Non‑Statutory Grandparent Visitation Does Not Survive Stepparent Adoption in West Virginia: Commentary on In re Adoption of K.J.

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s memorandum decision in In re Adoption of K.J., No. 23‑735 (Nov. 12, 2025), gives clear and highly practical guidance on a recurring problem in child welfare and adoption practice:

• What happens to grandparent (or other third‑party) visitation ordered during an abuse and neglect case when the child is later adopted by a stepparent?

The petitioners, Eric B. and Chasity B., are the maternal grandparents of K.J. They had:

• served as K.J.’s caregivers for approximately seventeen months during abuse and neglect proceedings;
• adopted K.J.’s half‑sibling in a separate proceeding; and
• obtained a standing court order for monthly visitation with K.J. when he was reunified with his father.

When K.J.’s father’s new wife sought to adopt K.J. in a stepparent adoption, the biological father and stepmother (the respondents) asked the circuit court to terminate the grandparents’ visitation. The grandparents did not oppose the adoption itself, but argued vigorously that their existing visitation order should continue after adoption.

The circuit court concluded it had no authority to preserve that visitation once it granted the adoption and vacated the earlier visitation order. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the grandparents’ visitation was not granted under the Grandparent Visitation Act and did not fall into any other recognized exception, it was automatically extinguished when the adoption became final.

Although issued as a memorandum decision under Rule 21, In re Adoption of K.J. consolidates and applies several key precedents, and it effectively closes an argued “gap” in West Virginia law regarding non‑statutory grandparent visitation after stepparent adoption.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Decision

In condensed form, the Court holds:

1. Baseline rule from In re Adoption of J.S.: When a circuit court grants an adoption under W. Va. Code §§ 48‑22‑701 to ‑704, it generally may not include any provision in the final adoption order that limits or interferes with the adoptive parent’s right to make decisions about the child’s care, custody, and control. This applies equally in stepparent adoptions.
2. Exceptions are strictly limited: The Court reaffirms that only three types of third‑party contact can survive adoption, as identified in footnote 15 of In re Adoption of J.S.:
   • a grandparent visitation order that survives adoption under W. Va. Code § 48‑10‑902 (i.e., an order expressly granted under the Grandparent Visitation Act);
   • a sibling visitation order entered under Syllabus Point 4 of James M. v. Maynard; or
   • a post‑adoption contact agreement that meets the requirements of W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑704 and Murrell B. v. Clarence R.
3. The grandparents’ visitation in this case did not qualify under any exception:
   • It was not entered under the Grandparent Visitation Act (no petition, no statutory findings, no analysis of the thirteen statutory factors, and no express reference to the Act);
   • It was not a sibling visitation order under James M. (no order preserving sibling contact was entered); and
   • It was not a post‑adoption contact agreement (no mutual agreement placed in or referenced by the adoption order, and the adoptive parent opposed continued visitation).
4. Result: Once the adoption order became final (thirty days after entry, under the adoption statutes), the grandparents were divested of any visitation rights they had previously enjoyed, and the circuit court correctly concluded it lacked authority to continue that visitation.

The decision confirms that non‑statutory, abuse‑and‑neglect‑based grandparent visitation does not survive a stepparent adoption in West Virginia unless clearly brought within one of the narrow statutory or doctrinal exceptions.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

The Court’s decision rests on a relatively straightforward procedural posture:

• Abuse and neglect case: K.J. was initially removed from his parents’ care in abuse and neglect proceedings. He was placed with his maternal grandparents, the petitioners, with whom he lived for about seventeen months.
• Parental rights and placement: The mother’s parental rights were terminated. The father, Keith J., completed an improvement period, and the circuit court returned K.J. to his custody in December 2021.
• Visitation order in the abuse and neglect case: In the same order that reunified K.J. with his father and dismissed the abuse and neglect case from its docket, the circuit court ordered that the grandparents "shall have visitation with the child ... the third weekend of every month." This order:
  • was the product of a multidisciplinary team (MDT) agreement; and
  • was not entered pursuant to the Grandparent Visitation Act.
• Grandparents adopt half‑sibling: In July 2022, the grandparents adopted K.J.’s half‑sibling, with whom K.J. had formed a bond while in their home.
• Stepparent adoption petition: In February 2023, Keith J. married Morgan B. In a later stepparent adoption petition, Keith and Morgan jointly sought to have Morgan adopt K.J. Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑301, the father joined as a petitioner. In the adoption petition, they explicitly asked the court to terminate the grandparents’ visitation as no longer in K.J.’s best interests.
• Notice to the grandparents: Under W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑601, anyone with existing court‑ordered visitation must be given notice of adoption proceedings. The grandparents received notice and filed a response opposing only the termination of their visitation, not the adoption itself.
• Circuit court’s actions:
  • July 2023: The circuit court granted the stepparent adoption but held the visitation issue “in abeyance” and requested briefing.
  • November 2, 2023: After a hearing, the court found it had no legal authority to continue the grandparents’ visitation post‑adoption and vacated its earlier visitation order.
• Appeal: The grandparents appealed, arguing that their visitation should survive adoption despite not being entered under the Grandparent Visitation Act and urging the Supreme Court to treat the issue as one of first impression.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Adoption Statutes and the Finality of Adoption

Two statutory provisions are central:

• W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑701(d): Once an adoption order is entered, the adoptive parent has the same rights "as if the child had been born to" that parent. This is the statutory basis for treating adoptive parents and biological parents identically for constitutional and parental decision‑making purposes.
• W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑703(a): Upon entry of an adoption order:
  • any person previously entitled to parental rights is divested of all legal rights and obligations to the child; and
  • the child is freed from all legal obligations toward those persons and becomes, “to all intents and for all purposes,” the legitimate issue of the adoptive parent(s).

These provisions reflect a legislative judgment that adoption is meant to be a “final and complete” reconfiguration of the child’s legal family—a point underscored in Murrell B. v. Clarence R., 242 W. Va. 358, 836 S.E.2d 9 (2019), and in Justice Davis’s oft‑quoted discussion in State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats.

B. The Grandparent Visitation Act

The Grandparent Visitation Act, W. Va. Code §§ 48‑10‑101 to ‑1201, provides the exclusive statutory mechanism for grandparents to obtain court‑ordered visitation over a fit parent’s objection. Two provisions are particularly important here:

• W. Va. Code § 48‑10‑501: A court may grant grandparent visitation only on findings that:
  • visitation is in the child’s best interests; and
  • visitation will not substantially interfere with the parent‑child relationship.
• W. Va. Code § 48‑10‑502: The court must consider thirteen specified factors (including prior relationship, the parents’ wishes, the child’s adjustment, etc.) before granting visitation. Post‑Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), West Virginia case law stresses that a court must give “significant weight” to a fit parent’s decision and cannot rely solely on a bare “best interests” finding.
• W. Va. Code § 48‑10‑902: If a child who is subject to a grandparent visitation order under the Act is later adopted, that visitation order is automatically vacated unless the adopting parent is a stepparent, grandparent, or other relative. In those relative or stepparent adoptions, the GVA order survives, but only if it was properly entered under the Act.

The decision in In re Adoption of K.J. turns in large part on whether the grandparents’ earlier visitation order qualifies as “a grandparent visitation order under this article” within the meaning of § 48‑10‑902. The Supreme Court answers that question decisively in the negative.

C. Sibling Visitation and Post‑Adoption Contact Agreements

Two other sources of post‑adoption contact are recognized in West Virginia law:

• Sibling visitation (James M. v. Maynard): Syllabus Point 4 of James M., 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991), directs that when parental rights are terminated, a circuit court should consider whether continued sibling contact is in the child’s best interests and, if so, enter an order to preserve that contact. Such an order can survive adoption.
• Post‑adoption contact agreements (W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑704; Murrell B.): Adoptive parents and third parties may voluntarily agree to post‑adoption visitation or communication:
  • There must be a mutual manifestation of assent to visitation or communication between the adoptive parent(s) and the third party; and
  • That agreement must either be stated in full in the adoption order or explicitly referenced in the order as an attached exhibit.

  In Murrell B., the Court construed “agreement” in § 48‑22‑704 exactly this way and held that only such written, incorporated agreements may be enforced post‑adoption.

In re Adoption of J.S., 245 W. Va. 164, 858 S.E.2d 214 (2021), collected these limited exceptions and emphasized that, absent an applicable exception, the adoptive parent’s rights must be free from judicially‑imposed third‑party visitation or interference.

V. Precedents Shaping the Court’s Analysis

A. In re Adoption of J.S. (2021)

J.S. is the cornerstone for the Court’s analysis. Syllabus Point 5 states:

Unless otherwise permitted by law, where a circuit court grants a petition for adoption of a child pursuant to the procedures set forth in West Virginia Code §§ 48‑22‑701 to ‑704 (2015), the court may not include any provision in the final order of adoption that would limit, restrict, or otherwise interfere with the adoptive parent's right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of the child.

In J.S., the Court:

• stressed that, once adoption is ordered, the adoptive parent stands in exactly the same constitutional position as a natural parent;
• linked this to the fundamental right to parent, protected by the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions (citing Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S.); and
• listed, in footnote 15, the limited situations where post‑adoption visitation is “otherwise permitted by law”: GVA orders surviving under § 48‑10‑902; sibling visitation under James M.; and § 48‑22‑704 visitation agreements as defined in Murrell B.

In re Adoption of K.J. essentially applies J.S. and its footnote 15 to facts involving grandparents with non‑statutory visitation arising out of abuse and neglect proceedings.

B. Murrell B. v. Clarence R. (2019)

In Murrell B., the Court dealt with individuals who had cared for a child during abuse and neglect proceedings and had later obtained visitation rights. After the child was adopted by paternal grandparents, the question arose whether those earlier visitation rights survived.

Key holdings relevant here:

• The Court read W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑703 and related provisions to reflect a legislative intent that adoption finality severs prior relationships and obligations in favor of the new legal family configuration.
• It held that when the adoption order became final (after 30 days), any pre‑existing visitation rights of those individuals were extinguished, unless preserved through one of the statutory mechanisms (e.g., a § 48‑22‑704 agreement).
• Even a pre‑adoption “psychological parent” relationship could not, by itself, create enforceable post‑adoption visitation rights absent statutory authorization.

The Court in K.J. directly analogizes the grandparents’ situation here to the caregivers in Murrell B.: significant emotional bonds and prior visitation do not, on their own, survive adoption.

C. Grandparent Visitation Line: In re Nearhoof, Cathy L.(R.)M., and Troxel

• In re Nearhoof, 178 W. Va. 359, 359 S.E.2d 587 (1987): Under the predecessor statute to the Grandparent Visitation Act, the Court held that a trial court could order post‑adoption grandparent visitation where the child had been adopted by a stepparent after the death of the grandparents’ child. That case involved a statutory petition under the grandparent visitation statute then in effect.
  
  In K.J., the Court notes that the statute applied in Nearhoof was the precursor to the current GVA, and that Nearhoof supports post‑adoption grandparent visitation only when the visitation order is granted under the governing grandparent visitation statute. Because the grandparents’ visitation was not granted under the GVA, Nearhoof is inapposite.
• In re Grandparent Visitation of Cathy L.(R.)M. v. Mark Brent R., 217 W. Va. 319, 617 S.E.2d 866 (2005): This case interpreted the GVA in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville. The Court stressed that a best‑interests analysis alone is insufficient; courts must give “significant weight” to the decisions of fit parents about grandparent visitation.
  
  Cathy L.(R.)M. is cited in K.J. for the proposition that a court cannot base grandparent visitation solely on a best‑interests analysis without the statutory balancing and deference required by the GVA and Troxel.
• Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000): The leading U.S. Supreme Court case on third‑party visitation, holding that the Due Process Clause protects a parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children, and invalidating a broad Washington statute authorizing third‑party visitation over a fit parent’s objection.

D. Sibling‑Relationship and Child‑Rights Cases: Honaker, Jonathan G., and James M.

• Honaker v. Burnside, 182 W. Va. 448, 388 S.E.2d 322 (1989): Recognized that termination of visitation with individuals close to a child—such as siblings or long‑term caregivers—can contribute to the child’s instability.
• In re Jonathan G., 198 W. Va. 716, 482 S.E.2d 893 (1996): Syllabus Point 11 (in part) acknowledges that "[a] child has a right to continued association with individuals with whom he has formed a close emotional bond."
• James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991): Syllabus Point 4 instructs circuit courts, in termination‑of‑parental‑rights cases, to consider whether continued sibling association is in the child’s best interests and to enter an order to preserve sibling contact if appropriate.

In K.J., the grandparents rely heavily on these “child‑rights” and sibling relationship principles, particularly because they adopted K.J.’s half‑sibling. The Court, however, distinguishes these precedents on a crucial procedural point: no sibling visitation order was ever entered under James M. to preserve contact between K.J. and his half‑sibling. Without such an order, there is nothing to enforce post‑adoption.

E. Other Authorities: Lindsie D.L., Brandon L., and Walker

• Lindsie D.L. v. Richard W.S., 214 W. Va. 750, 591 S.E.2d 308 (2003): Syllabus Point 3, cited via J.S., confirms that the Due Process Clauses of the West Virginia and United States Constitutions protect the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.
• State ex rel. Brandon L. v. Moats, 209 W. Va. 752, 551 S.E.2d 674 (2001): While mainly cited through Justice Davis’s dissent, the case is used in Murrell B. (and echoed in K.J.) to underscore that the Legislature intended adoption orders to provide a “final and complete resolution” of a child’s familial and legal relationships.
• Walker v. W. Va. Ethics Comm’n, 201 W. Va. 108, 492 S.E.2d 167 (1997): Provides the standard of review: final orders and ultimate dispositions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and questions of law de novo. In K.J., the core question—whether the circuit court had legal authority to continue visitation post‑adoption—is treated as a legal issue reviewed de novo.

VI. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in In re Adoption of K.J.

A. No “Issue of First Impression”

The grandparents framed their appeal as presenting a novel question:

If a grandparent is granted visitation but it is not specifically granted under the statutory guidelines in West Virginia Code Section 48, Article 10, does an adoption vacate a grandparent visitation order when a stepparent adopts?

The Supreme Court explicitly rejects the notion that this is an open question. By integrating:

• the baseline rule of J.S. (no interference with adoptive parent’s rights absent legal authorization),
• the statutory framework of the GVA and adoption statutes, and
• the detailed analysis in Murrell B. on the finality of adoption,

the Court treats the matter as already governed by existing law. The core analysis thus becomes a question of whether the grandparents can bring their visitation within a recognized exception, not whether an entirely new exception should be created.

B. The “Unless Otherwise Permitted by Law” Carve‑Out and Its Limits

The phrase “Unless otherwise permitted by law” in Syllabus Point 5 of J.S. is the pivot of the grandparents’ argument and the Court’s response.

The grandparents attempt to fit their visitation into that carve‑out by arguing:

• they are grandparents who had long‑standing bonds with the child;
• they had a pre‑existing court visitation order; and
• various child‑rights and best‑interests authorities support continuation of contact.

The Court answers by returning to J.S. footnote 15 and reiterating the three limited categories of arrangements that can survive adoption:

1. GVA grandparent visitation orders that survive under § 48‑10‑902;
2. Sibling visitation orders required by James M. Syllabus Point 4; and
3. Written post‑adoption contact agreements under § 48‑22‑704, as interpreted in Murrell B.

The Court methodically examines each category and explains why the grandparents fall into none of them.

1. No Grandparent Visitation Order Under the Act (§ 48‑10‑902)

The survival rule in § 48‑10‑902 applies only if the child is subject to a grandparent visitation order under the Act. The Court emphasizes:

• There was no petition or proceeding brought under the Grandparent Visitation Act.
• The circuit court did not undertake the statutory analysis required by §§ 48‑10‑501 and ‑502:
  • no express best‑interests finding in the statutory sense;
  • no finding that visitation would not substantially interfere with the parent‑child relationship; and
  • no explicit consideration of the thirteen factors listed in § 48‑10‑502.
• The visitation was created informally, based on MDT agreement and the judge’s sense that visits were in K.J.’s best interests and helpful for contact with the half‑sibling, during an abuse and neglect case—not as a GVA adjudication.

The Court explicitly rejects the idea that the mere identity of the petitioners as grandparents, or a general “best interests” rationale, converts their visitation into GVA visitation:

• Being a grandparent is necessary to use the GVA, but it is not sufficient to trigger the Act’s protections. The statutory procedural and substantive requirements must be followed.
• Best interests alone are not enough, especially after Troxel and Cathy L.(R.)M., which require strong deference to parental decisions.

Accordingly, § 48‑10‑902 does not apply, and the grandparents cannot rely on the GVA’s stepparent‑adoption survival rule.

2. No Sibling Visitation Order Under James M.

Although the grandparents adopted K.J.’s half‑sibling and emphasized the importance of that sibling bond, the Court notes:

• The circuit court did not enter a sibling visitation order preserving K.J.’s association with his half‑sibling under James M.
• There was no best‑interests determination specifically directed to sibling contact and no separate order securing sibling visitation rights.

In other words, while the facts might support such an order in a different procedural posture, the legal reality is that:

Put simply, there is no sibling visitation order to enforce post-adoption, so this exception is inapplicable.

3. No Post‑Adoption Contact Agreement Under § 48‑22‑704 / Murrell B.

Post‑adoption contact agreements require:

• a mutual manifestation of assent by the adoptive parent(s) and the third party; and
• an agreement either fully stated in or explicitly referenced by the adoption order.

In K.J.:

• The adoptive mother (Morgan B.) explicitly opposed continued visitation with the grandparents in the adoption petition.
• The adoption order granted the adoption but did not mention any visitation agreement, nor did it incorporate such an agreement by reference.

Thus, there was no enforceable agreement within the meaning of § 48‑22‑704 and Murrell B..

C. The Centrality of Adoption Finality and Parental Autonomy

Having concluded that no exception applies, the Court turns to the adoption statutes:

• Under § 48‑22‑703(a), the adoption extinguishes previous parental rights and obligations and reconstitutes the child as the legal offspring of the adoptive parent(s).
• Under § 48‑22‑701(d), the adoptive parent has parental rights as though the child were born to them.

The Court reaffirms the reading in Murrell B. that this language is “clear and unambiguous” evidence of the Legislature’s intent that adoption provides the child with “the comfort and knowledge of future certainty” regarding familial relationships. This certainty is incompatible with open‑ended third‑party visitation orders that are not grounded in a clearly‑authorized statutory or constitutional exception.

Consequently, as in Murrell B., the Court holds that once the adoption became final:

As of that date, [the grandparents] were divested of any visitation with [K.J.] they may have had prior to the adoption.

The circuit court therefore lacked authority to “continue” visitation in the adoption order without infringing upon the adoptive parent’s fundamental right to decide with whom the child will associate.

D. Treatment of the Grandparents’ Best‑Interests and Child‑Rights Arguments

The grandparents invoked:

• Honaker v. Burnside (stability and harm from terminating relationships);
• In re Jonathan G. (child’s right to continued association with emotionally significant figures); and
• the general “best interests of the child” language common to child‑welfare decisions.

The Court does not dispute that terminating contact can be disruptive or even harmful. However, it reasons that:

• These principles inform the exercise of judicial discretion within the bounds of statutory and constitutional limits; they do not create free‑standing post‑adoption visitation rights.
• In the face of explicit constitutional protections for parental autonomy and clear statutory text about adoption finality, generalized child‑rights or best‑interests formulations cannot justify carving out new, non‑statutory exceptions to J.S. and the adoption code.

In more practical terms: the Court acknowledges the bond and the potential benefit of ongoing contact, but concludes that deciding whether such contact should continue is a matter for the adoptive parents, not the courts, unless one of the recognized legal exceptions squarely applies.

E. Disposition of the Petitioners’ Procedural Arguments

The grandparents also advanced two procedural points:

1. W. Va. Code § 48‑10‑1001: This provision of the GVA states that a court which grants grandparent visitation retains jurisdiction during the child’s minority to modify or terminate such rights. The grandparents argued that this continuing jurisdiction should apply to their visitation.
   
   The Court finds this argument irrelevant because the visitation order was not granted under the GVA. Thus, § 48‑10‑1001 has no application.
2. Rule 6 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: This rule gives the circuit court exclusive jurisdiction to handle subsequent modifications of, among other things, visitation orders arising from abuse and neglect cases. The grandparents suggested that their visitation should have been litigated under the abuse and neglect docket rather than in the adoption case.
   
   The Supreme Court again finds this irrelevant: the core legal issue is not which docket was used, but whether the visitation order could legally survive the final adoption order in light of the adoption statutes and J.S. It could not.

The Court therefore treats these procedural claims as beside the point and declines to “belabor” them.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. What Counts as a “Grandparent Visitation Order Under the Act”?

Not every visitation order granted to grandparents is a “grandparent visitation order under [the Grandparent Visitation Act]” within the meaning of § 48‑10‑902.

To qualify:

• The grandparents must invoke the Grandparent Visitation Act (usually by petition under that statute).
• The court must consider the thirteen statutory factors in § 48‑10‑502.
• The court must make explicit findings that:
  • visitation is in the child’s best interests; and
  • visitation will not substantially interfere with the parent‑child relationship.
• The order should clearly indicate it is issued under the authority of the GVA.

If those elements are absent, the order is simply a discretionary visitation order and does not carry the special rule in § 48‑10‑902 allowing it to survive certain adoptions.

B. “Best Interests of the Child” vs. Parental Constitutional Rights

“Best interests of the child” is a core standard in family law, but it does not operate in a vacuum. In third‑party visitation cases:

• The U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel and the West Virginia Supreme Court in cases like Cathy L.(R.)M. have held that courts must give substantial deference to the decisions of fit parents.
• Courts cannot override a fit parent’s decision about grandparent visitation based solely on a judge’s independent view of the child’s best interests.
• Statutes like the GVA attempt to balance parental rights and children’s interests by requiring:
  • threshold findings about parental fitness and the impact on the parent‑child relationship; and
  • a structured, multi‑factor analysis rather than ad hoc judgments.

In the adoption context, the adoptive parent’s rights stand on the same constitutional footing as those of a biological parent. Thus, “best interests” cannot be used to impose ongoing third‑party visitation that would intrude on the adoptive parent’s fundamental right to parent, unless a statute or settled precedent clearly authorizes that intrusion.

C. Psychological Parents and Why Their Status Ends at Adoption

A “psychological parent” is someone who, through caregiving and emotional bonding, effectively functions as a parent in the child’s life, even without legal parental status. West Virginia courts recognize such relationships in various contexts, especially in abuse and neglect cases.

However, Murrell B. and now K.J. make clear:

• A psychological parent relationship does not, by itself, create a legally enforceable right to visitation after adoption.
• Once the adoption is final, the adoptive parents’ rights and the statutory goal of finality supersede any equitable considerations arising from the pre‑adoption psychological relationship, unless a valid statutory exception applies.

D. Post‑Adoption Contact Agreements in Practice

Post‑adoption contact agreements (sometimes called “open adoption” agreements) are voluntary arrangements in which:

• Adoptive parents agree to allow some form of ongoing contact (visits, letters, photos, etc.) between the child and a birth relative or other third party; and
• The agreement is made part of the adoption order under W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑704.

For such agreements to be enforceable:

• They must reflect the mutual consent of the adoptive parents and the third party; and
• They must be set out in, or explicitly referenced by, the final adoption order.

In K.J., there was no such agreement because the adoptive mother opposed continued grandparent visitation. Without adoptive parent consent and incorporation into the adoption order, no enforceable post‑adoption contact right exists.

VIII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. For Grandparents and Relative Caregivers

In re Adoption of K.J. has important practical implications for grandparents, kinship caregivers, and their counsel:

• Non‑GVA visitation is fragile: Visitation orders granted during abuse and neglect cases, or by informal MDT agreement, may terminate automatically upon adoption unless they are formally converted into:
  • a GVA order (with proper findings);
  • a sibling visitation order under James M.; or
  • a written post‑adoption contact agreement.
• To preserve rights, use the right vehicles at the right time:
  • If ongoing grandparent visitation is desired beyond the abuse and neglect case, grandparents should consider filing under the Grandparent Visitation Act before adoption occurs.
  • If the critical relationship is between siblings, counsel should seek a specific sibling visitation order under James M. at the time of the abuse and neglect disposition.
  • Where adoptive parents are open to ongoing contact, all parties should negotiate a § 48‑22‑704 agreement and ensure it is incorporated into the adoption order.
• Challenging adoption vs. preserving visitation: The grandparents in K.J. did not oppose the adoption itself, only the termination of visitation. After this decision, it is clear that once an unconditioned adoption order becomes final, the legal space for preserving ad hoc visitation is essentially closed, unless one of the recognized exceptions applies.

B. For Abuse and Neglect Practitioners and MDTs

The decision sends a strong signal to judges, GALs, DHHR, MDT participants, and attorneys:

• Informal or “by‑agreement” visitation arrangements made in abuse and neglect cases will not automatically survive adoption.
• When adoption (particularly stepparent adoption) is foreseeable, MDTs and counsel should:
  • explicitly discuss whether the relationships at issue should be preserved post‑adoption;
  • consider whether to initiate:
    • GVA proceedings for grandparents; or
    • James M. sibling‑visitation orders;
  • engage with potential adoptive parents about post‑adoption contact agreements, where appropriate.

In short, K.J. encourages moving from informal, MDT‑based arrangements to clearly labeled, statute‑compliant orders if long‑term enforceability is desired.

C. For Adoption Practitioners and Courts

For practitioners handling stepparent and relative adoptions:

• Adoption petitions should clearly address existing visitation orders. W. Va. Code § 48‑22‑601 requires notice to persons with existing visitation, but notice does not mean that those orders survive; counsel should explicitly request whether visitation should be terminated or preserved via recognized mechanisms.
• Courts must resist the temptation to “split the difference” by grafting non‑statutory visitation onto adoption orders. Under J.S. and reaffirmed in K.J., this would impermissibly interfere with adoptive parents’ constitutional rights.
• Written, incorporated agreements are the correct path for consensual ongoing contact. If adoptive parents and relatives agree to future contact, it must be reduced to a written agreement and made part of the adoption order to be enforceable later.

D. Likely Future Litigation and Potential Legislative Responses

While K.J. applies existing law rather than forging a brand‑new doctrine, it may spur:

• More formal use of GVA and sibling‑visitation procedures: To avoid the outcome in K.J., counsel may be more proactive in securing statutory grandparent or sibling visitation orders before adoption.
• Potential legislative attention: If policymakers believe that kinship caregivers or psychological parents should have more robust avenues to preserve contact after relative or stepparent adoptions, they could:
  • expand the GVA’s list of relationships or factors;
  • create a specific statutory framework for post‑adoption contact involving prior foster caregivers or kinship placements; or
  • clarify the weight to be given to a child’s own expressed wishes in post‑adoption contact disputes.

As the law stands after K.J., however, the Court has chosen to hew closely to the Legislature’s strong preference for adoption finality and to the constitutional primacy of adoptive parents’ decision‑making authority.

IX. Conclusion

In re Adoption of K.J. firmly establishes that, in West Virginia, grandparent visitation granted outside the Grandparent Visitation Act—and not embodied in a sibling‑visitation order or a post‑adoption contact agreement—does not survive a stepparent adoption.

The decision:

• reaffirms the baseline principle from In re Adoption of J.S. that courts may not interfere with adoptive parents’ rights absent clear legal authorization;
• confirms that the only recognized exceptions are:
  • GVA visitation orders that survive adoption under § 48‑10‑902;
  • sibling visitation orders under James M.; and
  • properly executed and incorporated post‑adoption contact agreements under § 48‑22‑704 and Murrell B.;
• underscores the Legislature’s intent that adoption be a final, comprehensive re‑ordering of the child’s legal family relationships; and
• clarifies that emotional bonds, psychological‑parent relationships, and general best‑interests considerations, while important, cannot independently sustain post‑adoption visitation against the wishes of a fit adoptive parent.

For practitioners, the core takeaway is a practical one: if continued contact between a child and grandparents, siblings, or other caregivers is to be enforceable after adoption, it must be grounded in the specific statutory mechanisms the Court has recognized. Informal or non‑statutory visitation orders, however well‑intentioned, will not survive the finality of adoption.