Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Ruiz v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 762 (11th Cir. 2007) and Mu Ying Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 745 F.3d 1140 (11th Cir. 2014): These cases frame the review posture. The court reviews the BIA as the final agency decision, but also the IJ’s reasoning to the extent the BIA relied on it.
• Perez‑Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301 (11th Cir. 2019) and Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc): They supply the substantial evidence standard: the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency and will reverse only if the record compels a contrary conclusion; a mere contrary view is not enough.
• Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2010); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42): Establish the asylum elements and protected grounds, including PSG and political opinion.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) and Cendejas Rodriguez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 735 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2013): Outline the withholding of removal standard, which is more demanding than asylum’s. The same nexus requirement applies.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) and Sanchez‑Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2021): Codify and interpret the “one central reason” nexus test. Sanchez‑Castro clarifies that harm driven by ordinary criminal activity and indiscriminate gang conduct typically does not establish nexus; a protected ground must be essential to the persecutor’s motive, not incidental or subordinate.
• Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2006): Emphasizes that evidence consistent with private violence or criminality, without more, fails the protected-ground nexus.
• Perez‑Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2019): Provides a counterexample where nexus was found; the cartel targeted the petitioner because of his family’s cartel affiliation. The Osorio‑Villalobos panel distinguishes this scenario because the record here did not show group‑based targeting.
• Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001) and INS v. Elias‑Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992): Define imputed political opinion and reject the notion that resisting recruitment or demands by non‑state actors is inherently a political act. Elias‑Zacarias holds that the perpetrator’s politics are irrelevant; the key is whether the persecutor targeted the applicant because of the applicant’s (actual or imputed) political opinion.

Collectively, these authorities supply the legal framework the panel applied to assess nexus and to reject the imputed political opinion theory in the absence of evidence that the gangs attributed an anti‑gang political stance to the petitioner.

Legal Reasoning Applied by the Court

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

1. Factual characterization of harm as pecuniary and indiscriminate. The record showed attempted extortion ($800 for a child’s safety), armed robbery for wages, and ongoing “tax” demands—classic hallmarks of profit‑seeking criminality. The gang’s communications did not reference the petitioner’s gender, alleged witness/reporting activity, or any group trait. The first episode—a man demanding her baby—further reflected predatory criminal conduct, not protected‑ground animus.
2. No “one central reason” nexus to a protected ground. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) and Sanchez‑Castro, protected‑ground motive must be essential to the persecutor’s actions. The panel concluded that any connection to the proposed PSGs (Salvadoran women; witnesses who report gang activity) or to an imputed anti‑gang political opinion was, at most, incidental. The absence of group‑related references or a discernible pattern of group‑based harm placed the case squarely within Sanchez‑Castro and Ruiz (2006).
3. Rejection of the de facto government/imputed political opinion theory. Invoking Elias‑Zacarias and Al Najjar, the panel held that resisting the authority or demands of gangs—even if they operate like de facto governments—does not, without more, express a political opinion or establish that the persecutors imputed such an opinion to the applicant. The petitioner’s own testimony that she was not affiliated with any groups in El Salvador (other than being a single mother) reinforced the absence of evidence of imputed political belief.

Because nexus failed for both asylum and withholding, the panel expressly declined to address whether the asserted PSGs were cognizable under the INA or whether the imputed political opinion claim had been withdrawn at the IJ level. This follows a common adjudicatory economy principle: when a threshold element fails, further issues need not be reached.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Although unpublished and non‑precedential, the decision underscores key, recurring constraints in gang‑related asylum claims in the Eleventh Circuit:

• Reaffirmed “pecuniary motive is not nexus” rule. Where the record supports a finding that gangs acted to extract money or otherwise for profit, the nexus element will typically fail absent direct or strong circumstantial evidence that the applicant was targeted because of a protected ground. This reinforces Sanchez‑Castro’s emphasis on motive.
• High evidentiary burden under the substantial evidence standard. The court will not disturb agency findings unless the record compels the opposite conclusion. Mixed evidence or plausible alternative inferences will generally not suffice to overturn the BIA.
• Limits on imputed political opinion in gang contexts. Framing gangs as de facto governments does not, by itself, transform refusal to pay or report crimes into protected political expression. Practitioners must marshal evidence that persecutors actually attributed a political stance to the applicant.
• Strategic and adjudicatory consequences. When nexus fails, courts may decline to reach PSG cognizability and other contested issues. This can leave doctrinal questions unresolved while signaling to litigants that building a robust record of persecutor motive is essential.

In practice, the opinion signals that future applicants alleging gang‑related persecution must present more than narratives of extortion, robbery, or generalized threats. Evidence tying the harm to a protected characteristic—such as persecutor statements, patterns of differential targeting, or contextual facts showing that the protected trait was indispensable to the decision to harm—will often be decisive.