No Herculean Efforts Required: Montana Supreme Court Reaffirms Fact-Dependent “Reasonable Efforts” in Interstate Child Welfare Cases

Introduction

In Matter of B.B.-R., YINC (Supreme Court of Montana, 2025 MT 229N), the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the termination of a mother’s parental rights to two children, K.B. and B.B.-R., following a multi-year child protection case marked by interstate complexities. The appeal centered on whether the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services Division (the Department) made “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family after the mother relocated to North Dakota and whether she should have been given more time to demonstrate parental fitness.

The key issues were: (1) whether the Department’s reunification efforts were reasonable—particularly in light of its failure to request an ICPC (Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children) home study when the children were placed on a trial home visit with the mother in North Dakota; and (2) whether the statutory criteria for termination under § 41‑3‑609(1)(f), MCA, were met by clear and convincing evidence, including whether the mother’s unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

Importantly, the Court issued a memorandum opinion under its Internal Operating Rules (I.O.R. § I(3)(c)), designating the decision as noncitable and nonprecedential. Even so, the opinion offers a clear, fact-bound application of established rules governing termination of parental rights, with special emphasis on reasonable efforts in an interstate context.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the District Court’s orders (Dawson County, Judge Olivia Rieger) terminating the mother’s parental rights to both children. The Court held that:

• The statutory elements for termination under § 41‑3‑609(1)(f), MCA, were satisfied by clear and convincing evidence: the children had been adjudicated Youths in Need of Care (YINC), the mother’s court-approved treatment plan was not successfully completed, and the conduct rendering her unfit was unlikely to change within a reasonable time (§ 41‑3‑609(2), MCA).
• The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding the Department made reasonable, though not flawless, efforts to reunify the family. The Department’s failure to request an ICPC home study for the North Dakota trial home placement did not, standing alone, negate reasonable efforts under the totality of circumstances.
• After more than three years of case activity, repeated extensions of Temporary Legal Custody (TLC), irregular visitation by the mother despite extensive Department assistance (including gas vouchers, hotel rooms, and arranging transportation), and inconsistent engagement in mental health services, the District Court’s finding that the mother’s unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time was supported by the record.

The opinion emphasizes that the reasonable efforts inquiry is “highly fact dependent” and that the Department must provide reasonable—not “herculean”—efforts, particularly where parental apathy or disengagement undermines reunification.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• In re B.J.B., 2025 MT 116, ¶ 5: Reinforces the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing termination decisions. The Court’s deference to the trial court’s “conscientious judgment” and longitudinal familiarity with the case was central here.
• In re X.M., 2018 MT 264, ¶ 17 (citing In re K.A., 2016 MT 27, ¶ 19): Defines abuse of discretion as action that is arbitrary, without conscientious judgment, or beyond the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. This framed the high level of deference to the District Court’s management of a prolonged case with evolving facts.
• In re M.V.R., 2016 MT 309, ¶ 23: Clarifies the standard of review bifurcation: findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law for correctness. This guided the Court’s careful separation of what it could reweigh versus what it must accept absent clear error.
• In re R.L., 2019 MT 267, ¶¶ 18, 20, 22: The doctrinal cornerstone for “reasonable efforts.” It establishes that:
  • Reasonable efforts are not a separate statutory element for termination but can be a predicate to the “unlikely to change” determination;
  • The analysis is highly fact dependent and based on the totality of circumstances;
  • The Department must make reasonable—not herculean—efforts; and
  • Parental apathy or disregard for the Department’s engagement matters.
  In this case, those principles directly supported the conclusion that, despite an ICPC oversight, the Department’s extensive supports for services and visitation met the reasonable efforts bar.
• In re A.M.G., 2022 MT 175, ¶ 28: Confirms a parent’s duty to engage with the Department to complete the treatment plan. The mother’s sporadic participation, minimal visitation after the children returned to Montana, and disengagement from mental health treatment aligned with this line of cases, weighting the analysis against extending the case further.

Legal Reasoning

The Court applied the three-part statutory test under § 41‑3‑609(1)(f), MCA, each element requiring clear and convincing evidence:

1. YINC adjudication: The children were adjudicated YINC by stipulation and court order in June 2021. This element was undisputed.
2. Treatment plan noncompliance/unsuccessfulness: The mother’s plan required visitation, mental health services, parenting education, stable housing and legal income, and contact with the Department. While she initially engaged and even obtained a trial home placement in North Dakota, the Department (and ultimately the District Court) found that her work on the plan was inconsistent and largely unsuccessful, especially after the children returned to Montana. Over the ensuing year, she visited only five times, despite the Department’s repeated offers of logistical and financial support to facilitate visitation and services.
3. Unfitness unlikely to change within a reasonable time (§ 41‑3‑609(2), MCA): The District Court made detailed findings about the mother’s inability to consistently participate in mental health therapy, irregular visitations despite significant Department assistance, lack of insight into the children’s needs, and her disengagement when overwhelmed. For K.B., the court found the mother was inconsistent with appointments and therapy the child “desperately needs.” The Supreme Court concluded these findings supported the statutory determination that the mother’s unfitness was unlikely to change within a reasonable time, particularly in a case that had extended beyond three years with multiple TLC extensions and failed trial placement.

On reasonable efforts, the Court carefully weighed the Department’s actions:

• Although the Department did not request an ICPC home study before the trial home placement in North Dakota, the Court held that omission did not, by itself, negate reasonable efforts.
• When North Dakota providers could not bill their state Medicaid, the Department offered to pay for services to remove financial barriers.
• After the children returned to Montana, the Department offered extensive practical assistance: gas vouchers, hotel rooms, arranging rides, coordinating a loaner vehicle, and “literally begged” the mother to visit.
• In assessing the “totality of the circumstances,” the mother’s persistent disengagement and apathy outweighed the Department’s administrative shortcoming on ICPC.

The Court reiterated that reasonable efforts are contextual, not absolute; agencies need not perform “herculean” feats. The District Court’s long-running familiarity with the case, the evidence of the children’s mounting needs (including B.B.-R.’s placement in a therapeutic group home), and the chronic pattern of parental disengagement all supported termination without further delay.

Impact and Practical Significance

While nonprecedential and noncitable under I.O.R. § I(3)(c), the decision offers clear guidance on several recurring issues in child welfare litigation:

• Reasonable efforts remain fact-intensive and holistic: A single procedural lapse (e.g., missing an ICPC home study) does not necessarily defeat the Department’s efforts. Courts will look to the aggregate quality and quantity of assistance and whether parents meaningfully engage.
• Interstate placements require documentation and creativity: When parents move out of state, Medicaid billing and service access complications are predictable. The Department’s willingness to pay providers directly, fund travel, and arrange transportation strongly supported the “reasonable efforts” finding.
• Visitation and engagement are outcome determinative: After the children’s return to Montana, the mother’s very limited visitation—even with logistical barriers removed—became a key fact demonstrating unfitness unlikely to change within a reasonable time.
• Permanency timelines matter: After more than three years and multiple TLC extensions, “more time” is difficult to justify absent demonstrable, sustained parental progress. Delaying permanency risks further harm to children with high therapeutic needs.
• For practitioners:
  • Agencies should proactively initiate ICPC processes, anticipate cross-state service barriers, and heavily document all offered supports.
  • Parents and counsel should press for ICPC compliance, memorialize service requests, and maintain consistent visitation; agency omissions will rarely overcome a record of ongoing disengagement.
  • Courts will continue to apply a deferential standard to trial courts that carefully build records over time, especially when children’s therapeutic needs and permanency considerations are well documented.

Bottom line: The opinion underscores that the Department’s reasonable efforts need not be perfect to be sufficient, particularly when parents fail to capitalize on those efforts.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• YINC (Youth in Need of Care): A legal status indicating the child requires court-ordered protection or services due to abuse, neglect, or lack of proper parental care.
• EPS/TIA/TLC: Emergency Protective Services, Temporary Investigative Authority, and Temporary Legal Custody are sequential tools allowing the Department to protect children while assessing the situation and implementing services. TLC extensions enable time to work treatment plans.
• Treatment Plan: A court-approved roadmap for parental remediation—e.g., therapy, parenting classes, stable housing and income, and regular visitation. Successful completion is a statutory cornerstone to reunification.
• Reasonable Efforts: The Department’s obligation to actively assist parents toward reunification. Efforts must be practical and meaningful, but the agency need not eliminate every hurdle or undertake extraordinary measures.
• ICPC (Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children): An interstate framework requiring approvals and home studies for out-of-state placements of children. While compliance is important, this case confirms that an ICPC lapse does not automatically negate reasonable efforts if the total record otherwise shows robust assistance.
• Clear and Convincing Evidence: A heightened burden of proof requiring the evidence to produce a firm belief or conviction in the truth of the allegations, though not as demanding as beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Abuse of Discretion: A deferential appellate standard; reversal occurs only if the trial court acted arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or outside the bounds of reason causing substantial injustice.
• “Unlikely to Change Within a Reasonable Time” (§ 41‑3‑609(2), MCA): The court evaluates whether the parent’s condition or conduct (e.g., mental health issues, substance abuse, history of violence, incarceration) will change soon enough to meet the child’s needs. The focus is child-centered and forward-looking.

Conclusion

The Montana Supreme Court’s memorandum opinion in Matter of B.B.-R. reinforces settled principles governing termination of parental rights. Applying a deferential standard of review and a fact-intensive assessment of “reasonable efforts,” the Court held that the Department’s assistance—despite an ICPC oversight—satisfied its obligations where the mother remained largely disengaged, inconsistently participated in services, and failed to visit regularly after substantial barriers were removed.

The decision underscores three enduring themes: (1) reasonable efforts are contextual and do not require perfection; (2) parental engagement is indispensable and must be sustained; and (3) when a case has stretched for years with limited parental progress, the law’s commitment to permanence and stability for children will prevail. Although nonprecedential and noncitable, this opinion offers a practical roadmap for courts, agencies, and parents navigating interstate complications in child welfare cases.

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Precedential status: Memorandum opinion under I.O.R. § I(3)(c); noncitable and not precedent. The case will be listed among noncitable cases in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.