No Mid‑Term Increases to Legislative “In‑District Compensation”: South Carolina Supreme Court Clarifies Compensation vs. Expense Reimbursement in Climer v. Loftis

Introduction

This original-jurisdiction case squarely confronts a perennial separation‑of‑powers concern: when, and on what terms, may a legislature alter the money that flows into legislators’ pockets during their own term. In the 2025 Appropriations Act, the 126th South Carolina General Assembly enacted proviso 91.13 to raise legislators’ “in‑district compensation” from $1,000 to $2,500 per month, effective immediately for Fiscal Year 2025–26. Petitioners David Wesley (Wes) Climer, a sitting state senator, and citizen taxpayer Carol Herring sought to enjoin the State Treasurer from disbursing these funds, arguing the increase violated the South Carolina Constitution’s bar on mid‑term increases to legislative compensation.

The Senate President (Thomas C. Alexander) and House Speaker (G. Murrell Smith Jr.) intervened to defend the proviso. The Court issued a temporary injunction in June 2025 to preserve the status quo, which halted not only the $1,500 increase but, under the proviso’s structure, all in‑district payments, including the longstanding $1,000 monthly amount dating from 1994.

On November 12, 2025, in a unanimous per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of South Carolina permanently enjoined payments under the proviso, holding the enactment unconstitutional because it increased the sitting legislature’s “compensation.” The Court reaffirmed the legislature’s authority to reimburse bona fide official expenses but emphasized that labels do not control; substance and effect do. The decision provides a practical roadmap for distinguishing compensation from expense reimbursement and offers guidance for drafting constitutionally compliant legislative compensation measures.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court granted a permanent injunction, concluding that proviso 91.13—which states “All members of the General Assembly shall receive an in‑district compensation of $2,500 per month”—effects a mid‑term increase in legislators’ compensation in violation of Article III, Sections 9 and 19 of the South Carolina Constitution. The Court emphasized:

Historically, “per diem” and “compensation” are treated as equivalents in the South Carolina Constitution; the Constitution permits raising compensation for future, but not current, members of the General Assembly.
The State may appropriate funds for legitimate “official expenses,” but courts will look behind labels to the enactment’s nature and reasonable effect.
Three indicators showed the proviso granted compensation, not expense reimbursement: the statutory label “in‑district compensation,” the absence of any limiting language tying funds to official expenses, and the classification of these amounts as gross income for federal tax purposes and as “earnable compensation” for South Carolina retirement benefits.
Because the proviso applied immediately to the 126th General Assembly, it unconstitutionally increased current members’ compensation. The Court therefore permanently enjoined payment of all funds covered by the proviso.

On standing, the Court held Senator Climer lacked standing to sue over an action of the body to which he belongs—especially one he voted to approve—strongly discouraging legislators from litigating internal grievances. However, citizen petitioner Herring possessed public-importance standing, allowing the Court to reach the merits.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Constitutional Text and History (Art. III, §§ 9, 19; historical constitutions): The opinion traces South Carolina’s constitutional treatment of legislative pay, noting that “compensation” and “per diem” have been used interchangeably since the early constitutions of 1790, 1861, 1865, and 1868. Section 19’s prohibition that “no General Assembly shall have the power to increase the per diem of its own members” is read in concert with Section 9’s compensation limit, confirming that “compensation” encompasses per diem and comparable remuneration formats.
Scroggie v. Scarborough (1931): Scarborough underscores that legislatures may constitutionally provide for payment of “official expenses”—those necessary to enable the Legislature to perform its functions. But Scarborough also articulates the core effect-over-label principle: a law’s purpose and constitutional validity are judged by its nature and reasonable effect, not its caption. This analytical mode is central to the Court’s decision here.
Godfrey v. Hunter (1935): Godfrey exemplifies the Court’s willingness to look behind an “expense allowance” label to determine whether a payment is truly compensation. That approach directly informs the Court’s treatment of “in‑district compensation” in this case.
Scroggie v. Bates (1948): Bates articulates the enduring rule: the Constitution does not forbid providing adequate pay for members of an incoming General Assembly; it forbids legislators from voting themselves additional compensation during their current terms. This case anchors the permissibility of delayed‑effective‑date raises and is expressly relied upon.
Joytime Distributors & Amusement Co. v. State (1999): The Court reiterates the strong presumption of constitutionality and the requirement that invalidity be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. The opinion’s conclusion that the proviso is unconstitutional despite this deferential standard signals the clarity of the violation.
Thomas v. Macklen (1938); Cohen v. Hoff (1814); McLain v. Hayne (1812): These decisions affirm the judiciary’s duty to invalidate statutes that contravene the Constitution and admonish against judicial intrusion into policymaking. The Court explicitly excludes any view on the “wisdom” of legislative pay levels, focusing instead on constitutional compliance.
Newman v. Richland County Historical Preservation Commission (1997); SC Public Interest Foundation v. SCDOT (2017); Sloan v. Greenville County (2003): These authorities inform the standing analysis. The Court holds that a legislator generally cannot sue over actions of the legislative body to which he belongs, while reaffirming “public importance” standing for citizens where issues are of significant public import and in need of prompt judicial resolution.
U.S. Constitution, 27th Amendment: Cited by analogy, the 27th Amendment’s bar on immediate changes to Congressional pay reflects the same structural concern addressed by South Carolina’s Constitution—deterring self-dealing in compensation.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in four steps.

Text, Structure, and History: Article III, Section 19 categorically forbids a sitting General Assembly from increasing its own per diem—understood historically and interpretively as “compensation” for services. The Court canvasses historical constitutional usage to equate “per diem” with “compensation,” rejecting any narrow, modern technical distinctions. The takeaway: the Constitution bars mid‑term increases to whatever form legislative remuneration takes—daily, monthly, or salaried.
Expenses vs. Compensation: The Constitution permits reimbursement of “official expenses,” i.e., costs necessary to perform legislative functions. But the judiciary will not be governed by labels; courts examine “nature and reasonable effect” to determine whether a payment is truly an expense reimbursement or compensation. This echoes Scarborough and Godfrey.
Application to Proviso 91.13: Applying this effect‑based test, the Court finds three powerful indicators that the $2,500 monthly sum is compensation, not an official-expense reimbursement:
- Statutory Text: The proviso itself calls the payment “in‑district compensation,” not “reimbursement,” and contains no language limiting the funds to official expenses, no eligibility criteria tied to incurred costs, no documentation requirement, and no clawback of unspent amounts.
- Tax Treatment: For federal tax purposes, the money is treated as gross income (compensation for services), albeit with the possibility of deductions if the legislator can prove expenses. This is characteristic of compensation schemes, not accountable-plan reimbursements.
- Retirement Treatment: Under state retirement statutes and guidance, the amount is counted as “earnable compensation,” reinforcing that the State itself treats the payment as pay, not reimbursement.
Because the payment’s nature and effect are those of compensation, increasing it during the 126th General Assembly violated the constitutional prohibition. The Court stresses that the 1994 increase was constitutionally structured to take effect for a future legislature; proviso 91.13 was not.
Remedy and Severability in an Appropriations Proviso: The Court permanently enjoins “payment of the funds covered by the proviso.” Importantly, the proviso did not separate the pre‑existing $1,000 amount from the $1,500 increase. As the Court observed during the temporary injunction phase, this drafting choice meant that enjoining the unconstitutional increase necessarily halted all in‑district payments authorized by the proviso. The Court declines to rewrite or salvage portions of the proviso, consistent with separation‑of‑powers principles.

Finally, the Court addresses standing. Senator Climer lacks standing to sue the legislative body of which he is part, particularly where he supported the overall appropriations act. By contrast, citizen Herring met the requirements for public-importance standing, permitting adjudication of this constitutional question of widespread significance.

Practical and Doctrinal Impact

This decision has immediate fiscal, drafting, and doctrinal consequences.

Immediate fiscal effect: No payments may be made under proviso 91.13. Because the proviso bundled the entire $2,500 figure, there is no current authority to pay the historical $1,000 amount for FY 2025–26. Unless and until the General Assembly enacts a new, constitutionally compliant provision (or reenacts the prior $1,000 under a separate, valid authorization), in‑district monthly payments are halted.
Clear drafting lessons for the General Assembly: To increase compensation lawfully, the General Assembly must:
- Delay effectiveness until the next General Assembly is seated (January 2027 in this cycle), mirroring the long-accepted Bates approach and the logic of the federal 27th Amendment; or
- Structure payments as bona fide expense reimbursements under an “accountable plan”–style framework:
  - Use “reimbursement” language, not “compensation.”
  - Expressly limit funds to documented, legislatively defined official expenses incurred in service to the district.
  - Require timely substantiation and return of unspent advances; prohibit personal use.
  - Exclude these amounts from “earnable compensation” for retirement and from gross income where federal law permits, aligning form with substance.
  - Impose caps tied to documented needs or geographic considerations, with auditing and compliance mechanisms.
The opinion makes plain that courts will test the reality of these features. Mere relabeling is insufficient if the effect remains a no‑strings monthly stipend.
Reaffirmation of effect‑based review: The Court reinforces that its constitutional analysis examines practical operation, not legislative labels. This has wider implications for any governmental “allowance” programs that might function as disguised compensation.
Strengthening the mid‑term raise prohibition: The decision closes the door on attempts to use “in‑district compensation” to effectuate immediate raises. Going forward, the safest routes are (a) a delayed‑effect raise for the next General Assembly or (b) a reimbursement program tightly tethered to actual expenses.
Standing guidance for legislative litigants: The Court’s admonition discourages sitting legislators from suing their own institution over enacted measures, signaling that intra‑legislative disputes should be resolved through political processes unless a separate citizen or group with appropriate standing brings the challenge.
Separation of powers and judicial restraint: The Court reaffirms that adequacy of legislative pay is a policy question outside judicial purview; the judicial role is limited to enforcing constitutional boundaries. The opinion’s per curiam, unanimous posture enhances its precedential force.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Per diem vs. compensation: Although “per diem” today may sound like a daily travel allowance, South Carolina’s constitutional text and history use “per diem” and “compensation” interchangeably to mean pay for legislative service. Thus, prohibiting mid‑term increases to “per diem” effectively forbids any mid‑term raise in legislative pay, regardless of whether it is calculated daily, monthly, or annually.
Expense reimbursement: Payments that reimburse officials for necessary, official costs (e.g., mileage, constituent services, staff support) can be constitutional even if paid during the term—provided they are genuinely tied to expenses, require documentation, and do not function as general pay.
“Nature and reasonable effect” test: Courts look beyond labels to how a payment functions. If money is paid in a fixed amount irrespective of actual expenses, is taxable as wages, and counts toward retirement as “earnable compensation,” it likely functions as compensation.
Appropriations proviso: A proviso is a condition or instruction within the annual appropriations act. If it is drafted to replace prior law without separating components, an injunction against the proviso can halt all payments under it—intended increases and historical baselines alike.
Standard of review: Statutes are presumed constitutional; challengers must show unconstitutionality “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Here, multiple converging indicators overcame that presumption.
Public-importance standing: In rare cases involving issues of significant statewide importance and the need for prompt resolution, citizens may have standing to seek judicial review even without traditional personal injury, ensuring government accountability.
Accountable plan concept (tax context): Under federal tax rules, reimbursements paid under an “accountable plan” are not treated as taxable wages if the employee substantiates expenses and returns any excess. Structuring legislative expense payments this way supports the claim that the payments are reimbursements, not compensation.

Conclusion

Climer v. Loftis cements a straightforward but vital constitutional rule for South Carolina: the General Assembly cannot increase the compensation of its current members, and courts will not permit that result to be achieved indirectly through mislabeled or unconditioned “in‑district compensation” stipends. The decision harmonizes historical constitutional usage, enduring precedent (Scarborough, Godfrey, Bates), and practical evidentiary signals (textual labels, tax treatment, retirement treatment) to police the line between pay and expenses.

Key takeaways:

“In‑district compensation” without limiting, substantiation, and clawback features is compensation, not expense reimbursement.
Mid‑term raises are unconstitutional; increases must be delayed to the next General Assembly or structured as true, documented expense reimbursements.
Courts will look to real-world operation, not titles, in assessing constitutional compliance.
Because the proviso bundled the entire monthly sum, the injunction halts all in‑district payments authorized by it for FY 2025–26, underscoring the importance of careful drafting.
Legislators generally lack standing to sue their own institution; public-importance plaintiffs can ensure judicial review where appropriate.

Beyond the immediate fiscal consequence, the opinion offers practical guidance for constitutionally sound legislative pay reform. If the General Assembly wishes to address the acknowledged growth in year‑round legislative responsibilities, it may do so either by adopting a delayed‑effective pay adjustment for the next legislature or by genuinely tying payments to documented official expenses. In doing so, it will honor both the Constitution’s anti‑self‑dealing safeguards and the practical needs of modern legislative service.