People v. James: In Bench Trials, Improper 404(b) Other‑Acts Evidence Is Not Harmless When the Factfinder Relies on It to Resolve a One‑on‑One Credibility Contest

People v. James: In Bench Trials, Improper 404(b) Other‑Acts Evidence Is Not Harmless When the Factfinder Relies on It to Resolve a One‑on‑One Credibility Contest

Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Date: October 10, 2025

Caption: People of the State of Michigan v. Mark Anthony James

Docket: SC 168509; COA 367048; Kent CC 22-002366-FH

Introduction

In this peremptory reversal under MCR 7.305(I)(1), the Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part the Court of Appeals and ordered a new trial after concluding that improper other‑acts evidence admitted at a bench trial was not harmless. The case centers on a conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, following a bench trial in which the prosecution presented testimony from a former girlfriend about a prior violent incident under MRE 404(b). The Court of Appeals agreed that admitting this other‑acts testimony was an abuse of discretion but deemed the error harmless. The Supreme Court held otherwise, stressing that the prosecution used the impermissible evidence to portray the defendant as a violent person throughout trial and that the trial judge expressly relied on that evidence in resolving credibility disputes—precisely the scenario that heightens prejudice in a one‑on‑one credibility contest.

The dissent, authored by Justice Zahra, would have denied leave. It argues that under MCL 769.26 and People v Lukity, a preserved, nonconstitutional evidentiary error warrants reversal only if it is more probable than not that the error affected the outcome; it further emphasizes the presumption in bench trials that judges disregard inadmissible evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other‑acts evidence under MRE 404(b) during a bench trial.
  • The Supreme Court held the error was not harmless. The prosecution repeatedly invoked the other‑acts testimony to paint the defendant as a violent person, and the trial judge expressly relied on the inadmissible evidence to bolster the complainant’s credibility and undermine the defendant’s credibility.
  • Applying the harmless‑error inquiry “focusing on the nature of the error and assessing its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence” (citing People v Denson, 500 Mich 385, 414 n 15 (2017)), the Court concluded that “the improper admission of the other‑acts evidence undermined the reliability of the verdict,” warranting a new trial.
  • All other issues raised by the defendant were denied leave; the Court did not retain jurisdiction.

Case Background and Procedural Posture

The defendant, Mark Anthony James, was convicted in a bench trial of assault with intent to do great bodily harm, MCL 750.84. The incident occurred at the home of Jerry Hogan, where the complainant, Jacqueline Abdullah, and the defendant were using alcohol and crack cocaine. A dispute over a lighter escalated. Abdullah testified that the defendant retrieved a kitchen knife and attacked her, causing relatively minor injuries before she disarmed him. She reported the incident days later. The prosecution sought to introduce 2015 testimony from an ex‑girlfriend, Natasha Olcjniczak, who described a prior violent episode involving the defendant. The State offered that testimony for identity, intent, common plan or scheme, lack of accident or mistake, and lack of self‑defense.

The Court of Appeals held that the 404(b) evidence was inadmissible propensity evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it, but affirmed the conviction on the ground that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed on the harmlessness determination and remanded for a new trial.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • People v Denson, 500 Mich 385 (2017)
    The Court relied on Denson’s articulation of harmless‑error analysis for preserved, nonconstitutional errors involving improper other‑acts evidence. Two aspects of Denson were central:
    • Prosecutorial use: Denson noted the prejudice when the prosecutor “referred to the evidence throughout the trial” to portray the defendant’s character—here, “to paint defendant as a violent person.” The James majority quoted and applied that logic.
    • Harmless‑error focus: Denson instructs courts to evaluate the “nature of the error” against the “weight and strength of the untainted evidence,” ultimately asking whether the error undermines the reliability of the verdict. The James majority expressly used this framework.
  • People v Martinez, 507 Mich 855 (2021)
    Martinez underscores that the risk of prejudice from other‑acts evidence is “especially high” in one‑on‑one credibility contests. James is quintessentially such a case: the judge found both the complainant’s and the defendant’s credibility pivotal, and the improper evidence was used to tip the scale.
  • MCL 769.26 and People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484 (1999) (raised in dissent)
    The statutory harmless‑error rule provides that a conviction shall not be reversed unless it affirmatively appears that a miscarriage of justice resulted; Lukity translates this to a “more probable than not outcome determinative” standard for preserved, nonconstitutional error. The dissent argues the majority’s disposition conflicts with Lukity or, at least, applies it too loosely. The majority, however, stayed within the Denson framework that itself interprets MCL 769.26, using “undermined the reliability of the verdict” as the analytical endpoint after assessing the untainted evidence and the nature of the error—a formulation the Court has employed in applying the statutory standard.
  • Bench‑trial presumptions (raised in dissent): The dissent references the presumption that judges, unlike juries, understand and apply evidence law correctly and disregard improperly admitted evidence. See, e.g., People v Wofford, 196 Mich App 275, 282 (1992); In re Forfeiture of $19,250, 209 Mich App 20, 31 (1995); and commentary (Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice). The majority effectively holds that this presumption is rebutted where the record shows repeated prosecutorial use and the trial court’s express reliance on the improper evidence to resolve credibility.

Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s analysis proceeds in two steps: (1) agreement that admission of the 404(b) other‑acts evidence was erroneous; and (2) a focused harmless‑error assessment.

First, the Court left intact the Court of Appeals’ determination that the other‑acts testimony was inadmissible propensity evidence prohibited by MRE 404(b)(1). The prosecution’s articulated non‑propensity purposes (identity, intent, common plan or scheme, lack of accident or mistake, and lack of self‑defense) did not, in the Court of Appeals’ view, withstand scrutiny; the Supreme Court did not revisit that conclusion and accepted it as the baseline error.

Second, and critically, the Court found the error not harmless. It emphasized:

  • The prosecution “referred to the evidence throughout the trial”—including during the direct examination of the other‑acts witness, the cross‑examination of the defendant, and closing argument—to “paint defendant as a violent person.” This mirrors the concern identified in Denson about repeated and rhetorical use of character‑based inferences.
  • The trial judge “expressly relied on the inadmissible other‑acts evidence in reaching its verdict.” The order specifically notes that the court leveraged the prior incident to assess and resolve credibility—bolstering the complainant and discrediting the defendant. In a bench trial, such express reliance overcomes any presumption that the judge compartmentalized or disregarded the improper evidence.
  • Given the case was a “one‑on‑one credibility contest” (Martinez), the risk of prejudice from other‑acts evidence is “especially high.” Where conviction turns on which of two witnesses is more believable, a tainted propensity inference cuts to the heart of the adjudication.
  • Applying Denson’s harmless‑error framework—“focusing on the nature of the error and assessing its effect in light of the weight and strength of the untainted evidence”—the Court concluded that the improper admission “undermined the reliability of the verdict.” Thus, a new trial is required.

In sum, the Court draws a clear line: even in bench trials, an error in admitting other‑acts evidence is not insulated by judicial expertise where the record shows the prosecution used the evidence to argue propensity and the trial court relied on it to resolve credibility.

The Dissent’s View

Justice Zahra would have denied leave, emphasizing:

  • The statutory harmless‑error rule, MCL 769.26, and Lukity’s “more probable than not outcome determinative” test for preserved, nonconstitutional errors—a “bedrock” standard repeatedly reaffirmed.
  • The bench‑trial presumption: judges know and apply the rules of evidence and are presumed to disregard improper evidence, particularly where, as here, the judge said he would not use the other‑acts evidence as character or conformity proof.
  • The trial court referenced the other‑acts testimony only twice; in the dissent’s view, reliance was “slim,” and independent evidence supported the verdict—including the court’s finding that the complainant testified truthfully, photographs of injuries, Hogan’s inconsistent statements, the implausibility that the complainant would fabricate given her relationship to the defendant as a source of drugs and cash, and the court’s finding that the injuries were not self‑inflicted.
  • Against this record, the dissent concludes it is not more probable than not that the error affected the outcome; therefore, affirmance was proper under MCL 769.26 and Lukity.

Impact and Implications

The Court’s order has significant practical and doctrinal consequences:

  • Bench trials are not immune to 404(b) prejudice: The presumption that judges disregard improper evidence can be overcome by the record. Where a court expressly relies on other‑acts evidence—or where the prosecution repeatedly deploys it to argue propensity—harmless‑error findings will be difficult to sustain.
  • Heightened sensitivity in credibility contests: When the case turns on a one‑on‑one credibility assessment, improper other‑acts evidence is especially dangerous. Trial courts must be rigorous in excluding 404(b) evidence unless a genuine, non‑propensity purpose is identified and supported by a careful MRE 403 analysis.
  • Harmless‑error analysis anchored in Denson: Appellate courts must evaluate the nature and pervasiveness of the improper use, the factfinder’s explicit reliance, and the strength of untainted evidence. The “reliability of the verdict” formulation—drawn from Denson—will continue to guide the inquiry under MCL 769.26.
  • Prosecutorial practice: Prosecutors should avoid 404(b) evidence when its real thrust is propensity; if admitted, they must scrupulously avoid using it to argue character or conformity. Repeated references across direct, cross, and summation can tip an appellate court toward finding non‑harmless error.
  • Defense strategy: Defense counsel should preserve 404(b) objections, request explicit findings showing the court’s non‑propensity purpose, and, if admitted, create a record of any prosecutorial reliance or judicial references that suggest propensity reasoning; these points were decisive here.
  • Trial court written/oral findings: Judges in bench trials should take care that credibility findings do not draw on prior bad acts to infer present conduct. If 404(b) evidence is admitted for a limited purpose, the court should articulate that purpose and avoid reliance that reads as propensity reasoning.
  • Peremptory reversals as a corrective tool: The Court’s use of MCR 7.305(I)(1) signals that certain 404(b) harmless‑error misapplications—especially where the record shows repeated use and judicial reliance—can be corrected without full briefing where controlling law (Denson; Martinez) is clear.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Other‑acts evidence (MRE 404(b)): Evidence of a person’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally not admissible to prove that the person has a bad character and therefore acted in line with that character on a particular occasion. It can sometimes be admitted for non‑propensity purposes (e.g., identity, intent), but only if those purposes are genuine and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice (MRE 403).
  • Propensity evidence: Using past behavior to suggest a person likely acted the same way this time (“once violent, always violent”). This is what 404(b)(1) generally forbids.
  • Harmless error (MCL 769.26): Not every trial error requires reversal. A preserved, nonconstitutional error warrants reversal only if it likely affected the outcome—variously framed in Michigan cases as “more probable than not outcome determinative” (Lukity) and assessed by whether the error “undermined the reliability of the verdict” after considering the nature of the error and the strength of untainted evidence (Denson).
  • One‑on‑one credibility contest: A case where the verdict turns largely on whether the factfinder believes one of two opposing witnesses. In such cases, improper evidence that tips credibility carries heightened prejudice (Martinez).
  • Bench‑trial presumption: Appellate courts generally presume judges know the law and disregard inadmissible evidence. That presumption is rebutted when the record shows the judge expressly or functionally relied on the improper material.
  • Peremptory reversal (MCR 7.305(I)(1)): The Supreme Court can decide a case summarily, reversing or affirming without full briefing or oral argument, when controlling law clearly dictates the outcome.
  • Abuse of discretion in admitting evidence: Occurs when a trial court’s evidentiary ruling falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes—such as admitting 404(b) evidence where the proffered non‑propensity purpose is not truly supported or where unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value.

Conclusion

People v. James fortifies an important limitation on harmless‑error findings in bench trials involving 404(b) evidence. The Michigan Supreme Court makes clear that the combination of (1) repeated prosecutorial reliance on other‑acts evidence to argue propensity, (2) the trial court’s express reliance on that evidence to resolve credibility, and (3) a one‑on‑one credibility contest, defeats the usual presumption that judges can and will compartmentalize inadmissible material. Applying Denson’s framework, the Court held that the error undermined the reliability of the verdict and required a new trial.

The decision underscores rigorous gatekeeping under MRE 404(b) and careful harmless‑error review under MCL 769.26. For future cases, James signals that improper other‑acts evidence can be outcome‑determinative even in judge‑tried cases—especially where the record shows explicit reliance on the tainted material in deciding whom to believe. The ruling will shape prosecutorial strategy, defense preservation, and trial‑court findings in Michigan criminal practice going forward.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Michigan

Comments