No Liberty Interest in Short-Term Restricted Housing and the Futility of Implied Private Rights of Action:
Commentary on Daniel Andrews, Sr. v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (3d Cir. 2025)

Introduction

Daniel Russell Andrews, Sr., an inmate formerly housed at the State Correctional Institution-Huntingdon, sued multiple Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserted First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations arising out of a prison library altercation, subsequent misconduct charges, and a 60-day stint in restricted housing. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment to all defendants, and the Third Circuit summarily affirmed. Although issued per curiam and designated “not precedential,” the opinion reiterates—and tightly synthesises—several recurring doctrinal points:

• Placement in restricted housing for 60 days does not, without more, trigger a protected liberty interest.
• An adverse ruling in the prison grievance process, standing alone, is insufficient to establish personal involvement for § 1983 liability.
• Inmates cannot premise civil claims on federal or state criminal statutes that contain no express private right of action—and courts will deny leave to amend as “futile” where such claims are proposed.
• Retaliation claims require non-speculative evidence of causal connection; bald allegations of conspiracy will not survive summary judgment.
• Eighth Amendment “failure-to-protect” liability demands actual, not constructive, knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit quickly disposed of Andrews’s appeal under its local summary-action procedures, concluding that the District Court’s opinion “thoroughly” addressed each claim and raised “no substantial question.” Key holdings at the district-court level, left undisturbed on appeal, include:

• Fourteenth Amendment Due Process – The 60-day restricted-housing placement did not impose an “atypical and significant hardship” under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), as refined by Burns v. Pa. DOC, 642 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2011). Therefore, no liberty interest—and hence no procedural due-process violation—existed.
• First Amendment Retaliation – Andrews produced no record evidence linking his filing of a Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) complaint to the misconduct charges; mere temporal proximity and allegations of “racial favoritism” were inadequate.
• Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect – The librarian (Hammon) had no prior knowledge that the other inmate (Bicking) posed a threat, defeating deliberate indifference.
• Personal Involvement – Grievance/hearing officials (Ellenberger & House) were dismissed because adverse rulings alone do not equal participation in the underlying wrong.
• Futility of Amendment – Proposed amendments invoking two criminal statutes were denied; those provisions confer no private civil remedy.

Analysis

Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) – Established the “atypical and significant hardship” benchmark for prison-liberty interests.
• Burns v. Pa. DOC, 642 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2011) – Applied Sandin in the Third Circuit; 89 days in administrative custody not liberty-implicating. Andrews’s 60 days is even shorter.
• Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) – Requires personal involvement for § 1983 liability; mere failure to grant relief in a grievance is not enough.
• Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2007) & Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers, 206 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2000) – Clarify the causation prong in retaliation claims; speculation or timing alone rarely suffices.
• Hamilton v. Leavy, 117 F.3d 742 (3d Cir. 1997) – Articulates deliberate-indifference standard in prison safety contexts.
• Capogrosso v. Supreme Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2009) – Pleading facts, not conclusions, is necessary for civil conspiracy claims.
• United States v. Wegeler, 941 F.3d 665 (3d Cir. 2019); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973); Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) – Reinforce the judiciary’s reluctance to imply private rights from criminal statutes.

Legal Reasoning

The District Court methodically applied the Celotex summary-judgment rubric to each constitutional claim:

Because disciplinary custody of two months fell squarely within periods previously deemed non-atypical, the court dismissed the due-process claims at screening. This application of Sandin/Burns extinguished all Fourteenth Amendment dimensions of the case and, by extension, ejected defendants whose only alleged wrong was reviewing misconducts.

Retaliation analysis uses a tripartite test: (i) protected activity; (ii) adverse action; (iii) causal link. The filing of a PREA complaint is undisputedly protected. But Andrews lacked evidence on element (iii). Crucially, none of the officers who issued or reviewed the misconducts were named in earlier grievances, and video evidence portrayed Andrews as the aggressor. Without temporal proximity or circumstantial corroboration, causation failed as a matter of law.

Deliberate indifference requires both awareness and disregard of an excessive risk. Andrews admitted he had no prior hostile history with Bicking and that Librarian Hammon possessed no knowledge suggesting danger. Absent subjective awareness, negligence—even if proven—cannot morph into constitutional culpability.

Defendants Ellenberger (hearing examiner) and House (major) embodied the recurring litigation phenomenon in prison cases: officials whose only connection is appellate or supervisory review. Under Rode, such roles do not satisfy § 1983’s personal-participation prerequisite unless coupled with affirmative acts or omissions that directly caused the constitutional injury. The court therefore granted their Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.

Andrews sought to insert two criminal statutes as additional claims. Citing Wegeler and the Supreme Court’s longstanding hostility to implied private rights, the District Court held amendment futile, thereby vindicating the gatekeeping role of Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002).

Impact of the Judgment

Though non-precedential, the decision offers practical guidance for litigants and district judges in § 1983 prison litigation:

• Reaffirmation of the “Short-Stint” Rule. Claims predicated on brief RHU/SHU placements remain challenging absent additional hardships (e.g., total sensory deprivation, loss of parole eligibility).
• Discouragement of Conclusory Conspiracy Allegations. Off-the-rack conspiracy assertions continue to falter unless buttressed by specific facts of agreement and concerted action.
• Heightened Scrutiny of Retaliation Causation. The opinion provides a template for rejecting speculative causation in prisoner First Amendment suits, something likely to be cited informally in motions practice.
• Gatekeeping on Futile Amendments. District courts can confidently deny leave to add claims resting on criminal statutes lacking explicit civil remedies.

Moreover, the case underscores the evidentiary value of video footage and contemporaneous misconduct reports in defeating prisoner civil-rights claims at summary judgment, a practical consideration that transcends doctrinal boundaries.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Atypical and Significant Hardship” – A legal yardstick for determining whether prison conditions trigger constitutional due-process protections. Ordinary discomforts of incarceration (even segregation for weeks) usually fail this test.
• Deliberate Indifference – More than negligence; the officer must actually know of a substantial risk and ignore it.
• Personal Involvement – In § 1983 suits, each defendant must have directly caused or participated in the constitutional violation; supervisory status alone is not enough.
• Private Right of Action – The ability of a private citizen to sue under a statute. Criminal laws generally empower prosecutors, not private litigants, absent express congressional language.
• Summary Judgment – Judgment entered by a court for one party against another without a full trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact.

Conclusion

Andrews v. Pennsylvania DOC affirms well-settled but frequently litigated principles: short-term segregation is ordinarily non-liberty-implicating; grievance officials are not ipso facto liable under § 1983; and criminal statutes typically harbor no implied private remedy. By summarily endorsing the District Court’s thorough opinion, the Third Circuit has delivered a concise doctrinal refresher and operational blueprint for future prison-condition litigation in the circuit. While the decision lacks precedential weight, its synthesis of standards and its practical bar to speculative claims will doubtless echo in district-court rulings and corrections-related litigation strategies for years to come.