Originating Creditors as FDCPA Exempt Entities: Defining “Debt Collector” Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)

Originating Creditors as FDCPA Exempt Entities: Defining “Debt Collector” Under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)

Introduction

Bradley James Albert, a pro se plaintiff, brought suit in the Northern District of Georgia against Discover Bank alleging a dozen claims, including violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), due process violations, and entitlement to punitive damages. Discover moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion in full, and Albert appealed. On May 28, 2025, a three‐judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, dismissed portions of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the dismissal of Albert’s claims in others, particularly the FDCPA claim, holding that Discover, as the originator of the debt, is exempt from the Act’s definition of a “debt collector.”

Summary of the Judgment

  • Jurisdictional Dismissal: Albert’s challenges to the district court’s order on his motion for reconsideration were entered after he filed his notice of appeal; hence, the Eleventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction to review them.
  • FDCPA Claim: Discover Bank, having originated the debt, does not qualify as a “debt collector” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), including its exemption for originators (subsection 6(F)). The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of Albert’s FDCPA claim.
  • Due Process Claim: The district court’s imposition of standard fourteen‐day deadlines for filings did not violate Albert’s due process rights and, even if an error occurred, it was harmless under Rule 61.
  • Sanctions Motion: Discover’s request for Appellate Rule 38 sanctions was denied, though the court cautioned Albert against future frivolous appeals on the same facts.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

  • Veritas v. CNN (121 F.4th 1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2024)): Reiterates the de novo standard on Rule 12(b)(6) motions and the requirement to accept complaint allegations as true.
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)): Frames the plausibility standard requiring more than “labels and conclusions.”
  • Jackson v. BellSouth (372 F.3d 1250, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004)): Emphasizes that plaintiffs must plead specific facts, not legal conclusions alone.
  • Campbell v. Air Jamaica (760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014)): Explains that courts liberally construe pro se complaints but will not rewrite deficiencies.
  • Green v. DEA (606 F.3d 1296, 1300–02 (11th Cir. 2010)): Establishes that a timely and proper notice of appeal is jurisdictional.
  • Sabal Trail Transmission (947 F.3d 1362, 1370 (11th Cir. 2020)): Requires an appeal to designate an existing order or judgment.
  • Bogle v. Orange County (162 F.3d 653, 661 (11th Cir. 1998)): Clarifies that appeals do not bring up post‐notice orders absent an amended notice of appeal.
  • Reese v. Ellis, Painter, Ratterree & Adams (678 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2012)): Defines the two elements of an FDCPA claim—(1) debt collector status and (2) debt‐collection conduct.
  • Davidson v. Capital One (797 F.3d 1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 2015)): Requires factual content to support a reasonable inference that a defendant is a debt collector.
  • Morse (532 F.3d 1130 (11th Cir. 2008)) & Pollard (816 F.2d 603 (11th Cir. 1987)): Illustrate rare imposition of Rule 38 sanctions on pro se appellants warned about frivolous claims.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court applied the familiar two‐step analysis for Rule 12(b)(6):

  1. Plausibility Standard: Under Iqbal and Twombly, a complaint must contain enough factual matter to allow a reasonable inference of liability.
  2. Deferential Construction: Pro se pleadings merit liberal construction, but the court will neither serve as counsel nor fill factual gaps.

On the FDCPA question, the statutory text of 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) was paramount:

“The term ‘debt collector’ means any person... whose principal purpose is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects... debts owed or due ... another, but does not include... any person collecting or attempting to collect a debt originated by such person.”

Discover clearly originated the consumer account at issue, triggering the § 1692a(6)(F) exemption. Albert’s complaint, by its own allegations, acknowledged Discover’s originator status, foreclosing any plausible FDCPA claim.

3. Impact of the Decision

This decision reinforces and clarifies several key points in consumer finance litigation:

  • Origination Exemption: Lenders and banks that originate consumer debt remain exempt from FDCPA liability so long as they pursue only their own debts.
  • Pro Se Limitations: Even liberal standards do not save complaints that rest on undisputed facts negating statutory elements.
  • Appellate Jurisdiction Vigilance: Litigants must timely and properly designate the orders they wish to appeal, especially when post-appeal orders follow.
  • Sanctions Warning: Pro se litigants are on notice that repeating baseless claims—particularly after explicit judicial warnings—may trigger Rule 38 costs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
An early procedural tool by which a defendant asks the court to throw out a complaint that fails, on its face, to state a legally valid claim for relief.
“Debt Collector” under the FDCPA
Any entity whose main business is collecting debts of others, or who regularly attempts such collections—unless the entity originated the debt it seeks to collect.
Pro Se Pleadings
Filings by individuals representing themselves. Courts read them more leniently but cannot rewrite them to save flawed claims.
Appellate Jurisdiction
The power of an appeals court to review a lower court’s decision. It depends on a timely, clear notice of appeal specifying which orders or judgments are challenged.
Rule 38 Sanctions
A mechanism for awarding costs to the winning party when an appeal is deemed frivolous—i.e., objectively baseless in law and fact.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Albert v. Discover Bank underscores the precise limits of the FDCPA’s debt-collector definition, confirming that originators of consumer loans are exempt from the statute’s reach. It also highlights the necessity of adhering to procedural rules—both in framing complaints and in perfecting appeals—and serves as a caution to pro se litigants who pursue meritless claims despite clear legal barriers. This precedent will guide lower courts in screening FDCPA complaints and reinforce disciplined appellate practice.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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