Nonowner-Occupied Short-Term Rentals Permitted in Residential Districts: New Hampshire Supreme Court's Interpretation of Conway Zoning Ordinance

Nonowner-Occupied Short-Term Rentals Permitted in Residential Districts: New Hampshire Supreme Court's Interpretation of Conway Zoning Ordinance

Introduction

The case of Town of Conway v. Scott Kudrick (175 N.H. 714) addresses the permissibility of nonowner-occupied short-term rentals (STRs) within residential districts under the Conway Zoning Ordinance (CZO) of the Town of Conway, New Hampshire. The Town of Conway sought to restrict STRs, citing concerns over the proliferation of such rentals and their impact on residential neighborhoods. Scott Kudrick, the defendant, operated multiple STR properties within Conway's residential zones. The Superior Court ruled in favor of Kudrick, interpreting the CZO as allowing nonowner-occupied STRs. The Town appealed this decision to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.

Summary of the Judgment

The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court’s decision, affirming that the Conway Zoning Ordinance permits nonowner-occupied short-term rentals in residential districts. The Court concluded that the CZO's definition of a "residential/dwelling unit" encompasses properties used as STRs, provided they offer complete and independent living facilities. The Town's argument that STRs should be restricted due to their commercial nature was rejected, as the Court emphasized that the occupants' residential use is the determining factor, not the nature of the owner's use.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Court extensively referenced several precedents to support its interpretation:

  • Working Stiff Partners v. City of Portsmouth, 172 N.H. 611 (2019): This case involved a similar issue regarding STRs in Portsmouth and underscored the importance of interpreting zoning ordinances based on their defined terms.
  • Blagbrough Family Realty Trust v. A&T Forest Prods., 155 N.H. 29 (2007): Highlighted the principle that courts should not infer legislative intent beyond the clear language of the ordinance.
  • BARRY v. TOWN OF AMHERST, 121 N.H. 335 (1981): Emphasized that the absence of specific language in one part of an ordinance but its presence in another indicates legislative intent.

Additionally, the Court referenced amicus curiae briefs and supporting cases from other jurisdictions to bolster its reasoning.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied traditional statutory construction principles, interpreting the CZO based on the plain and common usage of its terms. Key points in the Court’s reasoning include:

  • Definition Interpretation: The term "residential/dwelling unit" was analyzed within the CZO, which defines it as a unit providing complete and independent living facilities, including living, sleeping, eating, cooking, and sanitation provisions.
  • Contextual Analysis: The Court considered the phrase "living as a household" within the broader definition, determining that it focuses on the nature of use (residential vs. commercial) rather than the duration or ownership status.
  • Ambiguity Resolution: Faced with ambiguity in the phrase "living as a household," the Court deferred to the common usage and the overall context of the ordinance, dismissing any implied durational requirements absent explicit language.
  • Purpose Alignment: The Court held that allowing STRs does not conflict with the CZO’s purpose, as the occupants' residential use aligns with defining residential districts.
  • Separation of Powers: Emphasized that policy considerations regarding STRs fall within the purview of legislatures and municipal authorities, not the judiciary.

Impact

This judgment establishes a significant precedent for municipalities in New Hampshire and potentially other jurisdictions with similar ordinances. Key impacts include:

  • Broad Interpretation of Residential Use: STRs operated by nonowners are affirmed as permissible under residential zoning, provided they meet the definition of "residential/dwelling unit."
  • Clarity on Ordinance Interpretation: Reinforces the importance of clear and specific language within zoning ordinances to avoid ambiguity in land use regulation.
  • Judicial Restraint in Policy Matters: Underscores the judiciary's role in strictly interpreting legal texts without encroaching on policy decisions, which remain the responsibility of legislative bodies.
  • Guidance for Future Cases: Provides a framework for courts to assess similar disputes, particularly when ordinances lack explicit provisions regarding STRs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Residential/Dwelling Unit

A "residential/dwelling unit" is defined by the CZO as a single unit that provides complete and independent living facilities for one or more persons living as a household. This includes amenities like living spaces, sleeping areas, kitchens, and sanitation facilities.

Permissive Ordinance

A permissive ordinance allows certain types of land use within specified zones if they are listed or fall under broader categories. If a use isn't explicitly permitted or granted through special exceptions, it isn't allowed. In this case, the CZO is a permissive ordinance for residential and commercial districts.

Living as a Household

The phrase "living as a household" refers to the use of a property by individuals who share the same dwelling space for residential purposes. The Court interpreted this to focus on the nature of activities (residential vs. commercial) rather than how long the property is used for such purposes.

Conclusion

The New Hampshire Supreme Court's decision in Town of Conway v. Scott Kudrick clarifies the permissibility of nonowner-occupied short-term rentals within residential districts under the Conway Zoning Ordinance. By affirming that STRs fall within the definition of "residential/dwelling unit," the Court aligns its interpretation with the ordinance's language and purpose, emphasizing residential use over ownership status. This ruling not only resolves the specific dispute but also sets a precedent for how similar cases should be approached, highlighting the necessity for clear legislative language in zoning laws and reinforcing the distinction between judicial interpretation and policy-making.

Case Details

Year: 2023
Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire

Judge(s)

DONOVAN, J.

Attorney(S)

Upton & Hatfield, LLP, of Portsmouth (Russell F. Hilliard on the brief and orally), and Hastings Law Office, P.A., of Fryeburg, Maine (Jason B. Dennis on the brief), for the plaintiff. Devine Millimet &Branch, P.A., of Manchester (Matthew R. Johnson and Solal Wanstock on the brief, and Matthew R. Johnson orally), for the defendant. New Hampshire Municipal Association, of Concord (Stephen C. Buckley on the joint brief), and Black Lion Services, PLLC, of East Kingston (Timothy J. Corwin on the joint brief), for New Hampshire Municipal Association and New Hampshire Planners Association, as amici curiae. Robinson & Cole LLP, of Boston, Massachusetts (Danielle Andrews Long and Timothy C. Twardowski on the brief), for New Hampshire Association of Realtors, as amicus curiae.

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