No Ministerial Duty to Provide Free Transcripts: Arkansas Supreme Court Reaffirms “Compelling Need” and Limits Mandamus in Scott v. Sullivan, 2025 Ark. 152

Introduction

In Scott v. Sullivan, 2025 Ark. 152, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a petition for writ of mandamus filed by Ricky Lee Scott, a prisoner serving a life sentence for first-degree murder. Scott sought an order compelling a circuit clerk, multiple court reporters, and several circuit judges (and their successors) to produce transcripts of pretrial proceedings purportedly held in 1996 and 1997 in his criminal case, 19CR-96-61. He argued the missing transcripts would substantiate claims of prosecutorial sexual harassment, a speedy-trial violation, and contain exculpatory material.

The Court’s opinion does more than resolve a records dispute. It clarifies and consolidates several important doctrines in Arkansas law:

The threshold “compelling need” requirement to obtain transcripts at public expense is tethered to a viable, presently available postconviction remedy.
Mandamus cannot compel discretionary acts; there is no ministerial duty on clerks, court reporters, or judges to furnish transcripts free of charge in the circumstances presented.
Claim preclusion (res judicata) and the law’s treatment of speedy-trial and prosecutorial-misconduct allegations restrict attempts to relitigate or repackage previously rejected claims via transcript requests.

Justice Womack concurred, emphasizing that sovereign immunity would independently bar the petition as to the circuit judges, and would dismiss that portion of the appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of mandamus. The Court held that:

Scott failed to demonstrate a clear and certain right to transcripts at public expense because he did not show a compelling need for the documents to support an available postconviction claim.
His speedy-trial allegation is not a cognizable basis to void a judgment in postconviction proceedings and was already decided against him on direct appeal; claim preclusion bars relitigation.
His prosecutorial-misconduct theory is not cognizable in the posture he presents, should have been raised at trial, and was already rejected in prior coram nobis proceedings.
The pretrial proceedings at issue (bond and scheduling) are not relevant to guilt and, even if produced, would not have affected the outcome given multiple eyewitness identifications.
There is no nondiscretionary, ministerial duty on the named officials to produce transcripts at public expense; reporter record-keeping obligations do not transform into a duty to furnish free transcripts to convicted offenders.

Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the Court found no improvidence in the circuit court’s refusal to issue the writ.

Background and Procedural Posture

In 1998, Scott was convicted of first-degree murder in Cross County and sentenced to life imprisonment after multiple eyewitnesses identified him as the shooter. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court rejected his speedy-trial claim and affirmed. Over the ensuing decades, Scott pursued numerous postconviction remedies, including:

Rule 37.1 petition (denied), with the Supreme Court holding that pretrial release and bond issues were moot after conviction and that no record evidence showed a September 13, 1996 hearing occurred (Scott v. State, 355 Ark. 485, 139 S.W.3d 511 (2003)).
Multiple coram nobis petitions; in his fifth, he alleged misconduct by Deputy Prosecutor Joseph Boeckmann based on sexual advances. The Court denied relief, finding no showing that the alleged misconduct tainted critical witness identifications (Scott v. State, 2019 Ark. 94, 571 S.W.3d 451).
Habeas petitions (denied), most recently affirmed in Scott v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 178, 652 S.W.3d 562.

In the present mandamus case, Scott sought transcripts from bond hearings (March 25 and June 28, 1996) and trial-scheduling hearings (September 13, 1996, and January 3, 1997) in 19CR-96-61, and from alleged hearings in another case (19CR-95-255) that the circuit court determined had been dismissed and were unrelated to his murder conviction. The circuit court denied the writ as conclusory and immaterial to his conviction; the Supreme Court affirmed.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Mandamus Standards:
- Khalifa v. State, 2021 Ark. 109: Mandamus enforces an established right or a purely ministerial duty; it is not available to control discretion or review judgment calls.
- Jefferson County Election Comm’n v. Wilkins ex rel. Jefferson County, 2018 Ark. 184, 547 S.W.3d 58: The petitioner must show a clear and certain right to relief and no other adequate remedy.
- Gonder v. State, 2024 Ark. 63, 686 S.W.3d 786: Denials of mandamus are reviewed for abuse of discretion—improvident, thoughtless, or without due consideration conduct.
- Davis v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 119, 673 S.W.3d 436; Safe Surgery Ark. v. Thurston, 2019 Ark. 403, 591 S.W.3d 293: A ministerial duty is defined by constitution or statute; discretionary acts cannot be compelled by mandamus.
These cases framed the central threshold: unless Scott could identify a nondiscretionary, statute-defined duty to produce transcripts at public expense and demonstrate a clear, specific right to them, mandamus cannot issue.
Transcripts at Public Expense and “Compelling Need”:
- Martin v. State, 2019 Ark. 167, 574 S.W.3d 661: A convict seeking materials at public expense must show a “compelling need” for those materials as documentary evidence supporting a claim in a postconviction petition.
Martin supplied the governing standard. The Court used it to assess whether Scott linked his request to a viable postconviction avenue. He did not.
Limitations on Postconviction Relief:
- Marshall v. State, 2020 Ark. 66, 594 S.W.3d 78: A speedy-trial violation, by itself, is not a defect sufficient to void a judgment, foreclosing its use as a standalone postconviction claim.
- Burgie v. State, 2025 Ark. 94: Recites the claim-preclusion factors; once an issue has been litigated and resolved, it cannot be relitigated in a new proceeding or under a different guise.
- Jefferson v. State, 2023 Ark. 38, 660 S.W.3d 575: Prosecutorial-misconduct claims generally must be raised at trial; the opinion underscores non-cognizability of such claims in certain postconviction contexts.
These authorities collectively foreclosed Scott’s theory that transcripts were needed to revisit speedy-trial and prosecutorial-misconduct claims already rejected or not cognizable postconviction.
Scott’s Prior Litigation and Its Preclusive Effect:
- Scott v. State, 337 Ark. 320, 989 S.W.2d 892 (1999): Direct appeal affirming conviction and rejecting speedy-trial claim.
- Scott v. State, 355 Ark. 485, 139 S.W.3d 511 (2003) (Rule 37.1): Pretrial release and bond issues became moot postconviction; no record evidence supported the existence of a September 13, 1996 hearing.
- Scott v. State, 2019 Ark. 94, 571 S.W.3d 451 (coram nobis): Allegations regarding Deputy Prosecutor Boeckmann did not undermine eyewitness identifications central to guilt.
- Scott v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 178, 652 S.W.3d 562 (habeas): Postconviction challenges again failed.
The Court relied on this history to hold that even if the sought transcripts existed, they would not alter the conviction outcome and could not revive claims the Court had already rejected.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two coordinated steps, either of which would independently defeat the petition:

No “compelling need” tied to an available postconviction remedy: The Martin standard requires a petitioner to show a compelling need for copies at public expense as documentary proof in a viable postconviction vehicle. Scott’s principal theories—speedy-trial violations and prosecutorial misconduct—were either:
- Not cognizable in postconviction (Marshall; Jefferson),
- Already decided adversely to him and barred by claim preclusion (Burgie), or
- Irrelevant to guilt, given the nature of the proceedings (bond and scheduling) and the trial evidence (multiple eyewitness identifications).
Without a valid remedial pathway, Scott could not demonstrate a compelling need for the transcripts.
No ministerial duty to provide transcripts at public expense; mandamus unavailable: Mandamus compels only ministerial duties—non-discretionary obligations imposed by constitution or statute. While court reporters have record-retention responsibilities, Scott identified no legal authority requiring them (or clerks or judges) to furnish free transcripts to a convicted felon on demand. To the contrary, the duty to provide transcripts at public expense is discretionary and conditioned on the petitioner’s showing of compelling need. Because the decision is discretionary, mandamus cannot compel it (Davis; Safe Surgery Ark.; Khalifa; Wilkins).

The Court additionally endorsed the circuit court’s factual assessment that Scott’s allegations about the transcripts’ content were conclusory and, even if true, immaterial to his guilt, further undermining any claim of entitlement.

Impact and Prospective Significance

Scott v. Sullivan has several important consequences for Arkansas postconviction and records practice:

Clarifies the gatekeeping standard for free transcripts: The decision reconfirms that “compelling need” means more than generalized assertions; it requires a concrete, evidentiary link between the requested transcript and a claim that can still be heard. Transcript requests as discovery tools for fishing expeditions or to repackage settled issues will fail.
Limits mandamus as a records-enforcement device: Absent a statute or constitutional provision imposing a nondiscretionary obligation, mandamus will not compel production. Petitioners must locate a specific legal duty to produce free transcripts or proceed via other lawful avenues, recognizing that the decision to provide free copies is discretionary.
Reinforces claim preclusion in postconviction litigation: Attempting to relitigate speedy-trial or prosecutorial-misconduct claims through transcript requests will be barred where the issues have already been decided, or where the claims are not cognizable in postconviction proceedings.
Practical guidance for defense and appellate practitioners: The opinion underscores the importance of ensuring a complete appellate record in the direct appeal phase and making timely, specific transcript requests then. After conviction, the pathway narrows considerably.
State-employee status and sovereign-immunity defense: The opinion’s footnote distinguishes representation: the Attorney General represents state officials (judges, reporters) but not county employees (clerks). Justice Womack’s concurrence spotlights sovereign immunity as an independent bar to mandamus claims against judges, signaling another potent defense likely to be invoked in similar suits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Writ of Mandamus: An extraordinary court order directing a public official to perform a clear, nondiscretionary duty. It cannot be used to order how discretion should be exercised or to review judgments already made.
Ministerial vs. Discretionary Duty: A ministerial duty is a specific, mandatory action required by law, leaving no room for judgment. Discretionary duties allow officials to decide whether and how to act. Mandamus reaches only ministerial duties.
“Compelling Need” for Transcripts at Public Expense: A convicted person must show that the requested transcript is necessary documentary evidence for a claim that can still be brought in a recognized postconviction proceeding. Mere curiosity or general allegations are insufficient.
Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata): Once a claim or issue has been litigated and decided, it cannot be relitigated between the same parties. Attempting to revive a decided issue by seeking supporting transcripts typically fails.
Speedy-Trial Claims Postconviction: While a speedy-trial claim can be raised on direct appeal, it is generally not a basis to void a conviction in collateral proceedings and thus cannot establish “compelling need” for transcripts in that context.
Prosecutorial Misconduct in Postconviction: Such claims usually must be raised at trial or on direct appeal. Coram nobis offers a narrow path for newly discovered, extrinsic fraud, but Scott’s prior coram nobis petition was denied on the merits.
Habeas vs. Rule 37 vs. Coram Nobis:
- Rule 37: State postconviction remedy primarily for ineffective assistance and constitutional claims that could not be raised earlier; subject to strict timing and scope limits.
- Habeas Corpus: Challenges the facial validity of the judgment or the jurisdiction of the court; narrow in scope.
- Error Coram Nobis: Extraordinary remedy for fundamental errors of fact extrinsic to the record that would have prevented the judgment; granted sparingly.
Transcript access at public expense must connect to one of these viable paths to satisfy “compelling need.”
Exculpatory Evidence: Evidence tending to disprove guilt. While Brady v. Maryland imposes disclosure duties on prosecutors, a bare claim that unspecified transcripts contain exculpatory material does not, without more, meet the “compelling need” standard or overcome preclusion.
Sovereign Immunity (Concurring View): The State and its officials (in their official capacities) are generally immune from suit unless immunity is expressly waived. Justice Womack would dismiss the claims against judges on this ground.

Observations on the Parties and Representation

The opinion notes that the Attorney General did not represent the circuit clerk (a county employee) but did represent the state officials (circuit judges and court reporters), consistent with Arkansas Code sections 25-16-702, 14-14-1204(a)(1)(D), 16-13-501, and 21-8-102(a)(1)(J). This allocation is relevant to defenses like sovereign immunity and highlights the distinct legal positions of county versus state actors in litigation over court records.

Conclusion

Scott v. Sullivan fortifies Arkansas law on two fronts. First, it reiterates that a convicted person seeking transcripts at public expense must demonstrate a compelling need linked to a live, cognizable postconviction claim; speculative or precluded theories will not suffice. Second, it confirms that, absent a statute or constitutional mandate, no ministerial duty obliges court reporters, clerks, or judges to provide free transcripts upon request, rendering mandamus an improper vehicle to compel such production.

By tying transcript access to viable postconviction remedies and by emphasizing the discretionary nature of any free provision, the Court forecloses attempts to use mandamus as a backdoor to relitigate issues resolved on direct appeal or in prior collateral actions. The concurrence signals an additional barrier—sovereign immunity—likely to shape future suits against judicial officers. The overarching message is clear: transcript requests must be specific, necessary, and legally grounded in an available remedy; otherwise, they will not open the door to further litigation.