No Harm, No Constitutional Foul: Jordan v. Chiaroo and the Second Circuit’s Re-affirmation of the “Actual Injury” Requirement

1. Introduction

Jordan v. Chiaroo, No. 24-2397 (2d Cir. June 20, 2025), is a summary order in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District of Connecticut’s sua sponte dismissal of a pro se prisoner’s amended complaint. The plaintiff, Victor L. Jordan, Sr., alleged that several Connecticut Department of Correction officials—identified variously as Chiaroo, Mail Super “Mary,” Anthony Sariani, Counselor “King,” officer Edge, an unnamed property officer, and others—violated his constitutional rights when, inter alia, they:

Lost boxes of legal materials and personal property;
Refused to electronically file (“e-file”) court documents on his behalf;
Delayed his receipt of CM/ECF notices of electronic filing (“NEFs”);
Opened legal mail outside his presence on one occasion; and
Filed a false disciplinary report and placed him in solitary confinement allegedly in retaliation for litigation he had instituted.

Distilling the pleadings to their strongest possible construction (as required with pro se litigants), the district court treated the complaint as asserting causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for:

Denial of access to the courts (First and Fourteenth Amendments);
Interference with legal mail (First Amendment);
Deprivation of property without due process (Fourteenth Amendment); and
Retaliation for protected conduct (First Amendment).

On appeal, Jordan challenged only the denials of access, mail interference, and property-deprivation determinations. The Second Circuit, in a non-precedential summary order, affirmed, holding that Jordan failed to plead the essential element of actual injury for access-to-courts claims, alleged only an isolated instance of mail tampering (insufficient on its own), and had meaningful state post-deprivation remedies available for his property loss.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Reviewing de novo under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A (governing screening of prisoner complaints for frivolousness or failure to state a claim), the Second Circuit concluded:

Access to Courts: Allegations that officials refused to e-file documents or delayed NEFs did not describe “actual injury”—i.e., a concrete hindrance to a specifically identified, non-frivolous legal claim. Consequently, no constitutional violation was stated.
Legal Mail Interference: An isolated incident of opening legal mail outside the inmate’s presence, without more, falls short of establishing a First Amendment violation absent a pattern of interference or resulting harm.
Property Deprivation: Connecticut provides adequate post-deprivation remedies for lost property (grievance procedures, state claims commission). Because those remedies were not shown to be inadequate, the Fourteenth Amendment claim failed under Hudson v. Palmer.
Retaliation: Any potential retaliation claim was deemed forfeited because the appellant did not brief it on appeal.

“Because Jordan did not allege actual injury caused by King’s refusal to e-file his documents, he failed sufficiently to allege a denial-of-access claim.” – Jordan v. Chiaroo, slip op. at 4.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel leaned on a constellation of long-standing Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedents:

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)
– Established that prisoners must show actual injury to a non-frivolous legal claim to succeed on access-to-courts allegations.
Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403 (2002)
– Clarified pleading requirements: the lost or frustrated underlying cause of action must be described in the complaint.
Monsky v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1997)
– Applied Lewis within the Circuit, reiterating the injury-in-fact prerequisite.
Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346 (2d Cir. 2003)
– Held that a single incident of mail tampering generally does not rise to a constitutional violation absent evidence of an ongoing pattern.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984)
– Declared that an unauthorized property deprivation is not unconstitutional if the state offers meaningful post-deprivation remedies.
Riddick v. Semple, 731 F. App’x 11 (2d Cir. 2018)
– Confirmed Connecticut’s administrative remedies are ordinarily adequate for property-loss claims.
McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004)
Sharikov v. Philips Medical Sys. MR, Inc., 103 F.4th 159 (2d Cir. 2024)
– Emphasized the obligation to construe pro se pleadings generously while applying Rule 12(b)(6) standards.
Moates v. Barkley, 147 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1998)
– Stands for the proposition that issues not raised in the appellate brief are deemed waived.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

“Actual Injury” Is Non-Negotiable.
Relying heavily on Lewis and Harbury, the panel stressed that factual specificity linking the alleged obstruction (refusal to e-file, delayed NEFs) to a lost or frustrated legal claim is indispensable. Jordan failed to identify:
- Which court filings were blocked;
- The substance of the underlying claims affected; and
- A causal nexus between the officials’ conduct and an adverse judicial outcome.
Even statements in his appellate brief referencing “two habeas matters” lacked the requisite details and therefore could not cure the pleading deficiency.
One-Off Mail Opening ≠ Constitutional Violation.
The court reaffirmed Davis v. Goord, noting that sporadic mail mishaps, though regrettable, do not by themselves demonstrate a pervasive practice or an unconstitutional policy intended to chill protected communications.
Property Loss Must Be Redressed in State Forums First.
Applying Hudson, the panel found Connecticut’s administrative grievance procedures and state claims commission provide adequate post-deprivation relief. Because Jordan neither utilized those remedies nor alleged their inadequacy, his due process claim failed as a matter of law.
Issue Preservation Matters.
Any potential First Amendment retaliation theory—arguably the strongest claim—was abandoned on appeal, triggering Moates’ forfeiture rule. The panel therefore refused to consider it sua sponte.

3.3 Potential Impact

Although styled a summary order without precedential effect under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, Jordan v. Chiaroo nonetheless offers a salient reminder for litigants and lower courts:

Prisoner civil-rights complaints must concretely plead “actual injury” or risk early dismissal.
Isolated incidents of legal mail interference, absent a showing of pattern or harm, are unlikely to survive screening.
Where state law supplies meaningful post-deprivation procedures, federal courts will abstain from converting ordinary property-loss grievances into constitutional suits.

Practically, the decision signals to pro se prisoners that narrative detail and causal specificity are as critical as legal citations. Further, corrections administrators may view the order as tacit judicial validation of Connecticut’s lost-property remedial scheme, while civil-rights attorneys may perceive an elevated pleading bar for access-to-courts theories premised on electronic-filing logistics or CM/ECF notice delays.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Actual Injury: In prisoner access-to-courts cases, it means a real, concrete setback in a lawsuit (e.g., missed deadline causing dismissal, inability to file an appeal) traceable to prison officials’ interference.
Summary Order: A non-precedential decision resolving an appeal without a full published opinion; binds the parties but (unless specifically adopted later) does not create binding Circuit law.
Post-Deprivation Remedy: A procedure (grievance system, state tort action) provided by the state to compensate for losses after they occur. If adequate, it satisfies due-process requirements even when the state acted wrongly.
NEF (Notice of Electronic Filing): Automatic email or paper notice generated by the federal courts’ CM/ECF system informing parties that a document has been filed.
Pro Se Pleading Rule: Courts must liberally construe filings from self-represented litigants, but this leniency does not excuse the omission of essential factual allegations.

5. Conclusion

Jordan v. Chiaroo reiterates a cornerstone doctrine: constitutional claims grounded in access to the courts require proof of tangible harm. Mere inconvenience, delay, or one-off mistakes—without demonstrable prejudice to an identifiable legal action—do not suffice. Additionally, the Second Circuit maintained its long-standing position that isolated mail interference is non-actionable and that state post-deprivation remedies foreclose due-process property claims in federal court.

The ruling thus serves as both a cautionary tale for incarcerated litigants and a doctrinal touchstone for practitioners: no harm, no constitutional foul. Absent concrete injury or systemic misconduct, even troubling prison missteps remain outside the ambit of § 1983.