Parole-Arrest Reports Are “Criminal Investigation” Records: Ohio Supreme Court Requires Sentencing-Court Leave Under R.C. 149.43(B)(8) and Reaffirms Relator’s Burden to Prove Record Existence

Parole-Arrest Reports Are “Criminal Investigation” Records: Ohio Supreme Court Requires Sentencing-Court Leave Under R.C. 149.43(B)(8) and Reaffirms Relator’s Burden to Prove Record Existence

Introduction

In State ex rel. Robinson v. Clemans, 2025-Ohio-1021, the Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously denied an inmate’s mandamus petition seeking parole-related records from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC). The Court’s per curiam opinion clarifies two recurring pillars of Ohio public-records litigation involving incarcerated requesters:

  • A parole officer’s arrest report connected to a criminal offense qualifies as a record “concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution,” triggering R.C. 149.43(B)(8)’s heightened gatekeeping requirement that an inmate first obtain leave from the sentencing judge (or successor) upon a finding that the information is necessary to support a justiciable claim.
  • When a public office attests it has no responsive records, the relator bears the burden, by clear and convincing evidence, to prove the records exist and are maintained by the office. Unsupported assertions that a record “must exist” are insufficient.

The Court also resolved several procedural motions, reaffirmed the prohibition on “reply to a response to a motion” filings in its practice rules, recognized attorney-client privilege redactions, and rejected a late attempt to seek habeas corpus in a merits brief. The case thus serves as a roadmap for both requesters and custodians on how inmate-initiated public-records claims will be evaluated in Ohio’s highest court.

Case Overview

  • Parties: Relator was Jackie N. Robinson, an inmate at Grafton Correctional Institution (GCI); Respondent was Jennifer Clemans, then Quality-Assurance Analyst for the Ohio Parole Board.
  • Background: In October 2023, Robinson sent an internal “kite” to GCI’s warden’s assistant seeking:
    • (1) a 1987 arrest report by Parole Officer Michael Adams related to bank robbery and a parole violation;
    • (2) revocation order (DRC-3314);
    • (3) hearing summary report (DRC-3234);
    • (4) sanction receipt (DRC-3313);
    • (5) and (6) PVR/Kellogg Screening Forms (DRC-3462) tied to two identified numbers.
  • Agency Response: Clemans responded that four of the requested records did not exist; later filings asserted none of the requested records existed, and separately argued the arrest report request was barred absent judicial leave under R.C. 149.43(B)(8).
  • Mandamus Filing: Robinson sought an order compelling production and statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2). He also filed multiple motions (e.g., to compel unredacted emails, to “dismiss” the answer/brief, to strike a response, for a peremptory writ) and, within his merits briefing, alternatively requested habeas corpus.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The Court denied the writ of mandamus. For the five ODRC forms identified (DRC-3314, DRC-3234, DRC-3313, and two DRC-3462 forms), Robinson did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the records exist; Clemans attested that the forms he named were not used at the relevant times (1987 and 1993) and that no responsive DRC-3462 forms could be found.
  • With respect to the 1987 arrest report, the Court held it is a record “concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution,” and because Robinson was incarcerated, R.C. 149.43(B)(8) required him to first obtain a finding from the sentencing judge (or successor) that the information is necessary to support a justiciable claim. He did not do so, so the mandamus claim fails for that record as well.
  • The Court denied statutory damages, because the public office owed no duty to produce records that either did not exist or were properly withheld under R.C. 149.43(B)(8).
  • Robinson’s motions were denied:
    • Unredacted emails: Properly redacted under attorney-client privilege; no entitlement shown.
    • Motion to “dismiss” answer/brief: Not a recognized remedy; judicial notice cannot be used to decide legal questions.
    • Motion to strike response: The filing was essentially a prohibited reply under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.01(B)(2).
    • Peremptory writ/default: No basis; the answer was timely and not subject to Civ.R. 12(F).
  • The Court rejected the alternative habeas request, because habeas must be sought by petition under R.C. 2725.04 and accompanied by commitment papers; it cannot be embedded in a merits brief in a mandamus case.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • R.C. 149.43(B)(8) and its breadth:
    • State ex rel. Mack v. Richland Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2024-Ohio-2748: Reaffirmed that the statutory language is “broad and encompassing” and imposes heightened requirements on inmates seeking records concerning criminal investigations or prosecutions.
    • State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton, 2006-Ohio-5858: Offense and incident reports fall within the (then) R.C. 149.43(B)(4) (now (B)(8)) restriction. The Court relied on Russell to analogize Robinson’s 1987 arrest report to offense/incident reports—each triggers the leave-of-court requirement.
    • State ex rel. Ware v. Parikh, 2023-Ohio-759; State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Jones-Kelley, 2008-Ohio-1770: The public office bears the burden to show the exception applies and must show the request falls squarely within it; the Court held that standard was satisfied because the arrest report “concerned a criminal investigation.”
  • Burden to prove existence when the office says no records exist:
    • State ex rel. Culgan v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor, 2024-Ohio-4715; State ex rel. Cordell v. Paden, 2019-Ohio-1216: Once a custodian attests no responsive records exist, the relator must produce clear and convincing evidence that the records exist and are maintained by the office. Robinson provided none; ODRC’s evidence indicated the specific DRC forms did not exist at the operative times and that no DRC-3462 forms could be located.
  • Raising new defenses during litigation:
    • R.C. 149.43(B)(3); State ex rel. Scott v. Toledo Corr. Inst., 2024-Ohio-2694: A public office may rely on additional reasons or legal authority in defending a mandamus action, even if those reasons were not stated in the original public-records response. This allowed Clemans to invoke R.C. 149.43(B)(8) in court even though the initial exchange did not rely on that ground.
  • Attorney-client privilege and motion practice:
    • The Court accepted redactions of internal ODRC counsel’s email providing legal advice, consistent with privilege principles and regular practice under the Public Records Act.
    • State ex rel. Harris v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-2901: Courts cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts or legal conclusions; used to deny Robinson’s request to judicially notice his legal argument regarding leave-of-court.
    • S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.01(B)(2): Prohibits replies to responses to motions, leading to denial of Robinson’s “motion to strike,” which functioned as an impermissible reply.
  • Mandamus and statutory damages standards:
    • State ex rel. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Medicine v. OSU Bd. of Trustees, 2006-Ohio-903; State ex rel. Griffin v. Sehlmeyer, 2021-Ohio-1419: Mandamus is the mechanism to enforce the Public Records Act; the relator must show a clear legal right to the records and a clear legal duty to produce them, by clear and convincing evidence.
    • State ex rel. Grim v. New Holland, 2024-Ohio-4822: A requester must prove entitlement to statutory damages by clear and convincing evidence; without a violation of an obligation under R.C. 149.43(B), damages are unavailable.
  • Habeas procedural rules:
    • R.C. 2725.04; State ex rel. Jackson v. Sloan, 2016-Ohio-5106: A habeas action must be initiated by petition with commitment papers. Raising habeas in a brief in an unrelated original action is improper; the Court therefore denied Robinson’s alternative habeas request.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Nonexistence of the requested ODRC forms
    • The Court credited Clemans’s sworn attestations that DRC-3314, DRC-3234, and DRC-3313 were not in use when Robinson was arrested (1987) or when his parole violation occurred (1993). It also credited efforts to locate DRC-3462 forms and the attestation that the form did not exist in those years and/or could not be located.
    • Because the custodian stated no records existed, the relator’s burden was to produce clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Robinson offered none—he relied on bare assertions that ODRC “must” have the records. That is insufficient under Culgan and Cordell.
    • Without proof of existence, there can be no clear legal right or duty to produce; mandamus fails as to these five items.
  2. Arrest report and R.C. 149.43(B)(8)
    • R.C. 149.43(B)(8) restricts access by incarcerated individuals to “any public record concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution” absent a threshold judicial finding (from the sentencing judge or successor) that the information is necessary to support a justiciable claim.
    • Drawing on Russell, the Court equated a parole officer’s 1987 arrest report to offense/incident reports—quintessential criminal investigation records. Although Robinson characterized his need in terms of an administrative parole revocation, his own filings tied the arrest report to his claimed confinement and revocation proceedings arising from an underlying bank-robbery offense. The record thus “concerns” a criminal investigation.
    • Robinson never obtained the prerequisite judicial finding; R.C. 149.43(B)(8) therefore barred the request, and mandamus could not compel production.
    • The Court noted that a public office may rely on the (B)(8) defense even if it was not the initial stated basis for denial, pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(3) and Scott.
  3. Statutory damages
    • Because Robinson failed to establish any violation of a duty under R.C. 149.43(B) (either the records do not exist or (B)(8) properly bars production), statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) were unavailable.
  4. Procedural motions
    • Unredacted evidence: The Court found the redactions were attorney-client privileged communications from ODRC counsel to ODRC employees and declined to compel production.
    • “Dismiss” answer/brief; judicial notice: There is no authority to “dismiss” a responsive pleading or brief as such; the Court also rejected the attempt to convert a legal argument (no need for leave) into an adjudicative fact for judicial notice.
    • Motion to strike response: Denied because the filing attempted an impermissible reply to a motion response under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.01(B)(2).
    • Peremptory writ and default: No default applied; the answer was timely and not subject to striking. The request was “entirely meritless.”
  5. Habeas corpus
    • Habeas must be sought by petition and accompanied by commitment papers. Embedding a habeas request in a mandamus brief violates R.C. 2725.04 and Jackson; the Court denied it.

Impact

  • Clarity on R.C. 149.43(B)(8) for parole-related records: The decision confirms that an arrest report generated in connection with an offense underlying parole action is a “criminal investigation” record. Incarcerated requesters must obtain a judicial finding of necessity for a justiciable claim before obtaining such records. This will likely channel inmate requests to the sentencing courts and reduce direct production demands on custodians for arrest/offense/incident reports and similar investigatory documents.
  • Burden to prove existence is decisive: The Court’s reliance on Culgan and Cordell underscores that historical-form requests are vulnerable unless the requester can meet the heightened proof burden. Requesters should avoid specifying internal form numbers unless they can substantiate that those forms existed and were in use at the relevant time; otherwise, requests should be framed by function, timeframe, and custodian, not by form codes that may be anachronistic.
  • Strategic defenses for custodians: Public offices may develop and assert additional legal grounds during litigation (including (B)(8)), even if the initial response did not articulate those grounds. This reinforces the importance of thorough legal evaluation during litigation and cautions requesters against relying on any waiver theory.
  • Attorney-client privilege in the public-records context: The Court’s acceptance of redactions for legal advice communications reaffirms that privilege remains a robust exception to disclosure, even when the record itself is part of litigation filings. This may encourage agencies to route sensitive legal analysis through counsel to preserve privilege.
  • Procedural discipline in original actions: The denials of Robinson’s motions emphasize adherence to procedural rules in the Supreme Court (no replies to motion responses; no “dismissal” of answers; no judicial notice of legal arguments) and are cautionary for pro se litigants and practitioners alike.
  • No shortcut to habeas via mandamus briefing: The Court’s reiteration of habeas pleading requirements prevents collateral use of public-records litigation as a vehicle for release claims, preserving the distinct procedural track and threshold documentation of habeas corpus.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mandamus (in public records): A lawsuit asking a court to order a public office to do what the law requires—here, to produce public records. To win, the requester must show a clear legal right to the records and a clear duty on the custodian to produce them, proven by clear and convincing evidence.
  • R.C. 149.43(B)(8) (the inmate gatekeeper rule): If you are incarcerated, you cannot get records “concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution” unless the judge who sentenced you (or successor) first finds the information is necessary to support a legitimate, court-appropriate claim (a “justiciable claim”). This is designed to prevent fishing expeditions and ensure a threshold judicial screening.
  • “Concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution”: This covers offense/incident reports and related arrest reports about alleged crimes. Even if a requester frames the need as “parole” or “administrative,” if the record documents criminal investigation activity, (B)(8) applies.
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A high evidentiary standard—enough to create a firm belief or conviction in the mind of the fact-finder. In the records context, the relator must present solid proof (not mere suspicion) that the records exist and are held by the office.
  • Statutory damages (R.C. 149.43(C)(2)): A monetary remedy if a public office fails to meet a duty under the Public Records Act, but only if the requester proves a violation. Where there is no duty to produce (e.g., because the record does not exist or (B)(8) applies), no damages are available.
  • Attorney-client privilege: Communications seeking or giving legal advice between government counsel and agency staff are protected and may be redacted or withheld despite the Public Records Act.
  • Habeas corpus: A distinct legal action challenging the lawfulness of detention. It must be filed as a separate petition and include commitment documents; it cannot be tacked onto a mandamus brief.

Practice Pointers

  • For incarcerated requesters:
    • Before requesting arrest/offense/incident reports or similar records, file in the sentencing court for a finding under R.C. 149.43(B)(8) that the information is necessary to support a justiciable claim. Explain the specific claim and the nexus between the claim and the requested records.
    • When requesting older, internal forms, avoid assuming a particular form existed. Describe the function, date range, and office likely to have the records. If you rely on a form number, be prepared to submit evidence that the form existed during the relevant time.
    • To preserve eligibility for statutory damages, ensure your written request “fairly describes” the records, and be aware that damages depend on proving a duty violation.
  • For public offices/custodians:
    • Document search efforts and attest to nonexistence when applicable; this shifts the burden to the requester to prove existence.
    • Assert R.C. 149.43(B)(8) in inmate requests that implicate criminal investigations or prosecutions. You may raise additional defenses in litigation even if not stated initially (R.C. 149.43(B)(3)).
    • Protect legal-advice emails through privilege; narrowly redact and describe the basis if disclosure is litigated.
    • Adhere to Supreme Court practice rules to avoid motion practice pitfalls; police improper reply filings under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.01(B)(2).

Conclusion

State ex rel. Robinson v. Clemans cements two practical guardrails in Ohio’s public-records jurisprudence. First, it confirms that arrest reports—even in the parole context—are “criminal investigation” records, making R.C. 149.43(B)(8)’s sentencing-court leave a prerequisite for incarcerated requesters. Second, it reaffirms that when a public office attests that records do not exist, the relator must offer clear and convincing evidence to the contrary; conjecture or insistence is not enough. The Court’s disposition—denying mandamus, statutory damages, and a slate of procedural motions while respecting attorney-client privilege and habeas formalities—offers a comprehensive, procedure-forward template that will shape future inmate public-records litigation in Ohio. For practitioners and pro se litigants alike, the decision underscores that careful framing, evidentiary support, and compliance with statutory gateways are essential to prevail.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio

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