No Per Se “Interested-Adult Consultation” Rule for Juvenile Miranda Waivers in Connecticut: State v. Cooper (2025)

Introduction

In State v. Cooper (Supreme Court of Connecticut, officially released September 30, 2025), the court affirmed the murder conviction of a 17-year-old defendant and, in doing so, resolved several important questions at the intersection of juvenile interrogation law, expert evidence in closing argument, and consciousness-of-guilt instructions.

The case arose from the shooting of Jeri Kollock, Jr., inside the Charles F. Greene Homes housing complex in Bridgeport. Surveillance video captured the defendant, Jahmari Cooper, interacting with the victim, frisking his pockets, leading him into the building through the rear/basement entrance, and exiting alone through the front door minutes later with his face covered by a mask. Two weeks later, the police found in Cooper’s bedroom a .45 caliber Astra pistol with TulAmmo ammunition—the same brand as the casings recovered at the scene. A ballistics examiner later opined, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, that the casings and bullets from the scene and the victim’s body were fired by that pistol.

The legal disputes on appeal centered on:

Whether Cooper’s Miranda waiver, obtained at his home in the presence of his legal guardian, was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under federal law; and whether the Connecticut Constitution should require a meaningful, private consultation with an “interested adult” before a juvenile’s waiver is valid.
Whether portions of the prosecutor’s closing and rebuttal constituted prosecutorial impropriety—particularly comments about the firearms expert’s opinions and evocative references to the victim’s condition and the defendant’s conduct.
Whether the trial court erred in giving a consciousness-of-guilt instruction based on Cooper masking his face and later being apprehended in Florida; and, if so, whether any error was harmful.

The Supreme Court affirmed on all issues, including a significant holding: the court declined to adopt a state constitutional bright-line “interested-adult consultation” rule for juvenile Miranda waivers, reaffirming the totality-of-the-circumstances approach—now supplemented by recent statutory protections for juveniles during interrogation.

Summary of the Opinion

Miranda Waiver: The court upheld the trial court’s finding that the 17-year-old defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The defendant was nearly 18, in 10th/11th grade, not impaired, interviewed in his bedroom with his legal guardian present, and invoked his right to remain silent 19 minutes into the interview—signaling comprehension. Even assuming the first 19 minutes should have been suppressed, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the strength of the state’s case and the non-inculpatory nature of the statements used.
State Constitutional Rule Rejected: Applying State v. Geisler, the court declined to adopt a prophylactic state constitutional rule requiring suppression of a juvenile’s custodial statement when the juvenile was not afforded a meaningful opportunity to consult privately with an interested adult prior to waiver. The court reaffirmed the totality-of-the-circumstances standard (with special care for juveniles), pointing also to recent legislation (e.g., General Statutes § 54-86q) as added safeguards.
Prosecutorial Impropriety: The prosecutor’s descriptions of the firearms/toolmark expert’s testimony as reaching “a degree of scientific certainty” were consistent with the trial court’s limitations (disallowing absolute claims). References to expert qualifications were fair comment on the evidence, and the rebuttal phrasing “I completely disagree” did not convey personal knowledge or vouching. The prosecutor’s rhetorical statements—that the victim was naked, on his knees, possibly begging, stripped to humiliate him, and that the defendant set a “trap”—were supported by evidence and reasonable inferences relevant to intent.
Consciousness of Guilt Instruction: Even if the instruction was arguably improvident, any error was harmless. The state’s proof—surveillance video, building layout showing the path past the stairwell where shots were fired, ballistics evidence tying the gun in Cooper’s room to the crime—was strong without reliance on consciousness-of-guilt inferences.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Miranda and Waiver Doctrine

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966): Establishes the prophylactic warnings and waiver structure for custodial interrogations.
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979): The U.S. Supreme Court rejected per se rules in juvenile waiver contexts (e.g., request for probation officer as equivalent to a lawyer), affirming that voluntariness is determined under the totality-of-the-circumstances test—even for juveniles. This decision is central to Cooper’s holding that no bright-line “interested-adult consultation” rule is constitutionally required.
State v. Reynolds, 264 Conn. 1 (2003): Connecticut’s articulation of the voluntariness and knowledge inquiry for Miranda waivers, with factors including age, intelligence, education, intoxication, mental status, prior police experience, and emotional state. Cooper applies Reynolds, finding substantial evidence of a valid waiver.
State v. Whitaker, 215 Conn. 739 (1990) and State v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85 (1970): The court emphasized that Connecticut has not required parental contact for a juvenile in custody to waive Miranda rights and that minors can, under some circumstances, validly waive without parental consent; these precedents undercut the proposed per se rule.

State Constitutional Methodology

State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 (1992): Provides the six-factor framework for state constitutional analysis. The court canvassed text, Connecticut precedent, federal law, sister-state law, historical context, and public policy/sociological norms; it found the balance favored the established totality approach with legislative safeguards rather than a new per se rule.
State v. Purcell, 331 Conn. 318 (2019): Confirms that Connecticut may provide greater due process safeguards in the Miranda context but that additional prophylactic rules must be justified; Cooper’s Geisler analysis concluded no additional rule was warranted here.

Juvenile Sentencing and Interrogation Context

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) and State v. McCleese, 333 Conn. 378 (2019): While primarily sentencing cases, they reflect the judiciary’s recognition of youthfulness and “hallmarks of adolescence” as important considerations. Cooper acknowledges these insights and the need for special care in juvenile contexts.
Connecticut statutes: General Statutes §§ 46b-133(f), 46b-137(a) (parental presence and admissibility rules for those under 16 in juvenile proceedings) and § 54-86q (effective October 1, 2023, limiting deceptive/coercive tactics in juvenile interrogations). These statutes supply policy protections that complement, rather than displace, the totality test in adult criminal prosecutions.

Expert Evidence and Closing Argument

State v. Raynor, 337 Conn. 527 (2020): Discusses acceptable limiting language for firearms/toolmark opinions (e.g., “reasonable degree of certainty,” “practical certainty”) and disallows absolute claims of identity. Cooper aligns the prosecutor’s closing phrasing with the court’s limits and Raynor’s calibrated approach.
State v. Griffin, 339 Conn. 631 (2021): Warns that police misrepresentations about case strength can be coercive; Cooper limits that principle to statements post-waiver and, crucially, declined to consider unpreserved deception claims and found the detective’s comments came after the waiver.

Prosecutorial Impropriety

State v. Diaz, 348 Conn. 750 (2024); State v. Gary S., 345 Conn. 387 (2022); State v. Outing, 298 Conn. 34 (2010); State v. Albino, 312 Conn. 763 (2014); State v. Gibson, 302 Conn. 653 (2011): Together, these cases frame the standards for closing argument—generous latitude, but no facts outside the record, no vouching, no personal opinion, and caution against appeals to passion. Cooper applied these principles to uphold the prosecutor’s rhetorical but evidence-grounded arguments.

Consciousness of Guilt

State v. Scott, 270 Conn. 92 (2004): The instruction and its content lie in the trial court’s discretion.
State v. Coccomo, 302 Conn. 664 (2011): Evidence of post-crime conduct is admissible if relevant to a guilty conscience; ambiguity goes to weight, not admissibility.
State v. Thompson, 305 Conn. 412 (2012): Such claims are not constitutional; harm analysis focuses on whether jury was misled.

Legal Reasoning

1) Miranda Waiver (Federal Standard)

The court conducted a thorough totality-of-the-circumstances review. It emphasized:

Setting and tone: The interview occurred in the defendant’s bedroom, with his legal guardian present; he was unhandcuffed, not impaired, and the tone was conversational.
Capacity and experience: Despite being 17, Cooper exhibited no mental or intellectual deficiency; he had extensive prior system exposure—thirteen arrests and at least eleven prior times receiving Miranda warnings. The court accorded this some weight (while noting juvenile exposure may be less probative than adult exposure) and observed that invoking his right 19 minutes in strongly indicated comprehension.
Police conduct: The “you have to tell me yes” comment was reasonably understood as clarifying that a verbal waiver was required—not an insistence that he must waive. Alleged misstatements about surveillance footage occurred after the waiver and thus did not bear on the validity of the waiver itself. The request to speak with an uncle came after the waiver; the interview continued until Cooper invoked his right to remain silent, at which point the trial court suppressed all subsequent statements.

Weighing age alongside these factors, the court upheld the trial court’s finding of a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. And even if admitting the first 19 minutes was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the largely exculpatory content and the independent strength of the state’s case (video chronology and firearm linkage).

2) State Constitutional Claim and Supervisory Power

Applying Geisler, the court declined to adopt a bright-line state constitutional rule requiring a meaningful opportunity for private consultation with an interested adult as a precondition to a valid juvenile Miranda waiver.

Text and history did not compel greater protection than the federal baseline.
Connecticut precedent consistently applies totality for juvenile waivers, considering age and circumstances with special care, and has never required parental contact in the criminal context.
Federal law (Fare v. Michael C.) endorses totality even for juveniles.
Other states are divided; the majority adhere to totality (with New Jersey giving the absence of parental consultation “heavy weight” in totality), while Vermont (and to a limited age threshold, Massachusetts) impose stronger prophylactic rules. Cooper found the majority’s approach more persuasive, balancing juvenile needs with the integrity of truthful evidence.
Policy and social science: The court acknowledged developmental research and legislative reforms (e.g., § 54-86q’s restrictions on deception and coercion for juveniles), and recognized empirical findings that parents often do not advise silence or counsel in practice—undermining the premise that an “interested adult” rule invariably improves decision-making. The court suggested a prudent practice: offer a private consultation with an interested adult before a juvenile waives Miranda, noting it may weigh heavily in some cases, but stopped short of constitutionalizing a per se requirement. The court also declined to impose the rule via its supervisory authority.

3) Prosecutorial Impropriety

The court rejected claims that the prosecutor mischaracterized expert testimony or argued facts outside the record:

Ballistics phrasing: The trial court had barred absolute identity opinions and required the expert to couch his conclusions in “reasonable/practical/scientific certainty” terms. In closing, the prosecutor used variants of “a degree of scientific certainty,” which fit within the order and Raynor’s guidance. There was no assertion of 100% certainty.
Qualifications and vouching: The prosecutor’s references to the expert’s decades of experience were fair comments on admitted evidence and not expressions of personal belief in credibility.
“I disagree” remark: Read in context, it summarized and contrasted the evidence against defense counsel’s characterization, invited jurors to recall the testimony, and did not imply secret knowledge or personal vouching.
Rhetorical inferences: The prosecutor’s statements that the victim was on his knees, possibly begging, stripped to humiliate him, that the defendant lured him and set a trap, were grounded in record facts and reasonable inferences: bullet trajectory from above, low bullet holes on the landing walls, lack of blood and holes on the victim’s clothing, the blood trail, and the video chronology. These went to intent to kill, a central element differentiating murder from manslaughter.

4) Consciousness of Guilt Instruction

The instruction, referencing Cooper’s masking of his face and his later apprehension in Florida, was within the court’s discretion; in any event, even assuming arguendo that the instruction should not have been given or should have been narrower, any error was harmless. The state’s case was strong independent of this inference: the video sequence, the building’s internal path linking the rear entrance to the front exit via the stairwell where the shooting occurred, and the firearm and ammunition linkage. The prosecutor’s references to the instruction were restrained and tied to evidence.

Impact

1) Juvenile Interrogations in Connecticut

No per se “interested-adult consultation” rule: Connecticut continues to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances test to juvenile Miranda waivers in adult criminal proceedings. Age remains a highly salient factor, but absence of a private consultation is not dispositive.
Statutory safeguards matter: § 54-86q, effective October 1, 2023, restricts deceptive or coercive tactics in juvenile custodial interrogations; violations can affect admissibility and voluntariness analyses going forward.
Prudent practice for law enforcement: Although not constitutionally required, the court signals that offering a juvenile a private consultation with an interested adult before waiver is sound practice and may carry considerable weight in borderline cases.

2) Prosecutors’ Closing Arguments on Expert Evidence

Ballistics opinions should be framed in qualified terms acceptable under Raynor and trial court orders (“reasonable/practical scientific certainty,” not absolutes). Summarizing those conclusions in closing with similar qualifiers is permissible.
Highlighting an expert’s qualifications is generally acceptable; avoid personal opinions or implying knowledge outside the record.
Use vivid rhetoric only when tied closely to evidence; where intent is at issue, reasoned inferences from trajectory, scene reconstruction, and physical evidence are fair argument.

3) Defense Practice

Build the suppression record: Any cognitive or mental-health evidence (e.g., IQ, PTSD assessments) must be introduced at the suppression hearing; material introduced later (e.g., in a presentence report) will not be considered on appeal to undermine the waiver finding.
Target pre-waiver conduct: To challenge a waiver, focus on pre-waiver coercion or misrepresentation; post-waiver police assertions rarely affect the waiver itself (though they may bear on the voluntariness of the statements if separately challenged).
Object and preserve: If challenging expert phrasing or closing rhetoric, timely objections help frame appellate review.

4) Consciousness-of-Guilt Instructions

Trial judges retain discretion. Instructions should be calibrated to the facts and remind jurors that such evidence permits—but does not require—a guilt inference and may have innocent explanations.
Harmlessness is likely where independent evidence is strong. Defendants should be prepared to show how the instruction plausibly misled the jury in close cases.

5) Ballistics/Forensic Testimony

Raynor remains the key Connecticut authority on acceptable formulations. Courts may enforce qualifiers and strike unqualified “positive match” assertions. Cooper shows that closing arguments mirroring those qualifiers will withstand impropriety challenges.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Miranda warnings and waiver: Police must inform a suspect in custody of the right to remain silent and to an attorney. A “waiver” is valid only if the suspect understands these rights and voluntarily chooses to speak.
Totality of the circumstances: Courts consider everything relevant to the suspect’s decision—age, intelligence, experience, setting, tone, duration, presence of a guardian, intoxication, and police conduct—rather than applying a single bright-line rule.
“Interested-adult consultation” rule: A proposed rule that would require a juvenile to have a private, meaningful consultation with a parent/guardian (or similar adult) before any waiver could be valid. Cooper rejects this as a constitutional mandate in Connecticut.
Prophylactic rule: A judicially created safeguard designed to prevent violations of constitutional rights (e.g., Miranda itself). Cooper declined to create a new one in the juvenile waiver context.
Harmless error (beyond a reasonable doubt): Even if there was constitutional error (e.g., admission of statements), an appellate court will affirm if the government proves the error did not contribute to the verdict in light of the whole record.
Prosecutorial impropriety: Misconduct in closing argument can include stating facts not in evidence, vouching for a witness, expressing personal belief in guilt, or inflaming passions. Courts allow persuasive rhetoric grounded in the evidence and reasonable inferences.
Consciousness of guilt: Evidence of post-crime conduct (e.g., flight, disguise) that may suggest an awareness of guilt. It permits a jury inference but does not create a presumption, and jurors must consider alternative explanations.
Porter/Daubert standard: Governs admissibility of scientific/technical expert testimony. Connecticut’s Porter framework (following Daubert) emphasizes reliability and relevance. Cooper’s ballistics testimony proceeded under a limiting order rather than a Porter hearing, with agreed-upon qualifiers.

Conclusion

State v. Cooper solidifies several important propositions in Connecticut criminal practice:

The totality-of-the-circumstances standard continues to govern juvenile Miranda waivers in adult prosecutions. Connecticut declines to adopt a per se “interested-adult consultation” rule under either the state constitution or supervisory authority.
Nonetheless, age carries special weight, and police should prudently offer juveniles a private consultation with an interested adult prior to waiver; the failure to do so may weigh heavily in close cases. Legislative reforms (notably § 54-86q’s constraints on interrogation tactics) further bolster safeguards for juveniles.
On closing argument, prosecutors may characterize qualified expert opinions within court-imposed limits, reference expert credentials, and argue forceful but evidence-based inferences about intent, including the victim’s circumstances and the defendant’s planning, so long as argument remains tethered to the record.
Consciousness-of-guilt instructions remain within the trial court’s discretion and are unlikely to result in reversal where independent evidence is strong and instructions properly frame the inference as permissive.

Cooper thus reflects a calibrated balance: respect for the developmental realities of youth and modern policy protections, but no rigid new constitutional rule that excludes significant evidence when the totality of circumstances demonstrates a knowing and voluntary waiver. The decision sends a clear practical signal to law enforcement and prosecutors about best practices in juvenile cases while preserving a flexible, fact-sensitive framework for trial courts.