No Sua Sponte Duty to Re-Offer Plea Withdrawal & Minor Supervised-Release Misstatements Do Not Invalidate Guilty Pleas
Commentary on United States v. Morales-Ortiz, 104 F.4th ___ (1st Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

United States v. Morales-Ortiz presents the First Circuit’s latest guidance on two recurring issues in federal criminal practice:

1. When does a technical misstatement of a supervised-release maximum during a Rule 11 colloquy warrant vacating a guilty plea?
2. Does a sentencing court have a sua sponte obligation to invite a defendant to withdraw a plea once the parties’ Guidelines calculations prove incorrect?

The appellant, Edgar Joel Morales-Ortiz, pleaded guilty to two carjackings and one count of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. After the Probation Office identified Guideline calculations higher than those in the plea agreement, and after the sentencing court imposed upwardly variant terms, Morales sought reversal of both his conviction and sentence. The First Circuit affirmed, elaborating on the parameters of Rule 11, the plain-error standard, and the permissible scope of sentencing variances.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals (Judge Rikelman writing, joined by Judges Lynch and Howard) held:

• Only one Rule 11 error occurred—the magistrate judge’s misstatement that the firearm count carried a supervised-release maximum of three rather than five years. However, under plain-error review the mistake did not affect Morales’s substantial rights because:
  • The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) correctly stated the five-year maximum twice.
  • Both defendant and counsel confirmed, on the record, that they had reviewed the PSR and had no objections.
  • The overall “sentencing stakes” were dominated by a potential life sentence, making the two-year discrepancy relatively inconsequential.
• There was no Rule 11 violation arising from the parties’ erroneous Guidelines estimate; Rule 11 requires notice of the court’s obligation to calculate the range, not advance accuracy.
• Rule 11(d)(2)(B) imposes no duty on a district court to ask, unprompted, whether the defendant wishes to withdraw a plea after a Guidelines miscalculation surfaces.
• The upward variance on the § 924(c) firearm count—from the 60-month Guidelines term to 84 months—is procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district court:
  • relied on undisputed facts (e.g., discharge of a firearm during an armed robbery that same night);
  • gave an adequate, on-the-record justification linked to § 3553(a) factors; and
  • did not sentence Morales for the “wrong crime,” notwithstanding an oral slip referring to “brandishing.”

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. United States v. Romero-Galíndez, 782 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2015) – Provided the principal template: a three-versus-five-year supervised-release misstatement did not undermine the plea where the PSR cured the error and the imprisonment exposure was the driving concern. The panel relied heavily on this case to reject Morales’s Rule 11 claim.
2. United States v. Rivera-Maldonado, 560 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2009) – There, a three-year vs. life disparity in supervised release did warrant vacatur. The Court distinguished Rivera-Maldonado, stressing the “dramatic difference” standard.
3. United States v. Ortiz-García, 665 F.3d 279 (1st Cir. 2011) – Created an exception where the PSR is not clearly reviewed with the defendant. In contrast, the record in Morales-Ortiz contained express acknowledgements of review, eliminating the Ortiz-García concern.
4. United States v. Jones, 778 F.3d 375 (1st Cir. 2015) – Confirmed that Rule 11 does not demand precise future-Guidelines calculations. The Court leaned on Jones to dismiss Morales’s argument about the erroneous TOL estimate.
5. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) – Quoted for the principle that incorrect Guideline calculations by the district court constitute procedural error. Distinction: here the district court calculated correctly; the parties erred.
6. United States v. Cannon, 807 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1986) – Cited for the proposition that Rule 11(d) plants the burden of plea withdrawal on the defendant, not the judge.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Plain-Error Framework

Because Morales neither objected at the plea colloquy nor moved to withdraw his plea, the panel applied the four-part plain-error test: (1) error; (2) clear or obvious; (3) effect on substantial rights; (4) impact on fairness, integrity, or public reputation. The Court acknowledged a clear error (misstating supervised release) but found no reasonable probability that the plea decision would have differed.

3.2.2 “Sentencing Stakes” Doctrine

Following Rivera-Maldonado and Romero-Galíndez, the Court re-affirmed a de facto proportionality principle: the larger the sentence actually on the line (e.g., decades of imprisonment), the less likely a modest supervised-release misstatement will change a defendant’s calculus.

3.2.3 No Sua Sponte Duty Under Rule 11(d)(2)(B)

Rule 11(d) allows—but does not require—the defendant to request withdrawal after acceptance of a plea and before sentencing. The First Circuit clarified there is no judicial obligation to reopen the plea merely because a higher Guidelines range emerges later, absent a defendant-initiated motion.

3.2.4 Upward Variance Review

Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the Court held the 84-month sentence reasonable:

• Procedural adequacy: The judge explained the rationale; relied on undisputed facts; and did not double-count the firearm conduct already embedded in the carjacking Guideline.
• Slip-of-the-tongue doctrine: An oral mislabeling of the offense (“brandishing”) was harmless where the written judgment, statutory cites, and Guidelines references matched the plea.

3.3 Likely Impact on Future Cases

The opinion cements two practical rules within the First Circuit (and persuasive authority elsewhere):

1. A two-year error in supervised-release advice (3 vs. 5 years) rarely meets Rule 11’s substantial-rights prong when the defendant faces lengthy incarceration and is later informed correctly via the PSR.
2. District courts need not canvass a defendant about plea withdrawal solely because a PSR reveals a higher Guideline range than the parties predicted. The burden remains with defense counsel to move under Rule 11(d)(2)(B).

Practitioners should, therefore, anticipate that:

• Post-colloquy corrections in the PSR may cure minor Rule 11 defects if the record shows actual notice and understanding.
• Defense counsel must be proactive—remaining silent at sentencing may forfeit otherwise meritorious Rule 11 claims.
• When advocating for variance, prosecutors and judges may reference closely connected uncharged conduct, provided it is reliable and not double-counted by the Guidelines.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 11 Colloquy: The scripted conversation where the judge ensures a plea is voluntary, knowledgeable, and supported by facts.
• Supervised Release: A post-incarceration period during which the defendant must comply with conditions; violations can trigger re-imprisonment.
• Plain-Error Review: A demanding appellate standard applied when the issue was not raised below. The appellant must show a clear error that likely affected the outcome and undermines judicial integrity.
• Total Offense Level (TOL): A numerical score under the Sentencing Guidelines that, together with Criminal History Category (CHC), dictates an advisory imprisonment range.
• Upward Variance: A sentence above the advisory Guideline range justified by statutory factors (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
• Brandishing vs. Possessing (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)): “Possessing” carries a 5-year minimum; “brandishing” (displaying all or part of a firearm) carries 7 years; “discharging” carries 10. Morales pled to possessing.

5. Conclusion

Morales-Ortiz adds an important gloss to First Circuit jurisprudence:

Minor supervised-release misstatements will not topple a plea when the defendant is later correctly informed and faces vastly greater imprisonment exposure; and trial courts have no automatic duty to reopen pleas merely because advisory Guidelines shift.

Beyond clarifying Rule 11 doctrine, the decision underscores the strategic responsibility of defense counsel to object promptly and to move for plea withdrawal where appropriate. Sentencing courts, for their part, retain broad discretion to consider reliable, unchallenged facts within the § 3553(a) framework—yet must articulate their reasoning to withstand appellate scrutiny. Overall, United States v. Morales-Ortiz fortifies plea-colloquy stability and delineates the limits of plain-error relief in the First Circuit.