
  • People v. Groland, 908 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1995): Invoked to recognize prosecutors as “ministers of justice” who owe a higher duty to the public to act with probity. The Board relied on this status as a distinct aggravating consideration, given the respondent’s simultaneous service in Denver’s juvenile prosecution division while encouraging a minor’s illegal drug use.
  • In re Attorney F., 2012 CO 57: Reinforced the Colorado Supreme Court’s directive for case-by-case discretion and the ABA Standards’ flexibility in calibrating sanctions to specific facts. The Board explicitly leans on this flexibility to craft a split suspension with a long probation tail instead of requiring a reinstatement petition.

Legal Reasoning

The Board’s reasoning proceeds in a methodical sequence consistent with the ABA Standards and Colorado disciplinary jurisprudence:

  • Rule Violation Established: The respondent admitted the Colo. RPC 8.4(b) violation after his misdemeanor conviction. Judgment on the pleadings issued, focusing the proceeding on sanctions.
  • Duty, Mental State, Injury (Standard 3.0):
    • Duty: Beyond the baseline duty to obey the law and maintain personal integrity, the Board emphasized the respondent’s heightened duty as a prosecutor to uphold the law.
    • Mental State: The respondent acted knowingly—he was aware of encouraging illegal conduct, attempted concealment, and the covert migration to Snapchat. The Board did not find a conscious objective to achieve a specific wrongful outcome, crediting testimony that the respondent rationalized his conduct as “mentorship,” albeit in an “extremely misguided and unhealthy way.”
    • Injury: The Board detailed multi-faceted harm: direct harm to the child (confusion, normalization of illegal conduct, sexualized and profane content, wedge driven with parents), emotional and financial harm to the family (therapy, legal costs, fear and distrust), and institutional harm (erosion of public trust in prosecutors and the justice system).
  • Presumptive Sanction (Standard 5.12): Because the criminal conduct seriously adversely reflected on fitness yet did not include 5.11 elements (e.g., misappropriation, false swearing, etc.), the Board identified suspension as the presumptive sanction and acknowledged the general six-month floor for meaningful suspensions under Standard 2.3.
  • Aggravation and Mitigation (Standards 9.22, 9.32):
    • Aggravation:
      • Dishonest motive (9.22(b)) received moderate weight based on concealment (delete messages, migration to Snapchat, acknowledgment that parental discovery would be “horrifying”). The Board carefully distinguished “dishonest” from “selfish” motives.
      • Victim vulnerability (9.22(h)) carried the “greatest aggravating weight possible,” given the respondent’s position of trust and the minor’s age and impressionability.
      • Illegal conduct (9.22(k)) received limited weight because it overlapped with the substantive rule violation.
      • Additional aggravation: the “minister of justice” status—though not enumerated—was treated as a weighty aggravator under the nonexhaustive nature of 9.22, especially salient because the respondent was prosecuting juveniles while privately encouraging juvenile drug use.
    • Mitigation:
      • No prior discipline (9.32(a)) received very little weight given the recency of admission.
      • Cooperation (9.32(e)) received average weight.
      • Inexperience (9.32(f)) was rejected due to lack of causal nexus; the Board treated the misconduct as a personal judgment failure, not professional inexperience.
      • Character and reputation (9.32(g)) were acknowledged but not materially mitigating.
      • Other penalties/sanctions (9.32(k)) received significant weight: loss of prosecutorial position, incarceration (41 days served of a 60-day sentence), lengthy criminal probation, social limitations (no contact with minors), and reputational damage from publicity.
      • Remorse (9.32(l)) received moderate weight based on credible hearing testimony, therapy initiation, and continued treatment.
  • Calibration of Sanction: Balancing roughly offsetting aggravators and mitigators (tilting slightly toward aggravation), the Board imposed a seven-month served suspension, with the remainder of a one year and one day term stayed during a 30-month probation. The Board expressly considered and rejected requiring a reinstatement petition, finding it “unprofitable” given the elapsed time since misconduct, therapy, served criminal sentence, and existing rehabilitation steps. Instead, it opted for robust probationary oversight, including quarterly certifications of criminal probation compliance and therapy, ethics school within six months, and therapy continuation until a provider deems it no longer necessary.

What This Opinion Clarifies or Develops

  • Minister-of-Justice Status as a Standalone, Weighty Aggravator: Building on People v. Groland and the Standards’ nonexhaustive aggravation list, the opinion explicitly treats a prosecutor’s “minister of justice” role as a distinct aggravator of substantial weight, particularly when misconduct directly contradicts the prosecutor’s public-law enforcement function.
  • Victim Vulnerability Can Dominate the Aggravation Analysis: Where the victim is a minor entrusted to the lawyer’s care, the vulnerability factor may be accorded the “greatest aggravating weight possible,” signaling that exploitation or betrayal of such trust will heavily influence sanction severity.
  • Inexperience Mitigation Requires a Causal Link: The Board refused to apply inexperience (9.32(f)) where the misconduct flowed from personal judgment failures rather than professional immaturity—reinforcing that this mitigator is not automatic for newer lawyers.
  • Split-Suspension Architecture and Reinstatement Pathway: The Board demonstrates that a one year and one day suspension can be structured so that:
    • A portion is served;
    • The remainder is stayed during probation; and
    • Reinstatement may proceed by motion and affidavit under C.R.C.P. 242.38(b)(1), unless the stay is lifted by a probation violation, which would then trigger the petition pathway under C.R.C.P. 242.39.
    This is an important regulatory design choice: it preserves meaningful suspension and long-term supervision without necessarily demanding the more onerous petition-for-reinstatement process when rehabilitation evidence is already substantial.
  • Concealment via Ephemeral Messaging as “Dishonest Motive”: The opinion implicitly signals that deliberate use of platforms designed to defeat retrieval (e.g., Snapchat), coupled with instructions to delete messages, will be treated as evidence of dishonest motive under 9.22(b), even absent a “selfish” motive.

Impact and Forward-Looking Implications

  • For Prosecutors and Government Lawyers: The opinion warns that misconduct contradicting public-law enforcement duties will attract enhanced aggravation. Prosecutors’ off-duty conduct with minors, “mentoring” arrangements, and social-media communications are high-risk zones; breaches can yield significant suspension even for misdemeanor convictions.
  • For All Practitioners: The decision underscores that Colo. RPC 8.4(b) applies robustly to off-duty criminal conduct bearing negatively on fitness, especially where public trust is implicated. The detailed injury analysis (harm to families and to public confidence) shows that discipline can be severe even without client harm.
  • Sanctions Engineering: Hearing boards may flexibly use served-and-stayed suspensions coupled with long probation and targeted conditions (ethics school, therapy, compliance certifications) to protect the public while incentivizing rehabilitation. Where a lawyer has already endured significant criminal penalties and begun remediation, boards may opt against a petition requirement in favor of supervisory probation—reserving the petition pathway if probation fails.
  • Aggravation and Mitigation Practice: Practitioners should expect:
    • Vulnerability of victim, especially minors, to carry extraordinary weight.
    • Minister-of-justice status to be a prominent aggravator for prosecutors.
    • Inexperience to be unavailable absent a causal link to the misconduct type.
    • “Other penalties” (jail, probation, reputational harm) to count significantly when well-documented.
    • Remorse to matter most when paired with concrete actions (therapy, compliance) and credible testimony.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Colo. RPC 8.4(b): A lawyer commits professional misconduct by engaging in a criminal act that reflects adversely on honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. It does not require a felony; serious misdemeanors can suffice if they bear on fitness.
  • Knowing vs. Intentional (ABA Standards mental states): “Knowing” means aware of the nature of conduct and circumstances; “intentional” means acting with a conscious objective to achieve a particular result. The Board found knowing conduct (frequent initiation of messages, guidance on drug use and concealment) without a specific intent to bring about a particular harm.
  • Presumptive Sanction Under Standard 5.12: When a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conduct that seriously adversely reflects on fitness, but without elements like misappropriation or perjury (covered by 5.11), suspension is presumptively appropriate.
  • Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: These are circumstances that justify increasing or reducing discipline. They are not exhaustive, and boards may consider case-specific factors. Key here: vulnerability of a minor victim, prosecutorial role, concealment efforts, and the respondent’s criminal penalties, remorse, and therapy.
  • “Minister of Justice”: Prosecutors are more than advocates; they must ensure justice is done. Their special role enhances expectations of law-abiding conduct and integrity. Breaching that role aggravates sanctions.
  • Split Suspension; Stayed Portion; Probation: A board can require a chunk of the suspension to be served, then stay the remainder conditional on successful probation. If probation is violated, the stay can be lifted and the rest of the suspension imposed.
  • Reinstatement by Motion vs. Petition (C.R.C.P. 242.38 and 242.39): The Board may allow reinstatement by motion and affidavit under 242.38(b)(1). If conditions are violated and the stay is lifted, reinstatement may require a petition under 242.39, which is more demanding. The opinion uses this flexibility to match process to demonstrated rehabilitation.
  • Practical Meaning of “One Year and One Day”: That term often signals heightened reinstatement requirements. Here, the Board structured the order so the respondent could seek reinstatement by motion after serving seven months, while making clear that any breach would convert the pathway to a petition requirement.

Conclusion

People v. Steinhauser is a detailed, standards-driven sanction opinion that does several important things at once. It treats a prosecutor’s “minister of justice” role as a distinct and weighty aggravator, assigns dominant weight to the vulnerability of a minor entrusted to a lawyer’s care, and refuses to mitigate based on inexperience without a causal nexus. It also models a calibrated sanctions architecture: a meaningful served suspension, a substantial probationary tail with therapeutic and ethical-education conditions, and a reinstatement pathway by motion that can convert to a petition if probation fails.

For future cases under Colo. RPC 8.4(b), the opinion underscores that off-duty criminal conduct involving minors will be met with significant discipline, especially when concealment is involved and public trust in the justice system is at stake. At the same time, it shows that genuine, documented rehabilitation and the imposition of other penalties can materially temper how reinstatement is structured. The net effect is a strong reaffirmation of prosecutorial ethics, public-protection priorities, and flexible yet principled sanctioning under the ABA Standards.

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