Nonfeasance Requires a Special Relationship in Asbestos 'Take-Home' Exposure Claims: Delaware Supreme Court Affirmation

Nonfeasance Requires a Special Relationship in Asbestos 'Take-Home' Exposure Claims: Delaware Supreme Court Affirmation

Introduction

The case of Patricia Price and Bobby Price v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Company addressed the legal ramifications of asbestos exposure transmitted via an employee's household, commonly referred to as "take-home" exposure. Patricia Price, the plaintiff, sought to amend her complaint to categorize the alleged negligence by DuPont as misfeasance—a deliberate wrongful act—rather than nonfeasance, which involves a failure to act. The Supreme Court of Delaware ultimately affirmed the lower court's decision, reinforcing the necessity of a "special relationship" for nonfeasance claims to be actionable.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed the Superior Court's decision to deny Patricia Price's motion to amend her asbestos exposure complaint. The court concluded that Price's allegations constituted nonfeasance, as they did not establish a "special relationship" between her and DuPont. Consequently, without such a relationship, DuPont owed no duty of care to Price, rendering the amendment futile.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment heavily relied on the precedent set in RIEDEL v. ICI AMERICAS INC., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009). In that case, the court distinguished between misfeasance and nonfeasance, emphasizing that nonfeasance claims require a special relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. The court reiterated the principles from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which delineate the differences between misfeasance (affirmative wrongful acts) and nonfeasance (omissions to act).

Legal Reasoning

The court employed a structured analysis based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts to determine whether DuPont's actions constituted misfeasance or nonfeasance. Misfeasance involves an affirmative act that poses an unreasonable risk of harm, whereas nonfeasance involves a failure to act when there is a duty to do so. The court found that Price's allegations, even when recast, did not transform nonfeasance into misfeasance without introducing new factual elements. Additionally, the absence of a special relationship between Price and DuPont meant that nonfeasance did not give rise to a legal duty.

Impact

This judgment solidifies the legal framework surrounding asbestos exposure claims, particularly in "take-home" scenarios. By reaffirming the necessity of a special relationship for nonfeasance claims, the court narrows the scope of actionable negligence claims against employers in similar contexts. Future plaintiffs must establish such relationships to succeed in nonfeasance claims, or alternatively, present new evidence that might support a misfeasance claim.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Misfeasance vs. Nonfeasance:
- Misfeasance: An active wrongdoing that creates a new risk of harm (e.g., DuPont actively releasing asbestos). - Nonfeasance: A passive failure to act when there is a duty to do so, requiring a special relationship (e.g., not providing safety measures).
Special Relationship:
A legally significant connection between parties that imposes a duty of care (e.g., employer-employee relationship with specific obligations).

Conclusion

The Delaware Supreme Court's affirmation in Price v. DuPont underscores the critical importance of correctly categorizing negligence claims and establishing requisite relationships between parties. By delineating the boundaries between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and reaffirming the need for a special relationship in the latter, the court has provided clear guidance for both litigants and legal practitioners in handling asbestos exposure cases. This decision emphasizes that legal characterizations must be grounded in factual allegations and that mere redefinition without substantive changes does not alter the underlying legal principles.

Case Details

Year: 2011
Court: Supreme Court of Delaware.

Judge(s)

Carolyn Berger

Attorney(S)

Thomas C. Crumplar (argued) and Jordan J. Ponzo, Jacobs Crumplar, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware for appellants. John C. Phillips, Jr., Goldman Spence, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware for appellee.

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