No FMLA Interference Without Prejudice; 'But-For' Causation for FMLA Retaliation; Remote Prior Affiliation Insufficient for Recusal

Introduction

In Iris N. Wilson v. CSX Transportation, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit (unpublished, per curiam) affirmed summary judgment against a long-serving CSX employee who alleged (1) FMLA interference, (2) FMLA retaliation, and (3) race discrimination under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA). The appeal also raised recusal challenges to the magistrate judge and the initially assigned district judge.

Wilson, promoted in 2018 to a “very critical” crew operations supervisor role that required 24/7 coverage, experienced three medical-related absences across 2018–2019. CSX retroactively designated portions of these absences as FMLA leave without timely notice, and when Wilson did not return by a communicated target date and had no fixed return timetable, CSX filled her position and placed her in a union role upon her eventual return. Wilson argued that CSX’s approach interfered with her FMLA rights, retaliated against her for taking leave, and reflected racial bias; she further argued that the magistrate judge should have recused due to a decades-old relationship with CSX and that the district judge should have recused earlier due to CSX stock ownership.

The key issues on appeal were:

Whether a retroactive FMLA designation made without timely notice constitutes actionable interference absent prejudice.
Whether CSX’s “mission critical” staffing rationale and the indefinite nature of Wilson’s post-FMLA absence were pretext for FMLA retaliation or race discrimination.
Whether recusal was required under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455 based on a remote, prior affiliation and late-discovered stock ownership.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to CSX on all claims and rejected the recusal challenges:

FMLA Interference: Although CSX committed a technical violation by retroactively designating leave without timely notice, Wilson received the full 12 weeks of FMLA leave (indeed, she took 23.4 weeks of leave in the relevant 12-month period when non-FMLA leave is included) and failed to show prejudice from the notice defect. Without harm, an interference claim fails.
FMLA Retaliation: Even assuming a prima facie case, CSX offered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons—Wilson’s “mission critical” position, the heavy operational strain created by extended absence, the exhaustion of FMLA leave, her failure to return by October 1, and no expected return date—and Wilson did not show pretext under the but-for standard.
Race Discrimination (Title VII/FCRA): Wilson failed to identify valid comparators “similarly situated in all material respects.” Even assuming a prima facie case, she did not show CSX’s stated reasons were pretext for discrimination, nor did she provide a “convincing mosaic” of discriminatory intent.
Recusal: No plain error in the magistrate judge’s failure to sua sponte recuse; the relationship with CSX ended decades ago and the magistrate ruled only on non-dispositive matters. No abuse in the initial district judge’s later recusal; he recused after non-dispositive orders and before merits disposition, with no miscarriage of justice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Pizarro v. Home Depot, Inc., 111 F.4th 1165 (11th Cir. 2024): Reiterated de novo review of summary judgment and the requirement to draw inferences in favor of the non-movant. Guided the appellate review posture.
Ramji v. Hospital Housekeeping Sys., LLC, 992 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2021): Critical to the interference claim. Establishes that “technical” FMLA violations (e.g., untimely designation) are non-actionable absent employee prejudice remediable by damages or equitable relief.
29 C.F.R. § 825.301(d): Authorizes retroactive FMLA designation if the employer provides notice and the delay does not harm the employee. Used to contextualize CSX’s retro designation and the prejudice analysis.
Lapham v. Walgreen Co., 88 F.4th 879 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, No. 23-1283 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2024): Sets the but-for causation standard for FMLA retaliation and confirms use of McDonnell Douglas when evidence is circumstantial.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Provides the burden-shifting framework for retaliation and discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence.
Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care of Delaware, LLC, 854 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2017): Clarifies that FMLA retaliation requires intentional discrimination tied to protected activity.
Harris v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, 82 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2023): Confirms that Title VII and FCRA race discrimination claims share the same analytical framework.
Chapter 7 Tr. v. Gate Gourmet, Inc., 683 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012): Restates the McDonnell Douglas framework for Title VII claims.
Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc): Sets the “similarly situated in all material respects” comparator standard, central to rejecting Wilson’s comparators.
Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011); Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019); Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023): Explain the “convincing mosaic” concept and emphasize that a plaintiff may defeat summary judgment through a cumulative evidentiary showing even outside McDonnell Douglas.
St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993): Clarifies that proving pretext requires showing the employer’s reason is false and that discrimination is the real reason.
Jackson v. State of Ala. State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2005): Describes the kind of implausibilities and inconsistencies that can establish pretext.
Tanner v. Stryker Corp. of Michigan, 104 F.4th 1278 (11th Cir. 2024): Temporal proximity alone is insufficient to establish pretext; it must be coupled with other evidence.
Recusal: 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455; United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ramos, 933 F.2d 968 (11th Cir. 1991); Jenkins v. Anton, 922 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2019): Provide the standards and appellate review rules. Jenkins, in particular, supports the conclusion that decades-old representation is too remote to cast reasonable doubt on impartiality.

Legal Reasoning

1) FMLA Interference

Entitlement and Use: The FMLA grants up to 12 weeks of leave in a 12-month period for a serious health condition and a right to restoration to the same or equivalent position upon return. Wilson’s leave usage, after CSX’s retroactive designation, totaled 12 weeks of FMLA leave (3.4 + 5 + 3.6) plus additional non-FMLA leave to reach 23.4 weeks off in the year.
Retroactive Designation and Notice: CSX retroactively designated past absences as FMLA without timely notice—concededly a “technical violation.” However, under Ramji and § 825.301(d), such a violation does not constitute actionable interference absent prejudice.
No Prejudice Shown: Wilson argued she could not calculate remaining leave and believed she had additional FMLA time when she returned. The court emphasized that prejudice requires showing harm remediable by damages or equitable relief—for example, that timely notice would have changed medical decisions or return timing. Here, Wilson undisputedly could not return to work until November 19, 2019, well after 12 FMLA weeks had been used. Without harm, her interference claim fails.

2) FMLA Retaliation

Framework and Causation: Applying McDonnell Douglas to circumstantial evidence and Lapham’s but-for causation standard, the district court assumed a prima facie case.
Legitimate Reasons: CSX offered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons: the crew operations supervisor position is “mission critical,” requires continuous coverage, and Wilson’s extended absence imposed significant strain. After Wilson exhausted FMLA and failed to return on October 1 without a return date, CSX filled the position.
No Pretext: Wilson’s principal evidence (emails noting “impactful” absences and “major disruption”) was consistent with operational strain and not probative of retaliatory animus. She furnished no evidence that, but for her FMLA use, CSX would have acted differently. With no showing of falsity or discriminatory motive, pretext was not established.

3) Race Discrimination (Title VII/FCRA)

Prima Facie and Comparators: The comparator standard requires “similarly situated in all material respects.” Christman, the replacement, was available to start on November 9; CSX had posted the position after Wilson missed her October 1 return and had no reinstatement right because she had exhausted FMLA time. He was thus not similarly situated at the relevant time. Strachan held a different role, took only intermittent leave, and had remote-work flexibilities unavailable to Wilson’s role; Wilson never requested remote work.
No Pretext and No Mosaic: Even assuming a prima facie case, Wilson did not demonstrate that CSX’s reasons were a pretext for race discrimination. The record lacked race-based remarks or other circumstantial indicia suggesting discriminatory intent. The court found no “convincing mosaic” from which a jury could infer discrimination.

4) Recusal

Standards: Under § 455(a), recusal is required when impartiality might reasonably be questioned by a fully informed, objective observer. Under § 455(b), specified conflicts (including personal bias) mandate recusal. Bias generally must stem from extrajudicial sources. Appellate review is for abuse of discretion; where the party did not timely move below, plain error applies.
Application: Wilson moved for the magistrate judge’s recusal only after judgment. The magistrate’s decades-old relationship with CSX and rulings limited to non-dispositive orders were not grounds for sua sponte recusal. For Judge Adams, who later recused after non-dispositive orders upon realizing CSX stock ownership, the court found no miscarriage of justice because the merits ruling came from a different judge.

Impact

FMLA Administration: The decision underscores that employers may retroactively designate FMLA leave provided no employee harm results. But “technical violations” can still carry risk: employers should give timely written notices and maintain accurate, contemporaneous leave accounting to avoid prejudice disputes.
Operational Necessity as a Legitimate Reason: Documented operational strain—especially for roles requiring constant coverage—can be a robust non-retaliatory, non-discriminatory reason for staffing decisions once FMLA is exhausted and return is indefinite.
Retaliation Causation Standard: The court applies Lapham’s but-for causation to FMLA retaliation, raising the plaintiff’s burden: temporal proximity or “frustrated” internal emails alone will rarely suffice without evidence of causal determinism.
Comparator Rigor: Lewis’s “material respects” standard remains exacting. Differences in availability, job structure (remote-eligible v. not), and leave pattern (intermittent v. extended) can defeat comparators and thereby prima facie showings.
“Convincing Mosaic” Expectations: The opinion reinforces that an absence of overt bias can still leave room for a mosaic, but plaintiffs must marshal concrete circumstantial evidence—ambiguous statements, suspicious timing with other indicia, or systematic disparate treatment. Here, the record lacked such features.
Recusal Guidance: Historic, attenuated relationships and pre-merits non-dispositive orders usually will not impugn impartiality, particularly absent an extrajudicial source of bias or concrete prejudice. Parties should raise recusal issues promptly.
Persuasive, Not Binding: As an unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, the ruling is not precedential but may be cited as persuasive authority. It nevertheless aligns with, and reinforces, existing circuit doctrine.

Complex Concepts Simplified

FMLA Interference: An employer violates the FMLA by denying a statutory benefit (like 12 weeks of leave or reinstatement). But to win, the employee must also show actual harm—e.g., that a notice failure caused lost wages or foreclosed a treatment/return option.
Retroactive FMLA Designation: Employers can later label past leave “FMLA” if they notify the employee and the delay caused no harm. It prevents double-counting leave. If the employee can show the late label materially harmed them, they may have a claim.
FMLA Retaliation and But-For Causation: Retaliation requires proof that the adverse action would not have happened “but for” the employee’s FMLA use. This is a demanding standard: it’s not enough that leave and the action were close in time; the leave must be the determining reason.
McDonnell Douglas Burden-Shifting: A three-step method for circumstantial evidence cases:
1. Plaintiff shows a prima facie case (protected activity/adverse action/causation for retaliation; protected class/adverse action/qualification/comparator for discrimination).
2. Employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory/non-retaliatory reason.
3. Plaintiff proves that reason is pretext (false) and that unlawful motive was the real reason.
“Similarly Situated in All Material Respects” (Comparators): A comparator must match the plaintiff in key ways—similar conduct, same policies/supervision, comparable history—so differences do not explain different outcomes.
“Convincing Mosaic”: A cumulative set of circumstantial clues—timing, comments, patterns—that together allow a jury to infer discrimination, even if no single piece is conclusive.
Non-Dispositive Orders: Procedural rulings (e.g., scheduling, discovery, or deciding whether to hold oral argument) that do not decide the merits. Their issuance by a judge later recused carries a lower risk of prejudicing the ultimate outcome, especially when a different judge decides the merits.
Recusal Basics: Judges must step aside if their impartiality might reasonably be questioned or if specific conflicts exist. But bias must typically arise from sources outside the courtroom, and remote, historical associations generally do not mandate recusal.

Key Facts and Procedural Timeline

1999–2018: Wilson employed by CSX; promoted in May 2018 to crew operations supervisor (continuous coverage role).
Dec. 20, 2018–Jan. 12, 2019: Gallbladder surgery (~3.4 weeks).
May–June 2019: Anxiety-related leave (~5 weeks).
Aug. 5, 2019: Car accident; projected return Oct. 1, 2019; actual return Nov. 19, 2019.
Mid-2019 emails: Managers and HR discuss impact, FMLA designation, and operational strain; suggestion to require FMLA to “run out” entitlement and enable backfill.
Aug. 12, 2019: Benefits manager initially indicates 8.6 weeks FMLA available; CSX later retroactively designates prior absences as FMLA, without timely notice.
Oct. 1–2, 2019: Wilson does not return; CSX informs her the position will be filled; first notice to Wilson of FMLA designation/exhaustion.
Nov. 5/9, 2019: CSX hires Christman (white male) for the supervisor role; starts Nov. 9.
Nov. 19, 2019: Wilson returns to CSX in a union position.
District court: Grants summary judgment to CSX on interference, retaliation, and discrimination; later recusal of original district judge (stock ownership) came before merits decision; magistrate judge had only issued non-dispositive orders.
Eleventh Circuit: Affirms across the board; rejects recusal arguments.

Conclusion

This unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision solidifies several practical and doctrinal points in employment litigation within the circuit:

FMLA interference requires prejudice: A missed notice or retroactive designation, standing alone, is not actionable without a concrete showing of harm. Employers should still provide timely, accurate notices and designations to avoid prejudice disputes.
FMLA retaliation applies a but-for standard: Operational needs—especially for roles demanding continuous coverage—can be compelling legitimate reasons for staffing decisions after FMLA exhaustion and where return is indefinite. Plaintiffs must marshal evidence that protected leave was the determining cause of the adverse action.
Comparator rigor under Lewis remains exacting: Differences in role, availability, remote-eligibility, and leave patterns can defeat attempts to show disparate treatment. Absent concrete comparator proof or a robust circumstantial “mosaic,” Title VII/FCRA claims falter at summary judgment.
Recusal challenges require timely, substantive grounds: Remote, decades-old relationships and pre-merits, non-dispositive rulings rarely suffice to impugn impartiality; timely motions and specific, extrajudicial-bias evidence are essential.

While non-precedential, the opinion closely tracks existing Eleventh Circuit law and offers a practical roadmap for employers managing extended absences in mission-critical roles, and for employees framing viable FMLA and discrimination claims. The case underscores: document operational impacts, communicate FMLA status clearly and timely, and, for plaintiffs, develop comparator and causation evidence that can meet the demanding pretext and but-for standards.