No Home Rule Bar to State‑Mandated Even‑Year Elections: New York Court of Appeals Confirms Legislature’s Plenary Power over Timing of County and Town Elections

Introduction

In County of Onondaga v. State of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 05737 (Oct. 16, 2025), a unanimous New York Court of Appeals (Garcia, J.) upheld the constitutionality of the 2023 Even Year Election Law (EYEL) against a multi-county home rule challenge. The EYEL consolidates certain county and town elections with even‑year state and federal elections, amends the Municipal Home Rule Law to prevent county charters from superseding even‑year requirements, and shortens some terms elected in 2025 to align all covered offices with even‑year cycles.

Plaintiffs—counties and towns whose charters or local laws scheduled local elections in odd‑numbered years, joined by several individual voters—argued that Article IX of the New York Constitution guarantees counties the right to set the timing of their local elections and terms of office. After Supreme Court declared the EYEL unconstitutional, the Appellate Division reversed. On further appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding there is no express or implied constitutional limitation on the Legislature’s authority to enact the EYEL and that the law qualifies as a valid “general law” under Article IX. The Court also rejected voters’ claims under the Anderson/Burdick framework, concluding the EYEL imposes, at most, minimal burdens outweighed by the State’s substantial interests in voter participation and clarity.

The decision clarifies the contours of New York’s home rule protections, confirms the Legislature’s primacy in structuring the statewide election calendar for county and town officials, and provides a roadmap for how consolidation statutes can satisfy the “general law” requirement notwithstanding rational exemptions.

Summary of the Opinion

Holding: Article IX contains no express or implied limitation that bars the Legislature from mandating the timing of county and town elections or adjusting terms to implement that mandate. The EYEL is a constitutional exercise of legislative authority.
General law status: The EYEL is a “general law” under Article IX, § 3(d)(1) because, in terms and effect, it applies alike to a rationally defined class of counties and offices across the State. Rational exemptions do not destroy its generality.
Article IX § 1 (local “bill of rights”): The right to adopt alternative forms of county government (NY Const, art IX, § 1[h][1]) does not constitutionalize local control over the timing of elections or terms of office. Municipal Home Rule Law grants on those topics are statutory, not constitutional.
Article IX § 3(b) savings clause: The clause preserves then‑existing local provisions upon adoption of Article IX in 1963 until modified by lawful state action; it does not immunize current charters from later statewide legislation. The EYEL lawfully supersedes inconsistent local provisions.
Voter claims: Even assuming Anderson v. Celebrezze and Burdick v. Takushi apply to state constitutional claims, alleged injuries such as “voter fatigue,” longer ballots, or fundraising burdens are minimal and outweighed by the State’s legitimate interests. The EYEL is neutral and imposes no restriction on access to the ballot or the franchise.
Disposition: Order of the Appellate Division affirmed; injunction vacated; no reason to delay application to the next election cycle.

Background and Legislative Design

Enacted in 2023 (L 2023, ch 741), the EYEL amends the County Law, Town Law, and Village Law to move specified county and town elections to even‑numbered years. To ensure county charters cannot override this change, it amends Municipal Home Rule Law § 34(3) to add even‑year election requirements for county elected offices to the list of subjects that county charters may not supersede. The law provides a synchronization mechanism: while 2025 elections proceed as scheduled, certain terms elected that year will expire after three years—rather than four—to align cycles with even‑year general elections (L 2023, ch 741, § 5).

The Legislature’s stated aims were to reduce voter confusion and increase participation, citing research that voter turnout is highest in even‑numbered years when state and/or federal offices are on the ballot.

The EYEL includes several tailored exemptions, such as offices whose terms or timing are constitutionally fixed; offices with three‑year terms as of January 1, 2025; towns coterminous with villages; and counties located within New York City (see footnote 1 of the opinion).

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Matter of Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist. v County of Nassau, 22 NY3d 606 (2014): Emphasized the State as the “preeminent sovereign.” Local authority is delegated and operates as an exception to otherwise plenary state power. This frames the Court’s approach: absent a constitutional restriction, the Legislature may act statewide.
Matter of Resnick v County of Ulster, 44 NY2d 279 (1978): Describes the “home rule tradition,” including the liberal construction goal of Article IX to empower local governments while acknowledging coexisting state authority.
Matter of Kelley v McGee, 57 NY2d 522 (1982): Recognizes significant local power over the nature and functions of local offices but within the bounds set by the State’s constitutional and statutory framework.
Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490 (1977): Reiterates the State’s “untrammeled primacy” to address matters of state concern—key to understanding why broadly applicable election administration measures fall within legislative competence.
Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, 74 NY2d 423 (1989): Notes the “unsettled and tortuous” path of home rule, underscoring the need to read Article IX’s grants and limits in balance rather than in isolation.
Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v City of New York, 50 NY2d 85 (1980), and Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources, 46 NY2d 358 (1978): Establish that a statute remains a “general law” even if it applies to a subset of entities, so long as it is cast in general terms and applies alike to a rationally defined class related to the statute’s subject. These cases anchor the EYEL’s classification as a general law despite exemptions.
Rozler v Franger, 61 AD2d 46 (4th Dept 1978), affd 46 NY2d 760 (1978): Confirms that exempting chartered villages does not destroy a statute’s generality when the exception rests on reasonable classification; analogously supports the EYEL’s carve‑outs.
Matter of Burr v Voorhis, 229 NY 382 (1920): Recognizes broad legislative authority to adopt “reasonable, uniform and just” election regulations consistent with the Constitution; cited to underscore that setting election timing is within legislative competence.
Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780 (1983), and Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428 (1992): Supply the balancing framework for election burdens; applied by the Court (via Matter of Walsh v Katz, 17 NY3d 336 [2011]) to reject voters’ claims challenging the EYEL’s consolidation.
Scholarly sources (Galie, Hyman, Briffault; Temporary State Commission on the Constitutional Convention) inform the Court’s tracing of New York’s home rule evolution and the intended balance between local empowerment and state primacy.

Legal Reasoning

1) Article IX § 1: Local “Bill of Rights” and Its Limits

Plaintiffs argued that counties possess a constitutional right to set election timing and terms because Article IX § 1(h)(1) authorizes counties to adopt alternative forms of government and, implementing that authority, Municipal Home Rule Law § 33(3)(b) directs county charters to specify “manner of election” and “terms of office.” The Court rejected the argument for two reasons:

The constitutional text guarantees only the right to adopt an alternative form of government, not a right to control election timing or terms. The Constitution does not enumerate those subjects as locally guaranteed rights; they remain subject to statewide legislation unless expressly protected.
Municipal Home Rule Law delegations are statutory. The MHRL implements Article IX but does not convert its grants into constitutional entitlements. The Legislature may amend the MHRL—including § 34(3)’s list of non‑supersedable subjects—without offending § 1.

The EYEL does not infringe § 1’s enumerated rights (such as having an elective legislative body and locally elected or appointed officers). It alters election timing, a topic not constitutionally insulated from statewide regulation.

2) Article IX § 2(b)(2): General vs. Special Law

Because § 2(b)(2) permits the Legislature to act in relation to “the property, affairs or government” of local governments only by general law or by special law satisfying procedural prerequisites, plaintiffs contended the EYEL fell into neither category. The Court held the EYEL is a general law under § 3(d)(1):

It is “cast in general terms,” applies statewide in terms and effect, and its carve‑outs are reasonable, tied to constitutional constraints (e.g., positions whose terms are constitutionally fixed) and administrative rationales (e.g., NYC counties).
Under Uniformed Firefighters, Hotel Dorset, and Rozler, classifications and exemptions do not defeat generality where they define a rationally related class and operate uniformly within that class.

Having found the EYEL a general law, the Court did not need to reach whether the “substantial state concern” doctrine would excuse the procedural requisites for a special law.

3) Article IX § 3(b): The Savings Clause

Plaintiffs invoked § 3(b)’s provision that Article IX “shall not affect any existing valid provisions of acts of the legislature or of local legislation,” arguing it insulated existing county charters from later statewide legislation. The Court explained the clause’s function: it preserved the validity of pre‑1963 provisions at the time Article IX was adopted, while expressly allowing them to continue “until repealed, amended, modified or superseded.” Thus, the savings clause confirms—not restricts—legislative authority to later supersede local enactments, as the EYEL does.

4) Broad Legislative Authority over Election Administration

The Court grounded its conclusion in New York’s long‑recognized legislative primacy over elections, citing Burr v Voorhis for the principle that the Legislature may adopt reasonable, uniform regulations concerning voting that harmonize with the Constitution. Mandating even‑year elections and aligning terms are such regulations.

5) Voter Claims Under Anderson/Burdick

The individual voters alleged that consolidating local races into even‑year ballots would lengthen ballots, increase lines, create “voter fatigue,” and complicate campaigning. Even assuming Anderson/Burdick applies to state constitutional claims, the Court found these allegations reflect, at most, minimal burdens imposed by a neutral timing rule. On the other side of the scale, the State’s interests in boosting turnout and reducing confusion are legitimate and substantial. On the pleadings, the EYEL survives the balancing test; these are “not traditional voter suppression claims.”

Impact

On State–Local Power and Home Rule

Clarified limits of Article IX: The decision squarely holds that Article IX does not constitutionalize a local right to dictate election timing or terms of office. The right to adopt county charters exists, but their content on these topics remains subject to general laws.
Blueprint for future statewide reforms: The EYEL’s structure—general terms, rational exceptions, and an explicit MHRL § 34(3) non‑supersession clause—offers a legislative template for reconciling statewide policy with local charters.
Reduced litigation leverage for localities: Post‑Onondaga, home rule challenges to statewide election‑administration statutes will need to focus on whether a statute fails the “general law” definition or conflicts with an express constitutional limitation—both demanding showings.

On Elections Administration and Local Governance

Statewide calendar shift: Counties and towns with odd‑year cycles must transition to even‑year elections for covered offices. Local charters inconsistent with the EYEL are superseded and should be conformed through amendment.
Term synchronization: Offices elected in 2025 that formerly would have four‑year terms may serve three years to align with the new even‑year cycle. Localities should revisit staggering plans to maintain continuity of governance under the new calendar.
Administrative planning: Boards of elections will need enhanced ballot design, voter education, staffing, and equipment capacity to manage potentially longer even‑year ballots, alongside early voting and absentee processing.
Village and NYC considerations: The EYEL’s immediate focus is county and town offices; NYC counties are exempt. Any future extension to city offices would require separate consideration under Article IX and city‑specific statutes.

On Election Law and Voter‑Rights Litigation

Neutral timing changes are low‑burden: Onondaga signals that neutral, across‑the‑board adjustments to the election calendar typically impose only minimal burdens under Anderson/Burdick, especially when coupled with turnout and clarity rationales.
“Voter fatigue” allegations are insufficient standing alone: Generalized claims about longer ballots or lines, without concrete restrictions on access to the ballot or voting mechanisms, are unlikely to sustain a constitutional challenge.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Home rule: New York’s Constitution gives local governments certain powers, but those powers are delegated. The State stays supreme unless the Constitution expressly limits it.
Article IX § 1 (Bill of Rights for Local Governments): Lists core local rights (e.g., elected legislative bodies, power to adopt local laws, authority to adopt alternative county governments). It does not list a right to set election timing or terms of office.
General law vs. special law: A general law applies alike to all members of a class statewide; reasonable classifications and exceptions are permitted. A special law targets specific localities and generally requires local consent or other constitutional procedures—unless addressing a substantial state concern. The EYEL is a general law.
Municipal Home Rule Law (MHRL): The statute that implements Article IX. It tells counties what their charters should cover (like terms and the manner of election) but is subject to change by the Legislature. MHRL § 34(3) lists subjects county charters cannot supersede by local law; the EYEL added even‑year election requirements to that list.
Article IX § 3(b) savings clause: Preserves pre‑1963 local and state provisions when Article IX was adopted, until they are later repealed, amended, modified, or superseded. It does not freeze local charters against future state legislation.
Anderson/Burdick balancing: A court weighs the severity of burdens a law imposes on voting or candidacy against the state’s interests and the fit between means and ends. Neutral, non‑exclusionary adjustments to the election calendar typically pose minimal burdens and are upheld when backed by valid state interests.

Practical Implications and Compliance Pointers

Charter conformity: Counties with charter provisions mandating odd‑year elections or incompatible terms should initiate amendments to align with the EYEL. While inconsistency is already superseded by state law, conforming text reduces confusion.
Term mapping: Audit all affected offices, identify whose terms are shortened for synchronization, and communicate changes early to incumbents and the public.
Staggering strategies: Reassess staggered terms to preserve institutional continuity under even‑year cycles; consider transitional measures authorized by general law.
Public education: Prepare voter outreach on new timing, ballot length, and early voting options to mitigate any perceived “voter fatigue.”
Future legislation watch: Monitor any further statewide election‑administration reforms employing the EYEL template (general law with rational exceptions and MHRL non‑supersession).

Conclusion

County of Onondaga v. State of New York decisively confirms that New York’s home rule provisions do not bar the Legislature from setting a statewide election calendar for county and town offices or from adjusting terms to implement that calendar. By classifying the EYEL as a valid general law—despite rational exemptions—and by rejecting an implied constitutional right to local control over election timing and terms, the Court reinforces the State’s primacy in election administration and clarifies the operative boundaries of Article IX.

The decision also provides practical guidance: neutral consolidation of elections into even‑year cycles will typically survive constitutional scrutiny, and local charters cannot supersede general statewide election mandates. Going forward, Onondaga stands as a significant precedent for statewide structural reforms that touch local governance, so long as they are framed as general laws and do not trench on rights expressly constitutionalized for local governments.

Key Citations

NY Const, art IX, §§ 1, 2(b)(2), 3(b), 3(d)(1)
Municipal Home Rule Law §§ 33(3)(b), 34(3), 50, 59
Matter of Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist. v County of Nassau, 22 NY3d 606 (2014)
Matter of Resnick v County of Ulster, 44 NY2d 279 (1978)
Matter of Kelley v McGee, 57 NY2d 522 (1982)
Wambat Realty Corp. v State of New York, 41 NY2d 490 (1977)
Kamhi v Town of Yorktown, 74 NY2d 423 (1989)
Uniformed Firefighters Assn. v City of New York, 50 NY2d 85 (1980)
Hotel Dorset Co. v Trust for Cultural Resources of City of N.Y., 46 NY2d 358 (1978)
Rozler v Franger, 61 AD2d 46 (4th Dept 1978), affd 46 NY2d 760 (1978)
Matter of Burr v Voorhis, 229 NY 382 (1920)
Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780 (1983); Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428 (1992)
Matter of Walsh v Katz, 17 NY3d 336 (2011)