Optional Shop Reporting and Company-Truck Commutes Are Not Compensable “Principal Activities” Under the FLSA: Commentary on McAnally v. Alabama Plumbing Contractor LLC (11th Cir. 2025)

Optional Shop Reporting and Company-Truck Commutes Are Not Compensable “Principal Activities” Under the FLSA

Commentary on Paul McAnally v. Alabama Plumbing Contractor LLC, et al. (11th Cir. Mar. 21, 2025)

Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit, unpublished, per curiam decision addresses whether pre- and post-shift travel involving an employer’s shop and company trucks is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Six plumbing workers sued Alabama Plumbing Contractor LLC (APC) and its owner, Brent Vacarella, alleging FLSA violations for failure to pay overtime for time spent traveling in company trucks to and from APC’s shop and jobsites. The plaintiffs contended that reporting to the shop to receive assignments, gather supplies, and load heavy equipment commenced their “workday,” making subsequent travel compensable.

The core legal question is whether time spent reporting to the employer’s shop and traveling to and from jobsites in company vehicles constitutes compensable time under the FLSA, or whether it is excluded by the Portal-to-Portal Act, which exempts ordinary commuting and “preliminary” or “postliminary” activities from pay obligations unless those activities are “integral and indispensable” to the employees’ principal work.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer, holding that the activities at issue were not integral and indispensable to the plaintiffs’ principal plumbing work, and therefore the travel time remained non-compensable commuting.

Summary of the Opinion

  • The court applied the Portal-to-Portal Act (29 U.S.C. § 254(a)) and the Supreme Court’s “integral and indispensable” framework to determine compensability of pre- and post-shift activities.
  • Because some APC employees routinely traveled directly from home to jobsites without stopping at the shop, and because APC later closed its shop entirely while continuing operations, the court concluded that reporting to the shop and commuting in company trucks were not “indispensable” to performing plumbing work.
  • Accordingly, travel to and from the shop and jobsites—even in company vehicles—was treated as non-compensable commuting, not principal work.
  • The court rejected a jurisdictional challenge premised on 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)’s collective-action opt-in requirement, explaining that opt-in rules do not apply when a collective is not certified; the named plaintiffs clearly had standing to appeal.
  • Because the court affirmed on the merits, the appeal of the denial of conditional collective certification was moot. It also held that two appellants abandoned separate individual claims by raising them perfunctorily on appeal.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

  • Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247 (1956): Established that “principal activity or activities” include those that are an integral and indispensable part of an employee’s principal work.
  • Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 27 (2014): Clarified the meaning of “integral” (intrinsic to and necessary for the completeness of the work) and “indispensable” (cannot be dispensed with when performing principal work), and emphasized that the test is tied to the productive work the employee is employed to perform.
  • Llorca v. Sheriff, Collier County, Fla., 893 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2018): Reaffirmed that commuting and other preliminary and postliminary activities are compensable only if they are both integral and indispensable to the principal work, and explained that restrictions or incidental tasks during a commute generally do not convert it into compensable time.
  • 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207: FLSA minimum wage and overtime provisions. (The opinion references § 207 as “19 U.S.C. § 207” once—a clear typographical slip; the correct citation is 29 U.S.C. § 207.)
  • 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (Portal-to-Portal Act, as amended by the Employee Commuting Flexibility Act): Excludes ordinary commuting and certain preliminary/postliminary activities from compensation; clarifies that commuting in the employer’s vehicle within the normal commuting area, subject to agreement, is not a principal activity.
  • Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018): Summary-judgment standard; reviewed de novo with inferences to the non-movant.
  • Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2014): An appellant abandons an issue by only perfunctory reference without supporting arguments or authority.

How These Authorities Shaped the Court’s Reasoning

The Eleventh Circuit grounded its decision in the Integrity Staffing framework: an activity is compensable only if it is both integral and indispensable to the employee’s principal productive work. The court emphasized that:

  • “Commuting time and other preliminary and postliminary activities are compensable only if they are both an integral and indispensable part of the principal activities” (quoting Llorca).
  • Whether an activity is indispensable hinges on whether the employee “cannot dispense” with it and still perform the core job (Integrity Staffing).

Applying those principles, the court highlighted undisputed facts demonstrating dispensability:

  • Many employees regularly drove directly from home to jobsites without stopping at the shop.
  • APC ultimately closed its shop in 2022, yet continued to perform the same commercial plumbing work.

These facts showed that reporting to the shop and using company trucks for commuting were not necessary precursors to performing plumbing work. Because the work could be, and was, performed without those steps, they were not integral and indispensable components of the job. As a result, the time spent on those activities remained non-compensable under § 254(a).

Key Factual Elements

  • APC’s policy, communicated by text, said “time starts when you get to the job,” not at the shop.
  • Assignments could be delivered via jobsite instructions, phone, or text; plumbers were typically expected at jobsites by 7:00 a.m.
  • Use of company trucks was optional; employees who used them were expected to return the trucks to the shop, largely for insurance reasons, and needed permission to take them home.
  • Some days, employees stopped at the shop to pick up parts or equipment; on other days, they did not need to do so, and many workers never did.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Steps

  1. Identify the asserted compensable time: travel to and from the shop and jobsites in company trucks, based on alleged required pre-shift shop stops to receive assignments and load supplies/equipment.
  2. Apply the Portal-to-Portal Act: Ordinary commuting is not compensable; preliminary/postliminary activities are compensable only if integral and indispensable to principal activities.
  3. Evaluate dispensability: Because many employees dispensed with shop reporting entirely, and APC later dispensed with the shop itself, those activities were not indispensable to plumbing work.
  4. Conclude that no principal activity was triggered at the shop: Without a principal activity starting at the shop, subsequent trips remain commuting, outside the compensable workday.
  5. Affirm summary judgment for the employer: No genuine dispute of material fact prevented judgment as a matter of law under the controlling legal standard.

Relationship to the Employee Commuting Flexibility Act and DOL Concepts

Section 254(a) (as amended by the Employee Commuting Flexibility Act of 1996) expressly provides that using an employer’s vehicle for commuting—within the normal commuting area and subject to an agreement—is not a principal activity. While the Eleventh Circuit quoted this language, it did not need to decide the contours of “agreement” or “normal commuting area” on this record, because it resolved the case by finding the shop-related activities and company-truck commuting were not integral and indispensable to plumbing work at all.

The decision also implicitly sidesteps the “continuous workday” rule (that once a principal activity begins, subsequent travel during the workday may be compensable). By holding that no principal activity began at the shop—because shop reporting and related tasks were not integral and indispensable—the court avoided treating the shop-to-jobsite leg as “all in a day’s work.”

What the Court Did Not Decide (Open Questions)

  • Whether, in a different record, an employer-required shop stop involving non-de minimis, job-intrinsic tasks (e.g., mandatory loading of specialized equipment without which the job cannot be performed) could commence the workday and render subsequent travel compensable.
  • Whether the employer’s text policy (“time starts when you get to the job”) constitutes an “agreement” for purposes of § 254(a)’s employer-vehicle commuting clause, or how far that clause extends when employees perform incidental tasks during commutes.
  • How the analysis might change if the plaintiffs had shown that their particular job assignments always required shop-based tasks that were both integral and indispensable to that day’s plumbing work.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although unpublished and thus not binding precedent within the Eleventh Circuit, the ruling is persuasive and offers practical guidance in FLSA travel-time disputes:

  • Documentation of optionality matters. Evidence that employees can, and often do, go straight to jobsites strongly supports a finding that shop reporting is not integral and indispensable.
  • Employer policies that “time starts at the jobsite” and assignment logistics that do not require shop attendance reduce the risk that shop-to-jobsite travel becomes compensable.
  • Closing or de-emphasizing centralized shop functions (while continuing operations) can serve as additional evidence that shop-based preliminaries are not necessary to the principal work.
  • Plaintiffs seeking to convert commute time into compensable time must marshal concrete, job-specific proof that the pre- or post-shift tasks are mandatory and intrinsic to the job’s productive work, not merely convenient or routine.

On collective actions, the decision also clarifies two procedural points:

  • Named plaintiffs retain standing to appeal even if a collective was never certified and no opt-in consents were filed; § 216(b)’s opt-in requirement is inapplicable absent certification.
  • If the merits fail, an appeal of conditional certification is moot.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Principal activities: The core tasks an employee is hired to perform (here, plumbing at commercial jobsites).
  • Preliminary/postliminary activities: Before-and-after tasks (like commuting, gathering tools) that may be excluded from compensation unless they are integral and indispensable.
  • Integral and indispensable test: An activity is compensable only if it is intrinsic to the principal work and cannot be dispensed with when performing that work. If you can do the job without doing the activity, it’s generally not compensable.
  • Portal-to-Portal Act (29 U.S.C. § 254): A statute that narrows what counts as paid time by excluding ordinary commuting and certain pre-/post-shift tasks.
  • Employer-vehicle commuting clause: Commuting in an employer’s vehicle is not a principal activity if within the normal commuting area and subject to an employer–employee agreement.
  • Continuous workday rule: Once a principal activity starts, the rest of the day’s travel and tasks generally count as work. This only matters if a principal activity actually begins (e.g., mandatory, job-intrinsic tasks), which the court found did not happen at APC’s shop.
  • Summary judgment: A case can be decided without a trial if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
  • Abandonment on appeal: Issues are deemed abandoned if raised only in passing without developed argument and authority.

Practice Pointers

  • For employers:
    • Clearly communicate when compensable time begins (e.g., at the jobsite) and ensure assignment systems do not require shop attendance.
    • Make use of company vehicles for commuting optional and subject to a written policy or agreement.
    • Avoid mandatory, non-de minimis pre-shift tasks at the shop that are intrinsic to the day’s work; if they are necessary, expect that downstream travel could become compensable under the continuous workday rule.
    • Maintain records showing that employees commonly travel directly to jobsites and that operations continue unaffected without centralized shop stops.
  • For employees:
    • To claim travel time, identify specific, required pre- or post-shift tasks that are essential to performing your principal work that day (not merely convenient), and show they occurred before the travel at issue.
    • Document employer directives that require shop attendance and the non-de minimis nature of tasks performed there.

Conclusion

McAnally v. Alabama Plumbing Contractor LLC reaffirms that optional pre-shift shop visits and commuting in company vehicles are not compensable under the FLSA when they are not integral and indispensable to the employee’s principal work. The Eleventh Circuit treated the ability of many employees to bypass the shop—coupled with the employer’s later closure of the shop while continuing operations—as powerful evidence of dispensability. Without the commencement of a principal activity at the shop, shop-to-jobsite travel remained non-compensable commuting.

Beyond the merits, the court clarified that named plaintiffs in a non-certified case need not file § 216(b) consents to maintain appellate standing, and it reiterated the Eleventh Circuit’s abandonment doctrine for inadequately briefed issues. While unpublished, this decision provides persuasive guidance: employers that structure work to avoid mandatory, job-intrinsic pre- and post-shift tasks away from the jobsite, and that document the optional nature of shop attendance and employer-vehicle use, are well-positioned to defeat FLSA travel-time claims on summary judgment.

Note: This commentary analyzes an unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinion, which is not binding precedent in that circuit but may be cited as persuasive authority.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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