No Industry Standard, No Immunity: Eleventh Circuit Holds Standard of Care and Causation Are Jury Questions in Negligent-Work Exclusion vs. “Equipment Breakdown” Coverage Disputes

Introduction

This appeal arises from a dispute over commercial property insurance coverage following damage to an elaborate office aquarium at Kawa Orthodontics, LLP. After a crack developed in the aquarium’s bridge—an overhead structure connecting two large tanks—Kawa hired a contractor, Erisa Improvements, to remove and repair the bridge. During the removal work, workers used a makeshift platform resting on the tanks, and two large cracks then appeared in one of the tanks. Kawa submitted a claim to its insurer, Depositors Insurance Company, which denied coverage on the ground that negligent repair work caused the loss, triggering a policy exclusion for faulty workmanship and related negligent work.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment to Kawa, reasoning (i) the loss stemmed from a covered “accident” rather than negligent repairs and (ii) even if repairs caused the damage, Erisa could not be negligent in the absence of an industry-approved methodology or identifiable standard of care for repairing acrylic structures of the kind at issue. Depositors appealed. The Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that a jury could find the contractor negligent based on record evidence and that Florida law does not condition negligence on the existence of industry standards. The panel also made clear that whether the subsequent cracks were caused by an “accident” or by negligent repairs is a causation dispute for the jury that controls the application of the policy’s “Equipment Breakdown” coverage and its negligent-work exclusion.

Core issues include:

Whether the absence of an industry-approved repair methodology precludes finding negligence under Florida law.
Whether the cracks in the tank are attributable to a covered “accident” (“Equipment Breakdown”) or to negligent work excluded by the policy.
Whether the district court improperly resolved genuine factual disputes—particularly on standard of care and proximate causation—on summary judgment.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit (per curiam; unpublished) reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Kawa and remanded for further proceedings. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Depositors (the non-movant on Kawa’s motion), the court held:

Under Florida law, the standard of care is a question of fact for the jury. The lack of an industry standard or approved methodology does not preclude a negligence finding. Custom is evidence—but not the measure—of due care.
There is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Erisa’s repair methods—specifically, using the aquarium’s acrylic walls to support a makeshift scaffold—negligently caused the tank cracks, rather than those cracks being an inevitable “expansion” of an earlier accident in the bridge.
If a jury finds negligent repairs caused the damage, the loss may be excluded as “negligent work” and would not qualify as an “Equipment Breakdown” accident under the policy’s definition.
Kawa’s alternative “total system loss” theory stemming from the initial bridge crack also presents genuine factual disputes (e.g., potential repairability of the bridge), precluding summary judgment.

Because the existence of negligence and proximate cause must go to a jury, the panel did not reach Depositors’ additional arguments (including whether the district court erred by treating the initial bridge loss as part of the claim despite pleading limitations, and the denial of reconsideration).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008)
This diversity case confirms the application of Florida substantive law. The panel’s negligence analysis—including the standard of care and proximate causation—rests on Florida law.
Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 389 So. 3d 705, 712 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 2024), review denied, No. SC2024-1108, 2024 WL 4370566 (Fla. Oct. 2, 2024)
Cited for the principle that the standard of care is a question of fact for the jury. The panel deploys Johnson to reject the district court’s conclusion that the absence of an industry-approved repair methodology eliminated any negligence duty/breach analysis.
Nesbitt v. Community Health of S. Dade, Inc., 467 So. 2d 711, 713–14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903))
Nesbitt provides the classic negligence rule: “What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence.” This undermines the district court’s reliance on the absence of industry standards as dispositive. Customary practice is relevant but not controlling; reasonable prudence governs.
Dabney v. Yapa, 187 So. 2d 381, 383 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
Establishes that proximate cause is generally a jury question. The Eleventh Circuit cites Dabney to emphasize that whether the tank cracks were caused by negligent repairs or by a prior “accident” is for jurors to resolve, particularly where there is conflicting expert and circumstantial evidence.
Dep’t of Children & Families v. Amora, 944 So. 2d 431, 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
Provides Florida’s proximate causation standard: a “natural, direct, and continuous sequence” between negligent act and injury such that the injury would not have occurred “but for” the act. The panel uses Amora to rebut Kawa’s argument that the later cracks were merely an “expansion” of the earlier accident; a jury might instead find the workers’ methods were the proximate cause.
Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2012)
Recites the summary judgment standard—facts and inferences must be viewed in the nonmovant’s favor. The panel’s reversal is a textbook application: the district court drew inferences for the movant (Kawa) instead of for Depositors.
United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004)
Standard for reviewing denial of reconsideration (abuse of discretion). The panel did not need to reach this issue after finding reversible error on summary judgment.

Legal Reasoning

1) Standard of Care Is a Jury Question; Industry Custom Is Evidence, Not a Prerequisite

The district court concluded that because there was no “industry-approved methodology” to repair acrylic glass of this type, there was “no identifiable standard of care,” and the repair company could not be negligent. The Eleventh Circuit held that approach misapplies Florida negligence law. Under Johnson and Nesbitt, juries—not courts—determine the standard of care based on reasonable prudence in the circumstances. Industry practices can inform the standard, but do not define or limit it. In short, the absence of a formal method for repairing this aquarium bridge does not insulate repair contractors from negligence exposure where a jury could find unreasonable methods were used (e.g., supporting a makeshift scaffold on the tank walls).

2) Causation of the Tank Cracks Presents a Triable Issue

The record includes surveillance footage and expert testimony that Erisa workers rested a makeshift platform on the tank walls and that the workers’ weight overstressed the acrylic, causing the cracks. The expert opined, to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, that the cracks would not have occurred if the tank were left alone or if conventional equipment had been used. There was also a nearly two-month interval between discovery of the initial bridge crack and the subsequent tank cracks—further evidence permitting a jury to decouple the later damage from the earlier incident.

The district court relied on the same expert’s notions that the later cracks were an “accident waiting to happen” and that no long-term bridge fix was likely, but the panel reminds that proximate cause questions ordinarily go to the jury. On these facts, it would be reasonable for jurors to find a “natural, direct, and continuous sequence” between the repair methods and the tank cracks (Amora)—not merely an inevitable progression of the initial bridge crack.

3) Coverage Turning on Causation: Negligent-Work Exclusion vs. “Equipment Breakdown”

The policy’s “Equipment Breakdown” coverage hinges on damage caused by an “accident” to covered equipment, with “accident” defined as a “fortuitous event” and, relevant here, including a mechanical breakdown. The policy also has a “negligent work” exclusion for faulty design, workmanship, and repair—unless the negligent work “results in a Covered Cause of Loss.”

Kawa argued that even if repairs were negligent, they “resulted in” an “Equipment Breakdown” (a covered cause) and thus fall within the carve-back to the exclusion. The panel characterizes this as begging the causation question: if the jury finds that negligent repair directly caused the cracks, and those cracks do not qualify as an “accident” within the policy’s definition (e.g., not a mechanical breakdown), then the carve-back does not restore coverage. Put differently, whether the resulting damage counts as an “accident” is not assumed; it depends on how the jury resolves causation and fits the facts to the policy definition.

Kawa also framed the later cracks as merely an “expansion” of the first accident, invoking the policy clause deeming all accidents caused by the same event to be one “accident.” But the panel explains this theory collides with Florida proximate cause doctrine: a jury could find that the later cracks were caused by intervening negligent repair methods, not by the earlier event in the bridge (which had already been removed), particularly given the time gap and separate location.

4) “Total Loss of the System” Theory Is Also Fact-Bound

Kawa argued that the aquarium was a single functional system, so damage to one component (the bridge) meant a total loss from the outset. The insurer’s expert, however, testified there was “most probably” a way to temporarily repair the bridge without removal (e.g., cementing an acrylic slice to stabilize the crack). Video evidence also suggested the initial crack was confined to the bridge, while the tank cracks emerged during attempted repairs. This competing evidence makes the “total system loss” question unsuitable for summary judgment.

Impact

Negligence Litigation in Florida: The decision reinforces that the standard of care is a jury question rooted in reasonable prudence—not merely what the industry does or whether consensus methods exist. Contractors cannot avoid negligence exposure simply because a task lacks a codified methodology. Conversely, plaintiffs cannot short-circuit the negligence inquiry by arguing that “everyone does it this way” or “no one knows how to do it”—juries still decide.
Insurance Coverage for Repair-Related Losses: Where loss follows repair work, the negligent-work exclusion will often be litigated through causation. If the insurer can marshal evidence that repair methods directly caused the damage, insureds may not obtain “Equipment Breakdown” coverage by recharacterizing the event as an “accident.” Expect more fact-driven trials when surveillance, physical evidence, and expert mechanics point to repair techniques as the proximate cause.
“Resulting Loss” Carve-Backs: The opinion underscores that carve-backs (e.g., faulty workmanship “resulting in” a covered cause) do not automatically restore coverage. They apply only if the covered peril truly caused the loss, which is a fact question. Litigants should match the mechanism of damage to the policy’s definition of the covered peril (e.g., mechanical breakdown) and be prepared to show why the event was (or was not) fortuitous and within the listed occurrences.
Summary Judgment Practice: Courts should refrain from resolving hotly disputed causation and standard-of-care questions at summary judgment. Parties should invest in high-quality expert analysis and, where available, video or physical evidence that concretely describes how a repair method interacts with materials and structures.
Practical Risk Management: Contractors performing atypical or delicate work (like aquarium structures) should avoid improvisations that load structural components in ways not intended, document risk assessments, and use conventional equipment when feasible. Insureds should anticipate that “novelty” of a task will not insulate repair methods from negligence scrutiny.
Precedential Weight: Though unpublished, Eleventh Circuit decisions are citable as persuasive authority. This opinion will likely influence Florida federal courts (and state courts by analogy) confronting similar negligent-work vs. equipment-breakdown disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Standard of Care: The legal yardstick for how a reasonably prudent person (or contractor) would act under similar circumstances. It is not dictated by industry consensus; industry custom is evidence, but the jury decides whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonably prudent.
Proximate Cause: The legal link between conduct and injury. Under Florida law, it exists when there is a natural, direct, and continuous sequence from act to injury such that the injury would not have happened but for that act. Juries typically resolve proximate cause, especially when multiple explanations are plausible.
Negligent-Work Exclusion (Faulty Workmanship): A common property policy exclusion that removes coverage for damage caused by poor design, repair, construction, or maintenance. Many policies include a “resulting loss” carve-back: if the negligent work causes a separate, covered peril (e.g., fire), the ensuing damage from that peril is covered—even though the faulty work itself is not.
“Equipment Breakdown” Coverage and “Accident”: Here, the policy covers damage from an “accident” to equipment—defined as a fortuitous event and, as relevant, including “mechanical breakdown.” Not all damage qualifies; the event must fit the policy’s listed occurrence(s). If damage directly results from negligent repair technique, a jury may find it is not an “accident” as defined.
Summary Judgment: A pretrial mechanism to resolve cases without a trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact. Courts must view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. If reasonable jurors could disagree on negligence or causation, the case must proceed to trial.
“Single Accident” Clauses: Policies sometimes treat multiple related events as one “accident” if they arise from the same event. Whether later damage is part of the same accident or a new, intervening cause (like negligent repair) is a causation question for the jury.

Conclusion

Kawa Orthodontics v. Depositors Insurance Company clarifies two bedrock points under Florida law as applied in insurance coverage disputes involving repair-related losses. First, the absence of an industry-approved methodology does not eliminate the possibility of negligence; the standard of care remains a jury question informed by reasonable prudence, not dictated by custom. Second, whether subsequent damage is attributable to a covered “accident” (supporting “Equipment Breakdown” coverage) or to excluded negligent work is a fact-intensive causation inquiry for the jury, not an issue to be resolved on summary judgment based on generalized impressions of inevitability.

With surveillance evidence and expert opinions suggesting that repair techniques stressed and cracked the tank walls, the Eleventh Circuit correctly held that summary judgment was improper. The opinion thus reinforces the central role of the jury in resolving disputes at the intersection of negligence and first-party property coverage, and signals to litigants that careful, mechanism-focused proof of causation will determine whether a negligent-work exclusion controls or a covered “accident” has occurred. The case returns to the district court for trial or further proceedings consistent with these principles.