Introduction

In a consolidated opinion resolving four petitions—Ex parte Sandifer, Tanner, Fearn, and Barrett—the Alabama Supreme Court clarified two recurring issues in appeals from municipal courts to circuit courts for trials de novo:

• Preservation: whether a defendant must have challenged a municipal complaint’s sufficiency in the municipal court to preserve a “failure to charge an offense” challenge in the circuit court on de novo appeal.
• Pleading: what the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure require a municipal complaint to include, particularly whether it must contain “formal averments” such as an allegation that the ordinance was duly adopted before the offense (“authorized ordination”).

The petitioners were separately convicted in the Huntsville Municipal Court of various ordinance violations. Each appealed to the Madison Circuit Court for a trial de novo and, before trial, moved to dismiss the complaints. They argued that the complaints failed to aver that Huntsville’s ordinances had been duly adopted, and, in two cases, that the complaints referenced non-existent Alabama Code sections. The circuit court granted dismissal; the City of Huntsville appealed; the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court’s decision both preserves defendants’ ability to raise “failure to charge an offense” in the circuit court during a de novo appeal and modernizes municipal pleading law by reaffirming that Rule 13.2’s plain-statement standard, not pre-Rules formalities, governs municipal complaints.

Summary of the Opinion

• Certiorari jurisdiction: The petitions were timely. Even if the applications for rehearing in the Court of Criminal Appeals were arguably outside the 7-day period applicable to state pretrial appeals, the timeliness of a rehearing application is not jurisdictional, and the Court of Criminal Appeals may accept and consider such applications under Rule 2(b), Ala. R. App. P. The cert petitions were filed within 7 days of the rehearing denial orders, satisfying Rule 39(c)(2).
• Subject-matter jurisdiction: Alleged defects in municipal complaints did not deprive the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction in de novo appeals. Jurisdiction derives from § 12-11-30(3), Ala. Code 1975, and defects in charging instruments are not jurisdictional (Ex parte Seymour; United States v. Cotton).
• No waiver in de novo appeal: Defendants may raise a “failure to charge an offense” in the circuit court during a de novo appeal even if not raised in the municipal court. A trial de novo is “as if no trial had ever been had,” and Rule 15.2(d) allows such challenges “at any time during the pendency of the proceeding” (Ex parte Sorsby; Greenetrack; Ex parte Ramirez). The Court expressly disagreed with the Court of Criminal Appeals’ waiver ruling.
• Pleading sufficiency: Nevertheless, the complaints were sufficient under Rule 13.2, Ala. R. Crim. P. A municipal complaint need only provide a plain, concise statement of the offense in ordinary language sufficient to inform the defendant and allow the court to pronounce judgment. Post-Rules, municipalities are not required to include pre-Rules “formal averments” (e.g., “authorized ordination” and adoption-before-offense allegations). Mis-citation or absent citation does not render a complaint defective if the offense is conveyed (State v. Thomas; Whitt v. State; Moye v. City of Foley). Older cases like Harris v. City of Vestavia Hills, which demanded heightened formalities, are superseded by the Rules.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reversal of the circuit courts’ dismissals, though on the alternative ground that the complaints satisfied Rule 13.2, not on waiver.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536 (Ala. 2006), and United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002): Both establish that defects in indictments or charging instruments do not strip a court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court relied on these to reject the circuit courts’ view that municipal complaint defects deprived the circuit court of jurisdiction in the de novo proceedings.
• Ex parte Sorsby, 12 So. 3d 139 (Ala. 2007): Foundational authority for the nature of de novo review—“as if no trial had ever been had.” The Court relies on Sorsby to hold that de novo appeals are new proceedings and to reject the notion that procedural defaults in municipal court must be carried into the circuit court for issues like “failure to charge an offense.”
• Alabama Department of Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc., 369 So. 3d 640 (Ala. 2022): Reaffirms Sorsby’s de novo principle in the civil context, further supporting that circuit-court de novo proceedings are independent of lower-court procedural posture.
• Ex parte Ramirez, ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2025): Clarifies that while a district-court conviction is not “thrown away,” procedural aspects from the lower court are not imported into the circuit court’s de novo trial. This undergirds the ability to raise Rule 15.2(d) objections in the circuit court irrespective of municipal-court omission.
• State v. Shiver, ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024): (cited) Illustrates application of Sorsby’s de novo principles in practice, emphasizing that circuit-court de novo review does not revisit lower-court procedural regularity.
• Rule 13.2, Ala. R. Crim. P., and Committee Comments: The centerpiece for pleading sufficiency. Requires a plain, concise statement in ordinary language; expressly eliminates “formal averments.” The Court deploys Rule 13.2 to reject the petitioners’ demand for pre-Rules municipal pleading formalities.
• State v. Thomas, 200 So. 3d 35 (Ala. Crim. App. 2015); Whitt v. State, 827 So. 2d 869 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001): Support that a charging instrument can suffice without a statutory citation or with a mis-citation if its language conveys the offense and provides adequate notice.
• Moye v. City of Foley, 632 So. 2d 1012 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993): Confirms that municipal complaints meeting Rule 13.2’s standard are sufficient to provide the required notice.
• Harris v. City of Vestavia Hills, 49 Ala. App. 171, 269 So. 2d 626 (1972) and Young v. City of Attalla, 25 Ala. App. 255, 144 So. 128 (1932): Pre-Rules cases requiring municipal complaints to allege ordinance adoption and other formalities. The Court treats these as superseded by the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, particularly Rule 13.2.
• Ex parte Woodson, 578 So. 2d 1049 (Ala. 1991); Bailey v. City of Ragland, 136 So. 3d 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013); Truman v. City of Enterprise, 606 So. 2d 1151 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Ex parte Hall, 843 So. 2d 746 (Ala. 2002): Cited by petitioners for the proposition that municipalities must plead and prove the ordinance. The Court distinguishes them: they address the burden of proof at trial (evidentiary proof of the ordinance), not pleading sufficiency.
• Rule 2(b), Ala. R. App. P., and State v. Martin, 56 So. 3d 709 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009), aff’d 56 So. 3d 726 (Ala. 2010): Establish that appellate courts may suspend rules and extend time for rehearing; timely rehearing is not jurisdictional. Supports the Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction here.

Legal Reasoning

1) Certiorari timeliness and rehearing practice

The City argued the cert petitions were untimely because the petitioners’ applications for rehearing in the Court of Criminal Appeals were not filed within the 7-day window applicable to pretrial state appeals under Rule 40(c), Ala. R. App. P. The Supreme Court emphasized that the filing of a timely rehearing application is not jurisdictional and that the Court of Criminal Appeals may, under Rule 2(b), accept and consider such applications even if not within the strict 7-day period. Because the Court of Criminal Appeals accepted the applications and later overruled them, the certiorari petitions—filed within 7 days of that ruling—were timely under Rule 39(c)(2).

2) Subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court

The circuit courts had dismissed on the theory that defective municipal complaints deprived the circuit courts of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court rejected that view. Circuit-court appellate jurisdiction over municipal convictions is conferred by § 12-11-30(3). Consistent with Ex parte Seymour and Cotton, defects in a charging instrument do not void a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Treating pleading defects as jurisdictional confuses procedural sufficiency with the constitutional/statutory source of judicial power.

3) Preservation in de novo appeals: Rule 15.2(d) and the Sorsby line

The Court of Criminal Appeals had held that the petitioners waived their challenges by not filing pretrial motions in municipal court (Rule 15.2(a), Rule 15.3(a)(2)). The Supreme Court disagreed. A trial de novo in the circuit court is a new proceeding “as if no trial had ever been had” (Sorsby; Greenetrack). The Court underscored Ex parte Ramirez’s clarification: while the lower court’s conviction itself is not erased, its procedural history is not imported into the circuit court’s de novo proceeding. Crucially, Rule 15.2(d) carves out a special category: objections that a charge fails to state an offense “may be raised at any time during the pendency of the proceeding.” In a de novo posture, “the proceeding” includes the circuit-court proceeding. Thus, defendants may raise “failure to charge an offense” for the first time in the circuit court on de novo appeal.

4) Pleading sufficiency under Rule 13.2: Municipal complaints do not require pre-Rules formalities

Even though the petitioners could raise the issue in the circuit court, the Court held their complaints were substantively sufficient. Rule 13.2(a) requires only a “plain, concise statement of the charge in ordinary language” sufficiently definite to inform the defendant and to allow the court to impose judgment upon conviction. The Committee Comments state that the Rule “eliminates the necessity of formal averments.”

The Court endorsed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reasoning: a charging instrument need not cite a specific statute, and a mis-citation does not defeat sufficiency if the language conveys the offense (Thomas; Whitt). The municipal complaints here were written in terms adequate to inform the accused, and thus they met Rule 13.2(a) (Moye).

The petitioners’ reliance on pre-Rules decisions like Harris (which required averments that an ordinance was duly adopted prior to the offense) was misplaced. Those historical pleading formalities have been superseded by the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure. Later cases the petitioners cited—Woodson, Bailey, Truman, and Hall—speak to trial proof of an ordinance, not to complaint sufficiency. The Court implicitly drew an important line:

• Pleading sufficiency is governed by Rule 13.2’s notice-focused standard;
• Proof of the ordinance (including adoption and content) is an evidentiary matter at trial.

The petitioners also highlighted that Huntsville is a Class 3 municipality (see § 11-45-11 and § 11-40-12) and argued that the circuit court could not take judicial notice of its ordinances. The City responded that judicial notice is a matter of evidence, not pleading. The Supreme Court did not hinge its decision on judicial notice; instead, it held that judicial notice concerns do not augment pleading requirements under Rule 13.2. Whether and how a court may take judicial notice of an ordinance is a trial proof issue, not a pleading sufficiency issue.

Impact

This opinion meaningfully reshapes two practical aspects of municipal prosecutions and de novo appeals in Alabama.

• Preservation clarified: Defendants appealing for a trial de novo may raise a Rule 15.2(d) “failure to charge an offense” argument for the first time in the circuit court. Defense counsel need not fear forfeiture for omission in municipal court on that specific ground.
• Pleading modernized: Municipal prosecutors are not required to include pre-Rules formalities (e.g., allegations that the ordinance was duly adopted prior to the offense) in charging instruments. Complaints that satisfy Rule 13.2’s plain-statement standard are sufficient, even if they omit statutory citations or contain mis-citations, provided they adequately describe the offense in ordinary language.
• Subject-matter jurisdiction insulated: Courts should not conflate pleading defects with jurisdictional defects. Circuit courts retain jurisdiction over de novo appeals under § 12-11-30(3) regardless of perceived complaint deficiencies.
• Trial proof preserved: The opinion does not dilute a municipality’s burden at trial to prove the ordinance (where applicable). It simply separates pleading sufficiency from evidentiary proof. Practitioners should continue to prepare to prove or contest ordinance content and adoption at trial.
• Litigation strategy: Defense challenges will likely focus more on whether the complaint’s language actually provides adequate notice under Rule 13.2 and less on formalistic averments. Municipalities should ensure complaints plainly articulate the offense’s essential contours in ordinary language and be prepared to prove the ordinance at trial.
• Judicial notice questions left for another day: Although the Court noted arguments about judicial notice of Class 3 municipal ordinances, it resolved this case on pleading grounds. Future cases may still address when and how circuit courts may take judicial notice of non-Class 1 and 2 ordinances.
• Appellate practice reminder: The Court reinforced that timeliness of rehearing applications is not jurisdictional and that appellate courts may exercise discretion under Rule 2(b) to consider them, though this does not extend to enlarging the time for taking an appeal or filing certiorari petitions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Trial de novo: A completely new trial in the circuit court as if the municipal-court trial never happened. The circuit court does not review municipal-court procedures; it tries the case anew.
• “Failure to charge an offense” (Rule 15.2(d)): A special kind of objection asserting that the charging instrument does not actually allege a crime. It can be raised “at any time during the pendency of the proceeding,” including for the first time in the circuit-court de novo proceeding.
• Subject-matter jurisdiction: A court’s power to hear a type of case. It stems from statutes and the constitution. Defective complaints do not strip courts of this power.
• Rule 13.2’s “plain-statement” standard: A charging instrument must state, in ordinary language, what the defendant is accused of, with enough clarity to inform the defendant and allow on conviction the entry of proper judgment. It dispenses with older technical pleading formalities.
• Mis-citation vs. notice: A complaint that mis-cites a statute can still be sufficient if its narrative conveys the offense. The key is whether the defendant is fairly informed of the charge.
• Judicial notice of municipal ordinances: Some courts must take judicial notice of ordinances from Class 1 and 2 municipalities by statute; for others, proof may be required. This is an evidentiary question at trial, not a pleading requirement.

Conclusion

The Alabama Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Ex parte Sandifer, Tanner, Fearn, and Barrett establishes two important clarifications in the municipal-appeal context. First, on preservation, a “failure to charge an offense” challenge is not forfeited by omission in municipal court and may be asserted for the first time in the circuit court during a de novo appeal—faithful to Sorsby’s understanding of de novo proceedings and Rule 15.2(d)’s “any time” language. Second, on pleading, municipal complaints are governed by Rule 13.2’s plain-statement standard; the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure supersede the pre-Rules formalism once required by cases like Harris. Complaints need not include “authorized ordination” or similar formal averments to be valid, and mis-citation does not doom a complaint that otherwise provides adequate notice.

By separating pleading from proof, and jurisdiction from procedure, the Court streamlines municipal prosecutions and clarifies defense rights in de novo appeals. The upshot is practical and doctrinal clarity: defendants retain the ability to attack charging sufficiency in the circuit court, but municipalities need not revert to archaic pleading formulas. Going forward, the focus returns to whether complaints plainly inform the accused of the offense and whether the City can prove its ordinance at trial.