Nonretroactive First Step Act Amendments as “Extraordinary and Compelling” Grounds for § 3582(c)(1)(A) Relief

Introduction

United States v. Cruz-Rivera is a First Circuit decision addressing the authority of district courts to reduce an otherwise final sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) in light of nonretroactive amendments enacted by the First Step Act of 2018 (FSA). The defendant, Carlos Cruz-Rivera, received mandatory consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) totaling 684 months (25-year terms for his second and third § 924(c) convictions plus a 7-year term for his first). After losing on direct appeal, he sought relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)—as amended by FSA § 603(b)—arguing that two separate FSA provisions (§ 403’s revised § 924(c) stacking rule and § 603(b)’s self-initiation right) gave rise to “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction. The District Court denied relief with a terse order, and the First Circuit has now twice vacated and remanded for explicit, reasoned analysis under United States v. Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14 (1st Cir. 2022).

Summary of the Judgment

On May 12, 2025, the First Circuit vacated the District Court’s denial of Cruz-Rivera’s motion to reduce his sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A). The appeals court held:

Section 603(b) of the FSA permits defendants to move for sentence reductions after administrative exhaustion, removing the prior BOP-only bottleneck.
United States v. Ruvalcaba controls: district courts may consider nonretroactive sentencing amendments—such as the FSA’s amendment to § 924(c) stacking—as part of the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” inquiry, so long as the analysis is individualized and grounded in the defendant’s particular circumstances.
The District Court’s brief text order failed to specify which statutory ground (either the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” prong or the § 3553(a) factors) provided the basis for denial, and it was unclear whether the court misunderstood its post-Ruvalcaba discretion.
Because the record does not permit meaningful appellate review of the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” analysis, the First Circuit again vacated and remanded for a fuller explanation consistent with Ruvalcaba.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129 (1993): Held that consecutive § 924(c) terms in the same proceeding count as “second or subsequent” for mandatory minimum purposes, thus triggering a 25-year term on the second conviction.
Dean v. United States, 581 U.S. 62 (2017): Clarified that sentencing courts may consider the mandatory § 924(c) term when fashioning a sentence for the underlying predicate offense.
Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th 14 (1st Cir. 2022): Held that district courts are not bound by the Sentencing Commission’s pre-FSA policy statement when ruling on defendant-initiated § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions and may consider nonretroactive sentencing amendments as “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” on an individualized basis.
Brooker, 976 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2020): Interpreted § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow compassionate release motions only on the Bureau of Prisons’ own initiative before FSA § 603(b).
Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th 48 (1st Cir. 2022), and Saccoccia, 10 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2021): Articulated the three-step framework for § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions (exhaustion, “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” § 3553(a) factors).
McCoy, 981 F.3d 271 (4th Cir. 2020): Recognized that the stark disparity between pre- and post-FSA § 924(c) sentences may constitute an “extraordinary and compelling” basis for relief.

Legal Reasoning

The First Circuit’s analysis proceeds from the text of § 3582(c)(1)(A) as amended by FSA § 603(b), its decision in Ruvalcaba, and the need for reasoned district court orders:

Statutory Framework: A district court may reduce a final sentence if (a) the defendant has exhausted administrative remedies; (b) “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant relief; and (c) the reduction is “consistent with” applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements and justified by § 3553(a) factors.
First Step Act Amendments:
- § 603(b) permits defendants, post-exhaustion, to file § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions directly, no BOP referral required.
- § 403 narrows the § 924(c)(1)(C) 25-year mandatory minimum to “second or subsequent” offenses that occur after a prior § 924(c) conviction is final—but is expressly nonretroactive.
Ruvalcaba’s Guidance:
- District courts may consider nonretroactive sentencing amendments as part of the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” inquiry, so long as the analysis is done on the particular facts of each case.
- District courts are not bound by the pre-FSA policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 when resolving defendant-initiated motions.
Insufficient District Court Rationale: The District Court’s terse order—denying relief “for the reasons indicated by the government” or after “reviewing Ruvalcaba”—did not specify whether it rested on (i) a failure to show “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” (ii) a determination against relief under the § 3553(a) factors, or (iii) a misapprehension of its discretion post-Ruvalcaba. Without explicit findings, appellate review is “frustrated.”

Potential Impact

This decision underscores several lessons for district courts and litigants:

Procedural Clarity: Courts must issue reasoned orders identifying the statutory prong(s) on which § 3582(c)(1)(A) relief is granted or denied.
Scope of Discretion: After Ruvalcaba, nonretroactive sentencing amendments (including FSA § 403’s revision of § 924(c) stacking) can qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” depending on individualized factors such as the size of the sentence disparity and the defendant’s personal circumstances (e.g., age at sentencing).
Appellate Review: A barebones denial without explanation will be vacated and remanded for a fuller analysis, delaying finality and encouraging robust district court engagement with the FSA framework.
Future Litigants: Defendants should frame motion practice around both the statutory text and Ruvalcaba’s mandate—demonstrating how nonretroactive amendments impact their unique sentencing history and urging clear district court findings on each § 3582(c)(1)(A) element.

Complex Concepts Simplified

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) (“Compassionate Release”): Allows a court, on motion by the BOP or the defendant, to reduce a term of imprisonment for “extraordinary and compelling reasons” consistent with policy statements and § 3553(a) factors.
First Step Act § 603(b): For the first time, permits defendants to bring compassionate‐release motions after exhausting BOP administrative remedies.
First Step Act § 403: Alters § 924(c)(1)(C)’s definition of “second or subsequent” offense so that only a prior § 924(c) conviction that is already final triggers a 25-year mandatory minimum; does not apply to defendants sentenced before enactment.
§ 924(c) “Stacking”: Under prior law, multiple § 924(c) convictions in one proceeding triggered consecutive mandatory minimums (7 years for the first, 25 years each for the second and third), resulting in extremely long sentences.
“Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons”: A flexible statutory standard; following Ruvalcaba, it may include the disproportionate effect of a nonretroactive sentencing amendment as shown by the defendant’s particular circumstances.
§ 3553(a) Factors: Sentencing factors including nature and circumstances of the offense, history of the defendant, need for punishment and deterrence, and public safety, which must be weighed if the court finds an “extraordinary and compelling” ground for reduction.

Conclusion

United States v. Cruz-Rivera reaffirms that district courts have meaningful discretion under § 3582(c)(1)(A) to grant sentence reductions in light of the First Step Act’s nonretroactive amendments—but only if they engage in a reasoned, case-specific analysis. The decision emphasizes the necessity for explicit findings on the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” prong and/or the § 3553(a) factors, as immeasurably brief orders risk vacatur and remand. Going forward, practitioners and courts must carefully articulate how nonretroactive changes, such as the revised § 924(c) stacking rule, affect a defendant’s unique sentencing profile and whether that effect, combined with personal circumstances, justifies relief under the compassionate-release framework.