No State Action Without Delegated Authority: Sixth Circuit Applies Lindke Beyond Social Media to Bar § 1983 Claims Against Public Co‑Workers’ Unauthorized Searches

Introduction

This Sixth Circuit appeal arises from a school‑house encounter that blended co‑worker concerns, a concealed handgun, and a brief administrative meeting with law enforcement present. Plaintiff‑Appellant Holly Lawson, a high school guidance counselor, brought a handgun to a weekend Derby party and inadvertently continued to carry the bag containing the firearm into school the following Monday through Wednesday. Two co‑workers—Defendants‑Appellees Kayla Creely (freshman counselor) and Lori Franke (registrar)—observed Lawson exhibiting behavior they considered erratic, entered her office while she was away, and looked into her purse, where they saw what appeared to be the handle of a handgun. The next day, Superintendent Mark Kopp met Lawson at school, took her to the School Resource Officer’s (SRO) office with the SRO and a safety coordinator present, and asked if she had a weapon. Body‑camera footage captured Lawson voluntarily checking her bag, acknowledging the gun was inside. She was suspended, charged under Kentucky law, and later resigned in exchange for dismissal of the charge.

Lawson sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging two warrantless searches (the co‑workers’ peek into her bag and the May 5 interaction with Kopp) and an unlawful seizure during the May 5 meeting. She also sought municipal liability against the Franklin County Board of Education under Monell. The district court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding Creely and Franke were state actors but entitled to qualified immunity, and concluding Kopp’s actions satisfied Fourth Amendment standards.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed on different grounds as to the co‑workers: applying the Supreme Court’s recent Lindke v. Freed “actual authority” framework to public-employee conduct outside the social‑media context, the court held Creely and Franke did not act under color of state law because no state policy delegated to them the general type of authority they exercised. The panel also held Kopp’s interaction with Lawson was a brief, justified investigative detention, not an arrest, and that no state search occurred because Lawson herself voluntarily looked in her bag. Without an underlying constitutional violation, the Monell claim failed.

Summary of the Opinion

State action (co‑workers): The court held that Creely and Franke’s entry into Lawson’s office and opening of her purse was not taken “under color of state law” for § 1983 purposes. Relying on Lindke v. Freed and the Sixth Circuit’s Mackey v. Rising, the panel found no regulation or policy conferred on these employees the “actual authority” (or even the general type of authority) to investigate or search an employee’s personal effects. Generalized directives to “use sound judgment” and protect health and safety were too vague to supply such authority. Result: no § 1983 claim lies against them because there was no state action.
Superintendent’s conduct (seizure): Lawson was seized only once inside the SRO’s office (Kopp at the door; two armed officers present). That seizure was a valid Terry stop supported by reasonable suspicion (based on reliable internal reports), narrowly tailored in duration (about four minutes), and executed by the least intrusive means reasonably available, including moving to a secure office for safety.
Superintendent’s conduct (search): No state search occurred on May 5. Body‑camera footage showed Lawson voluntarily searched her own purse and verbally confirmed the gun’s presence; more than mere consent, this was a self‑initiated disclosure. Even if analyzed as consent to a search, the totality of circumstances supported voluntariness.
Monell liability: Absent a constitutional violation (Kopp) and absent state action (co‑workers), the Board could not be liable under Monell.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187 (2024): The Supreme Court clarified that § 1983 liability requires conduct “fairly attributable to the State,” meaning traceable to state power or authority. A public employee’s mere status does not convert private conduct into state action. The Sixth Circuit extends Lindke’s “actual authority” approach here, beyond social media, requiring a close fit between the challenged conduct and an official delegation of the general type of authority exercised. The opinion rejects reliance on “excessively broad job descriptions” (see also Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 529 (2022)).
Mackey v. Rising, 106 F.4th 552 (6th Cir. 2024): Applying Lindke, Mackey instructs courts to identify the “nature of the act” and compare it to the official’s state‑assigned responsibilities. Authority can be misused but must exist in the first place; the dividing line is between “misuse of authority” (which still is state action) and “absence of authority” (which is not). The panel used Mackey’s two scenarios to determine that the co‑workers had neither specific nor general delegated authority to investigate and search a colleague’s purse.
Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1975): Illustrates when off‑duty conduct is under color of law: a police officer with a 24‑hour duty to enforce the law acted under state authority even while off duty. Contrasted here to highlight that no similar specific or general duty existed for the co‑workers.
Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2004); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil, 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988): These cases frame the “color of law” inquiry and the “fairly attributable to the State” requirement, which the panel applied through the Lindke/Mackey lens.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and its progeny (e.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Davis, 430 F.3d 345 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343 (6th Cir. 1997)):

Guided the brief, targeted nature of the superintendent’s investigative detention, emphasizing reasonable suspicion, short duration, and least intrusive methods.

Seizure/custody authorities (United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); United States v. Knox, 839 F.2d 285 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lopez‑Arias, 344 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)): The panel identified when the seizure began (inside the SRO’s office) and why it remained within Terry limits despite moving Lawson to a private, secure location.
Consent/voluntariness authorities (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)): Used to explain why Lawson’s own actions—initiating the bag check—did not constitute a state search, and would amount to voluntary consent in any event.
Body‑camera/video evidence control (Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Jackson‑Gibson v. Beasley, 118 F.4th 848 (6th Cir. 2024)): The panel relied on video to resolve factual disputes about who initiated the bag inspection.
Fifth Amendment/Miranda context (Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); United States v. Salvo, 133 F.3d 943 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Woods, 711 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2013)): The court declined to consider unpled Fifth Amendment claims and reiterated that a Miranda violation alone does not generate § 1983 liability; moreover, “custody” for Miranda and “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment are distinct inquiries.
Monell framework (Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Pollard v. City of Columbus, 780 F.3d 395 (6th Cir. 2015); Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996)): The failure of an underlying constitutional violation or state action defeats municipal liability.

Legal Reasoning

A. State Action: Lindke’s “Actual Authority” Test Applied to Offline Co‑Worker Conduct

The linchpin of the panel’s reasoning is that § 1983 requires conduct under color of state law, which turns on whether the challenged act is traceable to state power or authority. The court rejected the district court’s “but for their jobs they had access” formulation as inconsistent with Lindke’s insistence on actual authority. The inquiry focuses on the nature of the act (here, entering a co‑worker’s office and looking in a purse) and whether a statute, regulation, policy, custom, or usage delegated either:

Specific authority to perform that act, or
General authority of the type exercised, even if the particular conduct exceeded authorized limits (misuse of power).

On the first prong, Lawson pointed to handbook language requiring employees to “use sound judgment” to protect the health, safety, and well‑being of others and District property. The court held this is far too general to authorize searching a colleague’s purse. In contrast to Stengel’s 24/7 duty to intervene in crime, the handbook contained no comparable directive to conduct investigations or searches. In fact, the same handbook required employees to cooperate with district investigations—implying investigation is someone else’s job.

On the second prong, the court read the school’s policies holistically and found they contemplated reporting suspicions to supervisors or law enforcement, not self‑directed investigative searches by rank‑and‑file staff. Crucially, the weapons policy vested search authority in the principal upon reasonable suspicion—expressly limiting who may search. That allocation of authority cut against any inference that co‑workers had delegated power to investigate or search employees’ personal effects. The co‑workers’ own testimony that they did not know of any policy authorizing the purse search reinforced the absence of delegation.

Bottom line: even if Creely and Franke misused access that their jobs afforded, they lacked delegated authority of the general type they exercised. Without state authority to misuse, there was no state action. The § 1983 claim against them fails at the threshold.

B. Seizure: A Brief, Safety‑Justified Terry Stop

The court carefully located the moment of seizure. There was no seizure at the lobby approach where Kopp asked to speak and Lawson agreed. The seizure occurred once Lawson was in the SRO’s office: the door closed, Kopp stood at the door, and two armed officers were present. Under Mendenhall/Bostick, a reasonable person would not feel free to leave in that setting.

The detention nevertheless satisfied Terry. Kopp had reasonable, articulable suspicion that Lawson possessed a firearm at school based on face‑to‑face, identifiable reports from school personnel (not anonymous, vague tips). The detention was exceptionally brief (about four minutes). The means used were the least intrusive reasonably available: relocating to a secure, private office minimized risk in a school lobby and avoided public embarrassment—an approach the Sixth Circuit has credited in analogous settings. The presence of two officers and a closed door did not turn the encounter into an arrest; there were no handcuffs, no drawn weapons, and no transport during the brief inquiry, distinguishing the circumstances from Lopez‑Arias and similar arrest‑level intrusions.

C. Search: No State Search; Lawson Voluntarily Revealed the Gun

The video record controlled. Kopp advised Lawson of the report and asked if it was true. Lawson, while responding verbally that she had a gun over the weekend, began looking through her own purse and then stated the firearm was inside. Because she initiated and performed the bag inspection herself, there was no government “search” to challenge. The officers merely observed and then photographed the contraband in place. Even analyzed through a consent lens, the totality of circumstances supported voluntariness: there were no threats, claims of authority to search, promises, or prolonged questioning, and Lawson is an educated adult who had been in the room for moments.

D. Monell: No Underlying Violation, No Municipal Liability

Monell requires a constitutional violation and an attributable municipal policy or custom. Because (1) the co‑workers were not state actors, and (2) Kopp’s conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment, the Monell claim necessarily failed. The court, therefore, affirmed judgment for the Board.

Impact

Clarifies state action after Lindke across contexts: This opinion extends Lindke’s “actual authority” test beyond social media to ordinary workplace conduct by public employees. It squarely rejects the “but‑for access” rationale: mere employment status or workplace access is insufficient. Plaintiffs must tie the challenged act to a concrete delegation of authority—either specifically for that act or generally for that type of function.
Limits § 1983 exposure for ad hoc co‑worker investigations: Public employees who take it upon themselves to search a colleague’s personal effects, absent delegated authority, act as private parties. Their conduct may raise employment or state‑law issues, but it will not ordinarily support federal civil‑rights liability.
Policy drafting and training implications for municipalities and school districts:
- General safety clauses in handbooks do not deputize all staff to conduct searches. If districts want non‑administrators to have search authority, policies must say so expressly, with standards and limits.
- Conversely, if districts want to avoid uncoordinated “investigations,” policies should clearly channel suspicions to principals or designated officials, as the policies here effectively did.
- Training should stress reporting protocols and clarify who has search authority and when.
Litigation strategy for § 1983 plaintiffs: In suits against public co‑workers, plaintiffs must identify the source of actual authority for the type of action at issue. Generalized “protect safety” language will not suffice. Where such authority is missing, plaintiffs may need to consider state‑law claims instead of federal civil‑rights claims.
School‑setting Terry guidance: Moving a suspect to a private, secure office for a very brief inquiry about a suspected firearm can be consistent with Terry, especially where safety concerns are acute and reasonable suspicion rests on identified co‑workers’ observations.
Video evidence primacy: Body‑camera footage can decisively resolve factual disputes about who initiated a search or how an encounter unfolded, limiting the efficacy of contrary recollections at summary judgment.

Complex Concepts Simplified

State action / acting “under color of state law”: For a § 1983 claim, the defendant’s conduct must be attributable to the State. After Lindke, courts ask whether a law, regulation, policy, custom, or usage actually delegated to the defendant the authority to do the type of act in question. If the State delegated such authority, even misconduct can be “state action” (misuse of power). If there was no delegation at all, the act is private.
General safety duties vs. investigative authority: Broad handbook statements (use good judgment; protect safety) do not, by themselves, authorize employees to perform searches or investigations. Look for specific language identifying who may search, when, and under what standard (e.g., principals on reasonable suspicion).
Terry stop vs. arrest: A Terry stop is a brief detention based on reasonable suspicion; it must be short and use the least intrusive means reasonably available. An arrest requires probable cause and involves more substantial restraints (e.g., handcuffs, transport, drawn weapons). Moving a subject to a nearby secure location can be acceptable under Terry when justified by safety concerns.
Consent and self‑search: A person can voluntarily consent to a search, but here the court found more: the plaintiff initiated and performed the search herself. Observing what a person voluntarily reveals is not a government search.
Fourth vs. Fifth Amendment standards: “Seizure” (Fourth Amendment) and “custody” (Fifth Amendment/Miranda) are different legal tests. A Miranda violation, without use of compelled statements in a criminal case, does not support § 1983 liability under Chavez v. Martinez.
Monell liability: Municipal liability requires an underlying constitutional violation and a policy or custom causing it. No violation, no Monell claim.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision affirms summary judgment across the board but does so in a way that meaningfully sharpens the state‑action inquiry in § 1983 litigation. Relying on Lindke and Mackey, the court held that public employees’ unauthorized, ad hoc search of a co‑worker’s purse was not under color of state law because no policy delegated to them the general type of authority to investigate or search; generalized safety directives are not enough. As to the superintendent, the encounter was a textbook Terry stop—brief, supported by reasonable suspicion, conducted by the least intrusive means—and no government search occurred because Lawson herself voluntarily looked into her bag.

Practically, the opinion underscores two critical takeaways. First, plaintiffs cannot “hang their hat” on a defendant’s public employment; they must tether the challenged act to a specific or general delegation of state authority. Second, in the school context, carefully tailored, safety‑driven investigative stops—especially when documented by body‑camera video—can withstand Fourth Amendment scrutiny. For municipal entities, the case is a reminder that clear policy drafting about who may search and when both promotes safety and delineates constitutional risk. Although unpublished, the decision is a cogent application of the Supreme Court’s recent state‑action guidance and will likely influence how courts and litigants across the Sixth Circuit frame § 1983 claims involving public employees’ workplace conduct.