On‑Bill Billing and the Limits of Section 1502: Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Non‑Electric Add‑Ons Fall Outside “Service”; Scope of “All Electric Services” Reserved

Introduction

In Interstate Gas Supply, Inc. d/b/a IGS Energy; NRG Energy, Inc.; and Shipley Choice LLC d/b/a Shipley Energy v. Public Utility Commission (No. 10 MAP 2024), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Middle District) addressed a high‑stakes dispute at the intersection of retail electric competition and utility billing practices. The appellants—three Electric Generation Suppliers (EGSs)—challenged the Public Utility Commission’s (PUC) approval of an Electric Distribution Company’s (EDC) on‑bill billing practices that allegedly favored the EDC’s own add‑on offerings over those of competing EGSs. Intervenor FirstEnergy Pennsylvania Electric Company, the EDC, offered on‑bill billing for its own products but denied similar access to competitors for comparable offerings, thereby, in the appellants’ view, leveraging its distribution monopoly against rivals in the competitive retail space.

The key legal questions were: (1) whether Section 1502 of the Public Utility Code (66 Pa.C.S. § 1502), which bars public utilities from granting “any” unreasonable preference or advantage “as to service,” prohibits an EDC from favoring itself; and (2) whether on‑bill billing in this context is a “service” covered by Section 1502—particularly when the line between “electric services” and non‑electric, ancillary offerings is blurred.

Justice Mundy issued a concurring opinion on September 25, 2025. The majority opinion (per Justice Brobson) is not reproduced here, but Justice Mundy’s concurrence both aligns with, and critiques, aspects of the lower courts’ and parties’ positions, while clarifying what the Court did—and did not—decide.

Summary of the Opinion

• The Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision upholding the PUC’s order, but on grounds different from those emphasized below. As related by Justice Mundy:
  • Section 1502’s non‑discrimination prohibition applies only to acts taken by a public utility “as to service.” “Service” is a defined term under 66 Pa.C.S. § 102 and encompasses acts done by utilities “in the performance of their duties under” the Public Utility Code.
  • An EDC’s statutory duty to bill is set by Section 2807(c) (Competition Act), which makes EDCs “responsible for billing customers for all electric services.” Because the appellants sought on‑bill billing for non‑electric offerings (e.g., insulation, home repair, warranty‑type products), those offerings are outside the EDC’s duty to bill and thus outside the statutory definition of “service” for Section 1502 purposes.
  • Result: The Code does not require EDCs to provide equal on‑bill access for non‑electric, non‑commodity offerings. The appellants’ discrimination claims therefore fail as a matter of statutory scope.
• Justice Mundy agreed with the outcome but wrote separately to:
  • Critique the Commonwealth Court’s reading of “any” in Section 1502 as “any other,” which would allow self‑preferencing. In her view, “any” is universal and includes self‑preferencing within its prohibition on unreasonable preferences.
  • Emphasize that on‑bill billing, when tied to “electric services,” is itself a “service” for purposes of Section 1502, consistent with the PUC’s reasoning in Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania.
  • Highlight that “all electric services” (Section 2807(c)) is undefined, plural, and begins with the universal “all,” signaling breadth beyond mere commodity supply. Because the record did not differentiate specific offerings, the Court left the term’s full scope open for future cases.

Analysis

Statutory Framework and Market Context

Pennsylvania’s Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act of 1996 (the Competition Act, 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 2801–2815) unbundled generation from distribution. EDCs retain monopoly control over distribution within geographic service territories and bill customers for both distribution and generation, even when generation is supplied by competitive EGSs. The convenience of on‑bill billing (placing multiple charges on a single utility invoice) can be a commercially significant channel; thus, control over on‑bill access is a potential competitive lever.

The Public Utility Code’s core anti‑discrimination provision, Section 1502 (66 Pa.C.S. § 1502), prohibits a public utility, “as to service,” from granting any unreasonable preference or advantage or imposing any unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage. Section 102 defines “service” to include acts performed in the execution of a utility’s duties “under this part” (i.e., the Public Utility Code). For electricity, Section 2807(c) specifies that EDCs are responsible for billing “all electric services,” in accordance with PUC regulations.

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Competition Act (66 Pa.C.S. §§ 2801–2815): Establishes the unbundled, competitive retail generation market and the continued regulated monopoly over distribution.
• Section 1502 (66 Pa.C.S. § 1502): The anti‑discrimination rule “as to service,” central to the appellants’ claim.
• Section 102 (66 Pa.C.S. § 102): Defines “service” as acts in the performance of duties under the Public Utility Code, narrowing Section 1502 to utility conduct within statutorily assigned duties.
• Section 2807(c) (66 Pa.C.S. § 2807(c)): Assigns EDCs responsibility for billing “all electric services.”
• PUC v. Columbia Gas of Pennsylvania, No. R‑2018‑2647577 (Pa. PUC Dec. 6, 2018): The PUC held that on‑bill billing is a “service” under Section 102 and that discriminatory access among third parties violated Section 1502. While that matter involved a gas utility and third‑party parity (not self‑preferencing), the PUC’s predicate finding that on‑bill billing can be a “service” informs the electric context when the billed item is within a utility’s statutory duty.
• In re Estate of Wilner, 142 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2016); Vellon v. PennDOT, 292 A.3d 882 (Pa. 2023) (Mundy, J., concurring); Krasner v. Ward, 323 A.3d 674 (Pa. 2024) (Mundy, J., dissenting): These opinions underscore the Court’s recognition that universal statutory terms—“all,” “every,” and “any”—are all‑inclusive absent textual limitation. Justice Mundy invokes these cases to argue that “any” in Section 1502 includes self‑preferencing (contrary to the Commonwealth Court’s “any other” gloss).
• Interstate Gas Supply v. PUC, 298 A.3d 1181 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023): The Commonwealth Court construed “any” in Section 1502 to mean “any other,” permitting self‑preferencing. The concurrence flags this as error but acknowledges the Supreme Court majority did not reach the issue because it decided the case on “as to service” grounds.

Legal Reasoning

1. Section 1502 Applies Only “As to Service”:

   The majority (as related in the concurrence) anchors its analysis in the statutory text. The anti‑discrimination command of Section 1502 is limited to utility conduct “as to service.” Section 102 adds an important limiter: “service” encompasses actions taken in performing duties imposed by the Public Utility Code. Thus, if the conduct is outside a statutory duty, Section 1502 is not triggered.

2. The Duty to Bill: “All Electric Services” in Section 2807(c):

   Section 2807(c) requires EDCs to bill for “all electric services.” If a product or offering qualifies as an “electric service,” then the EDC’s billing for that item is within its statutory duty; on‑bill billing in that context is a “service,” and Section 1502 applies. If not, the billing is outside the statutory duty and Section 1502’s non‑discrimination rule does not attach.

3. Applying the Framework to the Record:

   The appellants sought on‑bill billing access for non‑commodity offerings such as insulation services, home repair services, and warranty‑type products—items that do not, under ordinary usage, qualify as “electric services.” Because the EDC has no Code‑based duty to bill for such non‑electric offerings, the on‑bill billing channel for those items is not a “service” under Section 1502. Consequently, the EDC’s refusal to provide on‑bill access for those offerings does not violate Section 1502.

   Justice Mundy concurs in that outcome but stresses two limits:

   • She would read Section 1502’s “any” to prohibit self‑preferencing when Section 1502 applies; that is, for items that are “electric services,” an EDC cannot give itself a billing advantage over others.
   • The term “all electric services” is undefined, plural, and textually broad. Some offerings (e.g., “electrical maintenance,” “distributed solar generation,” “smart thermostats”) might in a proper record be argued to fall within “electric services,” but the appellants did not develop that distinction here. The Court therefore reserves the full scope of “electric services” for future resolution.
4. Relationship to Columbia Gas:

   The PUC has previously recognized, in the gas context, that on‑bill billing is itself a “service” subject to Section 1502 when the utility is acting within its statutory duty. Justice Mundy draws on that reasoning to confirm that, in electricity, on‑bill billing tied to “electric services” is a “service” for Section 1502 purposes. The present case differs because the offerings at issue were non‑electric.

Impact and Practical Implications

• For EDCs:
  • The decision confirms that Section 1502 does not require nondiscriminatory on‑bill billing access for non‑electric, non‑commodity offerings. EDCs may, consistent with the Code, reserve their billing channel for their own non‑electric products without violating Section 1502.
  • Caution: For offerings that plausibly qualify as “electric services,” Justice Mundy’s analysis would prohibit self‑preferencing. While the majority did not decide the “self‑preference” question, EDCs face litigation and regulatory risk if they deny on‑bill access for offerings with a strong electric‑service nexus.
  • Compliance planning should include a defensible classification of offerings as “electric services” versus non‑electric, with documented criteria tied to Section 2807(c) and PUC regulations.
• For EGSs and Competitive Providers:
  • The path forward is to build a record establishing that a given offering is an “electric service” under Section 2807(c). Offerings tied to metering, load management, distributed generation interconnection, or maintenance intimately connected to electric delivery may be stronger candidates than generalized home services.
  • Future complaints should squarely address the “electric services” classification, marshal technical and regulatory evidence, and distinguish offerings from plainly non‑electric products (e.g., home warranties) that the Court indicated would not qualify.
  • Where an offering qualifies as an “electric service,” Section 1502’s non‑discrimination rule should apply to the on‑bill channel. Justice Mundy’s view that “any” includes self‑preferencing provides a roadmap for future arguments; whether the full Court will adopt that view remains open.
• For the PUC:
  • The Court’s reservation of the meaning of “all electric services” invites the Commission to consider clarifying the term via regulation or policy guidance consistent with Section 2807(c). Clear criteria would reduce litigation and provide ex ante certainty.
  • The PUC’s Columbia Gas precedent remains a persuasive model for recognizing on‑bill billing as a “service” when the underlying billed item is within the utility’s statutory duty.
• For Consumers:
  • Consumers may see continued bundling of non‑electric add‑ons by EDCs on monthly bills, with limited access to the same channel for competing providers. The competitive implications for non‑electric ancillary markets will persist unless the offerings are reclassified or regulation changes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Electric Distribution Company (EDC): The regulated monopoly that owns and operates the poles, wires, and local infrastructure delivering electricity to homes and businesses. It bills customers and ensures safe, reliable distribution.
• Electric Generation Supplier (EGS): A competitive company that sells the electricity commodity. Customers can choose their EGS, but the local EDC still delivers the power.
• On‑Bill Billing: Placing charges for products or services on the EDC’s monthly utility bill. Because the utility bill is a highly visible, trusted channel, on‑bill access can be a competitive advantage.
• Section 1502 Non‑Discrimination “As to Service”: The utility may not give unreasonable preferences or impose unreasonable disadvantages when it is performing a “service” as defined by the Code. If the conduct falls outside a statutory duty, Section 1502 does not apply.
• “Service” under Section 102: Actions a utility takes in carrying out duties imposed by the Public Utility Code (Part I of Title 66). This definition narrows what conduct is covered by Section 1502.
• “All Electric Services” under Section 2807(c): The set of electric‑related items for which the EDC is statutorily responsible to bill. The term is undefined and open‑ended; the Court acknowledged that it likely includes more than the mere sale of the electricity commodity, but it did not set precise boundaries.
• Non‑Commodity vs. Non‑Electric: “Non‑commodity” refers to products or services other than the electricity itself. Some non‑commodity offerings may still be “electric services” (e.g., potentially certain electric maintenance or grid‑integrated devices), while others (e.g., general home repairs or warranties) are plainly non‑electric.

What the Court Decided—and Did Not Decide

• Decided:
  • Section 1502’s non‑discrimination rule applies only to utility conduct that qualifies as a “service” under the Code.
  • An EDC’s duty to bill runs to “all electric services.” On‑bill billing for non‑electric offerings is not within that duty, and thus not a “service” for Section 1502 purposes.
  • EDCs have no statutory obligation under Section 1502 to provide equal on‑bill access for non‑electric, non‑commodity offerings.
• Not Decided (Reserved or Addressed Only in Concurrence):
  • Whether Section 1502 prohibits self‑preferencing by an EDC when Section 1502 applies (Justice Mundy says yes; the majority did not reach the issue).
  • The precise scope of “all electric services” under Section 2807(c) (the majority leaves it open for a future case with a developed record).
  • Whether specific offerings like “electrical maintenance,” “distributed solar generation,” or “smart thermostats” qualify as “electric services” (the record did not distinctly present those issues).

Guidance for Future Litigation and Compliance

• Classifying Offerings:
  • Factors tending to support “electric service” classification may include tight integration with metering, load management, distribution system operation, interconnection, safety/compliance with electrical standards, or Commission‑mandated programs.
  • Factors tending against classification include generalized home services (e.g., insulation unrelated to utility programs, HVAC warranties, non‑electrical home repairs) and items with attenuated ties to electricity delivery.
• Building the Record:
  • Develop technical evidence on how the offering affects electric usage, reliability, or grid operations; cite Commission regulations or dockets showing EDC responsibilities touching the offering.
  • Propose clear, administrable criteria for “electric services” to assist adjudicators and the PUC.
• Risk Management for EDCs:
  • Where an offering plausibly qualifies as an “electric service,” consider neutral, nondiscriminatory on‑bill access policies to mitigate litigation risk, given Justice Mundy’s reading of “any” in Section 1502.
  • Document business justifications and objective eligibility criteria for on‑bill access, recognizing that “unreasonable” preferences are the focus of Section 1502.
• Regulatory Development:
  • The PUC may wish to undertake rulemaking or policy statements to clarify “all electric services” under Section 2807(c), harmonizing the Court’s textual approach with practical market realities and consumer protection considerations.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision, as illuminated by Justice Mundy’s concurrence, draws a sharp statutory boundary around Section 1502’s anti‑discrimination regime. The prohibition against unreasonable preferences applies only when a public utility acts “as to service,” and—by virtue of Section 102’s definition—only when the utility is performing duties imposed by the Public Utility Code. Because Section 2807(c) limits an EDC’s billing duty to “all electric services,” on‑bill billing for non‑electric offerings lies outside Section 1502’s reach. The practical upshot is that EDCs are not obligated under Section 1502 to grant EGSs equal on‑bill access for non‑electric add‑ons such as insulation, general home repair, or warranty products.

Two forward‑looking signals stand out. First, Justice Mundy’s textual analysis of “any” in Section 1502—drawing on the Court’s consistent treatment of universal terms—strongly suggests that, where Section 1502 applies, self‑preferencing is prohibited. The majority did not resolve that issue here. Second, the scope of “all electric services” remains undefined and open. Some offerings beyond the commodity itself may ultimately qualify as “electric services” and thereby trigger Section 1502’s non‑discrimination rule for on‑bill billing.

In the wake of this decision, stakeholders should focus on careful classification of offerings, development of robust records tying specific products to the EDC’s statutory duties, and, where appropriate, regulatory clarification. The Court’s opinion reaffirms a disciplined, text‑based approach to the Public Utility Code while leaving meaningful space for future litigation and policy development over the contours of “electric services” in a dynamic, technology‑driven energy marketplace.