Non-Physician Opinions and Post-Hearing Evidence: Seventh Circuit Reaffirms Materiality Barriers in Disability Appeals
Comprehensive Commentary on Jason Vuletich v. Frank Bisignano, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 24 June 2025

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s non-precedential decision in Jason D. Vuletich v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security, No. 23-3013 (24 June 2025). Although issued as a “Nonprecedential Disposition,” the opinion crystallises several recurring themes in Social Security disability litigation:

• the low threshold of “substantial evidence” that shields administrative findings from reversal;
• the materiality filter applied by the Appeals Council to post-hearing evidence; and
• the distinction between “acceptable medical sources” and other treating professionals.

Plaintiff-appellant Jason D. Vuletich, a former union boilermaker turned artist, alleged disability stemming primarily from anxiety and several physical ailments after traumatic fires in 2010. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his 2016 application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), finding only one severe impairment (anxiety) and identifying jobs he could still perform. The district court affirmed, and the Seventh Circuit now likewise affirms.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit, per Judges Hamilton, Scudder, and Jackson-Akiwumi, held:

1. Substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s findings that tinnitus, irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), herniated discs, and angina were not medically determinable or not “severe” impairments.
2. The ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity (RFC) assessment adequately accounted for documented anxiety and was not undermined by allegedly “cherry-picked” evidence.
3. The ALJ correctly discounted the opinion of therapist Lorene Cameron because she was not an “acceptable medical source,” and properly relied on state-agency physicians and psychologists.
4. The Appeals Council reasonably found new evidence (a deposition of Dr. Costakis) immaterial, and the Court of Appeals could not consider evidence dated after the administrative hearing.
5. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment was AFFIRMED.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Thorlton v. King, 127 F.4th 1078 (7th Cir. 2025)
   Restates the “low threshold” of substantial evidence and that reversal is proper only when the record “compels a contrary result.” Vuletich leans heavily on Thorlton to justify deference to the ALJ.
2. Farrell v. Astrue, 692 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2012)
   Provides the analytical framework for when the Appeals Council must consider post-decision evidence. If the Council deems evidence immaterial, reviewing courts cannot use it to upend the ALJ’s findings.
3. Grotts v. Kijakazi, 27 F.4th 1273 (7th Cir. 2022)
   Confirms that opinions from non-physician therapists do not qualify as acceptable medical source evidence that must be given controlling weight.
4. Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363 (7th Cir. 2004) & Schmidt v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2005)
   Restrict judicial review to the evidentiary record existing at the time of the ALJ’s decision.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Five-Step Disability Analysis – The ALJ methodically progressed through 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). Disputed steps were:
   • Step Two – Only anxiety was found severe; hypertension was non-severe; other alleged conditions lacked medical corroboration.
   • Steps Four & Five – A restricted RFC (limited public contact, simple tasks) allowed the identification of work as cleaner, packager, machine feeder.
2. Weighing Medical Opinions – State-agency consultants’ findings were internally consistent and supported by exam notes showing normal cognition and affect. Therapist Cameron’s opinion was discounted both for professional status and internal inconsistency.
3. Materiality of New Evidence – Dr. Costakis’s deposition (submitted only to the Appeals Council) was deemed immaterial. Absent a challenge to that determination, the Seventh Circuit refused to consider it.
4. Temporal Scope of Review – Citing Schmidt, the court excluded all post-2018 treatment notes.

C. Anticipated Impact

While officially non-precedential, Vuletich signals how the Seventh Circuit is likely to treat similar issues:

• The decision will be cited (§ 32.1) for reaffirming that claimants bear the burden of medical proof of severity; mere subjective accounts or therapist letters are insufficient.
• Counsels are reminded to build a robust record before the hearing; later supplementation faces the Appeals Council’s narrow materiality gate.
• The opinion reinforces the court’s trust in state-agency opinions when claimant’s treating sources are sparse, inconsistent, or non-qualifying.
• Expect more emphasis on whether mental-health providers meet “acceptable medical source” criteria under revised § 404.1502(a).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Severe Impairment

A medically determinable condition that significantly limits the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c)). Minor or well-controlled conditions fail this test.

Residual Functional Capacity (RFC)

The most a claimant can still do despite limitations. It is expressed in functional terms (e.g., “simple tasks,” “occasional interaction with coworkers”).

Substantial Evidence

“Such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Less than a preponderance; more than a scintilla.

Acceptable Medical Source (AMS)

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a), includes licensed physicians, psychologists, APRNs, PAs, etc. Non-AMS opinions (e.g., therapists, social workers) may be considered but receive less weight.

Appeals Council Materiality

New evidence must be (1) new, (2) material (reasonable probability it would change the outcome), and (3) relate to the period on or before the ALJ decision. If any prong fails, courts cannot rely on the evidence.

V. Conclusion

Vuletich v. Bisignano underscores three strategic lessons for Social Security litigants in the Seventh Circuit:

1. Develop the record early. Evidence obtained after the ALJ hearing faces an uphill battle under the Appeals Council’s materiality standards.
2. Identify acceptable medical sources. Mental-health opinions carry decisive weight only when rendered by licensed professionals recognized in § 404.1502(a).
3. Substantial evidence review is deferential. Reversal occurs only when the record incontrovertibly compels a different result. Merely pointing to conflicting evidence or characterizing the ALJ’s reading as “cherry-picking” is seldom enough.

Though labeled non-precedential, the decision provides a practical roadmap for future disability litigants and their counsel on navigating evidence, medical sourcing, and the limited nature of judicial review.