No Prophylactic Brady Duty: Wyoming Supreme Court Declines to Require Preemptive “Brady Cop” Disclosures and Sends Ambiguous Non‑Disparagement Clause to the Fact‑Finder

Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in Scott Drewry v. William Brenner, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as Chief of Police; and the Town of Greybull, 2025 WY 121 (Nov. 6, 2025). The case arises from a memorandum authored by Greybull Police Chief William Brenner after former Greybull officer Scott Drewry accepted employment with a neighboring department. The memorandum instituted a policy limiting Drewry’s participation when Greybull officers interacted with him and described Drewry as having a “history of deception,” invoking Brady v. Maryland and the “Brady cop” concept.

Drewry sued Chief Brenner and the Town of Greybull alleging: (1) breach of a settlement agreement’s non-disparagement clause; (2) defamation per se; and (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims. The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part: it held that qualified immunity bars the tort claims but that genuine disputes of material fact preclude summary judgment on the breach of contract claim due to an ambiguity in the settlement agreement’s reference to “the investigation.” The Court also rejected the contention that Brady imposed a legal obligation on the Chief to circulate the memorandum, thereby undercutting reliance on a “compliance with law” clause in the settlement agreement.

Summary of the Opinion

• Tort claims barred by qualified immunity: The Court held that Chief Brenner is entitled to qualified immunity on the defamation per se and IIED claims. Under Wyoming’s four-part test, Drewry conceded scope-of-duties and discretion; the Court found good faith and reasonableness as a matter of law. Because Wyoming doctrine ties vicarious liability to the officer’s liability, the ruling disposes of the tort claims against both the Chief and the Town.
• Breach of contract revived: The non-disparagement clause prohibits the Chief and Town from “demean[ing], disparag[ing], defam[ing] or otherwise talk[ing] negatively in any way about Mr. Drewry regarding the investigation, termination or resignation.” The Court found the phrase “the investigation” ambiguous and therefore unsuitable for summary judgment. The fact-finder must determine its scope and whether the memorandum’s statements were “regarding the investigation.”
• No prophylactic Brady duty: The Court rejected the argument that Brady required the Chief to preemptively author and distribute a case-neutral “Brady cop” memorandum. Brady’s disclosure obligation is on prosecutors and is case-specific. Thus, the settlement’s “Compliance with Law” clause did not excuse the memorandum as legally compelled.
• Disposition: Affirmed summary judgment on IIED and defamation per se (qualified immunity); reversed summary judgment on the breach of contract claim and remanded.

Factual and Procedural Background

After a 2016 hire process that included a résumé misstatement about a college degree, and later discipline related to on-duty interactions and training travel with a local woman, Drewry was involved in a 2021 DUI investigation where he arranged for a hospital blood draw to be held pending a warrant. A prosecutor alerted the Chief to discrepancies in the timing of the draw and seizure; an internal investigation followed. The department told Drewry he would be terminated; the parties ultimately entered a settlement converting the termination to a resignation and including a non-disparagement clause prohibiting negative statements about “the investigation, termination or resignation.”

When Drewry later took a position with the Basin Police Department, the Chief circulated a memorandum to Greybull officers and local officials announcing that, due to Drewry’s “history of deception,” Greybull officers would not allow him to participate in Greybull investigations and would limit backup interactions. The memo explained “Brady” obligations and used the colloquial “Brady cop” framing. Drewry sued for breach of the settlement, defamation per se, and IIED. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants; Drewry appealed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

• Qualified Immunity Framework
  • Palm‑Egle v. Briggs, 2024 WY 31, ¶¶ 33, 35, 37, 545 P.3d 828, 838–39: Reaffirmed Wyoming’s common-law qualified immunity and its availability at summary judgment; articulated the four elements: (1) scope of duties; (2) good faith; (3) reasonableness; (4) discretionary act.
  • Uinta County v. Pennington, 2012 WY 129, ¶¶ 13, 17, 20–21, 286 P.3d 138, 142–44: Adopted the objective “could have believed” good-faith standard and “might have reached the same decision” reasonableness standard; clarified the court decides qualified immunity as a matter of law.
  • Darrar v. Bourke, 910 P.2d 572, 578 (Wyo. 1996), and DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643, 655 (Wyo. 1986) (Thomas, C.J., specially concurring): If the officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the conduct is not tortious and no vicarious liability lies against the governmental entity.
  • Out-of-state persuasive authorities: Telthorster v. Tennell, 92 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. 2002) (objective “could have believed” test); Cherqui v. Westheimer St. Festival Corp., 116 S.W.3d 337 (Tex. App. 2003) (reasonable officers could disagree → good faith).
• Contract Ambiguity and Interpretation
  • Van Vlack v. Van Vlack, 2023 WY 104, ¶¶ 20, 34, 537 P.3d 751, 757, 760: Ambiguity is a question of law; unambiguous contracts are interpreted within the four corners; when ambiguous, courts consider extrinsic evidence and intent, typically precluding summary judgment.
  • Kuhl v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2012 WY 85, ¶ 21, 281 P.3d 716, 724: Extrinsic evidence may clarify ambiguous terms.
  • Hopkins v. Bank of the West, 2013 WY 129, ¶ 13, 311 P.3d 151, 155; Meima v. Broemmel, 2005 WY 87, ¶ 71, 117 P.3d 429, 452; Western Utility Contractors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 731 P.2d 24, 28 (Wyo. 1986): Ambiguity presents factual questions of intent for the trier of fact.
  • Wadi Petroleum, Inc. v. Ultra Resources, Inc., 2003 WY 41, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d 703, 708; N. Silo Res., LLC v. Deselms, 2022 WY 116A, ¶ 15, 518 P.3d 1074, 1081; Claman v. Popp, 2012 WY 92, ¶¶ 26–28, 279 P.3d 1003, 1013; Brockway v. Brockway, 921 P.2d 1104, 1106 (Wyo. 1996): Courts may consider surrounding circumstances where ambiguity exists; “double meaning” supports ambiguity.
  • Breach elements: Eiden Construction, LLC v. Hogan Associates Builders, LLC, 2024 WY 138, ¶ 43, 561 P.3d 304, 317–18; Larson v. Burton Construction, Inc., 2018 WY 74, ¶ 15, 421 P.3d 538, 544.
• Procedural Standards
  • Leeks Canyon Ranch, LLC v. Jackson Hole Hereford Ranch, LLC, 2025 WY 63, ¶ 17, 569 P.3d 1120, 1126–27; Leonhardt v. Big Horn County Sheriff’s Office, 2024 WY 128, ¶ 16, 559 P.3d 1053, 1058: De novo review of summary judgment; reasonable inferences to non-movant.
  • Kudar v. Morgan, 2022 WY 159, ¶ 11, 521 P.3d 988, 992; Gowdy v. Cook, 2020 WY 3, ¶ 22, 455 P.3d 1201, 1207; Warwick v. Accessible Space, Inc., 2019 WY 89, ¶ 10, 448 P.3d 206, 211; Mantle v. N. Star Energy & Construction LLC, 2019 WY 29, ¶ 116, 437 P.3d 758, 796; Woodward v. Valvoda, 2021 WY 5, ¶¶ 12–13, 478 P.3d 1189, 1196: Burdens on summary judgment and showing lack of evidence.
• Brady/Giglio Disclosure
  • Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963): Prosecutors must disclose material exculpatory and impeachment evidence to defendants. The Court emphasized that Brady’s duty is prosecutorial and case-specific.
  • LaFave treatise: Criminal Procedure § 24.3(b) (4th ed. Nov. 2024 Update), cited for the principle that evidence must have favorable relevancy to the specific criminal case.
• Wyoming’s Distinct Approach vs. Federal § 1983
  • The Court reiterates Wyoming doctrine differs from federal § 1983 practice: qualified immunity, once found for the officer, precludes tort liability for the entity through vicarious theories (Pennington, Darrar, DeWald), unlike federal official-capacity suits (see the Court’s footnote referencing Tenth Circuit authority).

Legal Reasoning

The Court first resolved the tort claims under qualified immunity. Drewry conceded that the Chief acted within the scope of his duties and performed discretionary functions by setting and communicating operational policies. The dispute centered on good faith and reasonableness:

• Good Faith: The test is objective: whether a reasonably prudent officer could have believed the conduct was justified based on the information possessed at the time. Even though witnesses disagreed with the memo and speculated about the Chief’s motives, differences of opinion and alleged animus are not dispositive. The Court emphasized it is the judge’s role to decide qualified immunity and that the “could have believed” standard was met given the record of prior internal investigations and discipline.
• Reasonableness: The standard is not negligence. The question is whether a reasonable officer might have reached the same decision. The Court found an objective basis for a limited-interaction policy concerning Drewry in future Greybull investigations (e.g., multiple incidents culminating in discipline). Therefore, the reasonableness prong was satisfied.

Because qualified immunity shields the officer from tort liability, Wyoming law forecloses tort liability against the Town based on vicarious theories for those same claims. Thus, summary judgment on defamation per se and IIED was affirmed for both defendants.

Turning to the contract claim, the Court carefully parsed the non-disparagement clause. It reads that the Chief and the Town “shall not demean, disparage, defame or otherwise talk negatively in any way about Mr. Drewry regarding the investigation, termination or resignation.” The Court noted:

• The phrase “otherwise talk negatively in any way” is broad, capturing adverse, unfavorable, or critical speech. The clause does not hinge on falsity; it bars negative talk within the specified subjects.
• The limiting phrase “regarding the investigation, termination or resignation” narrows the scope. Drewry’s appeal focused on “the investigation.”
• Ambiguity: While “investigation” clearly referred to a process triggered by the 2021 blood-draw event, the record showed that when the Chief and Town considered discipline or termination, they also discussed Drewry’s prior disciplinary history. The Court concluded the phrase “the investigation” could reasonably refer either to the narrow blood-draw inquiry or to a broader continuing process culminating in termination—creating a “double meaning.” That ambiguity must be resolved by the fact‑finder with the benefit of extrinsic evidence.

Finally, the Court addressed the settlement’s “Compliance with Law” clause, which defendants invoked to justify the memo. The Court rejected the argument that Brady required the Chief to circulate a case-neutral, forward-looking “Brady cop” memorandum. Brady imposes a disclosure duty on prosecutors, and only in the context of a specific criminal prosecution where the evidence is materially favorable. A generalized, prophylactic disclosure program was not legally compelled by Brady; therefore, the “Compliance with Law” clause did not excuse the conduct as mandated by law.

Impact and Significance

• Qualified Immunity in Wyoming Tort Litigation
  • The decision reaffirms a robust, objective qualified immunity standard: “could have believed” (good faith) and “might have reached the same decision” (reasonableness). Allegations of personal animus or inter-agency disagreement, without more, will not defeat qualified immunity.
  • Because Wyoming links officer immunity to the entity’s vicarious liability, early resolution of tort claims at summary judgment remains likely when the record shows reasonable bases for the officer’s conduct. This is distinct from federal § 1983 practice, where municipalities may face liability even when an officer is immune.
• Contract Drafting and Enforcement: Non‑Disparagement Clauses
  • Words matter. The Court’s focus on the breadth of “otherwise talk negatively in any way” and the ambiguity of “the investigation” highlights the need for precise drafting. Parties should define terms like “investigation” by scope, subject matter, and timeframe (e.g., “the December 2021 internal affairs investigation concerning the DUI blood draw”).
  • Truth is not automatically a defense to breach of a non-disparagement clause. If a clause prohibits “negative” talk regardless of truth, an accurate but negative statement can still breach the contract if it falls within the clause’s scope.
  • Ambiguity will typically preclude summary judgment and force a fact‑intensive inquiry into intent. Expect more evidentiary hearings or trials where clauses reference ill-defined processes.
• Brady/Giglio Compliance for Law Enforcement
  • The Court clarifies that Brady does not impose a duty on police agencies to proactively broadcast generalized “Brady cop” communications divorced from any pending criminal case. Prosecutors bear the duty to disclose, and it is case-specific.
  • Agencies should coordinate with prosecutors on case-by-case disclosures rather than rely on broad prophylactic memoranda—especially where settlement agreements contain non-disparagement terms. “Compliance with law” clauses are not blank checks; agencies must point to an actual legal obligation requiring the specific communication.
• Operational Policy vs. Contractual Restraints
  • The opinion draws a line between permissible internal policy-making (protected by qualified immunity in tort) and potential contractual liability for speech violating a non-disparagement undertaking. Agencies can be insulated from tort exposure yet still face contractual remedies.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Qualified Immunity (Wyoming): A common-law defense shielding public officials from tort liability if they act within their duties, in good faith (a reasonable officer could believe the conduct justified), reasonably (a reasonable officer might make the same choice), and while performing discretionary—not ministerial—functions. Decided by the court as a matter of law, often at summary judgment.
• Defamation per se: A tort that presumes damages for statements that are so harmful (e.g., accusing someone of a crime or unfitness in one’s profession) that damage is presumed. Here, the claim did not proceed because qualified immunity barred it.
• Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED): A tort based on extreme and outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress. Also barred here by qualified immunity.
• Non‑Disparagement Clause: A contractual promise not to speak negatively about another party on specified topics. Breach can occur regardless of the truth of statements, depending on the clause’s language.
• Ambiguity in Contracts: When language is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning because of indefiniteness or double meaning, courts allow extrinsic evidence and send the issue of intent to the fact‑finder.
• Brady/Giglio Duties: Brady requires prosecutors to disclose material exculpatory and impeachment evidence in criminal cases. Giglio (not cited by name in the opinion but commonly associated) extends this to impeachment evidence. The duty is prosecutorial and case-specific; police agencies typically assist but are not legally required to issue broad, forward-looking “Brady lists” absent specific legal authority.
• Ministerial vs. Discretionary Acts: Ministerial acts are mandatory with little judgment; discretionary acts involve policy choices or professional judgment. Qualified immunity covers discretionary acts.

Practical Takeaways

• For agencies: Develop case-by-case Brady/Giglio protocols with prosecutors. Avoid general “Brady cop” blasts that could breach non-disparagement agreements or create unnecessary exposure.
• For drafters: Define “investigation” (or similar terms) precisely—by date, subject, unit, and closure point. Consider carve-outs for case-specific prosecutor requests and narrowly tailored operational needs.
• For litigants: Distinguish tort theories (susceptible to qualified immunity) from contract claims (not barred by qualified immunity). Where ambiguity exists, anticipate fact-finding and prepare extrinsic evidence on the parties’ intent.
• For courts: The opinion reinforces that “compliance with law” clauses require identification of a specific legal mandate. Absent a concrete statutory or case-law duty, such clauses do not justify otherwise contract-breaching communications.

Conclusion

The Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision delivers three important messages. First, qualified immunity remains a potent, objective shield against tort claims for law enforcement policy-making, with determinations suitable for early resolution as a matter of law. Second, settlement non-disparagement clauses must be drafted with precision; when terms like “the investigation” carry a double meaning, fact-finding is necessary and summary judgment will be inappropriate. Third, and most notably, Brady does not impose a prophylactic duty on law enforcement administrators to circulate generalized “Brady cop” memoranda; Brady’s disclosure obligation is prosecutorial and case-specific.

In the short term, the ruling forecloses Drewry’s tort recovery but permits his contract claim to proceed to fact-finding on the scope of “the investigation” and whether the memorandum’s negative statements were “regarding” that subject. In the broader legal context, the decision clarifies the interplay between qualified immunity, contractual non-disparagement obligations, and Brady compliance, charting a careful course for agencies navigating post-employment reputational issues while maintaining operational integrity and legal compliance.