No Thirteenth Amendment Claim for Routine Prison Labor; Due Process Requires “Atypical and Significant Hardship” — Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms Omasta and Applies Sandin in Greene v. Secretary, FDOC

Introduction

In Robert Mark Greene v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, No. 25-10537 (11th Cir. Sept. 25, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished), a panel of the Eleventh Circuit (Judges Jill Pryor, Brasher, and Abudu) affirmed the dismissal of a Florida state prisoner’s civil rights complaint challenging compelled institutional labor. Proceeding pro se, Greene sought monetary damages against the current and former Secretaries of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), alleging that requiring him to work during incarceration violated the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The case squarely presented two questions that recur in prison litigation:

Whether compelled inmate labor implicates the Thirteenth Amendment where the prisoner has been duly convicted but not sentenced to “hard labor.”
Whether a due process claim lies when a prisoner is required to work without allegations that the labor conditions impose an “atypical and significant hardship” compared to ordinary prison life.

The Eleventh Circuit, applying its longstanding precedent in Omasta v. Wainwright, 696 F.2d 1304 (11th Cir. 1983), and the Supreme Court’s framework in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), held that Greene’s complaint failed to state a claim and affirmed the dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), without reaching the district court’s alternative designation of the action as frivolous.

Summary of the Opinion

Procedural posture: The district court (N.D. Fla.) dismissed Greene’s amended complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) for failure to state a claim and as frivolous. Greene appealed.
Standards of review: Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed de novo; a frivolousness finding is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court liberally construes pro se pleadings.
Thirteenth Amendment holding: Under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent (Omasta), compelled prison labor does not implicate the Thirteenth Amendment when the prisoner is incarcerated pursuant to a valid conviction; the “punishment for crime” exception applies. The court declined to adopt contrary readings Greene attributed to Fifth Circuit decisions.
Fourteenth Amendment holding: Greene’s due process claim failed because he alleged no facts showing a protected liberty interest—i.e., no “atypical and significant hardship” relative to ordinary prison life (Sandin). Conclusory allegations that he was required to work, even with threats of discipline, were insufficient without specific facts about severity or atypicality.
Frivolousness not reached: Because failure to state a claim sufficed to affirm, the court did not address whether the action was frivolous.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Role

Omasta v. Wainwright, 696 F.2d 1304 (11th Cir. 1983)
The linchpin of the Thirteenth Amendment analysis. Omasta holds that when a prisoner is incarcerated under a valid judgment and compelled to work pursuant to prison regulations or state statutes, the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude is not implicated. Omasta quotes Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963), that the Thirteenth Amendment “has no application where a person is held to answer for a violation of a penal statute.” The panel followed Omasta under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)
Governs when a prisoner has a state-created liberty interest that triggers due process protections. Such interests are limited to restraints that impose an “atypical and significant hardship … in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” The court found Greene’s allegations—compelled labor, without details—fell within the expected parameters of confinement and thus failed under Sandin.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Dean-Mitchell v. Reese, 837 F.3d 1107 (11th Cir. 2016)
Cited for baseline due process principles applicable to prisoners.
Pleading and screening authorities: 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (mandating dismissal “notwithstanding any filing fee”); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (complaint dismissal when allegations show no entitlement to relief); Ramirez v. Paradies Shops, LLC, 69 F.4th 1213 (11th Cir. 2023) and Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2012) (plausibility standard); Wainberg v. Mellichamp, 93 F.4th 1221 (11th Cir. 2024) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (courts need not accept legal conclusions couched as facts).
Prior-panel-precedent rule: Griffin v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA, Inc., 989 F.3d 923 (11th Cir. 2021); Fishman & Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co., 240 F.3d 956 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366 (11th Cir. 1997)
These authorities required the panel and the district court to follow Omasta unless abrogated by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc. The court explicitly invoked this rule in declining to adopt a different approach attributed to the Fifth Circuit.
Affirmance on alternative grounds not necessary: INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24 (1976); Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2010)
Support the court’s choice to affirm without reaching the “frivolousness” determination once failure to state a claim was established.
Fifth Circuit authorities invoked by Greene: Williams v. Henagan, 595 F.3d 610 (5th Cir. 2010); Watson v. Graves, 909 F.2d 1549 (5th Cir. 1990)
Greene argued these decisions distinguish between prisoners sentenced to hard labor and those who are not, implying greater Thirteenth Amendment protection for the latter. The Eleventh Circuit did not evaluate those cases’ correctness or applicability; it held that even if they differ, Omasta controls within this Circuit.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Thirteenth Amendment (Involuntary Servitude):

The Amendment prohibits slavery and involuntary servitude “except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.” The panel emphasized this “punishment clause.”
Under Omasta (and Draper), compelled labor for duly convicted prisoners, when part of the institutional regime, does not implicate the Thirteenth Amendment. The court rejected Greene’s attempt to create a constitutional distinction based on whether his sentence expressly included “hard labor.”
The panel underscored the Eleventh Circuit’s internal rule of stare decisis: even if other circuits view the issue differently, Eleventh Circuit panels must follow earlier Eleventh Circuit decisions unless abrogated by the Supreme Court or the court en banc.

Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process):

Prisoners have due process rights only where a protected interest is at stake. Under Sandin, state-created liberty interests are limited to restraints imposing an “atypical and significant hardship” relative to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Greene alleged only that he was compelled to perform institutional labor and threatened with discipline if he refused. He pleaded no specific facts about the nature, duration, conditions, health/safety risks, solitary confinement, or other consequences that might render the requirement atypical or significantly harsh.
Without factual allegations of severity or atypicality, the claim does not cross the plausibility threshold required by Iqbal/Twombly and Eleventh Circuit pleading standards.
Importantly, the panel included a cautionary note: it “do[es] not suggest that no work-related Fourteenth Amendment claim could ever state a claim,” but Greene’s complaint did not contain the necessary facts to do so.

Screening and Standards of Review:

Section 1915(e)(2) authorizes dismissal “notwithstanding any filing fee” and at any time the court determines a case is frivolous or fails to state a claim. Greene paid the fee, but screening remained proper.
Applying de novo review, the court affirmed on failure to state a claim and, consistent with Bagamasbad, did not reach the separate issue of frivolousness (which would be reviewed for abuse of discretion).

3) Impact and Forward-Looking Considerations

Practical impact within the Eleventh Circuit:

Thirteenth Amendment challenges to routine prison labor remain foreclosed. As long as the prisoner is duly convicted and the work is part of the institutional regime, Omasta controls. Litigants cannot rely on a “no hard labor sentence” theory to avoid the Amendment’s punishment clause in this Circuit.
Fifth Circuit distinctions carry no weight in the Eleventh Circuit. Even if Williams and Watson reflect a different approach, they do not displace Omasta. Practitioners must frame claims within binding Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedents.
Due process claims require detailed factual pleading. Allegations must show how the labor requirement imposed an “atypical and significant hardship.” Conclusory assertions will not suffice. Facts about duration, conditions, severe penalties (e.g., prolonged solitary confinement), medical contraindications, or extreme risks could matter.
Early screening is robust. District courts are reminded that dismissal under § 1915(e)(2) is mandatory upon identifying a pleading deficiency, even if fees are paid.

Potential avenues not foreclosed (as signaled by the panel’s note):

Fourteenth Amendment due process claims may proceed on adequately pleaded facts showing atypical/severe consequences tied to work requirements.
Eighth Amendment theories (not raised here) may be available for dangerous, medically contraindicated, or cruel work conditions.
Retaliation or discrimination claims (e.g., First Amendment retaliation for filing grievances or ADA/Rehabilitation Act claims for disability-based assignments) could present distinct legal issues if properly pleaded and exhausted.

Institutional effects:

Corrections administrations can continue to assign institutional labor without constitutional wage obligations, consistent with Eleventh Circuit law.
District courts received renewed confirmation that they may—and should—apply § 1915(e)(2) screening rigorously to dispose of insufficient complaints early.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Thirteenth Amendment “punishment for crime” exception: The Constitution bans involuntary servitude, but expressly allows it for those duly convicted of crimes. In the Eleventh Circuit, this means prisons can require inmates to work as part of incarceration without violating the Thirteenth Amendment.
“Atypical and significant hardship” (Sandin): To trigger due process protection for a state-created liberty interest, the condition must be far harsher than normal prison life. Ordinary disciplinary measures or routine obligations (like work assignments) typically are not enough, absent unusual severity.
Pleading standards (Iqbal/Twombly): A complaint must allege facts that make a claim plausible, not just legal conclusions. Specific, concrete facts about what happened, how severe it was, and why it was atypical are essential.
Prior-panel-precedent rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, one three-judge panel cannot overrule another published panel decision. Only the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc can do that. Thus, Omasta controls unless abrogated.
“Frivolous” vs. “failure to state a claim”: A case can be dismissed either because it lacks any arguable legal/factual basis (frivolous) or because, even taking alleged facts as true, the law affords no relief (failure to state a claim). Here, the court affirmed on the latter and did not need to decide the former.
§ 1915(e)(2) screening “notwithstanding any filing fee”: Courts must screen and dismiss deficient complaints at any time—even if the plaintiff paid the filing fee—when the statute’s criteria are met.

Conclusion

Greene reinforces two durable propositions in Eleventh Circuit prisoner litigation. First, Omasta remains dispositive of Thirteenth Amendment challenges to institutional labor imposed on duly convicted inmates: the punishment clause forecloses such claims, irrespective of whether the sentencing order specifies “hard labor.” Second, Sandin’s “atypical and significant hardship” standard cabins due process claims; bare assertions of compelled work and threatened discipline, without concrete facts demonstrating severity or atypicality, do not state a claim.

Although unpublished and therefore non-precedential, this decision crisply applies binding Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court authority, clarifies that contrary out-of-circuit views do not alter the result, and leaves open the possibility that a well-pleaded, work-related Fourteenth Amendment claim might proceed under the right facts. For litigants and courts alike, the message is clear: compelled prison labor, as a routine incident of lawful incarceration, is not a Thirteenth Amendment violation in this Circuit, and due process liability demands detailed allegations of extraordinary hardship beyond the ordinary incidents of prison life.