Parker v. NJMVC: Essential Eligibility Controls Title II and §504; No Pre‑Deprivation Hearing Required for Safety‑Driven CDL Passenger/School‑Bus Endorsement Revocations

Introduction

In a precedential decision, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment against Katrina Parker, a hearing‑impaired commercial driver whose New Jersey passenger (P) and school‑bus (S) endorsements were revoked without a pre‑revocation hearing. Parker sued the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission (NJMVC) and its Chief Administrator under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination (LAD), and 42 U.S.C. §1983 (procedural due process). The panel held Parker was not “qualified” under Title II (and not “otherwise qualified” under §504/LAD) because New Jersey requires compliance with the federal minimum hearing standard for P and S endorsements, a standard Parker undisputedly could not meet. The court also held that, even assuming a property interest in the endorsements, the Mathews balancing test did not require a pre‑deprivation hearing where public safety was at stake, the risk of error was low, and meaningful post‑deprivation remedies existed.

Parties and posture

Plaintiff–Appellant: Katrina Parker, a driver with an FMCSA exemption from the CDL hearing standard for interstate commerce, but expressly barred from operating a bus/motorcoach with passengers in interstate commerce and from school‑bus operation.
Defendants–Appellees: New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission and its Chief Administrator in her official capacity.
Procedural history: District of New Jersey granted summary judgment to NJMVC on all claims; Parker appealed. The Third Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed across the board:

Title II (ADA): A claimant must be a “qualified individual with a disability,” meaning they meet the program’s “essential eligibility requirements” with or without reasonable modification. New Jersey law incorporates the federal hearing requirement (49 C.F.R. §391.41(b)(11)) for P and S endorsements. Because Parker cannot satisfy that requirement, she is not “qualified,” and her Title II claim fails at the threshold.
Section 504 (Rehabilitation Act): “Otherwise qualified” means able to meet all program requirements in spite of the disability. Under Southeastern Community College v. Davis, Parker’s inability to meet the hearing standard defeats her §504 claim.
LAD: New Jersey courts align LAD disability analysis with §504/ADA frameworks. Because Parker is not qualified under those standards, her LAD claim fails as well.
Procedural Due Process (§1983): Assuming arguendo Parker had a property interest in the endorsements, the Mathews v. Eldridge factors did not require a pre‑revocation hearing. The private interest in endorsements (as distinct from a driver’s license) is comparatively weak; the risk of error was minimal because Parker concededly could not pass the hearing test; and the State’s public‑safety interest in promptly removing a hazard is strong. Available post‑deprivation judicial remedies further mitigate any risk of error. The court thus upheld revocation without a pre‑deprivation hearing.

Detailed Analysis

Regulatory backdrop and facts

New Jersey participates in the federal Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP) and must maintain “compatible” safety standards for commercial motor vehicles (CMVs). New Jersey law and regulation incorporate the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs), including the hearing standard at 49 C.F.R. §391.41(b)(11).

Parker obtained a CDL with an FMCSA exemption from the hearing standard for interstate commerce. However, that federal exemption:

Was limited to interstate commerce; and
Prohibited operating a motorcoach/bus with passengers in interstate commerce and did not apply to school buses.

New Jersey requires P and S endorsements to carry passengers and to operate school buses, respectively, and requires applicants to satisfy the federal medical/physical qualifications for those endorsements with no mechanism for individual variances (only class‑based waivers in narrow circumstances). Parker nonetheless received P and S endorsements in October 2017 due to an initial error. After inquiry and coordination with FMCSA, NJMVC notified Parker in August 2018 that her endorsements would be removed; the letters did not offer a pre‑revocation hearing. Her employer terminated her when the endorsements were removed. Parker did not pursue New Jersey’s 45‑day state‑court review process and instead filed suit in federal court seven months later.

Precedents cited and how they drove the decision

“Qualified” and “otherwise qualified” under Title II and §504

Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979): Defines “otherwise qualified” under §504 as someone who can meet all program requirements despite the disability. Rejects the notion that inability to meet legitimate physical requirements can be excused simply because the barrier stems from the disability. The Third Circuit applied Davis to conclude Parker is not “otherwise qualified” because she cannot meet the hearing requirement.
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999): Recognizes that federal safety rules limit ADA application as a matter of law. Supports New Jersey’s reliance on the FMCSR hearing standard as an essential safety requirement.
Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004): Title II does not require States to compromise essential eligibility criteria or fundamentally alter programs. Used to reinforce that the hearing standard is an essential eligibility criterion, not a mere procedural rule subject to modification.
Mary Jo C. v. NY State & Local Retirement System, 707 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2013) and PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001): The Third Circuit noted, but did not resolve, the question whether every eligibility requirement is “essential.” The court found that issue immaterial because Parker did not argue the hearing standard was non‑essential, and it plainly is essential for passenger/school‑bus operation.
New Directions Treatment Services v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2007): A successful facial Title II challenge to a zoning restriction. Distinguished because “qualified” status was undisputed there; here, Parker is not qualified.
Stanley v. City of Sanford, 145 S. Ct. 2058 (2025) (as cited by the panel): Emphasizes textual differences across ADA titles. Used to reject Parker’s attempt to import Title I’s “direct threat” construct into Title II. Title II’s definition hinges on “essential eligibility requirements” and contains no direct‑threat defense.

Procedural due process—licenses and safety

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): Three‑factor balancing test (private interest, risk of error/value of additional procedures, and government interest/burdens). The panel used Mathews to uphold revocation without a pre‑deprivation hearing.
Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977) and Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1 (1979): Supreme Court approved summary license suspensions/revocations without pre‑deprivation hearings when public safety is implicated. The panel applied this logic to endorsements, noting the government’s strong safety interest in promptly removing non‑qualified passenger/school‑bus drivers.
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971): Pre‑Mathews decision requiring a prior hearing where license deprivation was based on non‑safety fiscal interests. Distinguished: Parker’s revocation rested squarely on safety.
United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Culley v. Marshall, 601 U.S. 377 (2024): Clarify that pre‑deprivation process is not always required; post‑deprivation process can suffice, especially where the government must act quickly or safety is involved.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981): Availability of post‑deprivation judicial remedies can satisfy due process. The panel emphasized that Parker had both state review avenues and robust civil discrimination remedies (albeit unsuccessful in her case on the merits).

Legal reasoning

1) Title II and §504/LAD: “Qualification” is a threshold, not a merits issue

Title II limits its substantive protections to “qualified” individuals, defined as those who meet the program’s “essential eligibility requirements” with or without reasonable modifications, auxiliary aids, or barrier removal. 42 U.S.C. §12131(2). New Jersey made the federal hearing standard an eligibility condition for P and S endorsements. Because Parker could not meet that standard, she never cleared Title II’s threshold. That foreclosed resort to any further merits inquiries such as whether an individualized “variance” or assessment would be a reasonable modification. The court also rejected Parker’s attempt to import Title I’s “direct threat” analysis; Title II’s distinct text governs and contains no such affirmative defense, instead lodging the inquiry at the “essential eligibility” threshold.

Section 504 and the LAD follow the same logic. Davis’s definition of “otherwise qualified” requires the individual to meet legitimate program requirements despite the disability. Parker’s inability to satisfy the hearing standard ended the §504/LAD analyses. The court noted Parker did not argue that technological advances or auxiliary aids would enable her to meet the standard; more importantly, the FMCSR standard itself allows testing with or without hearing aids, and she still could not meet it.

2) Procedural due process: No pre‑deprivation hearing required for safety‑based, correctness‑certain revocations

The panel assumed (without deciding) that Parker had a property interest in the endorsements. Applying Mathews:

Private interest: Even a full driver’s license is not always “vital and essential” in procedural due process terms. Here, Parker retained her basic license and CDL; only endorsements were revoked. The interest in endorsements is comparatively weaker, particularly where the holder cannot lawfully satisfy the prerequisites.
Risk of erroneous deprivation and value of additional procedures: Minimal. The dispositive fact—Parker’s failure to meet the hearing threshold—was undisputed. An “individualized competency” hearing would not change that legal barrier. Moreover, New Jersey afforded post‑deprivation judicial review and Parker brought civil disability claims, which supply additional corrective mechanisms and potential compensation.
Government interest and burdens: Strong public‑safety interest in ensuring that only qualified drivers transport passengers or schoolchildren. Pre‑deprivation hearings would delay removal of a safety hazard and impose administrative burdens without appreciable error‑reduction.

As Dixon and Mackey teach, safety‑driven license actions may proceed without pre‑deprivation hearings. The same holds true for the discrete P and S endorsements here.

Impact and implications

For ADA Title II and §504 litigation

“Qualification” is a gateway requirement. Plaintiffs challenging exclusion from public programs must first demonstrate they meet the program’s essential eligibility criteria or that the criteria can be met with reasonable modifications that do not fundamentally alter the program or compromise safety.
Title I concepts do not map onto Title II. The court expressly declined to import Title I’s “direct threat” defense into Title II’s framework. Lawyers must anchor arguments in Title II’s text: essential eligibility, reasonable modifications, auxiliary aids, and the fundamental‑alteration limit.
Facial Title II challenges still require a “qualified” plaintiff. New Directions remains viable, but plaintiffs cannot bypass the qualification element by styling a claim as “facial” when their own qualifications are lacking.

For transportation safety and licensing

States may rigorously enforce FMCSR medical standards for endorsements, even for intrastate operation, without providing individual variances where their scheme requires compatibility with federal standards. New Jersey’s class‑based waiver authority and subsequent regulation clarifying the limited reach of FMCSA variances reinforce this design.
FMCSA exemptions do not compel passenger/school‑bus authorization. Federal hearing exemptions may be limited to certain operations (e.g., interstate CMV operation without passengers) and do not obligate states to issue passenger or school‑bus endorsements.

For procedural due process doctrine

Pre‑deprivation hearings are not categorically required for endorsement or license modifications, particularly where safety imperatives and undisputed non‑qualification exist.
Availability of post‑deprivation judicial review—both administrative appeals and substantive civil claims—can weigh heavily in Mathews analysis to validate immediate action by the State.

For employers and public entities

Employers in regulated transportation can rely on state licensing/endorsement prerequisites to define essential job functions for roles requiring specific endorsements. If a driver lacks a required endorsement due to non‑compliance with safety standards, Title II/§504/LAD will not compel assignment to those roles.
Public entities should provide clear notice and prompt post‑deprivation review channels. Although a pre‑deprivation hearing was not required here, transparent notice and accessible post‑deprivation processes reduce litigation risk and strengthen Mathews defenses.

Complex Concepts Simplified

CDL “P” and “S” endorsements: Additional authorizations on a commercial driver’s license. “P” permits carrying passengers in certain CMVs; “S” is required to operate school buses. These endorsements entail extra knowledge/skills tests and medical qualifications beyond a standard CDL.
FMCSR hearing standard (49 C.F.R. §391.41(b)(11)): To qualify medically, a driver must perceive a forced whisper at 5 feet in the better ear or have average hearing loss in the better ear not greater than 40 dB at 500, 1000, and 2000 Hz (with or without a hearing aid). It’s a safety rule.
FMCSA “variance” versus state “waiver”: FMCSA may grant limited exemptions or waivers from federal medical rules, often time‑bound and scope‑limited (e.g., not for passenger buses). A state may or may not mirror such flexibility for intrastate operations; New Jersey does not offer individual medical variances for P/S endorsements and only allows certain class‑based waivers.
Title II “qualified individual with a disability”: A person with a disability who meets the “essential eligibility requirements” for a public program or service, with or without reasonable modifications that do not fundamentally alter the program or undercut safety.
§504 “otherwise qualified”: A person who can meet all program requirements despite the disability, per Davis. It rejects the idea that someone is “qualified” except for the very requirement the program legitimately imposes for safety.
Direct‑threat defense (Title I only): An employer’s defense under Title I (employment) that an individual poses a significant risk of substantial harm that cannot be mitigated. The Third Circuit underscored that this is not a Title II concept.
Mathews v. Eldridge test: A balancing framework to decide what process is due before the government deprives someone of a protected interest. It weighs (1) the private interest, (2) risk of error and benefit of more procedures, and (3) the government’s interests and burdens. In safety‑critical licensing contexts, it often supports immediate action with post‑deprivation review.

What the Court Did Not Decide

Whether every eligibility requirement is “essential” under Title II. The panel noted the issue but found it unnecessary to resolve because Parker did not contest that the hearing requirement was essential for P/S endorsements.
Whether Parker had a property interest in endorsements. The court assumed arguendo and applied Mathews; the existence/contours of such a property interest remain an open question.
Any Title I (employment) ADA claim. The case concerned Title II (public services) and §504/LAD; the analysis and holdings do not control Title I disputes.

Key Takeaways

Meeting essential eligibility requirements is a threshold condition for Title II, §504, and LAD disability claims. Safety‑based medical standards incorporated into licensing regimes can be “essential,” and failure to satisfy them defeats the claim at the outset.
Title I’s “direct threat” framework does not apply to Title II. Plaintiffs cannot reframe a failure to meet essential safety criteria as an entitlement to individualized risk assessments under Title II.
Immediate revocation of safety‑critical endorsements without a pre‑deprivation hearing is constitutionally permissible under Mathews where non‑qualification is undisputed, safety stakes are high, and post‑deprivation remedies exist.
FMCSA exemptions do not obligate states to issue P/S endorsements, especially where the federal exemption itself restricts passenger/school‑bus operation and the state requires compliance with FMCSR standards for endorsements.

Conclusion

Parker v. New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission clarifies two significant points in the Third Circuit. First, for disability discrimination claims under Title II, §504, and New Jersey’s LAD, plaintiffs must meet essential safety eligibility criteria; courts will not require public entities to abandon or individualize those criteria where they are core to program safety. Second, in the procedural due process context, the Mathews balance permits immediate revocation of safety‑sensitive endorsements without a pre‑deprivation hearing when the individual indisputably fails to meet a critical safety requirement and post‑deprivation avenues are available. The decision reinforces the primacy of safety standards in commercial passenger transportation and delineates the limits of Title II’s reasonable‑modification mandate in that setting.