Non-Imputation of Neglect Among Siblings and the Role of Adjudicatory Findings in West Virginia Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: Commentary on In re H.B., R.B., B.S., P.S., O.S., & I.S.

Non-Imputation of Neglect Among Siblings and the Role of Adjudicatory Findings in West Virginia Abuse and Neglect Proceedings

Commentary on In re H.B., R.B., B.S., P.S., O.S., & I.S., No. 24-206 (W. Va. Nov. 12, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s decision in In re H.B., R.B., B.S., P.S., O.S., & I.S. is a significant refinement of the law governing child abuse and neglect proceedings in two interrelated areas:

  1. The relationship between adjudicatory findings and a circuit court’s authority to proceed to disposition; and
  2. Whether neglect of one child may be automatically imputed to other children in the home.

Justice Bunn’s opinion addresses an appeal by the mother, A.B. (“Mother”), from a Boone County circuit court order that:

  • Terminated her custodial rights to one child, H.B.; and
  • Terminated her parental rights to five other children: R.B., B.S., P.S., O.S., and I.S.

The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) confessed error as to adjudication of all children except P.S., arguing that the circuit court made no child-specific adjudicatory findings for the siblings even though Mother stipulated only to medical neglect of P.S. The Supreme Court ultimately:

  • Affirmed the adjudication and termination of Mother’s parental rights as to P.S.; but
  • Vacated the adjudicatory and dispositional orders as to H.B., R.B., B.S., O.S., and I.S., and remanded for further proceedings.

Doctrinally, the Court:

  • Builds on and applies its same-day decision in In re R.M., clarifying that the absence of child-specific adjudicatory findings does not deprive a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction;
  • Holds that such findings are nonetheless a mandatory statutory prerequisite to moving to disposition; and
  • Interprets West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 to allow automatic imputation of abuse of one child to other children in the home, but not neglect, absent separate evidence or findings connecting the neglect to the other children.

This commentary examines the opinion’s factual background, its holdings, the treatment of precedent, the Court’s legal reasoning, and its broader impact on West Virginia child protection practice.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Background and Facts

Four years before the petition, P.S. underwent surgery for an abscess behind her ear. Her physician advised Mother that P.S. needed follow-up medical care. Mother did not take P.S. to any follow-up appointments. Over time, P.S.’s condition worsened to the point that her ear canal and ear drum eroded, causing hearing loss by February 2023.

In March 2023, DHS filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging, among other things:

  • Mother’s medical neglect of P.S. due to failure to obtain follow-up care after the surgery;
  • Broader medical, emotional, and chronic neglect of all children in the home;
  • Marijuana use by Mother; and
  • A prior termination of Mother’s parental rights to another child based on abandonment.

At an August 2023 adjudicatory hearing:

  • Mother stipulated only to medical neglect of P.S., admitting that she had missed P.S.’s medical appointments to such an extent that it caused infection and hearing loss.
  • Despite that narrow stipulation, the circuit court adjudicated all children in the home (including H.B., R.B., B.S., O.S., and I.S.) as abused and neglected, and adjudicated Mother as an abusing and neglecting parent.

The circuit court granted Mother a six-month post-adjudicatory improvement period. Initially, she participated in services and regained physical care of several children (though DHS retained legal custody). However:

  • In October 2023 she tested positive for amphetamines;
  • There were serious concerns about an initial service provider (Coalfield Family Services) whose worker allegedly falsified service documentation; DHS responded by replacing the worker and then the provider, switching to Vance Family Services;
  • In December 2023 Mother tested positive for THC, methamphetamines, and amphetamines in a second consecutive positive drug screen;
  • She stopped drug screening, stopped attending hearings, and stopped communicating with DHS.

At the March 2024 dispositional hearing:

  • Mother did not appear but was represented by counsel;
  • The circuit court denied a continuance, noting that Mother had “disappeared for the last four months without explanation”;
  • Testimony from a CPS worker revealed that after the initial positive drug screen, an MDT meeting was held, services (including substance abuse treatment) were offered, and Mother denied having a substance abuse issue and then ceased contact.

The circuit court:

  • Terminated Mother’s custodial rights to H.B. (without terminating her legal parental status, in deference to his age and wishes); and
  • Terminated her parental rights to R.B., B.S., O.S., P.S., and I.S.

B. Issues on Appeal

Mother appealed, arguing:

  1. The DHS did not make “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family; and
  2. The circuit court failed to select the least restrictive dispositional alternative, particularly as to termination of her parental rights to P.S.

Mother did not challenge the adjudications. However, DHS itself, in its response brief, confessed error as to:

  • The adjudications of H.B., R.B., B.S., O.S., and I.S., because Mother stipulated only to conduct involving P.S., and DHS presented no separate evidence as to those other children; and
  • Therefore, it argued the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to proceed to disposition as to those children (relying on In re B.V.).

C. Holdings

Justice Bunn, writing for the Court, held:

  1. No subject matter jurisdiction defect, but a statutory defect:
    Applying In re R.M. (decided the same day), the Court held that:
    • The lack of specific adjudicatory findings for each child does not deprive a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction; but
    • Such findings remain a statutory prerequisite to moving to disposition under West Virginia Code § 49-4-601 and Rule 27 of the Child Abuse and Neglect Rules.
  2. No automatic imputation of neglect among siblings under current statute:
    Based on the language of West Virginia Code § 49-1-201:
    • The definition of “abused child” expressly references “another child in the home,” so physical or sexual abuse of one child can be imputed to other children at risk in the same home (following In re Christina L.);
    • The definition of “neglected child” does not include similar “another child in the home” language; thus, the Court held that neglect of one child cannot automatically be imputed to other children absent specific factual findings tying the neglect to those other children.
  3. Error in adjudicating siblings based solely on medical neglect of P.S.:
    • Mother’s stipulation was limited to medical neglect of P.S.;
    • DHS presented no additional evidence of abuse or neglect of the other children at adjudication; and
    • The circuit court made no specific factual findings regarding how the other children were abused or neglected.
    • Therefore, the adjudications of H.B., R.B., B.S., O.S., and I.S. were improper.
  4. Substantial frustration of the statutory process—vacatur and remand:
    Relying on In re Edward B., the Court held that the circuit court’s failure to properly adjudicate the siblings substantially “disregarded or frustrated” the statutory and rule-based process, requiring vacatur of both adjudicatory and dispositional orders as to those children—even though Mother did not raise the issue.
  5. Termination of parental rights to P.S. affirmed:
    • The adjudication of P.S. based on Mother’s stipulation to medical neglect was proper;
    • DHS made reasonable efforts to reunify, including offering services and responding to service-provider misconduct by reassigning and replacing providers;
    • Mother failed to engage meaningfully with services, relapsed into drug use, and then disappeared from the proceedings;
    • There was no error in refusing a post-dispositional improvement period, and no less restrictive alternative was appropriate given her noncompliance and lack of contact; and
    • Termination of parental rights—even though P.S. was placed with a fit non-abusing father—was authorized under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604 and established precedent such as In re R.J.M. and In re Emily.

III. Analysis

A. The Factual and Procedural Matrix in Context

The factual backdrop is an archetypal mix of chronic neglect, medical non-compliance, substance abuse, and disengagement from services that frequently appears in child welfare litigation. The key factual thread is Mother’s failure to obtain follow-up medical care for P.S. after surgery, leading to serious and permanent consequences (ear canal and ear drum erosion and hearing loss). That factual scenario underpins:

  • The adjudication of P.S. as a neglected child;
  • The Court’s analysis of the statutory definitions of “abused” and “neglected” children; and
  • The determination that DHS had at least one solid, proven maltreatment ground to support termination as to P.S.

The procedural path is also important:

  1. Mother’s narrow stipulation at adjudication created a record limited to P.S.;
  2. The circuit court’s broad adjudication of all children without child-specific findings set up the appellate issue later confessed by DHS;
  3. Mother’s initial improvement followed by relapse and disappearance framed the dispositional choices; and
  4. The Court’s sua sponte consideration of adjudicatory defects as to the siblings reflects the high value the Court places on strict compliance with abuse and neglect procedures, irrespective of whether parties raise the issue.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. In re Tiffany Marie S. – Standard of Review

Syllabus Point 1 of In re Tiffany Marie S., 196 W. Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996), sets out the now-canonical standard of review in abuse and neglect cases:

  • Factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard; and
  • Legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.

The Court reiterates this at Syllabus Point 1 of the present case, emphasizing the deference due to plausible factual findings, while reserving the power to correct clear legal error—especially in interpreting statutes and applying procedural rules.

2. Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L. – De Novo Review of Legal Issues

Syllabus Point 1 of Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995), confirms that purely legal questions, such as statutory interpretation, receive de novo review. That standard underpins the Court’s statutory analysis of § 49-1-201 and its interpretation of “abused child” versus “neglected child.”

3. State v. T.C. – Adjudication as a Prerequisite to Disposition

Syllabus Point 1 of State v. T.C., 172 W. Va. 47, 303 S.E.2d 685 (1983), is central:

In a child abuse and neglect hearing, before a court can begin to make any of the dispositional alternatives under W. Va. Code [§ 49-4-604], it must hold a hearing under W. Va. Code [§ 49-4-601], and determine “whether such child is abused or neglected.” Such a finding is a prerequisite to further continuation of the case.

The Court uses T.C. to reaffirm that an adjudicatory determination is a threshold requirement before disposition. What has evolved since T.C. is the understanding that this “prerequisite” relates to statutory authority and process, not to subject matter jurisdiction in the strict sense.

4. In re B.V. and In re R.M. – Subject Matter Jurisdiction Versus Statutory Prerequisites

DHS relied on Syllabus Point 3 of In re B.V., 248 W. Va. 29, 886 S.E.2d 364 (2023), which had implied that specific child-by-child adjudicatory findings were necessary for the circuit court to have subject matter jurisdiction to proceed to disposition. On the same day as this case, however, the Supreme Court issued In re R.M., clarifying and partially overruling B.V..

In R.M., the Court held (as reiterated in Syllabus Point 4 of this case):

Specific findings of fact explaining how each child's health and welfare is being harmed or threatened by the abusive or neglectful conduct of the parties named in the petition are a statutory prerequisite for the circuit court to proceed to the dispositional phase, not a requirement for establishing or maintaining subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent that Syllabus Point 3 of In re B.V. . . . holds otherwise, we expressly overrule that portion of Syllabus Point 3.

Here, the Court applies R.M. to reject DHS’s argument that the circuit court “lacked jurisdiction.” The error lies not in jurisdiction, but in statutory noncompliance. This allows the Court to:

  • Preserve the conceptual clarity of “subject matter jurisdiction”; while
  • Still insisting that adjudicatory findings are mandatory, and that material failure to comply will lead to vacatur.

5. In re Z.S.-1 – Requirements for a Valid Stipulated Adjudication

Syllabus Point 3 of In re Z.S.-1, 249 W. Va. 14, 893 S.E.2d 621 (2023), interprets Rule 26(a) of the Child Abuse and Neglect Rules:

Rule 26(a) . . . requires a stipulated adjudication to include both “(1) [a]greed upon facts supporting court involvement regarding the respondent['s] problems, conduct, or condition” and “(2) [a] statement of respondent's problems or deficiencies to be addressed at the final disposition.”

That rule matters here because:

  • Mother stipulated only to her neglect of P.S.; and
  • The stipulation did not—and could not—provide an evidentiary basis for adjudicating the siblings without additional evidence or findings.

The Court, following Z.S.-1, treats the stipulation as valid but limited in scope; it cannot be stretched beyond its express factual admissions.

6. State v. Elder and Related Authority – Plain Meaning Rule

Syllabus Point 2 of State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968), provides:

Where the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation.

This principle is reinforced by Syllabus Point 5 of General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959), and Martin v. Randolph County Board of Education’s admonition that courts presume the legislature means what it says.

Here, the Court applies the plain meaning rule to the statutory definitions of “abused child” and “neglected child” in West Virginia Code § 49-1-201 to reach a core doctrinal holding: only the abuse definition allows automatic imputation to “another child in the home”; the neglect definition does not.

7. In re Christina L. – Imputation of Abuse to Siblings

Syllabus Point 2 of In re Christina L., 194 W. Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995), states:

Where there is clear and convincing evidence that a child has suffered physical and/or sexual abuse while in the custody of his or her parent(s), guardian, or custodian, another child residing in the home when the abuse took place who is not a direct victim of the physical and/or sexual abuse but is at risk of being abused is an abused child under [W. Va. Code § 49-1-201].

That holding is firmly grounded in the statutory phrase “upon the child or another child in the home” in the abuse definition. The Court:

  • Reaffirms the correctness and continued vitality of Christina L. and similar cases involving physical, sexual, or emotional abuse; but
  • Distinguishes those cases from neglect cases, where the statutory language is different.

8. In re Edward B. and Related Cases – Substantial Disregard or Frustration of Process

Syllabus Point 5 of In re Edward B., 210 W. Va. 621, 558 S.E.2d 620 (2001), in relevant part:

Where it appears from the record that the process established by the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and related statutes for the disposition of cases involving children adjudicated to be abused or neglected has been substantially disregarded or frustrated, the resulting order . . . will be vacated and the case remanded for compliance with that process and entry of an appropriate . . . order.

The Court uses Edward B. as the doctrinal vehicle to:

  • Vacate the adjudicatory and dispositional orders as to the siblings; and
  • Do so sua sponte, even though Mother did not raise adjudicatory defects on appeal, because the defects are “obvious in the record” and go to the structural integrity of the proceedings.

The Court cites memoranda like In re E.T., In re S.J., and In re E.C. (unreported) as examples of prior use of this substantial-frustration doctrine where adjudicatory requirements were not followed.

9. In re R.J.M., In re Emily, and Others – Termination Standard and Less Restrictive Alternatives

Syllabus Point 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), states:

Termination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [W. Va. Code § 49-4-604] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under [W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.

In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 540 S.E.2d 542 (2000), confirms that the presence of a fit, non-abusing parent does not immunize the abusing parent from termination:

Simply because one parent has been found to be a fit and proper caretaker for [the] child does not automatically entitle the child's other parent to retain his/her parental rights if his/her conduct has endangered the child and such conditions of abuse and/or neglect are not expected to improve.

Those authorities underpin the Court’s rejection of Mother’s arguments that:

  • Termination was not the least restrictive alternative; and
  • The child’s placement with a non-abusing father should have militated against termination.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Adjudication, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Statutory Preconditions

The Court begins by disentangling jurisdictional and procedural concepts. It accepts, after R.M., that:

  • Subject matter jurisdiction in abuse and neglect matters arises from statute and is not destroyed by defects in adjudicatory findings; but
  • The statutes and rules (West Virginia Code § 49-4-601 and Rule 27) require that, after a duly held adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court:
    • Determine whether each child is abused and/or neglected, based on the evidence; and
    • Make written or on-the-record findings of fact and conclusions of law explaining those determinations.

The adjudication is thus both:

  • A substantive determination (abuse/neglect status); and
  • A procedural gateway (the “prerequisite” to disposition) whose absence substantially frustrates the statutory scheme.

2. Limits of Stipulations: The Four Corners Rule

Because Mother entered a stipulation under Rule 26, the Court examines what that stipulation could properly support:

  • Mother admitted to neglecting P.S. by failing to attend medical appointments, resulting in infection and hearing loss;
  • She did not admit to any conduct affecting other children; and
  • DHS did not supplement the record at adjudication with evidence of abuse or neglect of the other children.

The Court treats the stipulation as a binding admission, but “constrained as to what it could find based upon the four corners of the stipulation.” Put differently:

  • The stipulation is a solid basis to adjudicate P.S. as neglected;
  • It is not a basis to adjudicate siblings in the absence of statutory authority to impute neglect and without additional evidence or findings.

3. Statutory Interpretation: “Abused Child” Versus “Neglected Child”

The core legal reasoning rests on the textual analysis of § 49-1-201. The statute defines, in relevant part:

  • “Abused child” as one whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened by:
    [a] parent, guardian, or custodian who knowingly or intentionally inflicts, attempts to inflict, or knowingly allows another person to inflict, physical injury or mental or emotional injury upon the child or another child in the home . . .
  • “Neglected child” as a child:
    [w]hose physical or mental health is harmed or threatened by a present refusal, failure or inability of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care, or education . . .

Key points in the Court’s reasoning:

  1. The abuse definition explicitly mentions “another child in the home,” while the neglect definition does not.
  2. Applying the plain meaning canon (Elder and related cases), the Court refuses to read language into the neglect definition that the legislature chose not to include.
  3. Because the legislature included “another child in the home” in the abuse definition but omitted it in the neglect definition, the Court infers a deliberate legislative distinction.

The Court then harmonizes this with Christina L. and progeny:

  • Christina L. correctly held that abuse of one child (physical or sexual) can be imputed to another child in the home who is at risk, based on the abuse definition’s language.
  • However, no comparable statutory hook exists to automatically impute neglect in the same way.

The Court does, however, include an important caveat:

Nothing in this opinion should be read to indicate that a circuit court may not find a child neglected in those instances where the home environment or other specific circumstances demonstrate that a parent's neglect of the one child harms or poses a threat of harm to another child in the home.

In practice, this means:

  • Courts may still adjudicate siblings as neglected where the neglectful conditions (e.g., unsanitary housing, chronic supervision failures, severe medical noncompliance) objectively threaten all children;
  • But they must make specific factual findings connecting the neglect to each child; automatic imputation without such findings is not permitted.

4. Application to the Adjudication of the Siblings

The circuit court’s adjudicatory order:

  • Found that Mother admitted to neglecting P.S. by failing to attend medical appointments, causing infection and hearing loss;
  • Then broadly declared all children to be abused and neglected, without additional factual analysis or child-specific findings.

The Supreme Court identifies two major problems:

  1. The circuit court cursorily labeled P.S. as an “abused” child, even though Mother stipulated only to medical neglect and DHS introduced no further evidence to support an abuse finding.
  2. The court extended that improper “abuse” label to siblings and/or automatically imputed neglect to them without evidence or findings.

Given the Court’s statutory reading and the confines of the stipulation, it holds that:

  • The adjudication of P.S. as neglected is proper;
  • The characterization of P.S. as “abused” is erroneous (though not outcome-determinative for termination, which rests on neglect); and
  • The adjudications of H.B., R.B., B.S., O.S., and I.S. are invalid because neglect cannot be automatically imputed to them without child-specific evidence and findings.

5. Substantial Disregard or Frustration of the Statutory Process

Even though Mother did not challenge the adjudications, the Court:

  • Notes the defects are “obvious in the record”;
  • Relies on Edward B. to find that the adjudicatory and dispositional process was “substantially disregarded or frustrated”; and
  • Vacates both adjudicatory and dispositional orders as to the siblings and remands for proper adjudication and any further proceedings.

The Court emphasizes that:

  • Adjudicatory findings are critical not only for the parties, but also to enable meaningful appellate review;
  • When a circuit court fails to follow statutory and rule-based directives, appellate review is “thwarted” and orders cannot stand.

6. Reasonable Efforts and the Termination of Parental Rights to P.S.

Turning to Mother’s assignments of error as to P.S., the Court addresses:

  1. Whether DHS made “reasonable efforts” to preserve and reunify the family; and
  1. Whether a less restrictive disposition should have been ordered.

On reasonable efforts, West Virginia Code:

  • § 49-4-601(d) generally requires DHS to provide supportive services to remedy detrimental circumstances, subject to certain exceptions; and
  • § 49-4-604(c)(6)(C)(iii)–(iv) requires the court to consider whether reasonable efforts were made before terminating parental rights (absent aggravated circumstances).

The record showed:

  • Mother was granted a six-month post-adjudicatory improvement period with multiple conditions (life skills, therapy, mental hygiene assessment, stable housing, appropriate household, legal employment, etc.);
  • Services were arranged via Coalfield Family Services, then—after Mother reported fraud issues—reallocated to a new worker and eventually to a new provider (Vance Family Services);
  • After a positive drug screen, the MDT convened and offered substance abuse treatment, which Mother refused, claiming the drug test was false, and then ceased contact.

Although Mother argued that service-provider misconduct undermined DHS’s efforts, the Court holds that DHS acted reasonably:

  • Once the allegation of provider fraud arose, DHS promptly intervened, reassigned, and then changed providers;
  • DHS cannot provide services to someone who does not participate; and
  • Under § 49-4-610(4)(A), the parent bears responsibility for initiating and completing improvement-period terms.

The Court thus affirms the circuit court’s finding that DHS made reasonable efforts to achieve reunification, particularly as to P.S.

7. Refusal of a Post-Dispositional Improvement Period and Choice of Disposition

Under § 49-4-604(e), a circuit court may grant a dispositional improvement period, but is not required to do so. The Court reiterates that:

  • Improvement periods are discretionary; and
  • A parent’s noncompliance, disengagement, and disappearance militates strongly against granting a further opportunity.

Here:

  • Mother relapsed, refused to acknowledge substance abuse, and then absented herself from the proceedings for months;
  • There was no indication she would use a further improvement period productively; and
  • The circuit court reasonably concluded that there was “no reasonable likelihood” that conditions could be substantially corrected, satisfying § 49-4-604(c).

Therefore, the Court holds that:

  • A post-dispositional improvement period was not required; and
  • Termination of parental rights was an appropriate and lawful disposition as to P.S.

8. Termination Despite Placement with a Non-Abusing Parent

Mother argued that because P.S. was placed with her non-abusing father, termination of her parental rights was not the least restrictive alternative. The Court rejects that contention, relying on:

  • Emily (a fit parent’s presence does not shield the unfit parent from termination); and
  • R.J.M. (termination may be employed without intermediate lesser alternatives when no reasonable likelihood of correction exists).

The Court also clarifies a recurring confusion in practice:

  • Section 49-4-604(c)(5) (sometimes mislabeled by parties as “termination of custodial rights”) actually contemplates guardianships or continued DHS custody—not placement with a fit natural parent;
  • Placement with a non-abusing, fit biological parent with the other parent’s parental rights intact is more accurately analyzed under § 49-4-604(c)(6), which covers permanent placement and, where warranted, termination;
  • Here, P.S. was placed with her non-abusing father, and the circuit court lawfully terminated Mother’s parental rights to protect P.S.’s stability and safety.

IV. Impact and Implications

A. Adjudicatory Practice: Child-by-Child Findings Are Non-Negotiable

This decision reinforces, with added specificity, that:

  • At adjudication, the circuit court must:
    • Determine, as to each child, whether that child is abused and/or neglected; and
    • Make explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting that determination.
  • General findings that “all children in the home are abused and neglected” are insufficient, absent factual support for each child’s status.

Practically, this will require:

  • More careful structuring of petitions by DHS to specify how each child’s health and welfare is harmed or threatened;
  • More rigorous articulation of findings by circuit judges at the close of adjudicatory hearings; and
  • Greater vigilance by counsel and guardians ad litem to ensure that adjudicatory orders comply with § 49-4-601 and Rule 27.

B. Stipulations: Scope, Drafting, and Evidence

For practitioners, the case underscores several points about stipulated adjudications:

  • A parent’s stipulation is only as broad as its terms; if it covers just one child, courts cannot lawfully bootstrap that into adjudication of all siblings absent further evidence and findings.
  • DHS and GALs who seek adjudication of all children will need:
    • Either broader stipulations expressly covering all children; or
    • Supplemental evidence and testimony at adjudication to prove abuse or neglect as to non-stipulated children.
  • Courts must ensure that Rule 26(a)’s two-part requirement is met—agreed facts and identified deficiencies—and that the record clearly reflects which children each factual admission pertains to.

C. Sibling Neglect: No More Automatic Imputation

The most doctrinally significant holding is the express statement that, under the current version of § 49-1-201:

  • Abuse (physical/sexual/emotional) of one child can be imputed to “another child in the home” who is thereby an “abused child” at risk; but
  • Neglect of one child cannot automatically be imputed to siblings as a matter of law, because the neglect definition has no “another child in the home” language.

However, the Court preserves significant flexibility:

  • Courts may still find that all children are neglected, but they must:
    • Articulate the environmental or circumstantial facts (e.g., chronic unsanitary conditions, dangerous individuals in the home, systemic medical non-compliance) that demonstrate harm or threat to each child; and
    • Explain how those facts satisfy the neglect definition as to each child.

This approach:

  • Prevents purely formalistic or “rubber stamp” adjudications; but
  • Does not strip courts of authority to protect siblings when common conditions endanger them.

D. Enforcement of Procedural Regularity: Vacatur for Substantial Frustration

The Court’s reliance on Edward B. and its willingness to vacate orders sua sponte sends a clear message:

  • Compliance with the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings and relevant statutes is not optional;
  • Adjudicatory defects that substantially frustrate the process will result in vacatur—even if no party objects;
  • Appellate courts will not hesitate to correct serious structural errors to protect both due process and the integrity of child welfare outcomes.

This has concrete consequences:

  • Failure to make proper adjudicatory findings risks reversal, delay, and renewed litigation, which in turn affects child permanency timelines; and
  • Circuit courts must treat adjudication as a formal, separate phase with robust findings, not a perfunctory step.

E. Reasonable Efforts and Service-Provider Misconduct

The case also touches on a practical problem: when contracted service providers fail in their duties or commit misconduct (e.g., falsifying records), how does that affect DHS’s “reasonable efforts” obligation?

The Court’s approach suggests:

  • Reasonable efforts are judged by DHS’s overall conduct, including:
    • Monitoring of providers;
    • Responsiveness to complaints; and
    • Willingness to make adjustments (new workers/providers).
  • A single provider’s misconduct does not automatically mean DHS failed to make reasonable efforts, particularly when DHS:
    • Swiftly corrects the problem; and
    • Continues to offer appropriate services.
  • Parents remain obligated to participate and engage; refusal to engage can break the causal chain between DHS’s efforts and the parent’s lack of progress.

F. Legislative Signals

By drawing a sharp distinction between abuse and neglect imputation, the Court effectively hands the policy question back to the legislature:

  • If the legislature wishes to allow statutory imputation of neglect (i.e., to specify that neglect of one child presumptively renders siblings neglected), it can amend § 49-1-201 to add “another child in the home” or comparable language to the neglect definition.
  • Until then, courts must honor the existing textual distinction.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Adjudication vs. Disposition

  • Adjudication: The phase where the court decides whether each child is an “abused child” or “neglected child” under the statute, based on clear and convincing evidence.
  • Disposition: The phase where, after adjudication, the court decides what to do about that finding—e.g., reunification with services, improvement periods, placement with relatives, termination of parental rights.

Under West Virginia law, a court must complete adjudication before it can lawfully proceed to disposition.

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction vs. Statutory Preconditions

  • Subject Matter Jurisdiction: The power of a court to hear and decide a particular class of cases. It comes from the constitution and statutes and is usually not lost due to procedural mistakes.
  • Statutory Preconditions: Steps that must be followed for the court to act lawfully in a specific case. If they are not followed, orders can still be invalid—but the court still had jurisdiction in the abstract.

This case clarifies that:

  • Failure to make specific adjudicatory findings does not strip the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction; but
  • It does violate required statutory steps and can lead to vacatur for “substantial frustration” of the process.

C. “Abused Child” vs. “Neglected Child”

  • Abused child (simplified): A child whose parent intentionally inflicts (or allows others to inflict) physical, sexual, or emotional harm, including risk of such harm to “another child in the home.”
  • Neglected child (simplified): A child whose parent fails or is unable to provide necessary food, shelter, supervision, medical care, etc., and that failure harms or threatens the child’s physical or mental health.

The crucial difference for this case:

  • The abuse definition explicitly allows imputation to “another child in the home”; the neglect definition does not.

D. Improvement Periods

  • An improvement period is a court-authorized period during which a parent is given the opportunity—and responsibility—to correct the problems that led to the abuse/neglect case.
  • There are generally:
    • Post-adjudicatory improvement periods; and
    • Post-dispositional improvement periods.
  • Improvement periods are:
    • Discretionary, not mandatory; and
    • Conditioned on the parent’s active participation and compliance.

E. Reasonable Efforts

  • DHS must usually make reasonable efforts to:
    • Preserve and reunify families; and
    • Provide services to help parents correct problems.
  • Exceptions exist, such as aggravated circumstances (e.g., prior severe abuse, chronic neglect, previous terminations) under § 49-4-604(c)(7)(A); in those cases DHS may be excused from some reasonable-effort obligations.
  • Reasonable efforts are evaluated in context—DHS must act reasonably, but cannot guarantee parental success.

F. Custodial Rights vs. Parental Rights

  • Parental rights: The full legal relationship—decision-making, inheritance, etc.—between parent and child. Termination of parental rights is permanent and severs the legal relationship.
  • Custodial rights: The right to physical possession and day-to-day care of the child. A court can terminate or transfer custody while parental rights (like some residual visitation or decision-making) remain intact.

In this case:

  • The circuit court terminated Mother’s custodial rights to H.B. only, due in part to his age and wishes; but
  • Terminated her parental rights entirely as to the younger siblings, including P.S.

VI. Conclusion

In re H.B., R.B., B.S., P.S., O.S., & I.S. is a consequential decision in West Virginia’s abuse and neglect jurisprudence. It does not radically reshape the law, but rather clarifies and sharpens existing principles in ways that will significantly affect practice:

  • It confirms, via In re R.M., that specific adjudicatory findings are a statutory prerequisite—rather than a jurisdictional requirement—but that serious noncompliance warrants vacatur.
  • It draws a clear, text-based line between abuse and neglect in terms of sibling imputation:
    • Abuse of one child can be imputed to others in the home; but
    • Neglect of one child cannot be automatically imputed to siblings without separate evidence and findings.
  • It underscores that stipulated adjudications must be accurately scoped and cannot be stretched beyond their express terms.
  • It reinforces that DHS must make reasonable efforts, but those efforts are judged in context, and parents bear responsibility to engage with offered services.
  • It reaffirms that termination of parental rights is permissible—even where a child is safely placed with a fit non-abusing parent—if there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions can be substantially corrected.

For judges, practitioners, and child welfare agencies, the case is both a warning and a guide. It warns that shortcuts in adjudication—particularly in multi-child cases—can unravel entire proceedings on appeal. At the same time, it provides a clear roadmap for how to draft petitions, structure stipulations, make findings, and evaluate dispositions in conformity with the statutory scheme and controlling case law.

Ultimately, the decision advances two complementary goals: fidelity to legislative text and procedures, and protection of children through accurate, individualized adjudications and appropriate, well-justified dispositions.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia

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