Non‑Unanimous Death Recommendations, Ex Post Facto Limits, and Inextricably Intertwined Evidence in Florida Capital Trials: Commentary on Michael H. Hunt v. State

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Michael H. Hunt v. State (No. SC2024‑0096, Dec. 18, 2025) is a major capital-case decision at the intersection of criminal evidence doctrine and the State’s newly revised death-penalty scheme. The Court:

Affirms a first-degree murder conviction and death sentence arising from the killing of 19‑year‑old Alexandra “Lexie” Peck in Panama City.
Approves the expansive use of “inextricably intertwined” collateral-crimes evidence involving sex trafficking and sexual battery to prove motive, identity, and premeditation.
Confirms a broad view of the doctrine of transferred intent where an accomplice kills a different victim than the intended target.
Upholds the 2023 amendments to Florida’s capital sentencing statute (SB 450) allowing a non-unanimous (8–4) jury recommendation of death, against:
- Sixth Amendment challenges based on Ramos v. Louisiana,
- Eighth Amendment arbitrariness concerns, and
- Ex post facto challenges to applying the new scheme to pre‑amendment crimes.

Justice Labarga concurs only in result, stressing that Florida now has the least demanding jury requirement for recommending death in the nation and reiterating his longstanding concern over the abolition of proportionality review.

The opinion thus consolidates and extends Florida’s post‑Poole jurisprudence on capital sentencing and clarifies several aspects of trial practice in capital murder cases.

II. Case Background

A. Factual Setting

On April 4, 2019, a man later identified as Michael Hunt appeared at the Panama City home of Alexandra “Lexie” Peck’s family posing as a pizza delivery driver. When stepfather Danny tried to close the door, the man forced his way in, produced a firearm, and shot Danny in the neck. Danny testified that the intruder’s mask slipped, allowing him to see Hunt’s face and hear his distinctive voice. Danny yelled “run” to the others.

An accomplice followed Lexie into a back bedroom shared by residents and guests (Brentley and Izac). That accomplice shot Izac in the back, then shot Lexie in the back of the head, re‑shot Lexie and Izac, and shot Brentley. Lexie died at the scene; Danny, Brentley, and Izac survived with serious injuries; Gabe (Lexie’s brother) and his girlfriend P.O. hid and were uninjured. Jenna, Lexie’s mother, was at work.

The State’s theory was that Hunt, facing imminent arrest for serious sex crimes against P.O., planned to silence her as a witness. Lexie, who had similar red hair, was shot by Hunt’s accomplice under mistaken identity, believing her to be P.O.

B. Prior Relationship and Alleged Sex Crimes

A substantial portion of the evidentiary background involves Hunt’s sex‑crime conduct:

Hunt operated a “dance studio” known as “Polecats,” used as an event/party space but also as a location for prostitution.
He coerced his girlfriend, Kaitlyn West, and later sixteen‑year‑old P.O. into prostitution, threatening violence and using physical abuse.
He drugged and raped P.O. after giving her Xanax instead of ibuprofen, then trafficked her and Kaitlyn for about a year and a half, including at Polecats and in Biloxi after Hurricane Michael.
He repeatedly threatened to “end” P.O. and her boyfriend Gabe if they disclosed the trafficking and sexual battery to others or law enforcement.

P.O. eventually confided in Gabe’s mother Jenna and cooperated with Corporal Corinne Clark of the Panama City Police Department, signing criminal complaints for human trafficking and sexual battery. Clark obtained an arrest warrant for Hunt and planned to arrest him in court on other pending criminal cases.

When Hunt learned of the warrant in open court, he defied the judge’s instruction to remain, fled the courthouse, and traveled to Atlanta with Kaitlyn. There he:

Switched from his recognizable Ford Explorer to a borrowed Ford Escape,
Tinted the windows,
Bought untraceable “burner” phones and dark clothing (black sweatpants and hoodie), and
Told Kaitlyn, upon learning of P.O.’s complaint, “no witness, no case” and that he would do what he had to do.

He then returned to Florida, surveilled the area near P.O.’s residence in the disguised vehicle, and later carried out the home invasion with an accomplice, resulting in Lexie’s murder and multiple attempted murders.

C. Charges, Trial, and Sentence

Hunt was charged with:

First-degree murder of Lexie (on both premeditated and felony murder theories),
Attempted first-degree murder of Danny, Brentley, and Izac, and
Armed burglary of a dwelling.

The guilt phase lasted four days. The State called twenty‑nine witnesses; the defense called one. The State’s case relied heavily on:

Eyewitness and earwitness identifications from Danny and Gabe,
Ballistics evidence tying a recovered .380 pistol to the shooting of Danny, a weapon type Hunt was known to own, and
Cell phone data and vehicle tracking showing Hunt’s trip to and from Atlanta.

The jury convicted Hunt on all counts. In the penalty phase:

The State proved five statutory aggravators, all found unanimously by the jury:
1. Contemporaneous convictions for attempted first-degree murder,
2. Murder during a burglary,
3. Murder committed to hinder law enforcement or a governmental function,
4. Especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC), and
5. Cold, calculated, and premeditated (CCP) without pretense of moral or legal justification.
The defense presented only background mitigation about Hunt’s traumatic childhood, family dynamics, some mental-health history, and positive aspects of his life; no statutory mitigation under § 921.141(7)(a)–(g) was developed.

The jury, by a 10–2 vote, recommended death. The trial judge followed that recommendation and imposed a death sentence, together with sentences on the non‑capital counts.

III. Summary of the Court’s Decision

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed both the conviction and the death sentence. In doing so, it held:

Inextricably intertwined evidence: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Hunt’s sex trafficking and sexual battery of P.O. and Kaitlyn as “inextricably intertwined” with the charged murder and attempted murders. The court found the evidence relevant to motive, identity, intent, and premeditation, and concluded it did not become an improper “feature of the trial.”
Transferred intent instruction: The trial court properly instructed the jury on the doctrine of transferred intent, even though the person shot (Lexie) was killed by Hunt’s accomplice under mistaken identity, rather than as a classic “missed shot.”
Reasonable-doubt standard for aggravator sufficiency: The court declined to revisit State v. Poole and its progeny, rejecting the argument that the trial court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that proven aggravators are “sufficient” to justify death.
Non‑unanimous death recommendations and Ramos:
- The Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in Ramos v. Louisiana, does not require a unanimous jury recommendation of death, because the recommendation is not a “verdict” on an element of the offense.
Ex post facto challenge to 2023 death‑penalty amendments: Applying the amended § 921.141 (requiring only an 8‑4 recommendation) to Hunt’s 2019 crime does not violate the federal or state Ex Post Facto Clauses. Relying heavily on Dobbert v. Florida and the Sixth District’s reasoning in State v. Lobato, the Court held that the changes are procedural, do not alter the “quantum of punishment,” and do not present a sufficient risk of increased punishment for ex post facto purposes.
Sufficiency of the evidence: There was competent, substantial evidence from which a rational juror could find Hunt guilty of first-degree murder under either a premeditation or felony-murder theory.

Justice Labarga concurred in result only, reiterating his opposition to non‑unanimous death recommendations and the abolition of proportionality review, but acknowledging that the majority’s reasoning is consistent with binding precedent after Poole and Lawrence v. State.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Admission of Sex‑Crimes Evidence as “Inextricably Intertwined”

1. The Doctrine and Precedents

Florida evidence law distinguishes:

Williams rule evidence under § 90.404(2)(a), Fla. Stat. — other crimes, wrongs, or acts used to show things like motive, opportunity, intent, or common scheme, subject to specific notice and balancing requirements; and
“Inextricably intertwined” (or “inseparable”) evidence under § 90.402 — uncharged acts that are so bound up with the charged offense that they are part of the same transaction or necessary for a coherent narrative.

Key precedents cited by the Court include:

Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1994): Recognized that evidence of inseparable crimes is admissible as relevant “res gestae” evidence, not as collateral Williams rule evidence.
Ballard v. State, 66 So. 3d 912 (Fla. 2011): Articulated a four‑part test under which collateral-crimes evidence is “inextricably intertwined” if needed to:
1. Describe the deed adequately,
2. Provide an intelligent account of the crime charged,
3. Establish the full context of the charged crime, or
4. Describe the events leading up to the charged crime.
Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277 (Fla. 2009), and Peterson v. State, 2 So. 3d 146 (Fla. 2009): Even when inextricably intertwined, such evidence may not become a “feature of the trial” where the prosecution devolves into an attack on character rather than proof of the charged crime.
Cannon v. State, 51 So. 3d 1261 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011): Found an abuse of discretion where collateral crime evidence dominated the proceedings (half the openings/closings, two‑thirds of witnesses, repeated video), illustrating what it means to become a feature of the trial.

The Court also cites Campbell v. State, 271 So. 3d 914 (Fla. 2018), and Truehill v. State, 211 So. 3d 930 (Fla. 2017), approving evidence that “paint[s] an accurate picture of the events” when carefully limited.

2. Application in Hunt’s Case

The State initially noticed the sex‑crimes evidence under the Williams rule but, at the pretrial hearing, both sides and the judge ultimately agreed it was better characterized as “inextricably intertwined” and therefore admissible under § 90.402, not § 90.404(2)(a). The trial court:

Formally ruled the evidence would be admitted only as “dissimilar fact evidence” that is inextricably intertwined with the murder charges,
Repeatedly cautioned the State to avoid letting the sex‑crimes evidence become a feature of the trial, and
Intervened in questioning (e.g., regarding the Biloxi prostitution details) to keep testimony focused and brief.

On appeal, Hunt conceded relevance but argued that:

The scope of testimony about prostitution and sexual battery exceeded what was necessary to explain the murder, and
The inflammatory nature of sex‑crimes evidence ensured that it became a de facto feature of the trial.

The Supreme Court disagreed, emphasizing:

Only six of twenty‑nine State witnesses even mentioned the sex crimes.
Most references were limited and tied directly to the police investigation or the witness-silencing motive.
P.O. and Kaitlyn did not dwell on detailed prostitution narratives; their testimony was constrained to what was necessary to explain Hunt’s control, threats, and motive.
The State’s closing argument mentioned the sex‑crimes context only briefly and without a detailed rehash.

The Court held that the evidence:

Explained why an arrest warrant existed and why Hunt fled and planned a retaliatory killing (“no witness, no case”),
Showed a clear motive to eliminate P.O. as a witness and thereby provided context for premeditation, and
Helped establish identity (prior familiarity with the family, threats, and prior access to the home).

By contrast with Cannon, the sex‑crimes evidence here did not dominate the proceeding, and the Court therefore found no abuse of discretion.

3. Doctrinal Significance

The decision reinforces that:

The threshold for treating serious uncharged conduct as “inextricably intertwined” can be relatively broad where that conduct explains motive, identity, or narrative coherence in a capital case.
Courts will look closely at the proportion of trial time, number of witnesses, and emphasis in closing argument when assessing whether such evidence becomes a “feature of the trial.”
Even highly prejudicial evidence (human trafficking and sexual battery of a minor) may be upheld if the trial court actively limits its scope and it is tightly linked to the narrative of the charged crime.

In practice, Hunt gives prosecutors a robust precedent for introducing prior violent or exploitative conduct against the same victim to establish motive and context in homicides arising from witness silencing, provided the trial court carefully cabins the evidence.

B. Transferred Intent Instruction

1. The Doctrine and Prior Florida Law

“Transferred intent” is a doctrine that allows a defendant’s intent to kill one person to be legally transferred to the person actually killed. Traditionally, the classic scenario is:

The defendant aims and shoots at Victim A with intent to kill,
Misses, but instead kills Victim B,
The intent to kill A is transferred to B, making the homicide of B intentional first‑degree murder.

The Court cites:

Provenzano v. State, 497 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1986): Recognized the “usual case” of transferred intent but made clear the doctrine is broader and can apply when the “intricate design to effectuate death went awry.”
Lee v. State, 141 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1962): Held that transferred intent applies when a person is killed by “mistaken identity or accident,” not just a wayward bullet.
Coston v. State, 190 So. 520 (Fla. 1939); Hall and Pinder cited in Lee: Early Florida decisions adopting and enforcing the doctrine where the wrong victim is killed through mistaken actions.

Florida also embraces the doctrine that a defendant cannot “take advantage of his own wrongdoing” where his unlawful act kills an unintended victim. The opinion quotes Coston to this effect.

2. Application in Hunt

Hunt objected to the transferred intent instruction on the theory that:

He did not personally shoot Lexie; his accomplice did.
His accomplice intended to kill P.O. but mistakenly killed Lexie under misidentification (red hair), so when the accomplice “hit” the intended target (as he believed), there was no “miss-and-strike-someone-else” scenario.

He argued that transferred intent should apply only where a defendant shoots and misses the intended victim and kills someone else, not where an accomplice intentionally shoots believing the victim is the intended target.

The Court rejected this narrow reading. It held:

Transferred intent is not confined to the “missed shot” scenario; it also covers killings via “mistaken identity,” as in Lee.
Here, Hunt and his accomplice went to the house with the specific intent to kill P.O.; that murderous design was clear from Hunt’s threats, planning, and preparation.
The accomplice, acting in furtherance of that plan, believed Lexie to be P.O. because of her red hair and intentionally shot her. Under Florida law, that mistaken-identity killing is treated as if the intent to kill P.O. had transferred to Lexie.
Hunt’s liability is further reinforced by the law of principals (accomplice liability), such that his own intent to murder P.O. attaches to the act of his accomplice.

The Court also dismissed concerns that the instruction confused the jury, noting the presence of a separate principals instruction and the sufficiency of the record to support the doctrine’s application.

3. Impact

The opinion confirms that in Florida:

Transferred intent applies robustly to killings under mistaken identity, even where:
- The defendant did not pull the trigger, and
- The shooter believed he was killing the intended target.
Coupled with principals liability, the doctrine allows planners of a murder-by-witness-elimination scheme to be fully liable for first-degree murder when an accomplice kills the wrong victim.

This will be particularly significant in gang, conspiracy, and witness-elimination homicides where the target is misidentified, but the underlying homicidal plan is well documented.

C. Constitutional Challenges to Florida’s Capital Sentencing Scheme

1. Reasonable Doubt and the “Sufficiency” of Aggravators

Hunt argued that due process requires the trial court to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that aggravating factors exist (which the jury must find unanimously), but that those aggravators are sufficient to justify a death sentence.

The Court, as it has repeatedly done, declined to revisit State v. Poole, 297 So. 3d 487 (Fla. 2020), which held:

Only the existence of aggravating factors is an “element-like” fact that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt under Ring/Hurst principles.
The determination of whether aggravators are “sufficient” and outweigh mitigation is a normative, judgmental sentencing function, not a fact-finding exercise subject to the reasonable-doubt standard.

The Court cites McKenzie v. State, Orme v. State, Bevel v. State, and Wells v. State, all of which have reaffirmed this distinction and declined to elevate the sufficiency/weight determination to a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt factual finding.

Hunt explicitly raised the issue “to preserve it for federal review” and did not offer a new substantive reason to overturn Poole, which the Court found insufficient to revisit the settled rule.

2. Non‑Unanimous Death Recommendations and Ramos v. Louisiana

a. Sixth Amendment Analysis

After SB 450 (2023), Florida’s capital-sentencing structure includes:

A unanimous jury finding of at least one statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt as a prerequisite to death eligibility.
A recommendation of death if at least eight jurors vote for death; if fewer than eight, the recommendation must be life.
The trial judge as the ultimate sentencer, bound by a life recommendation but free to impose life or death when the jury recommends death.

Hunt argued that, in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83 (2020), the Sixth Amendment’s unanimous-jury right should extend to the recommendation of death as a functional equivalent of a verdict.

The Court rejected this by reaffirming:

Ramos is limited to jury verdicts on the elements of an offense. It held that a non-unanimous conviction verdict (10–2 in Louisiana, 11–1 in Oregon) violates the Sixth Amendment.
A Florida capital jury’s finding of an aggravator is an “element-like” finding and must be unanimous, which is already required by § 921.141(2)(a)–(b).
A jury’s recommendation of death is not a verdict on any element; it is an advisory sentencing recommendation regarding punishment for a crime already fully established by a unanimous guilty verdict and unanimous aggravator findings.
McKinney v. Arizona, 589 U.S. 139 (2020), confirms that appellate or judicial weighing and fact-finding in capital sentencing do not necessarily implicate the Sixth Amendment so long as the aggravator making the defendant death-eligible is jury‑found.

Thus, the Court held that Ramos does not constitutionalize a requirement of a unanimous death recommendation.

b. Eighth Amendment Analysis

Hunt also argued that eliminating unanimity undermines the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of reliability and non‑arbitrariness in capital sentencing.

The Court, citing Zant v. Stephens, Spaziano v. Florida, and Pulley v. Harris, summarized the relevant Eighth Amendment requirements:

There must be at least one statutory aggravating circumstance that meaningfully narrows the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.
The sentencer must be permitted to consider any relevant mitigating evidence about the defendant or the offense.
The scheme must include “safeguards” to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary, capricious, or freakish imposition of the death penalty.

Florida’s scheme, in the Court’s view, satisfies these demands because:

It requires unanimous jury findings of at least one statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt.
It allows broad mitigation under § 921.141(7), including “any other factors in the defendant’s background.”
It mandates a penalty-phase hearing (unless validly waived), juror weighing of aggravation versus mitigation, and detailed written findings by the judge.
It binds the judge to a life sentence if the jury recommends life and allows appellate review of every death sentence by the Florida Supreme Court.

Accordingly, the Court finds no Eighth Amendment requirement for a unanimous death recommendation and no constitutional infirmity in the 8–4 standard.

3. Ex Post Facto Challenge to Application of the 2023 Amendments

a. The Legal Standard

Under the federal and Florida Ex Post Facto Clauses (Art. I, § 10, U.S. & Fla. Const.), a law is ex post facto if:

It is applied to conduct that occurred before its enactment (retrospective application), and
It disadvantages the defendant by:
- Altering the definition of criminal conduct, or
- Increasing the punishment attached to the crime.

The Court relies heavily on:

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798): The foundational ex post facto categories.
Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990); Victorino v. State, 241 So. 3d 48 (Fla. 2018): Modern formulations emphasizing that ex post facto changes must either redefine crimes or increase the punishment.
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977): Upheld retroactive application of a revised Florida death-penalty statute adopted after Furman, finding that the new scheme merely changed the method for determining death sentences, not the quantum of punishment.
Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530 (2013); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987); Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (2000): Developed a “sufficient risk” test for determining when altered sentencing rules effectively increase punishment.

Florida’s Sixth District Court of Appeal’s decision in State v. Lobato, 394 So. 3d 1219 (Fla. 6th DCA 2024), plays a central role: it applies Dobbert and Peugh to SB 450 and finds no ex post facto violation. The Florida Supreme Court expressly embraces that analysis.

b. Hunt’s Argument

Hunt contended that:

Lowering the threshold from a unanimous 12–0 to an 8–4 jury recommendation of death increases the risk that he will be sentenced to death, and therefore effectively increases punishment.
Dobbert is limited because its rationale has been undermined by Collins, which warns against insulating changes from ex post facto review simply by labeling them “procedural.”
Under Peugh’s “sufficient risk” test, the new law disadvantages defendants by making it easier for the State to secure a death recommendation.

c. The Court’s Response

The Court, following Lobato, reasons as follows:

Dobbert remains controlling for changes in capital-sentencing procedure. There, Florida added a comprehensive new penalty-phase framework, including advisory juries, aggravator/mitigator weighing, and automatic Supreme Court review. Despite this, the U.S. Supreme Court held that:
- The statutory maximum punishment for first-degree murder (death) remained the same.
- The changes were procedural methods for determining whether to impose that punishment.
- Therefore, there was no ex post facto violation.
Collins v. Youngblood does not undercut Dobbert; it overruled Thompson v. Utah’s ex post facto holding about jury size and clarified that:
- The Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee concerns the structure of the jury (e.g., number of jurors),
- Those changes do not, in themselves, alter crimes or punishments for ex post facto purposes.
- If reducing the number of jurors needed to convict is not ex post facto, then reducing the number of jurors needed to recommend death (an advisory function) is likewise not ex post facto.
Under Peugh, the relevant question is whether the change creates a sufficient risk of increased punishment. The Court:
- Distinguishes Peugh and Miller, where guideline changes directly increased the applicable sentencing range or presumptive sentence.
- Notes that SB 450 preserves the “essential framework” of Florida capital sentencing: unanimous aggravator findings, jury weighing, judicial discretion, and the same maximum punishment (death).
- Emphasizes that the quantum of punishment (life or death) has not changed, only the internal mechanics of the jury’s recommendation.
- Observes that the new rule operates solely at the level of mercy (whether fewer than all jurors can block a death recommendation), which can only abrogate, not augment, the maximum penalty that has always been available.

Thus, the Court concludes:

The amendments are retrospective as applied to Hunt’s 2019 acts, but
They neither redefine first-degree murder nor increase the maximum penalty,
And they do not create a sufficiently certain risk of a harsher sentence to trigger ex post facto protections.

Accordingly, there is no ex post facto violation.

4. Justice Labarga’s Concurrence in Result

Justice Labarga writes separately to concur in result only. He accepts that the majority’s constitutional analysis is consistent with:

Poole (limiting the Sixth Amendment implications of Hurst), and
Lawrence v. State, 308 So. 3d 544 (Fla. 2020) (abolishing proportionality review).

However, he expresses two key normative concerns:

By requiring only an 8–4 jury vote for death, Florida now has the least demanding jury requirement for death among all death‑penalty states.
He believes the death penalty’s legitimacy and reliability are enhanced by demanding safeguards such as jury unanimity and judicial proportionality review, both of which are now absent from Florida’s scheme.

He therefore cannot fully join the majority opinion and instead concurs in the result, preserving his long‑stated skepticism about Florida’s capital sentencing structure.

D. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Even without a sufficiency challenge, the Court has an independent obligation to review the sufficiency of evidence in death cases. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the Court concluded a rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under either premeditated or felony murder.

Key evidence included:

Hunt’s knowledge of the arrest warrant for sex crimes against P.O. and his flight from the courthouse in defiance of a judge’s order.
His trip to Atlanta, where:
- He borrowed an unrecognizable vehicle and tinted its windows,
- Bought burner phones and dark clothing, and
- Expressly articulated a “no witness, no case” plan.
License-plate readers and phone records confirming the Atlanta trip and his presence back in Panama City at the relevant time.
Security camera recordings showing the borrowed vehicle near the crime scene before the murder.
Eyewitness/earwitness identifications by Danny and Gabe, who knew Hunt personally and recognized his “very distinctive” voice and, in Danny’s case, his face when the mask slipped.
Ballistic evidence linking a recovered .380 pistol to the shot that wounded Danny, matched to a weapon type Hunt was known to own.
Hunt’s apprehension the next day in the same Ford Escape, driving back toward Panama City, wearing the same black hoodie bought on the Atlanta trip and a wig to disguise himself.

These facts support:

Premeditation: Planning, acquisition of tools, expressed intent to eliminate a witness, and targeted travel back to the victim’s home.
Felony murder: The killing occurred during an armed burglary (forcible entry under false pretenses while armed) and attempted murders, all of which support the felony‑murder theory.

Thus, the conviction stands on solid evidentiary ground.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Inextricably Intertwined” Evidence vs. Williams Rule Evidence

Williams rule evidence (from Williams v. State, 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959)):
- Other crimes, wrongs, or acts separate from the charged crime.
- Admissible to show motive, intent, or common scheme, but with strict safeguards because of prejudicial impact.
Inextricably intertwined evidence:
- Acts that are part of the same episode or necessary background for the charged crime.
- Admitted as ordinary relevance evidence under § 90.402, not as Williams rule evidence.
- Example here: Hunt’s trafficking and threats against P.O. provided the necessary motive and context for the murder attempt.

Courts must still ensure even inextricably intertwined evidence does not overwhelm the trial or become a character attack.

2. Transferred Intent

Transferred intent means:

If you intend to kill one person and your actions instead kill someone else, the law “transfers” your murderous intent to the actual victim.
This applies to:
- Accidental strikes (missed shot hits a bystander), and
- Mistaken identity (you kill the wrong person because you think they are your target).
It prevents defendants from escaping liability because their violent plan harmed a different victim than intended.

3. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors

Aggravating factors:
- Statutorily defined facts that make a crime more serious (e.g., HAC, CCP, murder during a burglary).
- In Florida, at least one must be found unanimously by the jury to make a defendant death‑eligible.
Mitigating circumstances:
- Facts about the defendant or the crime that support a more lenient sentence (e.g., age, mental illness, childhood trauma, lack of prior criminal record).
- Florida allows both enumerated and “catch-all” mitigation under § 921.141(7)(h).

The sentencing decision involves weighing proven aggravators against mitigation to decide if death is appropriate.

4. Ex Post Facto Laws

An ex post facto law is:

A law that retroactively:
- Makes conduct criminal that was not criminal when done,
- Increases the punishment for a crime after it was committed, or
- Alters the rules of evidence to make conviction easier.

Not every procedural change is ex post facto. Changes in how a sentence is decided (for instance, adding or restructuring a penalty phase) are generally allowed so long as:

The maximum punishment does not increase, and
The change does not create a clear enough risk of a harsher sentence to effectively increase punishment.

Here, the Court views the shift from a 12–0 to an 8–4 death recommendation as a change in decision‑making procedure, not in the elements or maximum penalty.

5. Proportionality Review

Before Lawrence v. State, the Florida Supreme Court conducted proportionality review in every death case, comparing the case to other capital cases to ensure the sentence was proportionate to both:

The severity of the offense, and
The sentences imposed in similar cases.

Lawrence abolished this practice as a matter of state law, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment does not require proportionality review. Justice Labarga continues to view proportionality review as a crucial safeguard, but the majority adheres to Lawrence.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Florida’s Capital Sentencing Landscape Post‑Hunt

Hunt solidifies a new era in Florida capital sentencing:

Death eligibility hinges on:
- A unanimous guilty verdict on first-degree murder, and
- Unanimous jury findings of at least one (and possibly more) statutory aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt.
The penalty recommendation:
- Requires only an 8–4 supermajority for a death recommendation,
- Is binding in favor of life but only advisory for death, with the judge making the final choice.
There is no proportionality review by the Supreme Court, only sufficiency and legal error review.

As Justice Labarga notes, this makes Florida the state with the least stringent jury unanimity requirement for recommending death among jurisdictions that retain capital punishment.

B. Retroactivity and Pending Cases

By rejecting the ex post facto challenge, the Court effectively authorizes:

Application of the 8–4 recommendation rule to all pending capital cases where the crime predates April 20, 2023, but the penalty phase occurs after that date.
Re‑sentencing under the new standard for some cases vacated on other grounds, so long as the statutory framework is in force at the time of re‑sentencing.

This has practical consequences for defendants who committed capital-eligible crimes under a regime that, after Hurst (2016) and pre‑2023 statutes, required unanimous death recommendations. Their exposure to death now depends on the supermajority standard.

C. Trial Practice: Evidence and Instructions

For practitioners, Hunt provides guidance:

On collateral crimes evidence:
- Prosecutors can frame prior abuse or exploitation of a victim as “inextricably intertwined” when it explains why the homicide occurred (e.g., to silence a witness or maintain coercive control).
- Defense counsel should:
  - Push for strict limits on the scope and detail of such evidence,
  - Request curative or limiting instructions where appropriate, and
  - Document objections to preserve appellate review under the “feature of the trial” doctrine.
On jury instructions:
- Transferred intent instructions will be upheld in cases of mistaken-identity killings linked to a clear murderous plan, even where accomplices are involved.
- Combined with principals instructions, this significantly strengthens the State’s ability to secure first-degree murder convictions in complex multi‑actor scenarios.

D. Future Constitutional Litigation

The opinion also positions Florida in the national constitutional landscape:

The Court adopts a narrow reading of Ramos and a robust endorsement of Poole, which could invite federal review, particularly on:
- Whether a capital jury’s recommendation, in a system where the judge almost always follows it, is effectively part of the Sixth Amendment verdict process, and
- Whether the Eighth Amendment imposes more demanding reliability safeguards where unanimity has been abandoned and proportionality review eliminated.
On ex post facto law, Hunt sends a clear signal that:
- Significant changes in jury voting thresholds can be characterized as procedural and non‑ex post facto if they do not raise the statutory maximum penalty or change elements.
- Courts will require a strong showing that the change all but guarantees harsher sentences before finding a “sufficient risk” under Peugh.

Whether federal courts will ultimately agree with this application of Dobbert and Peugh remains to be seen, but Hunt provides a detailed roadmap defending non‑unanimous death recommendations against constitutional attack.

VII. Conclusion

Michael H. Hunt v. State is a pivotal Florida Supreme Court opinion that simultaneously:

Broadly endorses the use of highly prejudicial but contextual collateral-crimes evidence as “inextricably intertwined” to prove motive, identity, and premeditation in capital trials.
Clarifies that transferred intent in Florida reaches mistaken-identity shootings by accomplices, tightly binding planners of witness-elimination schemes to the lethal acts of their confederates.
Fortifies the post‑Poole capital sentencing architecture, holding that:
- The Sixth Amendment does not require a unanimous death recommendation,
- The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit an 8–4 supermajority death recommendation, and
- Applying the 2023 non‑unanimous recommendation statute to pre‑amendment crimes is not an ex post facto violation.
Affirms Florida’s move away from unanimity and proportionality review, while preserving the requirement of unanimous aggravator findings and automatic Supreme Court review in death cases.

From a doctrinal standpoint, the case cements Florida’s distinctive capital sentencing regime and provides prosecutors and trial courts with a detailed template for withstanding constitutional challenges to SB 450. From a policy and fairness standpoint, Justice Labarga’s concurrence underscores ongoing concerns about whether a system with non‑unanimous recommendations and no proportionality review can provide the highest degree of reliability demanded when the State imposes the ultimate punishment.

For lawyers and courts handling capital cases in Florida, Hunt will be a central reference point on:

The permissible scope of contextual collateral-crimes evidence,
The reach of transferred intent and accomplice liability, and
The constitutional durability of Florida’s new non‑unanimous death-penalty framework.