No Liberal Construction for Counseled EEOC Charges: The Seventh Circuit’s Strict Notice Approach to ADA Retaliation

Key holding: A counseled employee’s EEOC/IDHR charge that (1) generically alleges “retaliation” and “protected activity,” (2) cites only Title VII and sexual orientation discrimination, and (3) omits both any reference to disability and the ADA checkbox, does not exhaust an ADA retaliation claim—despite factual overlap and even if the agency investigation could have uncovered an ADA theory—because it fails to give the employer adequate notice of the ADA‑based claim.

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in Scroggin v. Universal Protection Service, LLC, a case arising from an alleged retaliatory demotion following an internal complaint about a supervisor’s comment suggesting the employee had “mental problems.” The plaintiff, Andrew Scroggin, ultimately sued his employer under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for retaliation, but his administrative charge had been framed as a Title VII “Complaint of Sexual Orientation Discrimination” with only a generic reference to “protected activity.”

The central issue on appeal was whether Scroggin had properly exhausted his administrative remedies for an ADA retaliation claim when:

• his IDHR/EEOC charge:
  • was drafted with the assistance of counsel,
  • explicitly invoked only Title VII and the Illinois Human Rights Act,
  • was captioned as “Complaint of Sexual Orientation Discrimination,”
  • checked only the “Title VII” and “Retaliation” boxes, and
  • did not identify disability or the ADA as a basis; and
• his subsequent federal complaint alleged ADA retaliation for complaining about disability‑related discrimination (the “mental problems” comment).

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), holding that Scroggin failed to exhaust his ADA claim because his charge did not provide adequate notice to his employer of an ADA‑based retaliation theory. The decision relies heavily on prior Seventh Circuit case law on:

• the scope of claims that can be brought after an EEOC charge,
• the “like or reasonably related” standard, and
• the distinction between pro se and counseled charges.

Although labeled a “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” and thus not binding precedent, the order offers a clear and instructive articulation of a strict notice‑based approach to administrative exhaustion for counseled plaintiffs, particularly when shifting from Title VII to ADA retaliation theories.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Andrew Scroggin worked as a security guard for Universal Protection Service, LLC, contracted to provide security services to State Farm in Bloomington, Illinois. In August 2022, he applied to a police department and listed his Universal supervisor, Rick Wiseman, as a reference.

When contacted, Wiseman allegedly told a detective that Scroggin had “mental problems” and wanted to work only from home. Scroggin insists he has no mental health problems and was not selected for the police position.

In September 2022, Scroggin met with Wiseman and complained that this “mental problems” comment was discriminatory. Shortly thereafter, Universal demoted him and cut his pay from $20 to $16 per hour. Scroggin viewed this as retaliation for his complaint.

B. The Administrative Charge

In January 2023—with assistance of counsel—Scroggin filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR), cross‑filed with the EEOC. The charge was:

• captioned “Complaint of Sexual Orientation Discrimination,”
• framed as alleging “retaliation” in violation of the Illinois Human Rights Act and Title VII, and
• comprised of four brief factual statements:
  1. He had been employed by Universal.
  2. He engaged in “protected activity” on September 30, 2022, and Universal was aware of it.
  3. On October 4, 2022, he was notified of his demotion and wage decrease.
  4. The demotion and pay cut were because of “retaliation” in violation of the IHRA and Title VII.

On the EEOC’s Notice of Charge:

• the box for “Title VII of the Civil Rights Act” was checked,
• the box for the “Americans with Disabilities Act” was not checked, and
• under “Circumstances of Alleged Discrimination,” only “Retaliation” was checked.

IDHR investigated and concluded there was “a lack of substantial evidence.” Its Investigation Report noted that:

• Scroggin had emailed HR to complain about Wiseman’s negative reference, but the email did not mention any protected category under state law; and
• the detective’s statement that Wiseman said Scroggin “had issues” was vague and not the same as stating he had “mental issues” or a mental disability.

The EEOC issued a right‑to‑sue letter.

C. The Federal Lawsuit and District Court Ruling

In his federal lawsuit, Scroggin did not proceed under Title VII. Instead, he alleged retaliation under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), claiming:

• he engaged in protected activity by complaining to Wiseman in September 2022 about disability‑based discrimination (the “mental problems” remark), and
• Universal retaliated against him by demoting him and cutting his pay.

Universal moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), arguing:

• Scroggin had failed to exhaust administrative remedies for an ADA retaliation claim, because
• his charge mentioned only Title VII, sexual orientation discrimination, and generic “retaliation,” and did not identify ADA or disability as a basis.

The district court agreed. It held:

• the charge did not put Universal on notice that Scroggin was pursuing an ADA‑based retaliation theory;
• had ADA retaliation been expressly alleged, both IDHR’s investigation and Universal’s defense strategy might have been different; and
• dismissal with prejudice was appropriate because the limitations period for bringing a Title VII claim had elapsed and equitable tolling was unwarranted.

D. The Seventh Circuit’s Holding

The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The panel:

• acknowledged that the facts described in the charge and in the complaint overlapped and that, “if construed generously,” the charge might support an ADA retaliation theory;
• nevertheless held that, for a counseled plaintiff, vague assertions of “protected activity” and “retaliation,” coupled with the failure to check the ADA box or mention disability, did not give Universal adequate notice of the ADA retaliation claim; and
• rejected the argument that:
  • the EEOC/IDHR investigation could or did suggest a disability angle, or
  • the right‑to‑sue letter itself expanded the scope of claims beyond the charge.

The court grounded its decision in:

• the purposes of administrative exhaustion (settlement and employer notice);
• its prior case law on the “like or reasonably related” standard; and
• its repeated insistence that counseled charges are not entitled to liberal construction.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Legal Framework: Administrative Exhaustion under Title VII and the ADA

1. Exhaustion requirement

The Seventh Circuit begins by reiterating that, under both Title VII and the ADA, a plaintiff must:

1. file an administrative charge with the EEOC (or a state deferral agency like IDHR), and
2. receive a right‑to‑sue letter

before bringing suit in federal court.

For this, the court cites:

• Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir. 2019) (Title VII), and
• Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909 F.3d 182, 189 (7th Cir. 2018) (ADA).

These cases confirm that the exhaustion requirement is a procedural prerequisite designed to:

• give the EEOC and employer a chance to resolve the dispute informally, and
• ensure the employer has notice of the conduct being challenged.

2. Scope of the subsequent lawsuit: “Like or reasonably related” claims

A plaintiff can bring:

• claims that were explicitly included in the charge, and
• claims that are “like or reasonably related” to the allegations in the charge, and that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC’s investigation of the charge.

  This standard, originally articulated in Cheek v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1994), is quoted and applied through:

  • Chaidez, 937 F.3d at 1004, and
  • Geldon v. South Milwaukee Sch. Dist., 414 F.3d 817, 819–20 (7th Cir. 2005).

  Under this test:

  1. There must be a “reasonable relationship” between the charge and the complaint; and
  2. The claim in the complaint must be one that could reasonably be expected to grow out of the EEOC’s investigation of the charge.

  Additionally, the charge and complaint must “describe the same conduct and implicate the same individuals.” (Chaidez, citing Cheek.)

  B. Precedents Cited and Their Roles

  1. Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 2019)

  The panel uses Chaidez in three significant ways:

  • Pleading standard: It cites Chaidez to adopt the Rule 12(b)(6)/12(c) standard—taking well‑pleaded allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
  • Exhaustion framework: It cites Chaidez for the purposes of exhaustion and the “like or reasonably related” test.
  • Counseled vs. pro se charges: Most critically, the court relies on Chaidez’s footnote 3, which differentiates between:
    • pro se charges, which receive a liberal construction, and
    • counseled charges, which do not.

  By emphasizing that Scroggin was represented by counsel when he filed the charge, the panel uses Chaidez to justify a strict, non‑liberal construction of his administrative allegations.

  2. Riley v. City of Kokomo, 909 F.3d 182 (7th Cir. 2018)

  Riley is cited for the uncontroversial proposition that the ADA carries an exhaustion requirement similar to Title VII. Its role is primarily confirmatory: it underscores that the ADA retaliation claim, like the earlier Title VII theory, must be administratively exhausted before reaching federal court.

  3. Cheek v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1994)

  Cheek originated the “like or reasonably related” standard in the Seventh Circuit. The panel:

  • quotes Cheek for the two‑part test (reasonable relationship plus foreseeability from the investigation), and
  • reiterates Cheek’s requirement that the charge and complaint must involve the same conduct and actors.

  But crucially, the panel does not rest its decision simply on whether an ADA claim could logically grow out of the facts. Instead, it introduces an additional constraint from Geldon: employer notice.

  4. Geldon v. South Milwaukee School District, 414 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2005)

  Geldon plays a pivotal role. It stands for the principle that:

  • even if an EEOC investigation could uncover additional discrimination theories,
  • a plaintiff still fails to exhaust if the charge did not give the employer fair notice of those theories.

  The Scroggin panel quotes Geldon for this precise point, using it to reject Scroggin’s argument that the EEOC or IDHR investigation might have unearthed an ADA angle. The court stresses that:

  • the exhaustion requirement serves not only the investigative function but also the employer‑notice function;
  • employers must be alerted to the nature of the alleged unlawful conduct before the investigation begins so they can defend and possibly conciliate; and
  • a counseled plaintiff cannot rely on vague allegations and then depend on the agency to discover the “true” statutory basis.

  5. Brooks v. City of Pekin, 95 F.4th 533 (7th Cir. 2024) & Carlson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 758 F.3d 819 (7th Cir. 2014)

  These two cases are cited together to show that ADA and Title VII retaliation claims have similar elements. Both require:

  • protected activity,
  • adverse action, and
  • a causal connection.

  The panel acknowledges that, because of this similarity, Scroggin’s generalized claim of “retaliation for protected activity” could, if read generously, support a retaliation claim under either statute. This partially supports Scroggin’s contention that the charge and complaint are “like or reasonably related.”

  Yet, the court ultimately holds that this conceptual overlap does not cure the notice defect, particularly in light of:

  • the express Title VII citation in the charge,
  • the absence of any ADA reference or disability‑related content, and
  • counsel’s involvement.

  6. Teal v. Potter, 559 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 2009)

  Teal reinforced the distinction between pro se and counseled plaintiffs in the exhaustion context. It held that:

  • courts interpret pro se EEOC charges liberally, but
  • they do not extend that leniency to charges drafted by lawyers.

  In Scroggin, the panel pairs Teal with Chaidez to emphasize that:

  • Scroggin’s charge merited strict rather than liberal construction; and
  • counsel’s failure to mention disability or the ADA is a meaningful omission, not a technicality.

  7. Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 307 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2002)

  Peters is invoked for the proposition that:

  • a charge that fails to identify the nature of the “protected activity” does not adequately alert the employer to the specific conduct being challenged.

  In Scroggin, the charge simply stated that the plaintiff had engaged in “protected activity” on a particular date. It did not:

  • identify the content of the complaint,
  • indicate that it involved alleged disability discrimination, or
  • clarify that it related to the “mental problems” comment.

  By relying on Peters, the panel finds that this generic reference is insufficient to give Universal notice that Scroggin was challenging an allegedly disability‑related remark and retaliation for protesting it.

  8. Ajayi v. Aramark Bus. Servs., Inc., 336 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2003)

  Ajayi addressed a plaintiff who:

  • failed to check the box for age discrimination on the EEOC form, and
  • included no facts indicating age‑based bias.

  The Seventh Circuit there held that she had not exhausted an age discrimination claim, because neither the box selection nor the narrative suggested an age‑based theory.

  In Scroggin, the panel analogizes:

  • Scroggin could have checked the ADA box but did not;
  • the charge as a whole lacked facts that would reasonably alert the employer or the EEOC to a disability‑related retaliation claim; and
  • such omissions are not “mere technical defects” when they result in lack of notice.

  9. Swearnigen-El v. Cook County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852 (7th Cir. 2010)

  In Swearnigen-El, the plaintiff did not check the box for “retaliation” or otherwise indicate that he was claiming retaliation as opposed to discrimination on other bases. The court held that he had failed to exhaust a retaliation claim.

  Scroggin relies on Swearnigen-El to reinforce that:

  • the checkboxes and narrative together define the scope of the charge;
  • failing to identify a theory (here, ADA/disability) by box or by facts is dispositive where the employer would not reasonably anticipate that claim; and
  • the exhaustion analysis is not purely formal, but the form matters insofar as it affects notice.

  10. Miller v. American Airlines, Inc., 525 F.3d 520 (7th Cir. 2008)

  Miller held that a facial challenge to a collective bargaining agreement provision was not reasonably foreseeable from the allegations in the plaintiff’s EEOC charge. Consequently, that theory was unexhausted.

  The panel uses Miller to underline the principle that plaintiffs cannot:

  • use a relatively narrow or generic charge to later pursue much broader or qualitatively different theories that the employer and EEOC could not reasonably anticipate from the charge’s text.

  11. Reynolds v. Tangherlini, 737 F.3d 1093 (7th Cir. 2013)

  Finally, Reynolds is cited for the rule that:

  • it is the charge—not the right‑to‑sue letter—that determines the scope of permissible claims.

  Scroggin argued that the EEOC’s right‑to‑sue letter should be read to encompass ADA retaliation. The panel rejected this argument, noting:

  • the letter was explicitly issued “based on the above‑numbered charge,” and
  • that charge was a Title VII retaliation charge, not an ADA charge.

  Thus, the right‑to‑sue letter did not open the door to a new statutory basis absent from the charge.

  C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Overlap of facts vs. adequacy of notice

  The court engages seriously with Scroggin’s core argument: that his ADA retaliation claim is “like or reasonably related” to the allegations in his charge because both involve:

  • the same adverse action (demotion and pay cut),
  • the same key actor (Wiseman), and
  • the same temporal sequence (complaint followed by demotion).

  The panel concedes that:

  • factually, the charge and the complaint do overlap; and
  • retaliation under Title VII and the ADA share similar analytical frameworks.

  So in a purely factual sense, the “like or reasonably related” test might favor Scroggin. However, the panel conducts a narrower, notice‑focused analysis and concludes:

  • the factual overlap is not dispositive where the statutory and protected bases are materially different and never disclosed; and
  • the central defect is that the charge, drafted by counsel, did not give Universal fair notice that:
    • disability or perceived mental disability was at issue, or
    • Scroggin believed he was retaliated against for opposing ADA‑prohibited conduct.

  2. The importance of specifying “protected activity” and statutory basis

  The court stresses two major omissions:

  1. Vague reference to “protected activity”:
     • The charge stated only that Scroggin had engaged in “protected activity” on a specific date.
     • Relying on Peters, the court held this was too vague to alert Universal to:
       • what exactly he complained about, or
       • that he was alleging disability‑related discrimination or retaliation.
  2. Failure to invoke ADA/disability:
     • The charge:
       • was captioned as “Complaint of Sexual Orientation Discrimination,”
       • cited only Title VII and the Illinois Human Rights Act, and
       • did not check the box for the ADA.
     • The narrative also did not describe facts that clearly suggested disability or perceived disability.
     • Under Ajayi, Swearnigen-El, and Miller, this omission meant Universal would not reasonably understand that ADA retaliation was being alleged.

  3. No liberal construction for counseled plaintiffs

  A significant theme is the panel’s insistence that:

  • counseled charges are not entitled to liberal construction.

  Drawing on Chaidez and Teal, the court emphasizes:

  • When a lawyer drafts the charge, the plaintiff is expected to:
    • select the correct boxes (or at least not misleading ones), and
    • provide a narrative sufficient to alert the employer and EEOC to all intended legal theories.
  • The court therefore reads Scroggin’s charge strictly:
    • as a Title VII sexual‑orientation‑based retaliation claim,
    • not as a disability‑related or ADA‑based claim.

  Allowing a counseled plaintiff to assert a vague retaliation charge and later shift to a different statute and theory (from Title VII sexual orientation to ADA disability) would, in the court’s view, undermine the exhaustion regime.

  4. Distinguishing “investigation scope” from “employer notice”

  Scroggin argued that:

  • the IDHR’s investigation showed that the agencies understood the underlying facts (the “mental issues” comment and his HR complaint); and
  • the EEOC could reasonably have been expected to uncover a disability‑based retaliation claim from investigating his Title VII charge.

  The panel’s response, grounded in Geldon, is:

  • Even if the agency could have inferred or actually did consider disability issues,
  • the employer‑notice function of exhaustion remains unmet when:
    • the charge’s text does not put the employer on notice that an ADA claim is in play.

  The panel warns that allowing vague charges to suffice for exhaustion in counseled cases would:

  • permit plaintiffs to “satisfy the notice requirement by making vague allegations,” and
  • force employers to guess at potential statutory theories, undermining the efficiency and fairness of the administrative process.

  5. Rejecting the “citation technicality” argument

  Scroggin contended that the only difference between his charge (Title VII) and his complaint (ADA) was the statutory citation, and that because both statutes cover retaliation, this difference was immaterial.

  The court responds by:

  • acknowledging that omissions in statutory citations may, in some cases, be technical; but
  • holding that here, the omission is substantive, because:
    • the charge did not mention disability,
    • the ADA box was not checked, and
    • the narrative contained no facts that would reasonably alert the employer to disability‑related retaliation.

  Thus, the panel treats the statutory citation and the omitted ADA box as important indicators of the claim’s nature—especially when combined with counsel’s involvement and the generic “protected activity” reference.

  6. The right‑to‑sue letter does not expand the charge

  Finally, the court rejects Scroggin’s reliance on the EEOC right‑to‑sue letter. Under Reynolds:

  • the right‑to‑sue letter is procedural; it does not define or enlarge the substantive scope of the claims; and
  • the underlying charge continues to govern which claims have been exhausted.

  Because the right‑to‑sue letter expressly referenced the “above‑numbered charge,” and that charge alleged only Title VII‑based retaliation, the ADA claim remained unexhausted.

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  IV. Impact and Significance

  A. Immediate Consequences for the Parties

  For Scroggin:

  • his ADA retaliation claim is barred for failure to exhaust;
  • his potential Title VII retaliation claim (which could have been pursued based on the charge as filed) is effectively lost because:
    • he chose not to plead it in federal court or
    • the statute of limitations has run, and the district court declined to apply equitable tolling.

  For Universal:

  • the decision confirms that it was not required to defend against an ADA‑based retaliation theory that had never been clearly presented at the administrative stage; and
  • it reinforces the value of close attention to the scope of EEOC/IDHR charges when assessing potential exposure.

  B. Broader Doctrinal Impact within the Seventh Circuit

  Nonprecedential status: The order is designated “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION” and may be cited only as allowed by Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. It is not binding precedent on future panels, but it is consistent with—and illustrates the application of—existing Seventh Circuit doctrine.

  Even as a nonprecedential order, Scroggin reinforces and sharpens several important doctrinal points:

  1. Strict notice requirement for counseled charges:
     • Counseled plaintiffs must be explicit about:
       • what protected activity they engaged in,
       • which statute(s) they invoke, and
       • which protected classifications (e.g., disability vs. sexual orientation) are implicated.
     • Vague references to “protected activity” and “retaliation,” without more, will not preserve unmentioned statutory bases (such as the ADA) even if factually plausible.
  2. Emphasis on employer notice over agency investigation potential:
     • The opinion squarely prioritizes employer notice over the hypothetical breadth of an EEOC investigation.
     • Even if the agency could reasonably see an ADA angle, exhaustion fails where the charge does not give the employer fair notice of that angle.
  3. Consequences of shifting statutory theories:
     • Plaintiffs cannot:
       • file an administrative charge under one statute (Title VII), and
       • then sue exclusively under another (ADA) when the new statute and protected basis were neither checked nor factual described.
     • This is especially risky when:
       • the charge caption itself is misleading (here, “Sexual Orientation Discrimination” while the later theory is disability‑based), and
       • counsel has been involved from the start.
  4. Form and content both matter:
     • The panel’s reliance on checkbox cases (Ajayi, Swearnigen-El) and narrative‑content cases (Peters, Miller) shows that:
       • neither the boxes nor the text are dispositive alone, but
       • together, they define the reasonable scope of the employer’s notice.
     • Where neither the boxes nor the narrative signal a given theory (here, ADA retaliation), that theory is unexhausted.

  C. Practical Guidance for Future Litigants and Counsel

  1. For plaintiffs and their lawyers

  • Be explicit about statutes and protected bases:
    • If a plaintiff believes they suffered retaliation for opposing disability‑based discrimination, the charge should:
      • check the ADA box,
      • reference disability, perceived disability, or mental health issues, and
      • describe the complaint involving those issues.
  • Describe the “protected activity” in plain terms:
    • Instead of saying, “I engaged in protected activity,” the charge should spell out:
      • who was complained to,
      • about what conduct, and
      • under what protected theory (e.g., disability, race, sex, sexual orientation).
  • Align the charge caption with the real theory:
    • Labeling a charge as “sexual orientation discrimination” when the real issue is disability‑related is dangerous; courts will treat such captions as meaningful in construing the charge.
  • Preserve multiple theories where appropriate:
    • If facts might implicate both Title VII and ADA retaliation, counsel should consider:
      • checking both the Title VII and ADA boxes and
      • including both bases in the narrative.
  • Be wary of later “statute‑swapping”:
    • Switching from Title VII at the administrative stage to ADA in federal court is perilous unless the original charge clearly encompassed the ADA theory.

  2. For employers and defense counsel

  • Scrutinize charges for scope:
    • When sued under a theory not clearly included in the charge, consider an early motion (Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c)) for failure to exhaust.
  • Document investigation strategy:
    • If an employer tailors its response to the claims evident from the charge, that supports an argument that it lacked notice of later‑asserted theories.
  • Use the counseled/pro se distinction strategically:
    • In counseled cases, emphasize that:
      • the plaintiff and counsel had the tools to identify the correct statutes and protected categories, and
      • omissions are substantive, not technical.

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  V. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

  A. Administrative Exhaustion

  “Administrative exhaustion” means that before suing in court under Title VII or the ADA, an employee must:

  1. file a complaint (a “charge”) with the EEOC or an equivalent state agency (like IDHR), and
  2. allow the agency to investigate and attempt resolution, and then receive a “right‑to‑sue” letter.

  This process:

  • gives the employer early notice,
  • gives the agency a chance to mediate or settle, and
  • narrows and clarifies the issues for any later lawsuit.

  B. “Like or reasonably related” claims

  Because employees often file charges pro se or without knowing all legal nuances, the courts allow some flexibility: a lawsuit may include claims that are not word‑for‑word in the charge if they are “like or reasonably related” to it.

  In practice, this means:

  • the new claim must concern the same basic facts and people, and
  • it must be the kind of claim the EEOC’s investigation of the original charge would naturally uncover.

  However, as Scroggin shows, this flexibility is far more limited when:

  • the plaintiff was represented by counsel in drafting the charge, and
  • the employer was never fairly alerted to the new theory (here, ADA retaliation).

  C. Judgment on the Pleadings (Rule 12(c))

  A Rule 12(c) motion tests whether, assuming all well‑pleaded facts in the complaint are true, the plaintiff has stated a legally viable claim. It is similar to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) but can be filed after the pleadings are closed.

  In Scroggin, the court assumed:

  • the alleged discriminatory comment and subsequent demotion occurred as described, but
  • still concluded that the ADA claim must be dismissed because the procedural prerequisite of administrative exhaustion had not been satisfied.

  D. Equitable Tolling

  “Equitable tolling” allows a court, in exceptional circumstances, to extend filing deadlines when a plaintiff could not reasonably file on time (for example, due to misleading conduct by the employer or extraordinary obstacles).

  Here, the district court refused equitable tolling for any potential Title VII claim, and that refusal was not disturbed on appeal. Thus, Scroggin could not cure his failure to plead Title VII by refiling.

  E. Nonprecedential Disposition

  The order is designated “NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION,” with a notation that it “may be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.” This means:

  • it is not binding precedent on future Seventh Circuit panels; but
  • it may be cited as persuasive authority (subject to local rules), especially where it is consistent with established case law, as here.

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  VI. Conclusion

  Scroggin v. Universal Protection Service underscores a critical and increasingly enforced point in Seventh Circuit employment law: counseled EEOC/IDHR charges must clearly identify the statutory and factual basis of the claims or risk forfeiting them.

  The decision:

  • confirms that mere factual overlap and generic references to “protected activity” and “retaliation” are insufficient to exhaust an ADA retaliation claim when:
    • the charge:
      • is captioned as a Title VII sexual orientation case,
      • cites only Title VII and state law,
      • fails to check the ADA box, and
      • omits any mention of disability in its narrative; and
    • the plaintiff is represented by counsel at the charging stage.
  • reiterates that the exhaustion requirement serves a dual purpose:
    • facilitating agency investigation and resolution, and
    • providing fair notice to the employer of the claims it must address.
  • clarifies that the scope of exhausted claims is determined by the charge itself, not by:
    • the theoretical breadth of the agency investigation, or
    • the wording of the right‑to‑sue letter.

  In practical terms, the case is a cautionary tale:

  • For employees and their counsel, it highlights the importance of carefully drafting administrative charges that explicitly identify all relevant statutes and protected bases—especially in complex or overlapping discrimination/retaliation scenarios.
  • For employers, it confirms that they are not required to anticipate unpled statutory theories when responding to charges and may rely on the face of the charge to define their obligations and exposure.

  Although nonprecedential, Scroggin is firmly grounded in established Seventh Circuit authority and will likely be persuasive in future disputes over the sufficiency of counseled EEOC charges, particularly where plaintiffs attempt to pivot from one anti‑discrimination statute to another after the administrative process has concluded.