No Taking in Police-Power Vehicle Forfeiture: The Seventh Circuit’s Decision in O'Donnell v. City of Chicago

I. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ryan O'Donnell & Michael Goree v. City of Chicago & URT United Road Towing, Inc., No. 24-2946 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), squarely addresses whether a city’s vehicle immobilization, towing, impoundment, and ultimate disposal regime—designed to enforce traffic and parking laws—constitutes a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment and its Illinois constitutional analogue.

The plaintiffs, Ryan O’Donnell and Michael Goree, brought a putative class action challenging Chicago’s “graduated forfeiture” scheme in Municipal Code of Chicago (“MCC”) § 9-100-120. After multiple unpaid traffic or parking violations, the City may immobilize a vehicle, impound it if unclaimed, and eventually sell or otherwise dispose of it—without paying any surplus proceeds to the owner or crediting any portion against the underlying ticket debt. O’Donnell’s car was sold at scrap value to URT United Road Towing, Inc. (“URT”), and Goree’s car was turned over to a lienholder.

The plaintiffs alleged that this scheme effects a facially unconstitutional taking of personal property without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution, and that URT, as the City’s contractor, was liable under Monell. They also asserted a state-law unjust enrichment claim against both defendants.

The Seventh Circuit, per Judge Kirsch, affirmed dismissal, holding that:

• Chicago’s graduated forfeiture scheme is an exercise of the City’s “police power” to enforce traffic laws, not an exercise of eminent domain or a compensable “taking” within the meaning of the Takings Clause;
• The plaintiffs’ facial takings challenge fails because the “mere enactment” of § 9-100-120 is not a taking in all or nearly all its applications;
• Tyler v. Hennepin County’s rule that government may not keep surplus value beyond what is owed in a tax foreclosure does not extend to punitive police-power forfeitures like vehicle impoundment;
• In the absence of any underlying constitutional violation, the Monell claim against URT fails; and
• Because the forfeiture was lawful, the plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment theory cannot succeed under Illinois law.

The decision crystallizes an important boundary between the Takings Clause and government actions under the police power, especially in the wake of the Supreme Court’s pro-property-owner ruling in Tyler. It also has practical consequences for municipalities that rely heavily on traffic enforcement and vehicle impoundment regimes both to promote public safety and to generate revenue.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Chicago’s Graduated Forfeiture Scheme

The opinion carefully describes the operation of MCC § 9-100-120, which structures Chicago’s response to repeated nonpayment of ticket debt:

1. Initial ticket and liability: After receiving a traffic or parking ticket, the vehicle owner must either:
   • pay in full,
   • enter an installment payment plan, or
   • contest the violation.
   See MCC § 9-100-050.
2. Final determination of liability: If the owner fails to pay or unsuccessfully contests the ticket, the City issues a notice of “final determination of liability.” MCC § 9-100-100.
3. Eligibility for immobilization: A vehicle becomes eligible for immobilization if the owner accumulates:
   • three or more final determinations of liability, or
   • two final determinations that are over a year old.
   When this threshold is met, all vehicles registered to that owner may be immobilized. MCC § 9-100-120(b). The City sends a notice of impending immobilization, giving the owner 21 days to pay or request a hearing.
4. Immobilization and towing: If the owner does nothing, the vehicle is placed on an immobilization list. Once immobilized, the owner has 24 hours to:
   • pay,
   • enter a payment plan,
   • join a relief program, or
   • request additional time.
   MCC § 9-100-120(c)-(d). If the owner fails to act, the City may tow and impound the vehicle. URT, a private contractor, performs the tows.
5. Impoundment and final disposition: After towing, the City sends another notice. The owner has 21 days to reclaim the vehicle by paying the fees or seeking an extension, and can also request an administrative hearing to challenge the immobilization or towing as erroneous. MCC § 9-100-120(e)-(f). If the vehicle remains unclaimed, the City may sell or otherwise dispose of it; some such vehicles are sold to URT at scrap value. MCC § 9-100-120(f).

B. The Plaintiffs’ Vehicles

Under this regime:

• In 2018, the City disposed of a vehicle owned by Michael Goree under § 9-100-120, relinquishing it to the lienholder without compensation to Goree.
• In 2021, the City disposed of Ryan O’Donnell’s vehicle by selling it to URT at scrap value, again without compensating O’Donnell or crediting any proceeds toward his ticket debt.

Both vehicles were lost to their owners as a result of nonpayment of traffic-related debt after the required notices and opportunities to pay or contest.

C. The Lawsuit and District Court Disposition

O’Donnell and Goree filed a putative class action on behalf of similarly situated vehicle owners. They alleged:

• A facial violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, as incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment;
• Parallel takings claims under the Illinois Constitution;
• A Monell-type claim against URT, contending that URT acted under color of state law in implementing an unconstitutional policy; and
• State-law unjust enrichment, arguing that the City and URT retained the value of the vehicles and any proceeds in violation of equity and good conscience.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motions, concluding that the forfeiture scheme represented an exercise of police power, not a compensable taking, and therefore that the derivative claims also failed.

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

The court’s core holdings can be summarized as follows:

1. Unified federal and state takings analysis:
   The court applied the same analytical framework to the federal and Illinois takings clauses, relying on the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Hampton v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District.
2. No taking under the Takings Clause:
   To state a takings claim, a plaintiff must show: (i) a taking of property (physical or regulatory), (ii) for public use, (iii) without just compensation. Citing Conyers v. City of Chicago and Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.. The court held that actions taken under § 9-100-120 are an exercise of police power (law enforcement and punishment for traffic code violations), not a taking within the scope of the Takings Clause.
3. Facial challenge standard not satisfied:
   Because the plaintiffs mounted a facial challenge, they had to show that the “mere enactment” of the provision constitutes a taking in all or virtually all applications, per Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis. Their arguments about hardship in specific scenarios (inability to pay; trivial underlying offenses; non-driving owners) were insufficient.
4. Police power vs. revenue-raising characterization:
   The court relied heavily on its recent decision in Hadley v. City of South Bend, describing law enforcement forfeitures as a “classic example” of the police power and generally not subject to takings challenges. The fact that the scheme also raises revenue does not convert it into a mere debt-collection device.
5. Distinguishing plaintiffs’ authorities:
   
   • In re Fulton (later vacated on other grounds) had described Chicago’s scheme as “revenue collection more so than police power” in a bankruptcy context, but did not hold that the scheme is exclusively a debt-collection mechanism.
   • Bennis v. Michigan and Tate v. District of Columbia showed that punitive law enforcement forfeiture of vehicles is “firmly fixed” in American jurisprudence and not treated as a taking.
   • Tyler v. Hennepin County—where the government’s retention of surplus equity in a tax foreclosure was held to be a taking—was confined to the tax context and did not apply to police-power forfeitures.
6. Monell and unjust enrichment claims fail:
   Assuming without deciding that URT is a state actor, the court held that there was no underlying constitutional violation to support a Monell claim. It further held that unjust enrichment under Illinois law cannot be established where the defendant’s benefit flows from lawful conduct; here, the City lawfully impounded and disposed of the vehicles, so neither the City nor URT was unjustly enriched.

The Seventh Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint in its entirety.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Framework

A. The Takings Framework: Lingle, Conyers, and Hampton

The court began with basic Takings Clause principles:

• The Fifth Amendment prohibits the taking of private property “for public use, without just compensation,” and applies to state and local governments via the Fourteenth Amendment.
• In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), the Supreme Court clarified that a takings claim requires a showing that government action either physically appropriated property or imposed regulations so onerous as to be functionally equivalent to a physical taking.
• Conyers v. City of Chicago, 10 F.4th 704 (7th Cir. 2021), distilled the elements of a takings claim: (1) a taking of property (physical or regulatory), (2) for public use, and (3) without payment of just compensation.
• Hampton v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District, 57 N.E.3d 1229 (Ill. 2016), confirmed that federal and Illinois takings doctrine are substantially aligned, allowing the Seventh Circuit to analyze the federal and state claims together.

B. Facial Challenges and Keystone Bituminous Coal

Because O’Donnell and Goree brought a facial challenge, they had to meet the demanding standard set out in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).

They must show that the “mere enactment” of § 9-100-120 constitutes a taking.

In other words, they needed to demonstrate that the ordinance is unconstitutional in all, or at least virtually all, of its applications, not merely that it might be unconstitutional as applied to some individuals or in some particular circumstances.

C. Police Power vs. Eminent Domain: Hadley v. City of South Bend

The key doctrinal framework for this case comes from Hadley v. City of South Bend, 154 F.4th 549 (7th Cir. 2025). There, the court distinguished between:

• Eminent domain: the state’s power to affirmatively acquire private property for public use, typically via condemnation, accompanied by just compensation; and
• Police power: the state’s broad authority to protect public health, safety, morals, and general welfare—often by restricting or destroying property interests without compensation as part of law enforcement or public regulation.

While the modern Takings Clause analysis does not draw “rigid distinctions” between these categories in every context, Hadley identified the use of law enforcement authority—including forfeitures incident to crime control—as a “classic example” of police power likely outside the Takings Clause’s scope.

The Seventh Circuit in O’Donnell directly imported this reasoning: Chicago’s immobilization and forfeiture regime was treated as police power law enforcement, not as an attempt to “take” property for public use in the eminent-domain sense.

D. Law Enforcement Forfeiture: Bennis and Tate

The court further grounded its approach in two key forfeiture cases:

• Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442 (1996): The Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of a vehicle jointly owned by an “innocent” spouse, because the vehicle had been used by the husband to solicit prostitution. The Court described civil forfeiture of property used in illegal activity as “firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country.”
• Tate v. District of Columbia, 627 F.3d 904 (D.C. Cir. 2010): The D.C. Circuit upheld a scheme similar to Chicago’s, concluding that the forfeiture and sale of vehicles for unpaid tickets was part of a punitive, law enforcement regime and did not constitute a taking.

By citing Tate and quoting Bennis, the Seventh Circuit aligned Chicago’s scheme with traditional law enforcement forfeiture practices: its primary purpose is deterrence and punishment for legal violations, not the acquisition of property for public use.

E. Revenue Collection vs. Law Enforcement: Idris and In re Fulton

The plaintiffs attempted to reframe § 9-100-120 as a sophisticated debt-collection tool rather than a true law enforcement mechanism. They drew on two prior Seventh Circuit cases:

• Idris v. City of Chicago, 552 F.3d 564 (7th Cir. 2009): The court had noted that Chicago’s traffic enforcement systems “raise money and improve compliance with traffic laws.” The plaintiffs seized on the revenue dimension to argue the forfeiture scheme was more like a collection procedure than punishment.
• In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019), vacated on other grounds sub nom. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 592 U.S. 154 (2021): In a bankruptcy context, the Seventh Circuit had described Chicago’s impoundment system as “an exercise of revenue collection more so than police power.”

In O’Donnell, the court treated these characterizations as context-specific, emphasizing:

• Fulton was a bankruptcy case, not a takings case, and did not hold that the scheme is exclusively a debt-collection mechanism.
• That a regime “raises money and improves compliance” is a feature, not a bug: revenue effects do not negate its punitive and deterrent function as law enforcement.

Thus, prior descriptions of the scheme as revenue-raising did not override the court’s classification of the regime as an exercise of the City’s police power for purposes of takings analysis.

F. Tyler v. Hennepin County and the Limits of the Surplus-Value Rule

The most significant national precedent in the background of O’Donnell is Tyler v. Hennepin County, 598 U.S. 631 (2023), where the Supreme Court held that a county violated the Takings Clause by retaining the entire value of a home sold in a tax foreclosure, even though the owner’s tax debt amounted to only a fraction of that value.

In Tyler, the Court emphasized that the government may not “take more from a taxpayer than she owes,” and recognized the owner’s residual equity as a distinct property interest protected by the Takings Clause.

O’Donnell and Goree argued by analogy that Chicago’s retention of all vehicle proceeds—even when those proceeds exceed the ticket debt, and without any credit for the owner—likewise constitutes an uncompensated taking of the owner’s residual equity.

The Seventh Circuit rejected this analogy, emphasizing:

• Different governmental powers: Tyler dealt with the tax power, whereas Chicago’s scheme operates under the police power to enforce traffic laws. The court cited Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, 552 F.2d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 1977), noting that the tax power and police power are “distinct and subject to different limitations.”
• No “surplus” in a punitive forfeiture: In a police-power, law-enforcement forfeiture context, the government is not merely collecting a debt; it is imposing a penalty and depriving property as part of punishment and deterrence. That framework does not carry a background rule that the government can take no more than a specified monetary “amount owed.”

By cabin­ing Tyler to the tax context, the Seventh Circuit effectively held that the Tyler “surplus retention” principle does not generalize to all government dispositions of property, especially where the primary characterization is penal enforcement rather than debt collection.

G. Derivative Doctrines: Monell, Sallenger, and Unjust Enrichment

Two additional lines of doctrine framed the disposition of the plaintiffs’ non-takings claims:

• Monell liability for URT: Monell v. Department of Social Services holds that municipalities (and, by extension, private actors functioning as municipalities) may be liable under § 1983 only for constitutional violations caused by an official policy or custom, not merely on a respondeat superior basis. The Seventh Circuit in Sallenger v. City of Springfield, 630 F.3d 499, 505 (7th Cir. 2010), reiterated that a Monell claim requires an underlying constitutional violation. In O’Donnell, the court assumed without deciding that URT could be considered a state actor, but held that absent a constitutional violation (no taking), the Monell claim necessarily failed.
• Unjust enrichment under Illinois law: The court cited K-Stones, Inc. v. Ko, 267 N.E.3d 363, 374–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025), which defines unjust enrichment as occurring when the defendant:
  “has unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff’s detriment, and ... the defendant’s retention of the benefit violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.”
  Because the court held that the City’s impoundment and disposal were lawful exercises of police power, there was no “unjust” benefit. Any advantage the City or URT derived from the vehicles was conferred by a valid ordinance, so the unjust enrichment claim necessarily failed.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Characterizing the Scheme as Police Power Law Enforcement

The court’s threshold move was to characterize the challenged scheme as an exercise of police power rather than of eminent domain. This classification determined the doctrinal lens for the entire analysis.

The opinion emphasized:

• The scheme targets individuals who have repeatedly failed to pay traffic and parking tickets—i.e., those who have “evaded punishment” for violations of the City’s traffic code.
• Rather than continue to issue tickets with no effect, the City escalates to immobilization and possible forfeiture, thereby:
  • hindering offenders’ ability to drive, and
  • forcing them to “internalize the consequences of their behavior.”
• The threat of losing one’s vehicle is instrumental in deterring further violations and inducing compliance with traffic law.

In other words, the forfeiture is part of the City’s toolbox for:

• punishing unlawful behavior, and
• regulating conduct (driving and parking) on public streets.

Labeling the scheme as law enforcement (police power) rather than property acquisition (eminent domain) allowed the court to align it with the longstanding tradition of vehicle and contraband forfeitures that have not been treated as takings.

B. Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge: Why the “Mere Enactment” Standard Matters

A critical element of the court’s reasoning was the nature of the claim: the plaintiffs brought a facial challenge, not an as-applied challenge.

Under Keystone, a facial takings challenge requires proof that a statute’s mere existence is unconstitutional, rather than that it produces unconstitutional results in particular instances.

The plaintiffs pointed to several potentially sympathetic scenarios:

• vehicle owners who genuinely cannot afford to pay tickets;
• owners ticketed for minor or technical infractions;
• owners who may not have been the actual driver when the violation occurred.

The court found these arguments insufficient because they highlighted only some potential applications of § 9-100-120. Even if the scheme might be harsh in certain edge cases, that does not mean its enactment is always or almost always unconstitutional as a taking.

Importantly, the court did not decide whether some as-applied takings (or other constitutional) challenges might succeed under different facts. It simply concluded that, on its face, the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of the City’s police power.

C. Rejecting the “Pure Debt Collection” Characterization

The plaintiffs’ principal argument was that § 9-100-120 functions primarily as a debt-collection mechanism that punishes financial inability to pay, rather than as a genuine law enforcement measure.

The court acknowledged:

• the reality that the scheme raises revenue;
• its prior description in Fulton as “an exercise of revenue collection more so than police power”; and
• concerns that some vehicle owners lose their cars because of inability—not unwillingness—to pay.

Still, it concluded that even if some forfeitures happen to disproportionately affect those with limited means, the structure and purpose of the ordinance are fundamentally punitive and deterrent. Two features were especially important:

• The scheme’s escalation and notice system gives owners multiple opportunities to pay or contest, and is triggered only after several unpaid final determinations.
• The fact that owners can reclaim their vehicles upon paying is consistent with punishment: once they “internalize the cost” of their violations by paying the accumulated debt and fees, the City’s punitive aim has been achieved and continued retention of the vehicle is unnecessary.

The court also observed that some owners may be able but unwilling to pay, undercutting the plaintiffs’ portrayal of the entire regime as targeting only those who cannot pay. Again, that observation is particularly salient in the facial challenge context.

D. Addressing the Breadth of the Forfeiture: All Vehicles, Minor Offenses, and Non-Drivers

The plaintiffs argued that § 9-100-120 is more sweeping than traditional forfeiture laws:

• It reaches vehicles even if they were not used in the underlying violation (e.g., another car registered to the same owner).
• The underlying offenses may be administrative or minor (e.g., parking tickets).
• It can burden owners who were not personally driving when the ticket was issued.

The court acknowledged these dissimilarities from Bennis but found them constitutionally immaterial under the Takings Clause:

• Including all vehicles registered to an owner ensures that individuals with multiple vehicles cannot readily evade the effect of enforcement by simply switching cars.
• That breadth itself serves a punitive and deterrent function, reinforcing the scheme’s character as law enforcement.
• The fact that forfeiture follows multiple final determinations—after notice and an opportunity to contest—addresses concerns about arbitrary or unknowing liability.

The court thus treated the scope of the scheme as a design choice within the City’s discretion for punishment and deterrence, rather than as a feature that transforms the scheme into a taking.

E. Why Tyler Does Not Control

The most analytically significant portion of the opinion is the court’s treatment of Tyler v. Hennepin County.

The plaintiffs framed their argument in Tyler’s terms:

• When Chicago sells a vehicle and keeps all proceeds—without crediting any portion against the owner’s debt—it is “taking more than is owed.”
• The owner’s equity (value of the vehicle minus debt) is a distinct property interest, as in Tyler, that cannot be appropriated without just compensation.

The Seventh Circuit distinguished Tyler on two grounds:

1. Context: Tax Power vs. Police Power
   In Tyler, the government was using the tax foreclosure process to collect unpaid property taxes, and the question was whether it could keep surplus equity beyond the amount of that tax debt. The Supreme Court emphasized a long tradition recognizing the taxpayer’s residual equity interest.
   
   By contrast, Chicago’s vehicle forfeiture under § 9-100-120 is part of a penalty for violation of traffic laws, not merely a means of collecting a fixed debt. In a punitive regime, the “amount owed” is not defined solely by unpaid tickets; the forfeiture itself is a component of the penalty.
2. No Background Rule Against Taking “More” in Penalties
   The court implicitly recognized that while tax collection is subject to strong background rules protecting surplus property, penal forfeitures are not constrained by the same “no more than owed” principle. The very nature of punishment is to impose a loss that can exceed the economic value of a particular debt (for example, fines well above administrative costs or incarceration beyond economic loss).

Relying on Aldens, Inc. v. LaFollette, the court underscored that tax and police powers are doctrinally distinct and that Tyler’s surplus-value rationale does not automatically extend to all deprivations of property by the state.

F. Collateral Consequences: Monell and Unjust Enrichment

Once the court concluded there was no taking, the fate of the remaining claims followed straightforwardly:

• Monell claim against URT: Since Monell liability requires an underlying constitutional violation, and no taking occurred, the court affirmed dismissal. It expressly stated that it could “assume (without deciding)” that URT was a state actor, underscoring that even if plaintiffs cleared that hurdle, they would still lose.
• Unjust enrichment: Because the City “lawfully impounded and disposed” of the vehicles, there was no unjust benefit under Illinois law. The legality of the City’s actions under the Takings Clause and under state law precluded a finding that retention of a benefit violated “justice, equity, and good conscience.”

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

For clarity, the following key legal concepts used in the opinion are explained in more accessible terms:

• Takings Clause: Part of the Fifth Amendment that says government cannot take private property for public use without paying fair value (just compensation). It applies to states and cities through the Fourteenth Amendment.
• Eminent domain vs. police power:
  • Eminent domain is when government deliberately takes property (like for a road or public building) and must pay.
  • Police power is government’s authority to protect public health, safety, and welfare—such as enforcing criminal laws, regulating traffic, or abating nuisances. Property restrictions or losses resulting from legitimate police power usually do not require compensation.
• Facial vs. as-applied challenge:
  • A facial challenge says a law is unconstitutional in all or almost all cases, simply based on its terms.
  • An as-applied challenge says the law is unconstitutional in the way it was used against a particular person or in specific circumstances.
• Forfeiture: The loss of property to the government because it is used in, or is connected to, a legal violation, or as a penalty for such violations. For example, cars or money involved in crime can be forfeited.
• Monell liability: A rule from Monell that cities and similar entities can be sued for constitutional violations only when the harm was caused by an official policy or custom—not just by an employee’s isolated actions. If there is no constitutional violation at all, there can be no Monell liability.
• Unjust enrichment: A state law doctrine where someone who unfairly gains a benefit at another’s expense must restore that benefit. It requires that keeping the benefit would be unjust in light of equity and good conscience. If the benefit arises from lawful conduct (like a valid statute), courts are less likely to find it “unjust.”
• Scrap value: The low value received when a vehicle is sold for parts or metal, rather than as a functional car.
• Lienholder: A person or entity (often a lender) that has a legal right (lien) on a vehicle as collateral for a loan. If the owner defaults or the vehicle is forfeited, the lienholder may have priority to receive the vehicle or its value.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Clarifying the Reach of Tyler v. Hennepin County

Perhaps the most important broader effect of O’Donnell is its limitation of Tyler to the tax foreclosure context.

After Tyler, there was a wave of litigation challenging various government practices where property was taken and any “surplus” value above a defined debt was retained. O’Donnell signals that:

• Courts will look closely at which governmental power is being used— tax collection, police power, regulatory authority, etc.—before applying Tyler’s surplus-value rule.
• Punitive and deterrent forfeitures under the police power are unlikely to be recast as “over-collection” takings simply because the government keeps more value than the amount of fines or fees owed.

This will be significant for municipalities and states defending forfeiture schemes against takings challenges premised on Tyler.

B. Endorsing Municipal Vehicle Impoundment as Non-Takings Enforcement

The decision provides strong support for cities that:

• rely on escalating enforcement measures (immobilization, impoundment, sale or disposal) to collect unpaid tickets and compel compliance; and
• face arguments that such measures effect compensable takings, especially when proceeds are not applied to debts.

By framing vehicle forfeiture as a “classic” police-power exercise closely analogous to Bennis and Tate, the Seventh Circuit gives municipalities a clear doctrinal foundation for defending these systems against Takings Clause claims, at least on a facial basis.

C. Interaction with Other Constitutional Claims (Due Process, Excessive Fines)

The opinion is narrowly tailored to the Takings Clause and Illinois unjust enrichment law; it does not address other potential constitutional constraints. In future cases, litigants may pursue:

• Procedural due process claims (e.g., inadequate notice, unfair hearings, unreasonable deadlines for contesting or reclaiming vehicles);
• Substantive due process arguments (although these are generally disfavored where more specific constitutional provisions apply);
• Excessive Fines Clause challenges under the Eighth Amendment, arguing that loss of a vehicle for relatively minor offenses or small debts is “grossly disproportionate” to the offense.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision does not foreclose such arguments; it simply holds that this particular enforcement system is not a taking.

D. Practical Consequences for Low-Income Vehicle Owners

From a policy perspective, the ruling:

• Validates systems that can result in the loss of a primary asset (a car) due to accumulated ticket debt; and
• Reinforces the idea that the Takings Clause is not a general tool for challenging disproportionate or regressive enforcement, so long as the government acts under its police power.

Advocates for low-income drivers may thus shift their focus to:

• legislative reform (e.g., caps, payment plans, amnesty programs);
• constitutional arguments under other provisions (e.g., due process, equal protection, or excessive fines); and
• empirical presentations showing the social costs and disparate impact of vehicle forfeiture regimes.

E. Doctrinal Stability for Law Enforcement Forfeitures

Finally, O’Donnell contributes to the stability of a long-standing doctrine: that punitive and remedial forfeitures under the police power are generally outside the ambit of the Takings Clause.

By reaffirming that principle in the context of traffic enforcement—and by distinguishing Tyler—the Seventh Circuit helps maintain a coherent boundary between:

• government’s duty to pay for property it deliberately acquires for public use; and
• government’s authority to impose penalties, including forfeiture, for violations of law.

VIII. Conclusion

O’Donnell v. City of Chicago is a significant articulation of the limits of the Takings Clause in the enforcement context. The Seventh Circuit holds that:

• Chicago’s vehicle immobilization, impoundment, and disposal scheme in MCC § 9-100-120 is an exercise of the City’s police power to enforce traffic laws, not a taking of property for public use requiring compensation;
• The plaintiffs’ facial challenge fails because they cannot show that the mere enactment of the ordinance constitutes a taking in all or nearly all applications;
• Tyler v. Hennepin County does not extend to punitive vehicle forfeitures carried out under the police power; and
• In the absence of a taking, derivative Monell and unjust enrichment claims necessarily fail.

The decision reinforces a clear doctrinal line: when government acts in its role as law enforcer, imposing forfeitures as punishment and deterrence, those actions typically fall outside the Takings Clause—even when they have harsh effects on individual property owners and even when the government retains all economic value from the forfeited property.

While O’Donnell may not foreclose other constitutional challenges to vehicle forfeiture schemes, it substantially narrows the role of the Takings Clause in this area and provides a robust framework for cities to defend similar enforcement mechanisms in the future.