No Privity Required: Expanding Contractor Immunity “For TxDOT” Under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 97.002

I. Introduction

In Third Coast Services, LLC and SpawGlass Civil Construction, Inc. v. Castaneda, the Supreme Court of Texas clarifies and significantly expands the reach of contractor immunity under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 97.002.

Two private contractors — SpawGlass (general contractor) and Third Coast (electrical/traffic-signal subcontractor) — were sued after a fatal collision at an intersection under construction along State Highway 249 (SH 249) in Montgomery County. The intersection was part of a toll-road project where Montgomery County, through its Toll Road Authority, had primary design and construction responsibilities, but the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) retained ultimate responsibility for the adjacent frontage roads.

The key issues were:

Whether § 97.002 immunity applies only to contractors in direct contractual privity with TxDOT;
Whether installing and managing traffic signals at a toll-road frontage intersection qualifies as “construct[ing] or repair[ing] a highway, road, or street” for purposes of § 97.002; and
Whether the contractors conclusively proved compliance with contract documents, as the statute requires.

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals had held that § 97.002 protects only contractors “hired by TxDOT,” i.e., those in direct contractual privity with the agency. On that basis alone, it rejected the contractors’ immunity defense. The Supreme Court reverses, holding that:

Section 97.002 does not contain a privity requirement; and
Contractors working on frontage roads that TxDOT will ultimately operate and maintain are performing work “for” TxDOT, even where their contracts are with a county or another contractor.

The Court also holds that traffic-signal work on those frontage roads qualifies as construction or repair of a “highway” within the statutory framework. The case is remanded only for the unresolved fact-intensive issue: whether the contractors proved compliance with material contract documents.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Statutory Provision at Issue

Section 97.002 provides:

A contractor who constructs or repairs a highway, road, or street for the Texas Department of Transportation is not liable to a claimant for personal injury, property damage, or death arising from the performance of the construction or repair if, at the time of the personal injury, property damage, or death, the contractor is in compliance with contract documents material to the condition or defect that was the proximate cause of the personal injury, property damage, or death.

This statute is an affirmative defense. A contractor seeking summary judgment must conclusively prove each element:

It is a “contractor”;
It “constructs or repairs a highway, road, or street”;
The work is “for” TxDOT;
The claim “aris[es] from the performance of the construction or repair”; and
The contractor was “in compliance with contract documents material to the condition or defect” that proximately caused the injury or death.

B. Supreme Court’s Core Holdings

No privity requirement. The Court rejects the court of appeals’ conclusion that § 97.002 applies only to contractors in direct contractual privity with TxDOT. “For TxDOT” is not equivalent to “under contract with TxDOT,” and the Legislature knew how to impose a privity requirement when it wanted to.
Meaning of “for TxDOT.” Applying the ordinary meaning of “for,” the Court holds that a contractor’s work is “for” TxDOT when TxDOT will be the recipient, owner, or user of the constructed or repaired highway, road, or street. Direct privity is sufficient but not necessary. Here, because TxDOT would ultimately operate and maintain the SH 249 frontage roads, work on those roads — including the intersection and traffic signals — was work “for” TxDOT, even though the contracts were with the County and a general contractor.
Scope of “highway, road, or street.” By incorporating the Transportation Code’s definition of “highway,” the Court holds that traffic signals are an “other necessary structure related to a public road.” Thus, installing and readying traffic signals at the SH 249 intersection constituted construction of a “highway” for § 97.002 purposes.
General contractors “construct,” even via subcontractors. The Court rejects the argument that SpawGlass did not “construct” anything because it delegated physical tasks to subcontractors. Citing prior statute-of-repose cases, the Court holds that a general contractor with ultimate responsibility to the owner “constructs” the project even if it does not literally perform the physical work.
Unresolved element remanded. The only remaining disputed element is whether the contractors were in compliance with contract documents material to the alleged defect (e.g., signal-head wrapping, temporary traffic control measures, timing of signal activation). Given the fact-intensive nature of this issue and the absence of court-of-appeals analysis, the Supreme Court remands for that court to decide it in the first instance.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The SH 249 Toll Road Project

The Texas Transportation Commission designated part of SH 249 as a future toll facility. Pursuant to Transportation Code Chapter 373, TxDOT entered into a “Construction, Operation and Maintenance Agreement” with Montgomery County, acting through the Montgomery County Toll Road Authority. The project was divided into:

The “County Project” — the southern portion of the new toll road, beginning at the Montgomery/Harris County border, to be designed, constructed, maintained, and operated by the County as part of its toll-road system; and
The “TxDOT Project” — the portion extending into Grimes County, to be developed by TxDOT.

Crucially, the Agreement provided that:

The County would finance, design, and construct the County Project;
Plans for the County Project had to be coordinated with TxDOT and submitted for TxDOT’s review and approval;
The County bore “all responsibility to the public” for design, maintenance, signing, and lighting on the County Project; but
TxDOT would be responsible for “the operation and maintenance of the frontage roads that are adjacent to the County Project.”

The County Project itself would not be part of the State Highway System so long as tolls were collected; the adjacent frontage roads, however, remained state roads under TxDOT’s operational and maintenance authority.

B. The Contractual Chain

Montgomery County contracted with SpawGlass Civil Construction, Inc. as the general contractor for the County Project.
SpawGlass then subcontracted with Third Coast Services, LLC, whose scope of work included installing “electrical components,” notably traffic signals at key intersections, including Woodtrace Boulevard at SH 249.

Thus, neither SpawGlass nor Third Coast had a direct contract with TxDOT. Their contractual relationships were with the County and with one another.

C. The Accident and Claims

The fatal collision occurred as Pedro Castaneda drove across SH 249 on Woodtrace Boulevard. At that time:

The intersection and surrounding area were under active construction;
Traffic lights had been installed but were not yet operational;
There was a stop sign controlling traffic; the police report indicated that Castaneda failed to yield the right of way; and
The parties disputed whether the (non-operational) signal heads were covered with black fabric as required for inoperative signals.

Castaneda’s family sued SpawGlass and Third Coast for negligence. The contractors responded by invoking § 97.002 through motions for traditional summary judgment, arguing that:

They were contractors constructing or repairing a highway for TxDOT;
The claims arose from the performance of that construction; and
They complied with contract documents material to the condition or defect at issue (e.g., traffic control plans, signal-covering requirements).

The trial court denied the motions. The contractors took an interlocutory appeal under § 51.014(a)(17), which authorizes appeals from orders denying summary judgment based on § 97.002.

D. Court of Appeals’ Decision

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment on a threshold ground: it held that § 97.002 applies only when the contractor is “hired by TxDOT.” Because:

SpawGlass was hired by Montgomery County, and
Third Coast was hired by SpawGlass,

the court concluded that neither worked “for” TxDOT within the meaning of § 97.002. It rejected the First Court of Appeals’ contrary decision in Mahoney v. Webber, LLC, which had allowed § 97.002 immunity where the contractor worked under a county contract to build a state highway segment.

Having resolved the case on privity, the court of appeals:

Did not address whether the work was “construction or repair of a highway, road, or street”; and
Did not decide whether the contractors conclusively proved compliance with material contract documents.

The Supreme Court granted review and reversed.

IV. Detailed Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Reasoning

A. Statutory Framework and Textual Approach

The Court emphasizes that statutory interpretation starts and ends, when possible, with the statutory text. Section 97.002:

Does not mention “contract,” “privity,” or “hired by TxDOT”;
Instead uses the phrase “constructs or repairs a highway, road, or street for [TxDOT]”; and
Contains no express limitation to prime contractors or direct TxDOT contractors.

The Court contrasts § 97.002 with other statutes where the Legislature did expressly require a contract with a governmental entity:

Transportation Code § 474.003(a): limits liability of “[a] contractor who enters into a contract with a governmental entity.”
Transportation Code § 472.021: references a “contractor” “under contract with this state or a political subdivision of this state.”

Because the Legislature demonstrated it knows how to condition protections on contractual privity when it wishes, the absence of such language in § 97.002 is treated as deliberate. The Court invokes its usual canon:

We “presume the Legislature chooses a statute’s language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while purposefully omitting words not chosen.”

Accordingly, § 97.002 cannot be read as if it said “a contractor who constructs or repairs a highway, road, or street under contract with TxDOT…”

B. The Meaning of “for TxDOT”

1. Ordinary Meaning of “for”

Because “for” is undefined, the Court turns to its ordinary dictionary meaning at or around the time of enactment. Across multiple dictionaries, “for” is used to indicate:

The person or entity to whom something is to be delivered or assigned;
The object or recipient of an activity; or
That which something is intended to belong to or be used by or in connection with.

From this, the Court derives a functional test: a contractor constructs or repairs a highway “for” TxDOT when TxDOT will be the recipient, owner, or user of the work. Applied generally:

Work on a state-owned highway, contracted directly with TxDOT, is obviously work “for” TxDOT;
Subcontractors performing portions of such work also work “for” TxDOT; and
But the concept is not limited to those in direct contractual privity with TxDOT.

2. No Exclusive-Beneficiary Requirement

Castaneda argued that because the County had primary responsibility for the County Project — financing, design, construction, maintenance, signing, and lighting — work on that project could only be “for” the County, not “for” TxDOT.

The Court squarely rejects the notion that work can be “for” only one entity:

Section 97.002’s text does not require that TxDOT be the exclusive beneficiary or controller of the work;
A contractor’s efforts may simultaneously be “for” multiple entities — e.g., the County as procurer/funder and TxDOT as ultimate operator and maintainer.

3. Rejecting an Overbroad Reading Favoring Contractors

At the same time, the Court declines to adopt the contractors’ broadest possible reading: that any work built to meet TxDOT standards or subject to TxDOT plan review is automatically “for” TxDOT. That would effectively:

Extend § 97.002 immunity to almost all public road work, any time TxDOT exercises even modest regulatory oversight; and
Transform “for TxDOT” into “subject to TxDOT standards or review,” which the statute does not say.

The Court thus draws a more tailored line: regulatory oversight and plan approval, by themselves, are not sufficient. There must be a more substantive connection — namely, TxDOT’s role as ultimate recipient, owner, or user of the constructed or repaired roadway facility.

4. Application to the SH 249 Frontage-Road Work

In this case, the decisive fact is that TxDOT, by contract, would have operation and maintenance responsibility for the frontage roads adjacent to the County Project. Those frontage roads:

Included the existing lanes of SH 249;
Were part of the state highway system; and
Were to be converted into toll-road frontage roads for which TxDOT would have long-term operational control.

SpawGlass’s and Third Coast’s contracts expressly included work:

On the existing SH 249 lanes that would become the frontage roads; and
On the traffic signals and lighting for the intersections along those frontage roads.

Even the plaintiff’s own summary judgment evidence acknowledged that the signals would be “controlled by TxDOT after the project was complete.” Thus:

The County was the contractual owner and funder of the construction phase; but
TxDOT was the ultimate recipient and operator of the completed frontage-road facilities (including signals).

Under the Court’s adopted meaning of “for,” this fact pattern conclusively establishes that the contractors worked “for” TxDOT. Their work was simultaneously:

“For” the County (as procuring entity and initial project manager); and
“For” TxDOT (as ultimate operator and maintainer of the frontage roads, including their traffic-control infrastructure).

The Court spells out that this conclusion aligns with Mahoney v. Webber, where a contractor working under a county agreement to construct part of a state highway was held to be working “for” TxDOT.

C. What Counts as “Constructing or Repairing a Highway, Road, or Street”

1. Incorporation of the Transportation Code’s Definition of “Highway”

The plaintiff argued that traffic-signal installation is something distinct from construction of a “highway, road, or street,” suggesting that § 97.002 should be confined to work on the pavement or structure of the road itself.

The Court looks to the Transportation Code’s definition of “highway” in § 221.001(1):

“Highway” includes a tolled or nontolled public road or part of a tolled or nontolled public road and a bridge, culvert, building, or other necessary structure related to a public road.

In State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., the Court had construed the phrase “other necessary structure related to a public road” as referring to structures that, like bridges or culverts, “pertain to the physical function of the road,” using a guardrail as an example.

Traffic signals at a public-road intersection — particularly at a tollway frontage intersection like Woodtrace Boulevard and SH 249 — are exactly that kind of structure:

They are physically installed into the intersection infrastructure;
They regulate the safe and orderly flow of vehicular traffic; and
They reduce the risks inherent in highway travel.

The Court therefore holds that traffic signals are “other necessary structure[s] related to a public road.” Work on such signals is work on a “highway” within § 97.002’s scope.

2. General Contractors as “Constructors” Even When They Subcontract the Physical Work

Castaneda offered an additional, narrower argument: that even if traffic-signal work is “highway construction,” SpawGlass did not “construct” anything because:

Third Coast, not SpawGlass, actually installed the signal components at the intersection; and
SpawGlass’s role was project management rather than physical labor.

The Court firmly rejects this “who swung the hammer” test. Relying on statute-of-repose cases (Reames v. Hawthorne-Seving, Inc. and South Texas College of Law v. KBR, Inc.), the Court reiterates that:

A general contractor “constructs” an improvement when it bears ultimate responsibility to the owner, even though subcontractors perform the hands-on construction tasks;
The statutory term “constructs” does not require personal physical performance by the contractor himself.

Applying this reasoning, SpawGlass “constructed” the highway improvements within the meaning of § 97.002, even if the installation work at the intersection was performed through Third Coast.

D. Section 97.002 as an Affirmative Defense and the Summary-Judgment Standard

The Court explicitly characterizes § 97.002 as an affirmative defense of avoidance. That is, it does not contest the factual basis of the plaintiff’s negligence allegations, but instead provides a legal shield if certain conditions are met.

Under Texas summary-judgment standards:

The defendant bears the burden to conclusively establish each element of the affirmative defense; and
If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then raise a genuine issue of material fact as to at least one element to avoid summary judgment.

Here, the Supreme Court holds that the contractors conclusively established:

That they constructed or repaired a highway (broadly defined) via the frontage-road and traffic-signal work; and
That such work was “for” TxDOT, given TxDOT’s ultimate operational control over the frontage roads and signals.

The remaining element — compliance with contract documents material to the alleged defect — remains genuinely disputed, so summary judgment cannot yet be rendered.

E. Remaining Issue on Remand: Compliance with Contract Documents

Section 97.002 requires that, “at the time of the injury,” the contractor must be “in compliance with contract documents material to the condition or defect” that proximately caused the injury.

The contractors argued they complied with the traffic-control plan and other relevant contract documents, supporting their motions with:

Testimony from the County’s project engineer; and
Testimony from their own employees asserting compliance with applicable specifications and plans.

Castaneda countered with evidence and argument alleging noncompliance, including that:

Both contractors failed to “wrap signal heads with dark plastic or suitable material” to conceal the signal faces until the signals became operational, allegedly contrary to the governing plans/specifications;
SpawGlass ignored repeated warnings about dangerous traffic conditions and failed to:
- Modify temporary traffic controls;
- Submit changes to the traffic-control plan;
- Furnish and maintain adequate barricades and warning signs;
which might have mitigated or eliminated the hazardous condition at the intersection.
Third Coast delayed in activating the signal lights after installation, allegedly in violation of its obligation to complete activities “as work progresses.”

These disputed issues go to:

What the relevant “contract documents” required (plans, specifications, traffic-control plans, schedules); and
Whether any breach was material to the “condition or defect” that proximately caused the crash (e.g., visibility of inoperative signals, absence of appropriate temporary traffic-control devices).

The Supreme Court notes that resolving these matters is fact-intensive, and — because the court of appeals never reached the issue — follows its ordinary practice of remanding for the intermediate court to address them in the first instance.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. Mahoney v. Webber, LLC, 608 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.)

Mahoney is pivotal: the First Court of Appeals held that § 97.002 does not require direct privity with TxDOT. It reasoned that a contractor could be protected if it “perform[ed] work under a contract that makes the [contractor] responsible for constructing or repairing a highway, road, or street for TxDOT,” even when the formal contract was with a local government.

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected Mahoney as “rewriting” the statute. The Supreme Court explicitly sides with Mahoney and disavows the Fourteenth Court’s narrow interpretation, thereby unifying the law across Texas appellate districts on this point and preventing a split on the meaning of “for TxDOT.”

B. Textual-Interpretation Cases

The Court’s analysis relies on leading Texas cases on statutory interpretation, including:

Rogers v. Bagley, 623 S.W.3d 343 (Tex. 2021), and
Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission, 518 S.W.3d 318 (Tex. 2017) — cited for the principle that the Legislature chooses statute language deliberately and omits words intentionally.
Hogan v. Zoanni, 627 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2021) — emphasizing that when a statute is silent on a subject, courts presume purposeful exclusion.

These cases ground the Court’s refusal to import a privity requirement into § 97.002 and its insistence on giving the word “for” its ordinary meaning rather than substituting a narrower, judicially-crafted term like “under contract with.”

C. State v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 223 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 2007)

Fidelity & Deposit interpreted the phrase “other necessary structure related to a public road” in Transportation Code § 221.001(1) and concluded it refers to structures integral to the road’s physical function (like guardrails).

The Court analogizes traffic signals to guardrails: they are infrastructure that physically and functionally control traffic, enhancing the safety and usability of the road. This precedent directly supports the conclusion that traffic signals fall within the “highway” definition, bringing signal installation and readiness under § 97.002’s protective umbrella.

D. Reames v. Hawthorne-Seving, Inc. & South Texas College of Law v. KBR, Inc.

These intermediate appellate cases addressed whether a general contractor qualifies as someone who “constructs” an improvement for statute-of-repose protection, even when subcontractors do the hands-on work.

Reames held that a general contractor who “bore ultimate responsibility” to the owner qualified as having “constructed” the improvement, despite using subcontractors.
South Texas College of Law applied Reames in an analogous context.

The Supreme Court import these principles into § 97.002, rejecting any hyper-literal argument that “constructs” applies only to those personally performing physical labor. Thus, general contractors like SpawGlass can invoke § 97.002 when they oversee and are ultimately responsible for highway work, even though subcontractors perform discrete tasks.

E. Other Doctrinal Cases

The opinion also cites:

Regency Field Services, LLC v. Swift Energy Operating, LLC, 622 S.W.3d 807 (Tex. 2021) — explaining the nature of an affirmative defense as one of avoidance, not factual denial.
First Sabrepoint Capital Management, L.P. v. Farmland Partners Inc., 712 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 2025) — confirming that a party moving for summary judgment on an affirmative defense must conclusively establish each element.
Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2016), and Apache Corp. v. Apollo Exploration, LLC, 670 S.W.3d 319 (Tex. 2023) — cited for the Court’s standard practice of remanding unresolved issues to the court of appeals rather than deciding them for the first time.

Together these precedents inform the procedural posture and the decision to reverse and remand rather than render.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. Doctrinal Impact on § 97.002

The opinion cements several critical points for future § 97.002 litigation:

Privity is not required. A contractor need not have a direct contract with TxDOT to claim § 97.002 immunity. Work may be “for TxDOT” even if the contract is with a county, city, toll-road authority, or another private contractor.
Functional test for “for TxDOT.” Courts must examine who will ultimately own, operate, or use the highway segments or related structures in question. If TxDOT is the ultimate recipient, owner, or user, § 97.002 can apply.
Construction of “highway” is broad. Traffic-control devices (like signals) are part of the “highway” when they are necessary structures related to the physical functioning of the road.
General contractors qualify as “constructors.” A general contractor overseeing a project and bearing ultimate responsibility to the owner is engaged in “constructing” the highway for § 97.002 purposes, even if subcontractors perform specific tasks.

B. Practical Impact on Different Actors

1. Contractors and Subcontractors

This decision significantly broadens the practical protection available to contractors and subcontractors on roadway projects connected to TxDOT. Entities that previously might have been uncertain whether § 97.002 applied — e.g., contractors working under county or regional mobility authority contracts but on facilities that TxDOT will operate — now have a clearer path to immunity.

However, the ruling also underscores that:

Contractors must prove factual compliance with contract documents that are material to the alleged defect;
Immunity is not automatic — it is a defense that must be conclusively established through competent summary-judgment evidence.

2. Local Governments and Toll-Road Authorities

Local entities engaged in agreements with TxDOT now operate within a clarified liability structure for their contractors:

Contractors working on facilities that will be owned or operated by TxDOT (such as frontage roads) may be protected by § 97.002; and
This may influence bidding, insurance, and risk allocation in design-build or construction contracts, potentially reducing contractor pricing to reflect reduced tort exposure.

Counties and toll-road authorities may also face increased scrutiny in how they allocate design, safety, and maintenance responsibilities with TxDOT in interlocal agreements, since those allocations will affect which contractors can invoke § 97.002.

3. Plaintiffs and Tort Litigation

From a plaintiff’s perspective, this opinion:

Closes the argument that a lack of direct contract with TxDOT automatically defeats § 97.002 immunity; and
Shifts the battleground to:
- Whether the work was truly “for” TxDOT under the recipient/owner/user test, and
- Whether the contractor complied with material contract documents.

Practically, plaintiffs may focus more on:

Disputing that TxDOT is the ultimate operator/owner of the specific segments or structures at issue;
Showing that the alleged defect lies outside the scope of contract documents; or
Proving noncompliance with key safety-related specifications (e.g., covering inoperative signal heads, temporary traffic-control plans).

4. TxDOT and the State

Although TxDOT is not itself a party in this case, the decision:

Reinforces the Legislature’s evident intent to shield highway contractors who follow TxDOT-approved plans from tort exposure; and
May improve TxDOT’s ability to attract qualified bidders and keep project costs lower by providing more predictable liability protection to contractors.

At the same time, TxDOT’s role as plan reviewer and approver remains central. If contractors are immune when following TxDOT-approved plans, then, in serious-accident litigation, attention may increasingly shift to:

TxDOT’s own design decisions (subject to sovereign-immunity and Tort Claims Act limitations); and
The adequacy of the plans and specifications themselves, as opposed to contractor deviations.

VII. Simplifying the Key Legal Concepts

A. Affirmative Defense

An affirmative defense accepts, for argument’s sake, that the plaintiff’s basic allegations may be true, but asserts a separate legal reason why the defendant should not be held liable.

Here, even if the contractors were negligent in some way, § 97.002 says they are not liable if:

They were constructing or repairing a highway for TxDOT;
The injury arose from that construction or repair; and
They complied with the relevant contract documents that governed the condition or defect alleged to have caused the injury.

So § 97.002 does not say “you were not negligent”; it says, “even if you were, you cannot be held liable under these conditions.”

B. Contractual Privity

Privity of contract refers to a direct contractual relationship between two parties. Before this decision, some courts treated § 97.002 as if it only protected contractors who had a direct contract with TxDOT itself.

The Supreme Court holds that privity is not required. Work can still be “for TxDOT” if TxDOT is the ultimate operator or user of the completed facility — even if the contractor’s written agreement is with a county, another government, or a general contractor.

C. “Arising From the Performance of the Construction or Repair”

For § 97.002 to apply, the injury must “aris[e] from the performance of the construction or repair.” In practical terms, this means that:

The accident must be causally linked to something about the construction work or how it was performed; and not, for example, to wholly independent factors.

Here, the alleged negligence — failure to properly cover non-operational signal heads, failure to manage temporary traffic control at an active work zone, and delays in activating signals — plainly arises out of construction activities at the intersection.

D. “Compliance with Contract Documents Material to the Condition or Defect”

This is the most technical requirement. It asks:

What did the contract documents (plans, specifications, traffic-control plans, schedules, etc.) require about the condition or component at issue — here, the intersection and traffic signals?
Was the contractor actually following those requirements at the time of the accident?
Is the alleged “condition or defect” (for example, visible but inoperative signals, insufficient warning signs, or delayed activation) one that is governed by those contract documents?

If the contractor was following the plans and those plans were material to the alleged dangerous condition, § 97.002 can shield the contractor from liability, even if the plans themselves were flawed.

E. “Highway” and “Other Necessary Structures”

The word “highway” in § 97.002 is not limited to pavement or lanes. Under the Transportation Code, it includes:

Public roads and parts of roads; and
Bridges, culverts, buildings, and “other necessary structures related to a public road.”

“Other necessary structures” are things like guardrails, traffic signals, sign structures, and possibly lighting — anything physically part of the roadway system that helps it function safely and effectively.

VIII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

This opinion establishes and clarifies several important rules regarding contractor immunity under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 97.002:

No privity requirement: A contractor need not be in direct contractual privity with TxDOT. It is enough that the contractor constructs or repairs highway facilities that TxDOT will own, operate, or use.
Functional “for TxDOT” test: The focus is on whether TxDOT is the ultimate recipient, owner, or user of the work, not on who signed the contract.
Broad highway concept: Traffic signals and similar traffic-control devices are “other necessary structures related to a public road” and thus part of the “highway” for § 97.002 purposes.
General contractors are covered: A general contractor constructs a highway even if subcontractors perform the physical installation work.
Fact-intensive compliance element: Immunity ultimately hinges on whether the contractor complied with contract documents governing the alleged defect — a question remanded to the court of appeals in this case.

In the broader legal landscape, this decision:

Harmonizes conflicting appellate interpretations of “for TxDOT”;
Expands the protective reach of § 97.002 to a wider range of contractors on projects intertwined with TxDOT facilities; and
Refocuses future litigation on the factual questions of contractual compliance and the precise allocation of operational responsibility between TxDOT and local entities.

For highway construction litigation in Texas, Third Coast Services v. Castaneda is now a leading authority on how far § 97.002 contractor immunity extends and when a contractor’s work, though procured by a local entity, will still be treated as work “for TxDOT.”