No Presumption of Irreparable Harm in ERISA Trustee-Entrenchment Disputes:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades v. Smith, 6th Cir. (2025)

Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades District Council No. 6 et al. v. Warren T. Smith et al. (July 31 2025) addresses a volatile governance conflict inside a Taft-Hartley multi-employer welfare benefit plan (“the Fund”). While ostensibly a routine appeal from a denial of a preliminary injunction, the case presented the court with two intertwined questions:

1. When, if ever, does an allegation of “trustee entrenchment” in an ERISA-governed trust automatically satisfy the irreparable-harm prong for injunctive relief?
2. What are the limits of appellate jurisdiction—particularly pendent jurisdiction—when a preliminary-injunction ruling and a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal are appealed together?

The plaintiffs (three loyal union-appointed trustees, the International Union of Painters & Allied Trades District Council No. 6 (“the Union”), and a plan participant) sought emergency relief removing two allegedly “wayward” union trustees (Smith and Clark) and undoing several board amendments that, in plaintiffs’ view, entrenched those trustees and facilitated fiduciary breaches. The district court refused injunctive relief and dismissed all claims against the eight employer-appointed trustees. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, announcing a clear rule: irreparable harm cannot be presumed from allegations of trustee entrenchment or speculative future fiduciary breaches; a concrete, imminent injury is indispensable.

Summary of the Judgment

Judge Davis, writing for a unanimous panel (Cole, White, Davis, JJ.), held:

1. Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. Their evidence of harm was retrospective or speculative, and monetary damages would be adequate redress. Consequently, the court affirmed denial of injunctive relief without reaching the remaining factors (likelihood of success, balance of harms, public interest).
2. Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction. The court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the employer trustees because the issues were not “inextricably intertwined” with the injunction questions. The dismissal order therefore remains unreviewed until final judgment.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• D.T. v. Sumner County Schools, 942 F.3d 324 (6th Cir. 2019) – Restated the principle that irreparable harm is “indispensable” for injunctive relief; heavily relied on for the conclusion that past injury and speculative fear do not suffice.
• Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) – Supreme Court anchor establishing that a plaintiff must demonstrate likelihood of irreparable harm; cited to reinforce that failure on this factor is fatal.
• Ohio v. Becerra, 87 F.4th 759 (6th Cir. 2023) – Provided the modern Sixth-Circuit articulation of the four preliminary-injunction factors.
• Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2002) – Quoted for the rule that harm must be “not fully compensable by monetary damages.”
• Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1982) – An early Sixth-Circuit statement that no strength on other factors can cure a failure to show irreparable harm.
• Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen Local 5 v. Hudson Valley District Council, 858 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) and related SDNY cases (Levy, Masino, Demopoulos) – Plaintiffs relied on these out-of-circuit authorities for a purported presumption of irreparable harm when trustees are “entrenched”; the Sixth Circuit expressly refused to adopt that line.

2. Legal Reasoning of the Court

The opinion is notable for its disciplined adherence to traditional equity principles within the ERISA context:

1. No shortcut around irreparable harm: Even in fiduciary litigation—where courts are often sympathetic to plan beneficiaries—the Sixth Circuit declared that the irreparable-harm element cannot be diluted. The court requires a plaintiff to identify a future injury that is certain and immediate, not merely possible.
2. Past violations ≠ future harm: Plaintiffs catalogued several historical acts (e.g., suspension of dental benefits, payment of counsel fees, creation of retiree health coverage for trustees). The court agreed these could constitute fiduciary breaches, but emphasized that injunctions are forward-looking; past wrongs support damages, not equitable relief.
3. Entrenchment theories scrutinised: The opinion acknowledges that “entrenchment” can violate ERISA §404, but rejects the notion that it inherently creates irreparable harm. Plaintiffs needed evidence that entrenchment would cause a concrete, non-compensable injury during the lawsuit’s pendency. None was offered.
4. Procedural nuance on appellate jurisdiction: By declining pendent jurisdiction over the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the panel preserved the traditional final-judgment rule and signaled restraint in expanding interlocutory review.

3. Impact of the Judgment

This decision carries several practical and doctrinal consequences:

• Higher bar for preliminary injunctions in ERISA trustee disputes. Unions and beneficiary groups litigating in the Sixth Circuit must produce concrete prospective evidence (e.g., a scheduled vote that will slash benefits) to satisfy the irreparable-harm requirement.
• Split with Second Circuit approach. New York district courts have occasionally presumed irreparable harm from entrenchment; the Sixth Circuit’s express refusal to do so marks a growing circuit divergence likely to influence future petitions for certiorari.
• Guidance on internal-union remedies. The ruling implicitly encourages unions to exhaust governance mechanisms in the Trust Agreement before seeking federal injunctions, because courts will not step in absent demonstrable imminent injury.
• Clarity on pendent jurisdiction limits. Litigants cannot assume that tagging a non-final dismissal onto a preliminary-injunction appeal will secure interlocutory review; the issues must be genuinely inseparable.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Taft-Hartley Plan: A jointly managed benefit fund created under §302(c)(5) of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), requiring equal representation of labor and management trustees.
• ERISA §404(a) Fiduciary Duties: Obligations of loyalty and prudence – trustees must act solely in participants’ interests and with the care of a prudent person.
• Entrenchment: When a trustee manipulates governance rules to make removal practically impossible, thereby insulating himself from accountability.
• Irreparable Harm: An injury that cannot be fully remedied by money after trial; must be imminent and certain, not hypothetical.
• Pendent (or “ancillary”) Appellate Jurisdiction: A discretionary doctrine allowing appellate courts to decide non-appealable issues that are inextricably intertwined with an appealable ruling.

Conclusion

Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades v. Smith cements a critical principle in Sixth-Circuit ERISA jurisprudence: there is no automatic or presumed irreparable harm in trustee-entrenchment or fiduciary-breach scenarios. Plaintiffs must marshal specific, imminent, and non-compensable injuries to obtain preliminary injunctive relief. By disentangling equitable relief from mere allegations of governance impropriety, the court preserves the traditional equitable threshold while leaving substantive fiduciary claims for full adjudication in the district court. Additionally, the decision reinforces cautious appellate practice by refusing pendent jurisdiction over unresolved merits issues. For unions, employers, and fiduciaries alike, the message is clear: immediate federal intervention in Taft-Hartley fund disputes will be rare unless tangible, unavoidable harm is convincingly demonstrated.