People v. Anderson (2025): Appeal Waivers and Privacy Expectations in Terminated Short‑Term Rentals

1. Introduction

People v. Anderson, 2025 NY Slip Op 06416, decided by the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, on November 21, 2025, is a relatively short opinion with substantial doctrinal significance in two distinct areas:

• The scope and validity of a criminal defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal—particularly as it relates to appellate review of suppression rulings.
• The scope of a defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy in a short‑term rental (here, an Airbnb) after the property owner terminates the rental agreement.

The defendant, Artis Anderson, Jr., pleaded guilty in Supreme Court, Monroe County, to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, in violation of Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 265.03(3). As part of his plea agreement, he executed a waiver of his right to appeal. On appeal, he challenged:

• The validity and scope of his appeal waiver, especially as to his right to challenge an adverse suppression ruling; and
• The lawfulness of the search that yielded the firearm, as well as related arguments under Payton v New York, 445 US 573 (1980).

The Fourth Department affirmed the conviction, but the panel split in its reasoning:

• The majority (three judges) held that Anderson’s waiver of the right to appeal was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and that it encompassed the challenge to the suppression ruling. On that basis, they did not reach the merits of suppression.
• Two judges (Bannister and DelConte, JJ.) concurred in the result only. They would have held that the appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary as to the suppression issue, but they agreed that the suppression ruling was correct on the merits. They wrote a detailed separate memorandum explaining both why the waiver was defective and why, even without the waiver, the firearm was properly admissible.

The opinion therefore creates:

• A binding reaffirmation—by a majority of the Fourth Department—that a general waiver of the right to appeal ordinarily encompasses suppression rulings even when suppression is not expressly mentioned in the colloquy; and
• A robust, reasoned counter‑view in a concurring memorandum, which stresses that, under People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545 (2019), and the revised New York Model Colloquy, trial courts may be required, in some circumstances, to specifically identify suppression rulings as among the rights surrendered by an appeal waiver—especially where suppression is a “major aspect” of the case.

On the search and seizure side, the concurring judges (who alone reach the issue) analogize an Airbnb rental to a hotel room: once the owner terminates the rental, the guest loses any reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. That conclusion, combined with the fact that the arrest occurred outside the apartment, leads them to find no violation of either the Fourth Amendment or the rule of Payton v New York.

2. Summary of the Opinion

2.1 Procedural posture and disposition

Anderson appealed from a judgment rendered September 22, 2022, following his guilty plea to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. He had previously litigated a motion to suppress a firearm recovered from an Airbnb apartment; the motion was denied, and he later entered into a plea agreement that included a waiver of the right to appeal.

The Fourth Department affirmed the judgment of conviction.

2.2 Majority memorandum

The majority’s memorandum is concise and focused almost entirely on the validity and scope of the appeal waiver:

• The court concludes that Anderson’s waiver of the right to appeal was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, citing its own recent decisions and the Court of Appeals’ leading decision in People v Thomas.
• It rejects the specific argument that the waiver was invalid because the trial court did not expressly say, during the plea colloquy, that the waiver would bar an appeal of the suppression ruling. Relying on cases such as People v Williams, People v Edmonds, and People v Babagana, the majority holds that no such explicit mention is required.
• Because the waiver is valid, the defendant’s challenge to the suppression ruling is held to be foreclosed—i.e., the appeal waiver encompasses the suppression issue.
• To the extent Anderson asserts that counsel was ineffective for misunderstanding the scope of the appeal waiver, the majority holds that this claim depends on matters outside the record (e.g., off‑the‑record attorney‑client advice) and therefore must be raised in a post‑judgment motion under CPL 440.10.

On this reasoning alone, the majority affirms the conviction without addressing the Fourth Amendment/suppression issues on the merits.

2.3 Concurrence in result (Bannister and DelConte, JJ.)

The concurring judges fully agree that the conviction should be affirmed—but for very different reasons:

• They disagree with the majority’s appeal waiver analysis. In their view, the particular record here does not show a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to challenge the suppression ruling on appeal.
• Nonetheless, they deem the suppression ruling correct on the merits and therefore would affirm on substantive grounds.

Their memorandum has two major components:

1. Validity of the appeal waiver as to suppression
   • They stress that under People v Thomas, appellate courts must look at “all the relevant facts and circumstances” surrounding a waiver, including the defendant’s age, experience, and the nature and timing of the proceedings.
   • They highlight the new language in the New York Model Colloquy for waivers of the right to appeal, which now explicitly recommends that courts specify that the waiver includes claims such as an error in denying a suppression motion when such issues are important in the case.
   • They conclude that the combination of: (a) an ambiguous colloquy (“some others” issues that cannot be waived, without specifying what they are), (b) the centrality of the suppression ruling to the case, (c) the long delay between the suppression ruling and the plea, and (d) sentencing‑stage statements suggesting that an appeal could still be taken, made it reasonable for Anderson to believe that the suppression issue remained appealable.
   • On this record, they find the waiver unknowing and involuntary as to the suppression issue.
2. Merits of the suppression challenge
   • They recount that Anderson rented an apartment via Airbnb, brought a firearm into it, and was observed on a security camera by the property owner, in violation of the rental terms.
   • The owner terminated the rental (via Airbnb) and called the police to eject Anderson and his guest. After the police took them into custody outside the unit, the owner searched the apartment for any remaining belongings and discovered the firearm hidden under the mattress.
   • Citing People v D'Antuono, they conclude that once the owner terminated the rental, Anderson lost any reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment; therefore, he had no constitutional basis to challenge the owner’s search.
   • They reject Anderson’s reliance on Payton v New York, stressing that Payton concerns warrantless, nonconsensual entries into a home to make an arrest. Here, it was undisputed that Anderson was taken into custody outside the apartment, so Payton and its progeny do not apply, citing People v Garvin, 30 NY3d 174 (2017).

Thus, while the voting outcome is unanimous (affirmance), the doctrinal foundation splits: three judges rely on the appeal waiver; two judges reject that waiver (as to suppression) but find no constitutional violation in the search or arrest.

3. Detailed Analysis of the Opinion

3.1 Appeal waivers: Precedents and framework

3.1.1 The controlling Court of Appeals framework – People v Thomas

The starting point for New York appeal‑waiver doctrine is People v Thomas, 34 NY3d 545 (2019), cert denied 140 S Ct 2634 (2020), cited heavily in both the majority and concurring opinions.

In Thomas, the Court of Appeals:

• Reaffirmed that a criminal defendant may validly waive the right to appeal as part of a plea bargain, so long as the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
• Rejected practices in which courts or written waivers are framed as though the defendant is giving up all review of any issue, emphasizing that certain claims always survive an appeal waiver (e.g., jurisdiction, voluntariness of the plea, legality of the sentence).
• Clarified that appellate courts must consider “all the relevant facts and circumstances” surrounding the waiver—including the content of the colloquy, written waivers, timing, and defendant’s personal characteristics—to determine whether the defendant truly understood the consequences.
• Encouraged the use of the New York Model Colloquies for waivers of the right to appeal.

Critically, Thomas itself held that, under the circumstances of that case:

• The appeal waiver was valid, even though the suppression ruling was not explicitly named during the in‑court colloquy.
• The defendant had received a written waiver that enumerated surviving rights and had an opportunity to discuss it with counsel immediately after an adverse suppression ruling and just before pleading guilty.
• The trial court made clear the waiver related to “what is taking place right now, the plea and what will take place…when you are sentenced” and addressed the written waiver adequately.

The Fourth Department majority in Anderson follows that general approach; the concurring judges, however, emphasize that Thomas also imposes a duty to scrutinize the specific context and language used in each case, not simply assume every general waiver reaches every specific issue.

3.1.2 Other Fourth Department precedents on appeal waivers

The majority in Anderson relies on a line of Fourth Department cases that have treated general appeal waivers as encompassing suppression challenges without requiring explicit mention of suppression at the plea colloquy. Key cases include:

• People v Kelly, 231 AD3d 1515 (4th Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 931 (2025)
• People v Cunningham, 213 AD3d 1270 (4th Dept 2023), lv denied 39 NY3d 1110 (2023)
• People v Williams, 237 AD3d 1581 (4th Dept 2025), lv denied 44 NY3d 985 (2025)
• People v Edmonds, 229 AD3d 1275 (4th Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 930 (2025)
• People v Babagana, 176 AD3d 1627 (4th Dept 2019), lv denied 34 NY3d 1075 (2019)
• People v Giles, 219 AD3d 1706 (4th Dept 2023), lv denied 40 NY3d 1039 (2023)

Though the Anderson opinion does not describe these cases in depth, the citations serve several purposes:

• They demonstrate a consistent local practice in the Fourth Department of upholding appeal waivers and treating them as covering suppression rulings even without individualized references to suppression during the colloquy.
• They support the proposition that the court views Thomas as allowing general but properly framed colloquies to produce valid waivers.

The concurring judges acknowledge this line of authority, citing, for example, People v Jackson, 198 AD3d 1317 (4th Dept 2021), lv denied 37 NY3d 1096 (2021), where similar waivers were upheld even though suppression was not explicitly mentioned. They do not purport to overrule that line (which they cannot as a two‑judge concurrence), but instead emphasize why the specific record in Anderson falls outside that pattern.

3.1.3 Written waivers and ambiguous colloquies – Outley and Durie

The concurring memorandum cites:

• People v Outley, 232 AD3d 1284 (4th Dept 2024), lv denied 43 NY3d 946 (2025)
• People v Durie, 216 AD3d 1449 (4th Dept 2023)

to underline an important principle: a written appeal waiver does not automatically cure defects or ambiguities in the oral colloquy. Instead:

• The trial court should confirm on the record that the defendant has actually read, understood, and discussed the written waiver with counsel.
• If the oral colloquy suggests limits or exceptions that are not reconciled with the written waiver—or is otherwise confusing—those ambiguities may render the waiver unknowing or involuntary.

In Anderson, there is a written waiver of the right to appeal signed by Anderson and his counsel, but:

• The trial court did not ask on the record whether Anderson had reviewed and understood it.
• The written document itself did not make explicit that the waiver encompassed review of the suppression ruling.

Accordingly, the concurrence finds that the written waiver cannot “fix” the ambiguity generated by the trial court’s oral description of the waiver.

3.2 The majority’s legal reasoning on appeal waivers

The majority’s reasoning is concise but doctrinally clear:

1. General validity of the waiver
   The court holds that Anderson’s waiver was “knowing, voluntary, and intelligent,” invoking its own prior cases and Thomas “generally.” Although the opinion does not reproduce the plea colloquy, the majority evidently reads the record as satisfying the standard model:
   • The waiver was described as separate and distinct from the trial rights automatically forfeited by the guilty plea.
   • The court likely described that certain issues (such as jurisdiction, competency, sentencing legality) survive an appeal waiver, mirroring the Model Colloquy.
2. Scope of the waiver
   The defense argument targeted the scope: that even if the waiver was valid as to some issues, it did not validly include the suppression ruling because the court never specifically said so. The majority responds in two steps:
   • It characterizes this as an argument that the waiver is “invalid on the ground that [Supreme Court] did not specifically inform [him] that his general waiver…encompassed the court’s suppression ruling.”
   • It then “reject[s]” this argument, citing Williams, Edmonds, and Babagana—cases in which the Fourth Department has treated a properly explained general waiver as including suppression challenges, even absent express mention of suppression in the colloquy.
   Hence, the majority holds that Anderson’s “valid waiver of the right to appeal thus encompasses his challenge to the court’s suppression ruling.”
3. Ineffective assistance claim channeled to CPL 440.10
   Anderson also suggested that his own counsel misunderstood the scope of the waiver (e.g., believed suppression could still be appealed). Because such a misunderstanding would largely rest on off‑the‑record interactions between attorney and client, the majority characterizes this as:

   “[A] contention [that] involves matters outside the record on appeal and must be raised via a motion pursuant to CPL 440.10.”

   That is consistent with longstanding New York law: ineffective‑assistance claims that turn on events not captured in the trial record are not reviewable on direct appeal but instead must be brought in a post‑conviction collateral proceeding under CPL article 440.

In sum, the majority opinion presents Anderson as a routine application of existing appeal‑waiver doctrine: the waiver is valid; it covers the suppression challenge; and claims of counsel’s misunderstanding belong in a collateral attack, not direct appeal.

3.3 The concurring judges’ reasoning on the appeal waiver

Bannister and DelConte, JJ., offer a more nuanced and fact‑sensitive approach, drawing heavily on the Thomas framework and the revised New York Model Colloquy.

3.3.1 Emphasis on totality of circumstances under Thomas

They begin by underscoring the appellate court’s duty:

“Our responsibility as an appellate court is to ‘oversee the process and to review the record to ensure that the defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal reflects a knowing and voluntary choice’” (quoting Thomas, 34 NY3d at 559).

The key points they stress from Thomas are:

• The appellate court must consider “all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the waiver,” including the defendant’s background and the “nature and terms of the agreement.”
• The analysis focuses not on formalistic compliance but on whether the record demonstrates that the defendant actually understood the waiver’s consequences.

3.3.2 The role of the updated Model Colloquy

The concurrence explains that both the Court of Appeals and the Fourth Department have endorsed the Model Colloquy as a best practice for explaining appeal waivers. They quote a particularly important passage from the current version:

“By waiving your right to appeal, you do not give up your right to take an appeal by filing a notice of appeal with this court and the District Attorney within 30 days of the sentence. But, if you take an appeal, you are by this waiver giving up the right to have the appellate court consider most claims of error, [including a claimed error in the denial of your (specify, e.g., motion to suppress),] and to consider whether the sentence I impose, whatever it may be, is excessive and should be modified. As a result, the conviction by this plea and sentence will normally be final. Do you understand?”

They make two key observations:

• In the earlier version of the Model Colloquy, reference to suppression was only in a footnote; after the Court of Appeals’ decision in Thomas, this language was moved into the main text, signaling that naming major, case‑specific issues (like suppression) can be integral to a valid waiver when those issues are central.
• The current Model Colloquy explicitly contemplates that in some cases, a failure to identify such major issues may render a waiver unknowing and involuntary with respect to those issues.

Thus, while explicit reference to suppression is not a categorical requirement in every case, the concurrence suggests that where the suppression ruling is the pivotal issue—indeed, outcome‑determinative—the court should explicitly tell the defendant that the appeal waiver will foreclose review of that ruling.

3.3.3 Why the waiver was ambiguous in Anderson

Applied to Anderson, the concurring judges find several problems:

1. Timing and centrality of the suppression ruling
   In Thomas, the suppression hearing was held immediately before the plea, and the adverse ruling was fresh in the defendant’s mind. Here, by contrast:
   • The suppression hearing occurred over a year before the plea.
   • The court’s written decision denying suppression issued roughly six months before the plea proceeding.
   Given the passage of time and the central importance of the firearm (the sole piece of incriminating physical evidence in a single‑count indictment), the suppression ruling was “the major aspect” of the case: if the gun were suppressed, the charge would have to be dismissed.
2. Ambiguous oral colloquy (“and there’s some others”)
   During the plea colloquy, the trial court did several things familiar from the Model Colloquy:
   • It stressed that certain issues were “so important that we won’t let you waive your right to appeal on those issues.”
   • It then named three specific non‑waivable issues: (1) the court’s jurisdiction, (2) the defendant’s competency to plead guilty, and (3) the legality of the sentence.
   However, the court then added:

   “And there’s some others, okay?”

   without specifying what those “others” were. Because the court did not explicitly state that the suppression ruling would be barred by the waiver, and instead suggested that some unspecified “other” issues were too important to waive, the concurring judges find that:
   • This phrasing created a reasonable basis for Anderson to believe that his suppression challenge might be one of the “others” so important that it remained appealable.
   • Given that the suppression ruling was determinative, that belief was objectively plausible.
3. Written waiver not explained or integrated
   The record contains a written appeal waiver signed by Anderson and counsel. However:
   • The trial court did not inquire whether Anderson had reviewed or understood that written document.
   • The document did not itself explicitly state that the suppression ruling was among the rights surrendered.
   Under Outley and Durie, a written waiver cannot cure an ambiguous or misleading oral colloquy when the court does not confirm that the defendant read and understood it. Thus, the written waiver does not resolve the ambiguity created by the “some others” language.
4. Sentencing‑stage statements reinforcing misunderstanding
   The concurring judges also rely on what occurred at sentencing:
   • Defense counsel, who had advised Anderson on the appeal waiver, requested a stay of sentencing “so that defendant could appeal the suppression ruling.”
   • The court denied the stay without clarifying that the suppression issue was already waived and could not be appealed.
   • After imposing sentence, the court told Anderson he still had “the ability to appeal,” explaining that counsel would file a notice of appeal, that it would not cost him anything, and that he could get assigned counsel.
   These statements, in the concurring judges’ view, “strengthened the inference” that both Anderson and his lawyer believed that an appeal—including a challenge to the suppression ruling—remained open despite the waiver.

Taken together, the concurrence concludes that Anderson’s appeal waiver was not knowing and voluntary with respect to his suppression challenge. In other words, they would treat the waiver as partially invalid: valid as to many routine issues but not as to the suppression ruling, which they deem both central and inadequately explained.

3.4 Suppression and search‑and‑seizure analysis (concurrence)

Because the majority does not reach suppression, the concurring memorandum provides the only detailed appellate discussion of the Fourth Amendment (and New York constitutional) issues—though this discussion is technically non‑binding dicta, it is nevertheless highly informative and potentially influential.

3.4.1 Factual background of the search

The concurrence lays out the facts as follows:

• Anderson rented an apartment through Airbnb for himself and a female guest.
• The property owner observed, via security camera, Anderson bringing a firearm into the apartment in violation of the rental terms.
• The owner:
  • Contacted Airbnb to cancel the reservation—i.e., to terminate Anderson’s occupancy rights; and
  • Called the police to assist in ejecting Anderson and his guest from the premises.
• The police took Anderson and his guest into custody outside the apartment.
• After they were removed, the property owner searched the apartment to ensure no personal effects were left behind. During this search:
  • The owner found the firearm hidden under the mattress.

Anderson moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that it was obtained through an unlawful arrest and an unlawful search.

3.4.2 Expectation of privacy after termination of a short‑term rental – D'Antuono

The concurring judges’ core reasoning on the search centers on People v D'Antuono, 306 AD2d 890 (4th Dept 2003), lv denied 100 NY2d 593 (2003):

• D'Antuono involved a situation in which a defendant’s occupancy rights in a space (such as a hotel or motel room) had been terminated.
• Once the lawful possessory interest ends (e.g., check‑out time passes, the rental agreement is lawfully rescinded), the guest loses any reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises.
• Without a reasonable expectation of privacy, a person has no standing to challenge a search of that space under the Fourth Amendment or its New York analogue.

Applying D'Antuono, the concurrence holds:

“[T]he record supports the court's determination that the property owner terminated the rental prior to the search and, thus, that defendant lost his reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment.”

This is a significant application of hotel‑room privacy doctrine to a modern short‑term rental platform (Airbnb). It treats the Airbnb guest much like a hotel guest whose license to occupy the room can be revoked for violating terms (here, bringing in a firearm). Once Airbnb and the owner terminate the reservation, the guest’s privacy interest expires, and the owner can enter and inspect.

Although not expressly articulated in the opinion, a related and important sub‑text is the “private search doctrine”: a search conducted solely by a private party (the property owner), acting on his own initiative and not as an agent of law enforcement, generally does not implicate the Fourth Amendment at all. Here the concurrence’s focus is more on the loss of expectation of privacy than on agency, but as a practical matter, once the owner lawfully regains control of the premises and searches them, his discovery of evidence can ordinarily be turned over to police without constitutional violation.

3.4.3 Rejection of the Payton v New York argument

Anderson also argued that the search (or the recovery of the firearm) was tainted by a violation of Payton v New York, 445 US 573 (1980). Payton held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a routine felony arrest.

The concurrence makes short work of this claim:

• They note that “it is undisputed that defendant was taken into custody outside of the apartment.”
• They cite People v Garvin, 30 NY3d 174 (2017), cert denied 586 US 814 (2018), which reaffirmed that Payton governs entries into the home; it does not apply where:
  • Police either arrest the defendant in a public place, or
  • The defendant voluntarily comes to the doorway or outside, and the arrest occurs there without police intrusion into the dwelling.

Given that Anderson was taken into custody outside the Airbnb unit, the rules of Payton and its “constructive entry” doctrine do not apply; no warrant was constitutionally required for an arrest in a public or quasi‑public space, assuming probable cause existed.

Therefore, the concurring judges conclude that both:

• The search revealing the firearm; and
• The arrest itself

were not constitutionally infirm, and the trial court properly declined to suppress the firearm.

3.5 Impact and implications

3.5.1 Appeal waivers: toward more granular, context‑specific review

Although the majority opinion continues the Fourth Department’s trend of enforcing broad appeal waivers, the concurring memorandum signals a potentially important shift in emphasis:

• Binding rule (majority): A general waiver of the right to appeal—properly explained—can validly cover suppression rulings even if suppression is not specifically mentioned during the plea colloquy.
• Emerging caution (concurrence): Where a suppression ruling is central to the case, and where the colloquy’s language could reasonably lead the defendant to believe that some “other” major issues remain appealable, courts must carefully scrutinize whether the record actually shows an informed waiver as to that issue.

Practically, this has several implications:

• For trial judges:
  • The case underscores the wisdom of following the Model Colloquy closely, including the bracketed language:

    “including a claimed error in the denial of your (specify, e.g., motion to suppress)”

  • In cases where a suppression ruling is outcome‑determinative, best practice is to explicitly tell the defendant that by waiving his right to appeal, he is also waiving the right to have an appellate court review that ruling.
  • Courts should avoid vague references to “some other” issues that are too important to waive unless they are willing to specify clearly what those issues are.
  • At sentencing, standard advisories about “your right to file a notice of appeal” should be calibrated to avoid contradicting or undermining the earlier waiver explanation.
• For defense counsel:
  • Counsel must accurately advise defendants that, in New York, an appeal waiver typically will foreclose challenges to pre‑trial suppression rulings, unless the record clearly preserves them.
  • If counsel believes a suppression issue is important enough to preserve, they should negotiate plea terms without an appeal waiver, or with a expressly limited waiver that preserves specified claims.
  • If counsel misadvises a defendant about the scope of a waiver, that may form the basis of an ineffective assistance claim—but, as the majority notes, such a claim usually must be raised by CPL 440.10 motion, not on direct appeal.
• For appellate courts:
  • Anderson illustrates a willingness (at least among some judges) to probe beyond boilerplate and to consider how the colloquy’s wording, timing, and subsequent events (like sentencing remarks) may affect a defendant’s understanding.
  • While the majority opinion is terse, the concurrence may influence future panels confronting factually similar scenarios—especially when ambiguous colloquy language is combined with a highly consequential suppression ruling.

3.5.2 Short‑term rentals and the Fourth Amendment

On the search‑and‑seizure side, Anderson contributes to an evolving body of law concerning short‑term rentals (Airbnb, VRBO, etc.) and privacy expectations:

• Hotel‑room analogy: By relying on D'Antuono, the concurring judges treat an Airbnb rental like a hotel room:
  • While a guest maintains lawful occupancy under a rental agreement, he generally has a reasonable expectation of privacy against police intrusion.
  • However, once the rental is lawfully terminated—here, via cancellation for violation of rental terms—the guest’s expectation of privacy ends.
  • The owner may then lawfully enter the premises and conduct inspections or searches for his own purposes, and evidence discovered (e.g., a firearm under a mattress) can be turned over to law enforcement.
• Private vs. governmental search:
  • Although not explicitly framed in those terms, the case fits within the broader “private search” doctrine: a search by a private owner, acting independently, does not invoke the Fourth Amendment.
  • Future cases may have to address trickier questions, such as when a property owner acts at the express direction of the police, potentially becoming a government agent; Anderson does not reach that level of complexity on this record.
• Termination mechanism (platform‑based):
  • Anderson highlights that a host’s use of an online platform (Airbnb) to cancel a reservation can have real legal effects: once the booking is canceled and the host seeks police assistance to remove occupants, the guest’s privacy expectation in the unit can evaporate.
  • Short‑term renters should thus be aware that material breaches of terms (e.g., bringing prohibited firearms) can not only result in eviction but also in the loss of constitutional protections related to the premises.

3.5.3 Limits of Payton claims

Anderson also reinforces the modern understanding of Payton v New York:

• Payton is fundamentally about entries into a residence without a warrant.
• If the defendant is arrested outside the home (as in Anderson) or voluntarily exits the home in response to police request (as in Garvin), Payton generally does not apply.
• Defendants must therefore frame Payton arguments carefully; simply being associated with a residence where police are present does not create a Payton issue unless officers enter or effectively compel the defendant to appear at the threshold in a way that amounts to an entry.

4. Key Legal Concepts Explained (Simplified)

4.1 Waiver of the right to appeal

In New York, a defendant who pleads guilty ordinarily retains a right to appeal certain issues, including:

• Some pre‑trial rulings (e.g., suppression decisions),
• The legality of the sentence, and
• Certain constitutional defects.

However, prosecutors frequently require defendants, as part of a plea bargain, to sign a waiver of the right to appeal. This is a separate agreement in which the defendant gives up the right to have an appellate court review most claims of error.

A valid waiver:

• Must be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent—the defendant must understand what he is giving up.
• Does not cover every conceivable issue: jurisdictional defects, involuntary pleas, and illegal sentences generally remain reviewable.
• Often—but not always—includes challenges to suppression rulings, unless they are explicitly preserved.

4.2 Suppression motions

A suppression motion is a pre‑trial request by the defense asking the court to exclude evidence (such as a gun, drugs, or statements) on the ground that it was obtained in violation of constitutional rights (e.g., the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures).

If a suppression motion is granted, key evidence may be excluded, which sometimes forces the prosecution to dismiss the case. If denied, that ruling often becomes the central issue the defendant hopes to challenge on appeal.

4.3 Reasonable expectation of privacy

To challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must show a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or the item seized. Courts ask:

• Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy (did they actually expect privacy)?
• Is that expectation one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable?

A hotel or short‑term rental guest usually has such an expectation during the valid period of the rental. However, once the rental is terminated or the guest is evicted, the law generally recognizes that the expectation of privacy ends, and the owner regains full control of the premises.

4.4 Payton v New York

Payton v New York, 445 US 573 (1980), is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that the police may not:

• Make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect’s home to make a routine felony arrest,

absent exigent circumstances. If they do, the arrest and any evidence obtained as a direct result may be suppressed.

However:

• Payton does not apply to arrests in public places.
• If a suspect is arrested outside the home, or voluntarily comes out at the officers’ request, the rule usually does not apply.

4.5 CPL 440.10 motions

CPL 440.10 allows a criminal defendant to ask the trial court to vacate a judgment of conviction after it becomes final, on certain grounds—such as newly discovered evidence or constitutional violations not fully reflected in the trial record.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims often rely on facts outside the record (such as what advice counsel gave the defendant off the record). Those claims are usually not reviewable on direct appeal and must be raised by a 440.10 motion instead, as the Anderson majority notes.

5. Conclusion

People v. Anderson does not break radically new ground, but it crystallizes two significant trends in New York criminal law:

1. Appeal waivers and suppression rulings.
   • The majority reaffirms that a properly explained general waiver of the right to appeal can validly encompass appellate review of suppression rulings, even if suppression is not mentioned by name.
   • The concurring judges, however, stress that under People v Thomas and the revised New York Model Colloquy, courts must carefully assess whether a defendant actually understood that the waiver covered such a central issue—especially where ambiguous colloquy language and sentencing‑stage statements might reasonably suggest otherwise.
   • In doing so, the concurrence effectively cautions trial courts to adopt best practices: explicitly mention suppression issues when important, avoid vague references to unspecified “other” non‑waivable issues, and harmonize oral and written waiver explanations.
2. Short‑term rentals, privacy, and searches.
   • On the search‑and‑seizure front, Anderson extends traditional hotel‑room privacy doctrine to an Airbnb context: once the host terminates the rental, the guest’s reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises ends.
   • The property owner’s subsequent search of the unit and discovery of a concealed firearm did not violate Anderson’s rights because he no longer had a protected privacy interest at the time of the search.
   • Coupled with a reaffirmation that Payton does not apply to arrests executed outside a dwelling, the case clarifies the limits of both privacy and arrest‑entry doctrine in this increasingly common short‑term rental setting.

In the broader legal landscape, Anderson underscores the tension between encouraging finality in plea bargaining (via robust appeal waivers) and ensuring that defendants knowingly relinquish only what the law permits them to relinquish and what they truly understand. It also reflects the courts’ adaptation of longstanding Fourth Amendment principles to new forms of housing and occupancy, such as platform‑based short‑term rentals.

Going forward, practitioners in New York should read Anderson as:

• A reminder that appeal waivers will generally be enforced broadly,;
• A warning that ambiguous waiver colloquies—especially in cases dominated by a single suppression issue—may prompt searching appellate scrutiny; and
• A signal that occupants of short‑term rentals risk losing constitutional privacy protections in those premises once the host lawfully terminates the rental and retakes control.