People v Hunt: Limiting Lesser-Included False-Reporting Charges to Non-Speculative Non‑Fire Emergencies

I. Introduction

In People v Hunt, 2025 NY Slip Op 06450 (4th Dept Nov. 21, 2025), the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed a conviction for falsely reporting an incident in the second degree under Penal Law § 240.55(1) and exposure of a person. The decision is doctrinally significant in three ways:

It reaffirms how appellate courts in New York conduct weight-of-the-evidence review, particularly in false alarm/fire alarm prosecutions.
It clarifies when third-degree false reporting (Penal Law § 240.50[1]) should be charged as a lesser-included offense of second-degree false reporting (Penal Law § 240.55[1]) in fire-alarm cases, emphasizing that such a charge cannot rest on mere speculation that some non-fire emergency might have been reported.
It confirms that a defendant’s release to parole supervision does not moot a challenge to the severity of a sentence, though the sentence in this case was upheld.

The case involved a defendant who, immediately after being released from a police station on unrelated charges, re-entered the police station’s vestibule and pulled a wall-mounted "FIRE ALARM" handle, triggering a fire alarm response despite the absence of any fire. He later apologized to the police for "pulling the fire alarm" while knowing "that there was not a fire," explaining that he did so out of anger over his earlier arrest.

On appeal, the defendant challenged (1) the verdict as against the weight of the evidence, (2) the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury on third-degree false reporting as a lesser-included offense of second-degree false reporting, and (3) the severity of his sentence. The Fourth Department unanimously affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Department held:

Weight of the evidence: The jury’s verdict finding the defendant guilty of second-degree false reporting under Penal Law § 240.55(1) was not against the weight of the evidence. Surveillance video, absence of any fire, and the defendant’s own post-arrest statement amply supported the elements of the crime, including knowledge of falsity and the "not unlikely that public alarm or inconvenience will result" requirement.
Lesser-included offense: While the parties agreed that third-degree false reporting (Penal Law § 240.50[1]) is theoretically a lesser-included offense of second-degree false reporting (Penal Law § 240.55[1]), the court held that there was no reasonable view of the evidence under which the jury could acquit on the second-degree charge (false report of a fire) yet convict on third-degree false reporting based on a non-fire emergency. To accept that scenario would require "sheer speculation," which New York law forbids as a basis for a lesser-included charge.
Sentence and parole: The court acknowledged that the defendant’s release to parole supervision did not moot his challenge to the severity of the sentence because he remained under Parole Board control until sentence expiration. Nevertheless, it concluded that the sentence imposed was not unduly harsh or severe and declined to exercise its interest-of-justice authority to reduce it.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Taji S. Hunt, was arrested on unrelated charges and taken to a police station. After being released, he returned to the station’s vestibule within minutes:

He knocked on the interior locked door of the police station.
He then went to a nearby wall-mounted pull station clearly marked "FIRE ALARM."
He pulled the alarm, activating the building’s fire alarm system.
There were no visible signs or indications of a fire anywhere in the station.

The activation of the alarm prompted a response from firefighters, even though the firefighters were aware that they were responding to a false alarm. Subsequently:

The defendant made a statement to the police, apologizing "for pulling the fire alarm" while knowing "that there was not a fire."
He explained that he pulled the alarm out of anger at the police regarding his prior arrest.

A jury convicted him of, among other offenses, falsely reporting an incident in the second degree (Penal Law § 240.55[1]) and exposure of a person. On appeal from the judgment of Oneida County Court (Robert Bauer, J.), the defendant raised three main issues:

The second-degree false reporting conviction was allegedly against the weight of the evidence.
The trial court allegedly erred by refusing to instruct the jury on third-degree false reporting (Penal Law § 240.50[1]) as a lesser-included offense.
The sentence was allegedly unduly harsh or severe (with the People arguing, unsuccessfully, that this claim was moot due to his parole status).

IV. Precedents and Legal Framework

A. Weight-of-the-Evidence Review

The court relied heavily on established New York Court of Appeals authority defining the Appellate Division’s role in weight-of-the-evidence review:

People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 (1987): Provides the canonical test. The appellate court must first ask whether, "based on all the credible evidence[,] a different finding would not have been unreasonable." If so, it must then weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences and decide whether the jury was justified in finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 (2007): Clarifies the steps in weight review and stresses that the appellate court “acts, in effect, as a second jury” when performing this function, but must assess the evidence in light of the elements as charged to the jury.
People v Delamota, 18 NY3d 107 (2011), and People v Kancharla, 23 NY3d 294 (2014): Reaffirm that weight review is an independent factual review of the record evidence, measured against the jury charge actually given.

In Hunt, these cases reinforce the point that the Fourth Department was not simply checking for evidentiary sufficiency; it was reweighing the evidence to determine whether the guilty verdict on the second-degree false reporting count was justified.

B. False Reporting and Public Alarm – Penal Law § 240.55(1)

The key statute is Penal Law § 240.55(1), which, as charged to the jury and quoted in the opinion, provides that:

"[A] person is guilty of falsely reporting an incident in the second degree when, knowing the information reported, conveyed or circulated to be false or baseless, [the person] . . . [i]nitiates or circulates a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending occurrence of a fire . . . under circumstances in which it is not unlikely that public alarm or inconvenience will result."

Two aspects are critical here:

Knowledge of falsity: The defendant must know that the reported occurrence (here, a fire) is false or baseless.
"Not unlikely" public alarm or inconvenience: The circumstances must be such that public alarm or inconvenience is not unlikely to result.

To interpret the "public alarm or inconvenience" element, the court relied on:

People v Bayes, 78 NY2d 546 (1991): A seminal Court of Appeals case on false fire alarms. Bayes held that by communicating a report of a fire in a manner that requires the fire department to respond, a defendant makes it not unlikely that public alarm or inconvenience will result. The inconvenience and potential danger arise because:
- Emergency vehicles must travel rapidly on public roads.
- Firefighters are diverted from potential genuine emergencies.
People v DeShields, 169 AD3d 823 (2d Dept 2019), lv denied 33 NY3d 1030 (2019): An Appellate Division case applying similar reasoning to uphold second-degree false reporting convictions in false fire alarm contexts.

Hunt follows Bayes by emphasizing that even when firefighters know they are responding to a false alarm, the fact of the emergency response itself is sufficient to create a situation where public alarm or inconvenience is "not unlikely."

C. Lesser-Included Offenses under New York Law

New York has a well-developed doctrine governing when a trial court must, upon request, instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense. The court in Hunt cites:

People v Glover, 57 NY2d 61 (1982): Establishes the core two-part test for lesser-included offenses, codified via CPL 1.20(37) and 300.50(1).
People v Van Norstrand, 85 NY2d 131 (1995): Emphasizes that the inquiry focuses on whether any reasonable view of the evidence permits conviction on the lesser and acquittal on the greater.
People v James, 11 NY3d 886 (2008): Restates the test: the defendant must show (1) that the greater offense cannot be committed without simultaneously committing the lesser; and (2) that a reasonable view of the evidence supports guilt of the lesser but not the greater.
People v Green, 56 NY2d 427 (1982), rearg denied 57 NY2d 775 (1982): Another leading case explaining theoretical impossibility in the lesser-included context.
People v Hull, 27 NY3d 1056 (2016): Clarifies that the second prong asks whether "on any reasonable view of the evidence it is possible for the trier of fact to acquit the defendant on the higher count and still find [them] guilty on the lesser one."
People v Rivera, 23 NY3d 112 (2014), quoting People v Martin, 59 NY2d 704 (1983): Directs courts to consider the evidence "in the light most favorable to the defendant" when deciding whether a lesser-included charge is warranted.
People v Butler, 84 NY2d 627 (1994), rearg denied 85 NY2d 858 (1995): Warns that a lesser-included charge must not rest on "sheer speculation." If the only basis for the lesser is speculative, the charge should not be given.
People v McNeill, 107 AD3d 1430 (4th Dept 2013), lv denied 22 NY3d 957 (2013), and People v Saunders, 292 AD2d 780 (4th Dept 2002), lv denied 98 NY2d 681 (2002): Applications of these principles in refusing lesser-included charges where the record did not support a reasonable view that only the lesser offense had been committed.

In Hunt, these authorities frame the analysis of whether third-degree false reporting (Penal Law § 240.50[1]) should have been charged as a lesser-included offense of second-degree false reporting (Penal Law § 240.55[1]).

The court also references:

CPL 1.20(37): Defines a "lesser included offense."
CPL 300.50(1): Governs when and how trial courts submit lesser-included offenses to the jury.
1 Howard G. Leventhal, Charges to the Jury and Requests to Charge in a Criminal Case in New York § 36:18 (Nov. 2024 Update): A treatise source confirming that third-degree false reporting is generally recognized as a lesser-included offense of second-degree false reporting.

D. Sentencing and Mootness on Appeal

The court relied on:

People v Maye, 194 AD3d 1421 (4th Dept 2021), and People v Paul, 139 AD3d 1383 (4th Dept 2016), lv denied 28 NY3d 973 (2016): These cases hold that a challenge to the severity of a sentence is not moot merely because a defendant has been released to parole supervision. The defendant remains "under the control of the Parole Board" until the sentence is fully served, and thus the appellate court can still provide meaningful relief by modifying the sentence.

In Hunt, these precedents are invoked to reject the People’s mootness argument, but the court nonetheless affirms the sentence as not unduly harsh or severe under its discretionary review powers.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in People v Hunt

A. Weight-of-the-Evidence Challenge to Second-Degree False Reporting

1. The Standard Applied

The Fourth Department followed the Bleakley/Danielson/Delamota/Kancharla framework:

Assume, for purposes of analysis, that an acquittal would not have been unreasonable (Danielson).
Act "in effect, as a second jury" and independently review the evidence in light of the elements as charged to the jury.
Determine whether the jury’s finding of guilt is against the weight of the evidence.

The court did not simply ask whether there was some evidence supporting guilt (which would be the legal sufficiency test); instead, it reweighed the proof on the second-degree false reporting count.

2. Evidence of Knowledge and Falsity

The court highlighted the following:

Conduct: Defendant re-entered the police station vestibule shortly after his release, knocked on the locked interior door, then intentionally pulled a handle clearly labeled "FIRE ALARM," triggering the building’s alarm.
Absence of any fire: There were "no signs of any fire" at the station.
Defendant’s statement: He confessed and apologized "for pulling the fire alarm" while knowing "that there was not a fire" and said he did it to show his anger toward the police for his earlier arrest.

From this, the court concluded that the jury could reasonably find the defendant:

Knowingly initiated a false report of a fire (activation of a clearly labeled fire alarm for a non-fire purpose); and
Was fully aware there was no fire at the time of the alarm.

The defendant’s own statement was particularly damaging, as it corroborated both his knowledge of the absence of fire and his deliberate misuse of the alarm system as an expression of anger, rather than as a report of any emergency.

3. The Public Alarm/Inconvenience Element

A key element of Penal Law § 240.55(1) is that the false report be made "under circumstances in which it is not unlikely that public alarm or inconvenience will result." The defense sought to exploit the fact that:

Firefighters dispatched to the station "were aware that they were responding to a false alarm."

The court rejected the suggestion that this undercut the not unlikely requirement, relying on Bayes:

"[B]y communicating the report of [a] fire in a manner that required the fire department to respond, defendant made it 'not unlikely' that public alarm or inconvenience would result" because, among other things, "requiring [an] unnecessary response to an alarm may inconvenience and indeed endanger the public[ ] by placing rapidly moving emergency vehicles on public roads and keeping firefighters from attending a genuine emergency elsewhere."

Thus, the focus is on:

The objective risk of public alarm or inconvenience created by the emergency response; not on the subjective understanding of the responding firefighters.

The court treated the emergency response itself as a built-in source of potential public danger and inconvenience—consistent with Bayes—and held that this element was clearly met.

4. Conclusion on Weight of the Evidence

Even assuming "arguendo" that an acquittal would not have been unreasonable, the court, acting as a second factfinder, concluded that the evidence supporting the second-degree false reporting conviction was strong and uncontradicted:

Video proof of alarm activation;
Absence of any fire or emergency;
Defendant’s clear admission.

Accordingly, the conviction was not against the weight of the evidence.

B. Refusal to Charge Third-Degree False Reporting as a Lesser-Included Offense

1. The Two-Prong Lesser-Included Test

The court reiterated the two required showings (from Glover, James, and Van Norstrand):

Theoretical prong: It must be "theoretically impossible" to commit the greater offense without at the same time committing the lesser by the same conduct.
Evidentiary prong: Viewing the proof in the light most favorable to the defendant, there must be a reasonable view of the evidence that would permit a jury to:
- Acquit the defendant of the greater offense;
- Yet convict the defendant of the lesser offense.

Applying this framework:

It was undisputed that Penal Law § 240.50(1) (third-degree false reporting) is a lesser-included offense of Penal Law § 240.55(1) (second-degree false reporting) under the theoretical prong. In the language of Glover, it is "theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without at the same time committing the lesser."
The dispute centered entirely on the evidentiary prong.

2. What Third-Degree False Reporting Adds to the Analysis

Although the opinion does not quote Penal Law § 240.50(1) verbatim, the reasoning makes clear that:

Second-degree false reporting (here, § 240.55[1]) addresses false reports of a fire under circumstances where public alarm or inconvenience is not unlikely.
Third-degree false reporting (§ 240.50[1]) is broader and can encompass false reports of other types of emergencies (e.g., non-fire emergencies) without the same elevated context that increases the crime to second degree.

The defense’s theory was that the jury could rationally find that:

The defendant was not falsely reporting a fire (which would negate second-degree false reporting), but
He was falsely reporting some other emergency (triggering liability only for third-degree false reporting).

If the record supported that scenario on a reasonable view of the evidence, the defendant would be entitled to the lesser-included charge.

3. The Evidence the Defense Relied On

The defense pointed to:

General testimony by firefighters:
- That people could use a pull station to report "other emergencies."
- That the fire department responds to more than just fires.

From this, the defense attempted to construct a reasonable possibility that the defendant might have been falsely reporting some non-fire emergency when he pulled the alarm, supporting a third-degree but not a second-degree false reporting conviction.

4. The Court’s Response: No Evidence of a Non-Fire Emergency

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant (as required by Rivera and Martin), the court concluded that the record did not support a reasonable view that the defendant:

Intended to report some non-fire emergency, or
Believed he was communicating any emergency other than a fire.

Instead, the record established:

The defendant activated a wall-mounted pull station labeled "FIRE ALARM."
He later apologized "for pulling the fire alarm" (emphasis added) while knowing "that there was not a fire" (emphasis added).
He stated that he did this to express anger toward the police for his earlier arrest, not to report any actual emergency.

The Fourth Department found "nothing in the record" suggesting that he "falsely reported some emergency other than a fire." The generalized testimony that:

Pull stations could theoretically be used for other emergencies, and
The fire department responds to more than just fires,

did not, in the court’s view, supply any specific evidence about this defendant’s conduct or intent sufficient to support the defense’s theory.

5. The Butler "No Speculation" Principle

Citing People v Butler, the court emphasized that a requested lesser-included charge must not require the jury to "resort to sheer speculation." Because:

There was no evidence that the defendant sought to report a non-fire emergency, and
All concrete evidence (labeling of the device, the defendant’s own words) tied his conduct to a false report of a fire,

the notion that the defendant was falsely reporting something other than a fire was purely speculative. On these facts, the court held:

"[I]n the absence of evidence that defendant falsely reported some emergency other than a fire, there is no reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding, without 'resort to sheer speculation,' that defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater."

This application tracks McNeill and Saunders, where the Fourth Department likewise refused to give lesser-included charges where no non-speculative evidentiary basis supported conviction on the lesser alone.

6. Result

Because the evidentiary prong of the lesser-included test was not satisfied, the trial court acted properly in refusing to instruct the jury on third-degree false reporting as a lesser-included offense of second-degree false reporting.

C. Sentence Review and Parole Mootness

1. Mootness Rejected

The People argued that the defendant’s challenge to the severity of his sentence was moot because he had been released to parole supervision. The Fourth Department disagreed, citing Maye and Paul:

A defendant on parole remains "under the control of the Parole Board" until sentence expiration.
An appellate court can still grant meaningful relief by reducing the sentence, which would shorten or eliminate the parole period.

Thus, the defendant’s challenge to the sentence remained live.

2. Sentence Not Unduly Harsh or Severe

Exercising its broad, discretionary review powers under CPL 470.15(6)(b), the court concluded that the sentence imposed was not "unduly harsh or severe." The opinion does not detail the sentence or the factors considered, but the holding confirms:

The panel saw no basis to reduce the sentence in the interest of justice.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. "Against the Weight of the Evidence" vs. "Legal Sufficiency"

These two appellate standards are often confused:

Legal sufficiency asks: Could any rational jury find the defendant guilty, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution? It is a minimal threshold; if there is some evidence of each element, the verdict is legally sufficient.
Weight of the evidence asks: Even if the verdict is legally sufficient, was the jury justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? The Appellate Division:
- Acts as a "second jury";
- Weighs conflicting testimony and inferences; and
- Can reverse even when the evidence is technically sufficient, if it believes the verdict is unjust or against the weight of the credible evidence.

In Hunt, the defendant raised a weight challenge, and the court conducted the more searching, fact-based review required by Bleakley, ultimately sustaining the verdict.

B. Lesser-Included Offense

A lesser-included offense is a crime whose elements are entirely contained within another, "greater" offense. Under New York law:

It must be theoretically impossible to commit the greater offense without simultaneously committing the lesser (e.g., you cannot commit burglary without committing trespass).
There must be a reasonable view of the evidence under which a jury could:
- Acquit on the greater offense, and
- Convict on the lesser offense.

If both prongs are met, the defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser offense, giving the jury a more nuanced set of options. If the second prong fails (as in Hunt), the court must not give the lesser instruction, especially where doing so would invite speculation.

C. "Not Unlikely That Public Alarm or Inconvenience Will Result"

This phrase in § 240.55(1) is interpreted broadly:

The focus is on risk creation, not on what actually happens in a particular case.
Initiating an alarm that requires an emergency response inherently creates a significant risk of:
- Public danger (e.g., high-speed emergency vehicles in traffic).
- Public inconvenience (e.g., evacuations, traffic disruptions, diversion of emergency resources).

Thus, even if responders quickly realize the alarm is false, or even if they start out knowing it is false, the mere necessity of response is enough to satisfy this element—exactly as reaffirmed in Hunt via Bayes.

D. Mootness and Parole

A claim is "moot" when the court’s decision would no longer have any practical effect on the parties. In the sentencing context:

Completion of a sentence can sometimes moot a severity-of-sentence challenge, but
When a defendant is on parole, they are:
- Still serving the sentence; and
- Still subject to supervision and restrictions by the Parole Board.

Therefore, an appellate reduction of the sentence could shorten or end parole, providing real relief. In such cases, as in Hunt, a severity-of-sentence challenge is not moot even though the defendant is not physically incarcerated.

VII. Impact and Future Implications

A. False Alarm Prosecutions and Public Risk

People v Hunt reinforces and slightly extends the logic of Bayes:

False activation of a fire alarm—especially in a public facility like a police station—almost automatically satisfies the "not unlikely that public alarm or inconvenience will result" element.
This remains true even where firefighters respond knowing the alarm is false; the decision stresses the systemic risks and resource diversion inherent in any emergency response.

For prosecutors, this decision:

Provides robust support for charging second-degree false reporting (rather than only third-degree) in deliberate false fire alarm cases.
Offers appellate authority that the "not unlikely" element can be established largely by showing:
- Activation of a fire alarm; and
- A corresponding emergency response.

B. Lesser-Included Charges in False Reporting Cases

Perhaps the most novel aspect of Hunt is its clear application of the "no speculation" rule to the relationship between:

Second-degree false reporting of a fire (Penal Law § 240.55[1]); and
Third-degree false reporting (Penal Law § 240.50[1]), which may include non-fire emergencies.

The decision sends a clear message:

That third-degree false reporting is a lesser-included offense of second-degree false reporting in the abstract does not, by itself, entitle a defendant to a lesser charge.
There must be affirmative evidence that could reasonably support a finding that the defendant:
- Did not falsely report a fire (negating the greater offense), yet
- Did falsely report some other emergency (sustaining liability for the lesser)
Vague, generalized testimony about what a pull station can be used for, divorced from the defendant’s actual statements and conduct, is insufficient to support the lesser charge without inviting pure speculation.

For defense counsel, the case highlights the need to:

Develop specific evidentiary support for alternative theories (e.g., non-fire emergencies), rather than relying on hypothetical or generalized testimony.
Recognize that courts will not instruct on a lesser-included offense if the only path to that verdict is jury speculation, even when the lesser offense is conceded to be a valid theoretical lesser.

For trial courts, Hunt provides a concrete example of when to deny a requested lesser-included instruction in a false reporting case:

The lesser is properly refused where:
- The evidence consistently and specifically frames the conduct as a false report of a fire (e.g., pulling a "FIRE ALARM," admitting there was "not a fire"), and
- There is no factual basis for viewing the conduct as a false report of any different type of emergency.

C. Appellate Practice and Parole

On the sentencing front, Hunt confirms Fourth Department precedent that:

Severity-of-sentence challenges by defendants on parole remain reviewable.
Prosecutors should be cautious in arguing mootness premised solely on the defendant’s physical release from custody.

Nevertheless, by declining to modify the sentence, the court signals that:

While such challenges are technically justiciable,
Defendants still face a substantial hurdle in persuading the Appellate Division to exercise its rarely-used discretion to reduce sentences that fall within statutory bounds and are not plainly disproportionate.

VIII. Conclusion

People v Hunt is a concise but important reaffirmation and clarification of New York law in several areas:

It confirms that deliberate activation of a fire alarm in the absence of a fire, coupled with an emergency response, comfortably satisfies the elements of second-degree false reporting under Penal Law § 240.55(1), even when responders know the alarm is false.
It sharpens the doctrine of lesser-included offenses in the context of false reporting statutes. Although third-degree false reporting is accepted as a lesser-included offense of second-degree false reporting, a trial court need not (and should not) charge the lesser where there is no non-speculative evidentiary basis to find that only a non-fire emergency was falsely reported.
It reiterates that a defendant’s release to parole supervision does not moot a challenge to sentence severity, while simultaneously demonstrating the Appellate Division’s restrained approach to sentence modification.

In broader perspective, Hunt reinforces the principle that New York courts will:

Take seriously the public safety and resource-allocation implications of false emergency reports, especially in institutional settings like police stations;
Resist jury instructions that invite conjecture unsupported by evidence; and
Maintain meaningful, though sparingly exercised, oversight of sentencing even after a defendant’s release to supervision.

The decision thus provides useful guidance to prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial judges in handling false alarm cases and structuring lesser-included offense submissions, while solidifying the contours of appellate review in both evidentiary and sentencing contexts.

This commentary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.