No New Precedent: Denial of Review in People v. Terry, with a Dissent Urging Evidence-Based Causation and Aiding‑and‑Abetting Proof at Bindover

Introduction

In People of Michigan v. Damaree Darvell Terry, the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal from an interlocutory decision upholding a bindover to stand trial on multiple felonies arising out of a fatal high-speed incident in Warren, Michigan. Although the Court issued no merits ruling—and thus established no new binding law—the dissent by Justice Kyra H. Bolden articulates a pointed critique of the bindover in this case, emphasizing the gatekeeping role of probable cause at preliminary examination, the distinct elements of aiding-and-abetting liability, and the dual requirements of factual and proximate causation for second-degree murder in vehicular contexts. The dissent also faults the magistrate’s reliance on speculation rather than evidence, invoking People v. Stafford as a cautionary precedent.

The case pits the State’s theory that all drivers in a high-speed convoy share culpability—even if only one vehicle causes a collision—against the defense’s insistence that, absent proof of shared plan, encouragement, or causation, a non-striking driver cannot be bound over on second-degree murder. Justice Bolden would have granted leave for the Court of Appeals to fully assess whether the bindover was an abuse of discretion.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court’s order (July 25, 2025) granted immediate consideration but denied leave to appeal. No majority opinion issued, and the denial expresses no view on the merits. Justice Bolden dissented, explaining:

Preliminary examinations are statutory safeguards requiring evidence-based probable cause for each element of each charged offense before a defendant may be bound over to circuit court (citing MCL 766.13, People v. Yost, and People v. Shami).
In this case, the non-striking defendant’s car did not collide with the victims and was not damaged; there was no evidence of coordination, communication, or encouragement between defendant and the striking co-defendant (Hudson).
Although malice could be inferred from driving at extreme speeds while fleeing police, the prosecution still had to show probable cause for causation and for aiding-and-abetting elements. On the record presented, causation and assistance/encouragement were lacking.
The magistrate’s reasoning—calling defendant “a missile” who “could have hit someone too”—substituted speculation for evidence, echoing the error found in People v. Stafford.
Given the gatekeeping function of bindover, the burdens of unjustified felony prosecution, and the closeness of the legal questions, further appellate review was warranted. Justice Bolden would have remanded to the Court of Appeals as on leave granted.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Operate Here

People v. Yost, 468 Mich 122 (2003); MCL 766.13; People v. Weston, 413 Mich 371 (1982): These authorities underscore the preliminary examination as a substantive screening mechanism. A bindover may occur only when evidence supports probable cause that a felony was committed and that the defendant committed it. Weston emphasizes that this is not a mere formality—it is meant to prevent unwarranted prosecutions.
People v. Anderson, 501 Mich 175 (2018); People v. Babcock, 469 Mich 247 (2003); People v. Shami, 501 Mich 243 (2018): Together, they set the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing bindovers and define probable cause at that stage: evidence of each element, or reasonable inferences thereto, sufficient to cause a person of “ordinary prudence and caution” to entertain a reasonable belief in guilt. An outcome straying outside a principled range constitutes an abuse of discretion.
People v. Feezel, 486 Mich 184 (2010); People v. Schaefer, 473 Mich 418 (2005); People v. Barnes, 182 Mich 179 (1914): These decisions define causation in criminal law, requiring both factual (but-for) and proximate cause. Proximate cause limits liability to harms that are a direct and natural result of the defendant’s conduct; superseding causes that are not reasonably foreseeable break the causal chain.
People v. Robinson, 475 Mich 1 (2006); People v. Perry, 460 Mich 55 (1999): Aiding and abetting is not a separate offense but a theory of vicarious liability; the prosecution must show (1) a principal committed the crime, (2) the defendant assisted or encouraged, and (3) the defendant intended the crime or knew of the principal’s intent when aiding.
People v. Smith, 478 Mich 64 (2007); People v. Spears, 346 Mich App 494 (2023); People v. Goecke, 457 Mich 442 (1998): Elements of second-degree murder include a death, causation by the defendant’s act, malice, and absence of justification. Goecke explains that malice can be inferred from acts showing wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood of causing death or great bodily harm—often applied in extreme-driving cases.
People v. Stafford, 434 Mich 125 (1990): The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed reversal of a bindover where the magistrate relied on broad assumptions and speculation rather than evidence establishing each element. Justice Bolden invokes Stafford to argue that the “missile” reasoning here mirrors those disapproved assumptions.

Legal Reasoning: How the Dissent Would Apply These Principles

1) The bindover threshold is element-by-element

The magistrate had to find probable cause for each element of each charge. For second-degree murder premised on aiding and abetting, that means:

A principal committed second-degree murder (here, the co-defendant Hudson allegedly caused the fatal crash).
Defendant assisted or encouraged the commission of that crime.
Defendant intended the commission of the crime or knew of the principal’s intent when assisting.
And, for murder itself, causation and malice must be established (with the principal’s act imputed to the aider only if the aiding-and-abetting elements are met).

Justice Bolden accepts that malice can be inferred from extreme-speed driving and fleeing police. But malice is not enough. The State must still present evidence supporting causation and the aider’s assistance/encouragement and mental state.

2) Causation: factual and proximate cause

The dissent stresses that defendant’s car did not strike the victims’ vehicle and was not part of the collision. Absent aiding-and-abetting, the “death caused by an act of the defendant” element is unsupported: there is no direct factual cause, and no record evidence that defendant’s own acts set in motion the chain of events culminating in the death.

Proximate cause could, in principle, be satisfied if the victim’s injury were a direct and natural result of defendant’s acts and if no superseding cause broke the chain. But nothing in the preliminary record showed that defendant’s conduct—separate from the striking car—was a proximate cause of the death. The striking driver’s red-light violation at extreme speed could be viewed as an independent, possibly superseding, act unless the State ties the non-striker to that act via aiding-and-abetting proof.

3) Aiding and abetting: proof of assistance/encouragement and intent

The dissent emphasizes evidentiary gaps:

No communications between defendant and Hudson were shown.
No shared plan or agreement was proven.
No overt acts of assistance or encouragement were identified (e.g., blocking, signaling, pacing, or other coordinated maneuvers).
No evidence that defendant knew Hudson intended to commit second-degree murder—or conduct amounting to malice—at the time any aid was purportedly given.

Without these, the legal bridge that would attribute the principal’s deadly act to the non-striking defendant is missing. In Michigan, the act of the principal is imputed to the aider only if the State first proves the aider’s assistance/encouragement and intent/knowledge. Mere simultaneous reckless driving, without more, does not itself supply those elements.

4) The magistrate’s reasoning: speculation vs. evidence

The bindover relied on statements that defendant was “a missile” who “could have hit someone too.” Justice Bolden reads this as reliance on hypothetical culpability—“what might have happened”—rather than on evidence that the aiding-and-abetting and causation elements were satisfied in fact. Citing Stafford, she treats this as outside the principled range of outcomes required by Babcock and Anderson.

Potential Impact and Practical Implications

Because the Supreme Court denied review, the bindover stands and no new binding precedent emerges. Nevertheless, the dissent signals several important practice points for future cases involving group high-speed driving, street racing, or convoy flight from police:

Prosecutors: To pursue aiding-and-abetting homicide against a non-striking driver, be prepared to introduce concrete evidence of assistance/encouragement and shared intent or knowledge—such as communications (before or during the event), coordinated maneuvers (blocking, pacing, signaling), admissions, digital data (event data recorders, location and speed telemetry), or video demonstrating mutual participation beyond “mere presence” or parallel reckless driving.
Defense: At prelim, force the State to prove each element. Emphasize the absence of a direct causal link from the non-striker’s conduct to the death and the lack of evidentiary support for assistance/encouragement or shared intent. Highlight Stafford to push back against speculative bindovers.
Trial courts: Apply Shami and Yost rigorously. Probable cause is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt but still requires evidence—not hypotheticals—supporting each element of the charged offense or reasonable inferences thereto.
Street-racing and convoy cases: The dissent implicitly warns against importing civil “concert of action” concepts wholesale into criminal aiding-and-abetting without meeting the criminal law’s intent and assistance requirements. Absent such proof, the non-striker’s second-degree murder exposure is vulnerable at the preliminary stage.
Other charges (fleeing and eluding; reckless driving causing serious impairment): The dissent’s causation critique may affect these counts too if the State relies on an aiding-and-abetting theory or must prove that this defendant “caused” injury. The opinion does not resolve those issues, but the same evidentiary demands for causation and assistance/encouragement would likely apply.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Preliminary examination (prelim): A hearing before a district court to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a felony was committed and that the defendant committed it. If not, the case cannot proceed to circuit court for trial.
Bindover: The decision to transfer a case to circuit court for trial after a prelim establishes probable cause.
Probable cause (at prelim): Evidence, or reasonable inferences from evidence, that would cause a person of ordinary prudence to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief in the defendant’s guilt as to each element of each charge.
Abuse of discretion: An appellate standard under which a decision is reversed if it falls outside the principled range of outcomes.
Second-degree murder: Requires a death; causation by an act of the defendant; malice (intent to kill, to cause great bodily harm, or to do an act with wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood of causing such harm); and absence of justification/excuse.
Malice (in extreme-driving cases): Can be inferred where the driver’s conduct—such as extreme speed or fleeing police—shows wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood of causing death or serious bodily harm.
Aiding and abetting: Vicarious liability theory. The State must show that the principal committed the crime; the defendant assisted or encouraged its commission; and the defendant intended the crime or knew of the principal’s intent when providing assistance/encouragement.
Factual causation (“but for”): The harm would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct.
Proximate causation: A legal limitation on liability requiring that the harm be a direct and natural result of the defendant’s conduct; a superseding intervening cause not reasonably foreseeable can break the chain.
“As on leave granted” remand: A procedural posture in which the Court of Appeals is directed to consider an appeal as if leave had been granted, allowing full merits briefing and decision.

Conclusion

The Michigan Supreme Court’s denial of leave in People v. Terry leaves the bindover intact and establishes no new law. Yet Justice Bolden’s dissent is a pointed reminder that preliminary examinations are meaningful gatekeeping proceedings, not perfunctory steps. For aiding-and-abetting second-degree murder—particularly in vehicular contexts where only one driver strikes the victim—the prosecution must present evidence at prelim of assistance or encouragement and the requisite intent or knowledge, as well as evidence of causation. Malice inferred from extreme driving is insufficient by itself.

The dissent’s reliance on People v. Stafford underscores that speculative hypotheses (such as labeling a non-striking car a “missile” that “could have” caused harm) cannot substitute for proof connecting a particular defendant to each element of the charged offense. While not binding, the dissent is likely to influence how prosecutors build street-racing and convoy-chase homicide cases, how defense counsel challenge bindovers, and how magistrates evaluate probable cause beyond the pull of generalized culpability.

Bottom line: No new precedent was created by the Court’s order. But the dissent articulates a clear, disciplined framework for evidence-based bindover decisions in aiding-and-abetting vehicular homicide prosecutions—one likely to shape litigation strategy and lower court analysis in future cases with similar facts.